- Resource System
- Coastal marine ecosystem
- Resource Units
- Myok (seeweed), coastal marine fish stocks
- Location
- South Korea
This case is an update on a prior case study about the Kagodo myok (seaweed) grounds (Case No. 86) analyzing Sang-Bok Han’s 1972 Ph.D. dissertation on field work conducted in three South Korean fishing communities from 1968 to 1972.
For purposes of this report, the SES study boundaries were expanded to include the entire South Korean coastal area and the fishery resources surrounding the peninsula extending 200 nautical miles to the east, south, and west.
Update prepared by Ute Brady, reachable at zapodidae@cox.net
Case Summary: As a result of various international agreements entered into by the South Korean government since the 1990s, the institutional framework within which fisheries management was embedded for the past fifty years has expanded to include not only the fishing village cooperative structure observed by Han (which underwent fundamental restructuring over the years), but also various other voluntary input (Self-Management System (SMS) and Fish Stock Rebuilding Plan (FSRP)) and one output control strategy (Total Allowable Catch (TAC)). Although fishery household incomes have vastly improved, it is uncertain whether these management strategies, individually or combined, will lead to the recovery of the marine ecosystem and a more robust SES due to the following:
- Ineffective monitoring, sanctioning, and lack of legal enforcement mechanisms prevail in all currently implemented fisheries management systems.
- The seemingly haphazard implementation of the various input and output control measures, which all operate simultaneously without any interconnectivity, makes it difficult to assess the overall impact of the individual policies on each other and the SES as a whole.
- All management techniques appear to place an emphasis on the management of economically viable marine species with little apparent input from independent sources, such as marine conservation groups, marine biologists, etc., to evaluate the impact of fisheries on the overall marine ecosystem.
- According to FAO reports South Korea does not keep records of its fisheries’ bycatch making an accurate assessment of fishery impacts on the entire marine ecosystem even more difficult.
- The use of maximum sustainable yield harvesting numbers (TAC and FSRP) fosters the continued overexploitation of commercially viable species.
- Financial and administrative support provided only to select “model” villages in the SMS leads to an inequitable distribution of funding and unfair advantages to the model communities, resulting in resentment and lack of incentive to participate in villages not so chosen.
- While the responsiveness and adaptiveness that is derived from the strong bottom-up/top-down influence exerted in the SMS model communities has led to some successes, it is unclear whether the government intends to expand this model to all fishing communities and/or whether the government intends to continue this particular governance method long-term.
The resource appropriated from Kagodo myok grounds is myok. This resource consists of Myok grounds surrounding the island - see location form map. The boundaries are institutionally defined, with each village owning its own grounds.
SCREENER:
Case: Kagodo myok grounds, Korea
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe two resources in detail. The primary resource is the Kagodo myok grounds, situated in Kagodo myok grounds of Korea. More generally, it is located in Orient. The system's sector is that of other. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Kagodo myok grounds. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Kagodo myok grounds have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
The Kagodo myok grounds covers an unknown area. There are 25-50 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are sometimes formally organized.
Han discusses three fishing villages and the differences among them in the organization of fishing. Kogodo is a very isolated island fishing community. During the spring, seaweed is harvested. The people collectively own the seaweed grounds and one member from each household can access the grounds. There is also a summer anchovy fishery, and a fall mixed fishery. No cooperative exists and the village communal organization organizes the fisheries. Hamguri is not as isolated as Kagodo. During the spring, villagers also collect seaweed from communal grounds. In addition, it has a spring fishery of shrimp and a fall fishery of shellfish. The fishermen are organized into a very strong cooperative, which has engaged in improving the fishery and has instituted money-making projects for the fishers. Sokpyong is located in an urban area and its fishing processes are diverse. The fishers fish for shellfish, octopus, anchovy, and squid. They own very advanced equipment like diving machines which permit easier harvesting of shellfish and seaweed. They too have a strong co-op that funds innovative techniques.
CITATION(S):
Han, San-Bok (1972) "Socioeconomic Organization and Change in Korean Fishing Villages: A Comparative Study of Three Fishing Communities." Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University.
The resource appropriated from Kagodo myok grounds is myok. It is produced biologically and is a renewable stationary unit. This resource consists of Myok grounds surrounding the island - see location form map. The boundaries are institutionally defined, with each village owning its own grounds.
The boundary of this resource has institutional arrangements. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, but are divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (inferred). The study did not indicate whether the quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others . The case information did not indicate whether or not a variance in quality between zones has ever created conflict among appropriators.
