- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Freshwater
The case of Kheri Irrigation takes place in Sonjo village of Kheri and its adjacent farmlands within the Ngorongoro district of the Arusah region in Tanzania. The resource appropriated is water flowing from a stream, three springs, furrows, and sluices that supply water for irrigation and domestic uses. The boundaries of the location are defined by the village settlement and the land owned by the village people. There are a total of 101-200 formally organized appropriator teams.
After Gray's (1963) ethnography of the Sonjo, Potkanski and Adams (1998) conducted a study in same villages. They found that the population growth have led to more intensely contested boundaries and satellite villages attempt to gain access to irrigation water. Water is also less scarce due to government programs (related to structural adjustments programs) attempting to increase the production of water intensive cash crops. Given these disturbances, the local water managers attempted to allocate water use based on a pay-per-use system. This was deemed as unfair by central government, and a Village Chairman was appointed to ensure equitable allocation of water. This decreased the legitimacy of the local water managers, and increased crop failures as scarce water was spread over a larger area of land. Water managers were less able to stop water theft during this time. At the end of the study, the authors state that the traditional system was reinstated to restore a sense of order in the governance system.Â
This case is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Kheri Irrigation is water. The following study discusses an irrigation system that consists of a furrow and sluices that divert water from a stream and three springs to the adjacent farmland.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Kheri Irrigation is water. The following study discusses an irrigation system that consists of a furrow and sluices that divert water from a stream and three springs to the adjacent farmland.
SCREENER:
Case: Kheri Irrigation, Tanzania
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Kheri Irrigation, situated in Kheri Village of Tanzania. More generally, it is located in Africa. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Kheri Irrigation. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Kheri Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 101-200 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Gray spent six months in 1955 with the Sonjo, primarily in the village of Kheri. In his discussion of Kheri's irrigation practices he uses Karl Wittfogel's hypotheses about irrigation as the guiding framework, and finds that "Wittfogel's main thesis finds little support from Sonjo data. ...Among the traditional societies of Africa ... despotism is a characteristic that seems to vary independently of the practice of irrigation."
CITATION(S):
Gray, R. (1963) THE SONJO OF TANGANYIKA: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF AN IRRIGATION-BASED SOCIETY. London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute.
The resource appropriated from Kheri Irrigation is water. The following study discusses an irrigation system that consists of a furrow and sluices that divert water from a stream and three springs to the adjacent farmland.
SCREENER:
Case: Kheri Irrigation, Tanzania
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Kheri Irrigation, situated in Kheri Village of Tanzania. More generally, it is located in Africa. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Kheri Irrigation. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Kheri Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 101-200 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Gray spent six months in 1955 with the Sonjo, primarily in the village of Kheri. In his discussion of Kheri's irrigation practices he uses Karl Wittfogel's hypotheses about irrigation as the guiding framework, and finds that "Wittfogel's main thesis finds little support from Sonjo data. ...Among the traditional societies of Africa ... despotism is a characteristic that seems to vary independently of the practice of irrigation."
CITATION(S):
Gray, R. (1963) THE SONJO OF TANGANYIKA: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF AN IRRIGATION-BASED SOCIETY. London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute.
RESOURCE INFO:
The resource appropriated from Kheri Irrigation is water. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The following study discusses an irrigation system that consists of a furrow and sluices that divert water from a stream and three springs to the adjacent farmland.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (inferred).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of water within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of water within a single year (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of water from year to year (inferred).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is moderately sloping (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks. The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (highly confident).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the village Kheri and its adjacent farmlands. The boundaries of the location are defined by the village settlement and the land owned by the village people. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of a stream, three springs, furrows, and sluices that supply water for irrigation and domestic uses (coding).
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is not frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and relatively autonomous with respect to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is Sonja: 2.15'S, and its longitude is Sonja: 35.45'E. The elevation of this location is 1737 meters (highly confident). The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 1812 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 103, evapotraspiration: 80
February precipitation: 85, evapotraspiration: 72
March precipitation: 151, evapotraspiration: 80
April precipitation: 172, evapotraspiration: 71
May precipitation: 64, evapotraspiration: 61
June precipitation: 5, evapotraspiration: 47
July precipitation: 1, evapotraspiration: 40
August precipitation: 2, evapotraspiration: 37
September precipitation: 4, evapotraspiration: 37
October precipitation: 21, evapotraspiration: 46
November precipitation: 80, evapotraspiration: 80
December precipitation: 124, evapotraspiration: 80
COUNTRY, REGION, TIME:
This study examines a common-pool resource institution in Tanganyika, starting in 0, ending in 0.