There are natural barriers within the resource, and they coincide with microzones (inferred). There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Myok can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of Myok within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of Myok within a single year (inferred). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of Myok from year to year (inferred).
The bottom topography of Kagodo myok grounds is primarily rock (educated guess).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated on an island off the southwest coast of Korea in the East China Sea and in the coastal waters surrounding the island. The boundaries of the location are defined naturally and institutionally. The boundaries of the island are natural. However, the boundaries of the grounds are rule and technologically defined. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of Myok (seaweed), and Anchovy (coding), as well as bass and snapper. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is not frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). Additionally, the most common mode of transportation in this region is cargo ship. This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is . The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
The resource appropriated from Kagodo myok grounds is myok. This resource consists of Myok grounds surrounding the island - see location form map. The boundaries are institutionally defined, with each village owning its own grounds.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation alone. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not exercising nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are not exercising, or attempting to exercise closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 101 to 200 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in external markets, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (inferred). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (inferred). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were not exercising, nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were not exercising, nor attempting to exercise, closed access to this resource (confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while delivering harvest to a central location (highly confident). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There was no information provided to indicate whether or not there are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource. There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (ambiguous). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (ambiguous). The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. The study did not indicate whether or not there are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource. The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (inferred). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (confident). There appears to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (inferred).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related to other local resources, as well as evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (confident).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 51-100, at the end of the period (inferred). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (inferred).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 67.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -2
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are Kagoda men and women who collect myok. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 288 (inferred). Less than 10% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (inferred).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Korean.
The appropriation process is organized as team process consisting of 31-45 teams.. The head of an appropriation team is based on exchange relationships (educated guess).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 201 through 300 years (ambiguous). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered very low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (inferred), time limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), and marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (confident).
The resource appropriated from Kagodo myok grounds is myok. This resource consists of Myok grounds surrounding the island - see location form map. The boundaries are institutionally defined, with each village owning its own grounds.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a major subdivision of a country. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights are transmitted for an entire household or production unit (such as a boat) from one generation to another.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be transferred to members of a family but not outside the family.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
There is a single arrangement by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
The harvest by each tom (residential unit) is divided into equal size shares - the owners of the boats receive 3 shares each, one for the boat, one for his work, and one for providing meals for their crews; the crews receive one share.
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
Korean Fisheries (approx. 1945 to early 1970s)
Resource System
Fishery: specifically economically significant species, such as mackerel, sardine, anchovy, Alaskan pollock, hairtail, seabream, drums, croakers, pilcher, shell fish, and cephalopods.
Resource Users
Fishermen who are also members of their respective fishing village cooperative
Public Infrastructure Providers
National cooperative
Regional cooperatives (66)
Fishing village cooperatives (1,722)
Public Infrastructure
1953 Fisheries Law and the 1962 Fisheries Cooperative Law which established the top-down/bottom-up fisheries management consisting of the three layers of cooperatives (national, regional, and local).
Relationship 1
Economic profit-seeking and competition due to market demands is leading to overharvesting of commercially valuable marine species.
Relationship 2
National fisheries cooperative - servicing credit and financing through cooperative banking; distributes subsidies and enacts cooperative legislation.
Regional cooperatives - responsible for selling fishermen's products, training fishermen, giving loans to local cooperatives, and managing fishing rights.
Fishing village cooperatives - responsible for management of the commonly-held local fishing ground; extending loans to members; supplying necessary goods; and providing common services, including welfare, education, storage, processing, and sales of fishery products.
Relationship 3
Fisheries Law grants rights of access to the common pool marine resources by extending various types of fishing rights to fishing cooperatives, such as:
Fixed net license
Common fishing ground
Relationship 4
No discernible investment in the resource.
Relationship 5
Fisheries cooperative law does not appear to specify any monitoring or legal deterrence mechanisms to prevent overharvesting of marine resources by fishermen.
Relationship 6
No direct effect of fishery laws on fishermen.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Increase in exploitation of commercially valuable marine species
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
None.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Technological advances in fishing equipment
Outside market demand for fishery products
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Outside market demand for fishery products
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Korean Fisheries (approx. mid 1970s to late 1980s)
Resource System
Fishery: specifically economically significant species, such as mackerel, sardine, anchovy, Alaskan pollock, hairtail, seabream, drums, croakers, pilcher, shell fish, and cephalopods.
Resource Users
Fishermen who are also members of fishing village cooperatives.
Non-members/outsiders who are illegally leasing access to the communal fishing grounds from fishing cooperatives.
Public Infrastructure Providers
Government cooperative
Regional cooperatives (66)
Fishing village cooperatives (1722)
Public Infrastructure
Numerous revisions to the 1962 Fisheries Cooperative Law in the 1970s and 1980s greatly diminished the role of the regional cooperatives and increased the autonomy of the village cooperatives.
Relationship 1
Increasing overexploitation of marine resources, despite an increase in marine productivity attributable to the 1976 climatic regime shift, due to:
Privatization of the communally-owned fishing grounds by leasing resource access rights to non-members.
Relationship 2
Over time, the 66 regional cooperatives were overwhelmed with the supervision/management of 1,722 fishing cooperatives and stripped of their oversight power.
Local fishing cooperatives used the increased autonomy granted by the national fishery cooperative to illegally lease access to community fishing grounds to non-members/outsiders.
No monitoring or legal deterrence/enforcement provisions regarding overharvesting of marine resources.
Relationship 3
Several revisions to the 1962 Fisheries Cooperative Law diminished the supervisory/management role of the regional cooperatives eliminating any oversight over local fishing cooperatives.
Transfer of near autonomous power to local fishing cooperatives.
Relationship 4
No discernible investment in marine resources conservation or ecosystem/habitat restoration.
Relationship 5
Fisheries cooperative law does not appear to specify any monitoring or legal deterrence mechanisms to prevent overharvesting of marine resources by fishermen.
Government policy of converting massive coastal areas into agricultural and industrial land removed valuable estuary and coastal habitat for marine species and impacting resource dynamics.
Relationship 6
No direct impact of laws on resource users.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Climatic regime shift in 1976 led to an increase in total marine biomass by approximately 15% and facilitated an increase in total catch production of approximately 48%.
Massive tidal land reclamation projects converted coastal ocean habitat into industrial and agricultural land.
Marine pollution from agricultural and industrial runoff.
Increasing industrialization of fishing fleets (GPS, sonar, etc.) is allowing fishing fleets to track, follow, and catch fish of all sizes, year round.
Increasing national demand for fishery products as affluence among urban population rises.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Not discernible.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Competition from commercial fishing fleets greatly diminishing off-shore fishing resources.
Outmigration of labor.
Increasing poverty.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Competition from commercial fishing fleets greatly diminishing off-shore fishing resources.
Outmigration of labor.
Increasing poverty.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Fishing Cooperatives 1990s to present
Resource System
Fishery: specifically economically significant species, such as mackerel, sardine, anchovy, Alaskan pollock, hairtail, seabream, drums, croakers, pilcher, shell fish, and cephalopods.
Resource Users
Fishermen who are also members of the fishing cooperatives
Outsiders (non-members)who are legally leasing access to the communal fishing grounds from fishing cooperatives.
Tourists (in some instances)
Public Infrastructure Providers
Fishing village cooperatives
City mayors, county and/or district chiefs who issue fishery permits to fishing cooperatives.
Private businesses/government
Public Infrastructure
1962 Fisheries Cooperative Law with 14 Amendments which gives fishing cooperatives near autonomous power over local resources
Local Autonomy Act (which transferred the issuance of fishing permits from regional to local governance)
14th Amendment of the 1962 Fisheries Cooperative Law divides common coastal fishing grounds into village fishing grounds and cooperative aquaculture, thereby shrinking the size and depth of fishing grounds.
14th Amendment also allows non-members access to common fishing grounds, as long as they have permission from the local fishing cooperative.
Subsidies and financial payments given directly to village cooperatives to induce international competitiveness within the fisheries sector. This funding was provided directly to cooperatives without any regulations or stipulations attached .
Relationship 1
Continued overexploitation of marine resources.
Relationship 2
Laissez-faire governance structure between cooperatives and resource users.
No oversight over resource extraction - fishing cooperatives have largely lost control over who is harvesting what and when.
No monitoring, sanctioning, or other legal enforcement of rules.
Continued privatization of the communally-owned fishing grounds by leasing resource access rights to non-members.
Village cooperatives are now also leasing fixed net fishing rights and aquaculture sites to the highest bidder.
Government and/or private businesses working with some villages and/or fishing cooperatives towards converting fishing villages into tourist destinations.
Relationship 3
Laissez-faire governance structure transferring near autonomous power to fishing cooperatives.
Issuance of fishing permits is transferred to local governance (mayors, district chiefs, etc.)
Relationship 4
No discernible investment in marine resources conservation or ecosystem/habitat restoration.