During the period of time that this region was studied, the citizens of Tanganyika were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local general purpose governments (ambiguous). Regarding the charter of a local general purpose government, the citizens had full choice and could draft their own charter without receiving approval elsewhere (ambiguous). If a basic charter of a traditionally evolved local general purpose government was in existence, it could be maintained (highly confident). The citizens living in Tanganyika were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local special purpose enterprises with some public powers (highly confident). Regarding the charter of a local special purpose enterprise, the citizens had full choice and could draft their own charter without receiving approval elsewhere (highly confident).
During the time of this study, citizens in this or similar regions had created or evolved public enterprises with public treasuries and collective decisions outside the formal governmental structure (highly confident).
The individuals that made collective choice decisions in Tanganyika were locally elected officials who could act on their own without prior review (highly confident). The source of funds used by general purpose local governments was more than 80% from local taxes and related sources (highly confident). The judiciary system in this region during the time of the study was entirely a traditional judiciary system (inferred). The tenure of the judges was a life term (inferred). In general, the judges in Tanganyika are considered to be relatively honest (inferred). The single dominant legal tradition in use in this region was a tradition other than Roman, Common, or Islamic law. (confident).
The resource appropriated from Kheri Irrigation is water. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The following study discusses an irrigation system that consists of a furrow and sluices that divert water from a stream and three springs to the adjacent farmland.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (inferred).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of water within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of water within a single year (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of water from year to year (inferred).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is moderately sloping (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks. The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (highly confident).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the village Kheri and its adjacent farmlands. The boundaries of the location are defined by the village settlement and the land owned by the village people. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of a stream, three springs, furrows, and sluices that supply water for irrigation and domestic uses (coding).
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is not frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and relatively autonomous with respect to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is Sonja: 2.15'S, and its longitude is Sonja: 35.45'E. The elevation of this location is 1737 meters (highly confident). The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 1812 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 103, evapotraspiration: 80
February precipitation: 85, evapotraspiration: 72
March precipitation: 151, evapotraspiration: 80
April precipitation: 172, evapotraspiration: 71
May precipitation: 64, evapotraspiration: 61
June precipitation: 5, evapotraspiration: 47
July precipitation: 1, evapotraspiration: 40
August precipitation: 2, evapotraspiration: 37
September precipitation: 4, evapotraspiration: 37
October precipitation: 21, evapotraspiration: 46
November precipitation: 80, evapotraspiration: 80
December precipitation: 124, evapotraspiration: 80
COUNTRY, REGION, TIME:
This study examines a common-pool resource institution in Tanganyika, starting in 0, ending in 0.
During the period of time that this region was studied, the citizens of Tanganyika were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local general purpose governments (ambiguous). Regarding the charter of a local general purpose government, the citizens had full choice and could draft their own charter without receiving approval elsewhere (ambiguous). If a basic charter of a traditionally evolved local general purpose government was in existence, it could be maintained (highly confident). The citizens living in Tanganyika were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local special purpose enterprises with some public powers (highly confident). Regarding the charter of a local special purpose enterprise, the citizens had full choice and could draft their own charter without receiving approval elsewhere (highly confident).
During the time of this study, citizens in this or similar regions had created or evolved public enterprises with public treasuries and collective decisions outside the formal governmental structure (highly confident).