Relationship 5
Fisheries cooperative law does not appear to specify any monitoring or legal deterrence mechanisms to prevent overharvesting of marine resources by fishermen.
Development of aquaculture sites further limits coastal habitat and contributes to marine pollution.
Laissez-faire governance is encouraging greater accessibility to the resource thereby magnifying overexploitation of marine species.
Relationship 6
14th Amendment to the 1962 Fisheries Law divided common coastal fishing grounds into village fishing grounds and cooperative aquaculture areas shrinking the size and depth of village fishing grounds.
Government financial assistance and subsidies fosters competitive fishing methods to compete in the international marketplace.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Ocean pollution
Global climate change
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
International treaties and agreements
Competition and disputes over fishing rights with Japan and China.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Competition from commercial fishing fleets greatly diminishing off-shore fishing resources.
Fisheries Agreement with Japan and China diminishes traditional fishing grounds.
Outmigration of labor.
Demographic changes in fishing village population (aging of the population)
Increasing poverty.
Recent trends: Significant improvement in economic conditions for fishery households. Tourism development is leading to a return migration of younger fishermen back to their villages.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Competition from commercial fishing fleets greatly diminishing off-shore fishing resources.
Fisheries Agreement with Japan and China diminishes traditional fishing grounds.
Outmigration of labor.
Demographic changes in fishing village population (aging of the population)
Increasing poverty.
Recent trends: Significant improvement in economic conditions for fishery households. Tourism development is leading to a return migration of younger fishermen back to their villages.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Total Allowable Catch (TAC) (1998 - present)
Resource System
9-10 commercially valuable marine species which require conservation measures and are subject to transboundary disputes with adjacent nations.
Resource Users
Fishermen
Public Infrastructure Providers
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MOMAF) OR:
City or provincial government
Public Infrastructure
Law of Fisheries (revised in 1995)
Presidential Decree of the Fishery Resource Protection Act (1996)
(Both laws are modeled after the UN Law of the Sea)
Fisheries Agreement with Japan and China.
Relationship 1
All nine to ten species subject to TAC restrictions have been declining in numbers since TAC implementation
Relationship 2
Quota allocation certificates are issued by MOMAF and the local government authority to individual fishermen.
Fishermen self-report their catches to sellers and distributors
Fishermen have no input in the allocation process or in any other aspect of the TAC system
Relationship 3
Sellers and distributors report fishermen catch data to MOMAF.
12 observers are assigned to monitor catches in 7 landing reports.
Accuracy of reporting system questionable - no cross-checking of data between fishermen and sellers.
Relationship 4
No beneficial impact on the nine or ten species "protected" under TAC.
Relationship 5
Catch allocation quota is determined in negotiations between the government and the fishing industry and is based on maximum sustainable yield.
Bycatch data is not considered in evaluations.
Relationship 6
No discernible impact.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Pollution.
Global climate change.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
UN Law of the Sea
Excessive resource overexploitation and illegal fishing by neighboring nations.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Increasing international and national demand for fishery products.
Declining fish prices due to international competition.
Outmigration of labor.
Demographic changes in fishing village population (aging of the population)
Increasing poverty.
Recent trends: Significant improvement in economic conditions for fishery households. Tourism development is leading to a return migration of younger fishermen back to their villages.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Increasing international and national demand for fishery products.
Declining fish prices due to international competition.
Outmigration of labor.
Demographic changes in fishing village population (aging of the population)
Increasing poverty.
Recent trends: Significant improvement in economic conditions for fishery households. Tourism development is leading to a return migration of younger fishermen back to their villages.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Self-Control Management System (SMS) (2001 - present)(
Resource System
Fishery: specifically economically significant species, such as mackerel, sardine, anchovy, Alaskan pollock, hairtail, seabream, drums, croakers, pilcher, shell fish, and cephalopods.
Resource Users
Fishermen
Public Infrastructure Providers
Fishermen
Central government (MOMAF)
Various fishery interest groups (fishery cooperatives, unit cooperatives, fishery associations, and fishery committees) form a fishery committee
Local government
Regional government
Public Infrastructure
Amendments to Fisheries Law
Relationship 1
In some instances, marine resources have rebounded under SMS.
Illegal fishing and overexploitation continues to be a problem.
Relationship 2
Fishery interest groups (cooperatives, fishery associations, etc) form a committee which then develops regulations for self management.
The fisheries committee plans and implements the SMS program.
MOMAF provides administrative, technical, and legal support (to model communities only)
Local, regional, and national government supervise the implementation of the project, identify model communities, and promote those successful cases to other fishing communities.
Cleaning of fishing grounds
Building seafood processing facilities
Networking information
Voluntary program.
Relationship 3
Financial, administrative, and legal assistance is provided to "model" communities only.
Goals of program is to assist fishing communities to transit from centralized to decentralized self-control.
Voluntary program.
No monitoring or legal deterrence mechanisms in place.
Relationship 4
Some SMS programs run in conjunction with Fish Stock Rebuilding Plans - in these instances, marine resources are being rebuilt.
Relationship 5
Voluntary program.
No monitoring or legal deterrence mechanisms in place.
Relationship 6
Jealousy and infighting between "model" communities and those not so chosen.
Lack of interest and participation in SMS in non-model communities.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Continued overexploitation and illegal fishing.
In some instances, select fish stocks are being restored.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
International treaties and agreements
Competition and disputes over fishing rights with Japan and China.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Competition from commercial fishing fleets greatly diminishing off-shore fishing resources.
Fisheries Agreement with Japan and China diminishes traditional fishing grounds.
Outmigration of labor.
Demographic changes in fishing village population (aging of the population)
Increasing poverty.
Recent trends: Significant improvement in economic conditions for fishery households. Tourism development is leading to a return migration of younger fishermen back to their villages.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Competition from commercial fishing fleets greatly diminishing off-shore fishing resources.
Fisheries Agreement with Japan and China diminishes traditional fishing grounds.
Outmigration of labor.
Demographic changes in fishing village population (aging of the population)
Increasing poverty.
Recent trends: Significant improvement in economic conditions for fishery households. Tourism development is leading to a return migration of younger fishermen back to their villages.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Fish Stock Rebuilding Plan (FSRP) (2005 - present)
Resource System
Fishery: specifically recovery target fish species, such as sand fish, blue crab, octopus, abalone, skate ray, cod, yellow croaker, file fish, Korean flounder, Purplish Washington Clam.
Resource Users
Fishermen
Public Infrastructure Providers
Central government
Fishermen
Academics
Researchers
NGOs
Fisheries Science Committee
Fishery Resource Management Committee
Public Infrastructure
Fisheries Resources Management Act
UN Law of the Sea
Fisheries Agreement with China and Japan
Relationship 1
Continued depletion of marine resources due to overexploitation and illegal fishing
Decline of adult fish caught to only 20% since 2000
Relationship 2
FSRP is implemented in conjunction with SMS.
The Fishery Resource Management Committee provides fishermen with a list of target species to be protected.
Fishermen enter into voluntary agreements that stipulate the amount of fishing gear by vessel, limitation of number of fishing trips, and development of spawning protection regions.
Voluntary program.
Relationship 3
Voluntary program.
Limited oversight. No monitoring or legal deterrence mechanisms.
Relationship 4
Targeted fish species have shown increases in population size under FSRP.
Relationship 5
No monitoring or legal deterrence mechanisms.
Relationship 6
No discernible direct impact of laws on resource users.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Marine pollution.
Global climate change.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
International treaties and agreements
Competition and disputes over fishing rights with Japan and China.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Competition from commercial fishing fleets greatly diminishing off-shore fishing resources.
Fisheries Agreement with Japan and China diminishes traditional fishing grounds.
Outmigration of labor.
Demographic changes in fishing village population (aging of the population)
Increasing poverty.
Recent trends: Significant improvement in economic conditions for fishery households. Tourism development is leading to a return migration of younger fishermen back to their villages.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Competition from commercial fishing fleets greatly diminishing off-shore fishing resources.
Fisheries Agreement with Japan and China diminishes traditional fishing grounds.
Outmigration of labor.
Demographic changes in fishing village population (aging of the population)
Increasing poverty.
Recent trends: Significant improvement in economic conditions for fishery households. Tourism development is leading to a return migration of younger fishermen back to their villages.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Brady U, Arizona State University.
Korean fishing communities in transition: Institutional change and coastal development. Department of Geography, University of Washington. Ph.D.
. 2001.Limitations of the Korean conventional fisheries management regime and expanding Korean TAC system toward output control systems. Marine Policy. 30:510-522.
. 2006.Recent developments in Korean fisheries management. Ocean and Coastal Management. 49:355-366.
. 2006.An eco-system based fisheries assessment approach for Korean fisheries. Fisheries Research. 100:26-41.
. 2009.The economics of rebuilding fisheries in Korea: National comprehensive approaches. Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research. 2(2):20-27.
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