The individuals that made collective choice decisions in Tanganyika were locally elected officials who could act on their own without prior review (highly confident). The source of funds used by general purpose local governments was more than 80% from local taxes and related sources (highly confident). The judiciary system in this region during the time of the study was entirely a traditional judiciary system (inferred). The tenure of the judges was a life term (inferred). In general, the judges in Tanganyika are considered to be relatively honest (inferred). The single dominant legal tradition in use in this region was a tradition other than Roman, Common, or Islamic law. (confident).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Kheri Irrigation is water. The following study discusses an irrigation system that consists of a furrow and sluices that divert water from a stream and three springs to the adjacent farmland.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1955. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 76 to 100 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was a planned change in resource size and structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 2600000
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was well maintained, and in excellent working order (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (highly confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (inferred). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (ambiguous). There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (ambiguous). There are not records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (ambiguous). There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (highly confident). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (highly confident). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (highly confident). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (educated guess). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). There is a moderate range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (inferred). It is unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (highly confident). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 101-200 appropriators at the end of the period (confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators (not necessarily all) rotated into this position (highly confident). This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (highly confident). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 11-25 (highly confident). Official monitors are paid in commodities and in money. None of the monitors were full-time (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 4 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 7.1 - 8.1 - 9.1 - 10.1
Subgroups 7.1 and 8.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 7.1 and 8.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 7.1 and 9.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 7.1 and 9.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 7.1 and 10.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 7.1 and 10.1 do not differ in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 8.1 and 9.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 8.1 and 9.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 8.1 and 10.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply. Subgroups 8.1 and 10.1 do not differ in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource and in the way they use the appropriation units. Subgroups 9.1 and 10.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, withdrawl rates from the resource, and exposure to variations in supply. Subgroups 9.1 and 10.1 do not differ in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource and use of the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed. By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the Wenamiji. They are a group of councilmen who held primary rights and authority regarding the irrigation system. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). Membership at the start of this group numbered 17 (ambiguous). This group ended with a membership of 17 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Sonjo. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The clan identification for most of this subgroup is Almost equally distributed among th four clans. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (ambiguous). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de jure by this subgroup (highly confident). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years. Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered high (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units where the flow of units first enters into the resource (i.e. headenders) (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (ambiguous). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly legumes, and also grains other than paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). Action in both the collective choice arena and constitutional-choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (confident).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the Minor Wenamiji. They are individuals who held hereditary rights, but have no control over the irrigation system. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). Membership at the start of this group numbered 18 (ambiguous). This group ended with a membership of 18 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Sonjo. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de jure by this subgroup (highly confident). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years. Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered high (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after one or more other subgroups have withdrawn (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (ambiguous). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly legumes, and also grains other than paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the Wakiama. They are individuals who obtained temporary rights through paying tribute to the Wenamiji. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 23 (inferred).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Sonjo. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de jure by this subgroup (highly confident). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (highly confident). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years. Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered high (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after one or more other subgroups have withdrawn (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (ambiguous). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly legumes, and also grains other than paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the Clients. They are individuals who had no primary rights but must apply for secondary water rights to individuals with primary rights. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 70 (educated guess).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Sonjo. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years. Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 10%-25% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after all other subgroups have withdrawn (i.e. tailenders) (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly legumes, and also grains other than paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (ambiguous). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (ambiguous). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Kheri Irrigation is water. The following study discusses an irrigation system that consists of a furrow and sluices that divert water from a stream and three springs to the adjacent farmland.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1955. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 76 to 100 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was a planned change in resource size and structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 2600000
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was well maintained, and in excellent working order (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (highly confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (inferred). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (ambiguous). There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (ambiguous). There are not records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (ambiguous). There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (highly confident). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (highly confident). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (highly confident). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (educated guess). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). There is a moderate range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (inferred). It is unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (highly confident). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 101-200 appropriators at the end of the period (confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators (not necessarily all) rotated into this position (highly confident). This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (highly confident). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 11-25 (highly confident). Official monitors are paid in commodities and in money. None of the monitors were full-time (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 4 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 7.1 - 8.1 - 9.1 - 10.1
Subgroups 7.1 and 8.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 7.1 and 8.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 7.1 and 9.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 7.1 and 9.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 7.1 and 10.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 7.1 and 10.1 do not differ in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 8.1 and 9.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 8.1 and 9.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 8.1 and 10.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply. Subgroups 8.1 and 10.1 do not differ in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource and in the way they use the appropriation units. Subgroups 9.1 and 10.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, withdrawl rates from the resource, and exposure to variations in supply. Subgroups 9.1 and 10.1 do not differ in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource and use of the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed. By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the Wenamiji. They are a group of councilmen who held primary rights and authority regarding the irrigation system. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). Membership at the start of this group numbered 17 (ambiguous). This group ended with a membership of 17 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Sonjo. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The clan identification for most of this subgroup is Almost equally distributed among th four clans. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (ambiguous). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de jure by this subgroup (highly confident). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years. Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered high (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units where the flow of units first enters into the resource (i.e. headenders) (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (ambiguous). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly legumes, and also grains other than paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). Action in both the collective choice arena and constitutional-choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (confident).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the Minor Wenamiji. They are individuals who held hereditary rights, but have no control over the irrigation system. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). Membership at the start of this group numbered 18 (ambiguous). This group ended with a membership of 18 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Sonjo. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de jure by this subgroup (highly confident). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years. Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered high (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after one or more other subgroups have withdrawn (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (ambiguous). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly legumes, and also grains other than paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the Wakiama. They are individuals who obtained temporary rights through paying tribute to the Wenamiji. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 23 (inferred).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Sonjo. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de jure by this subgroup (highly confident). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (highly confident). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years. Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered high (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after one or more other subgroups have withdrawn (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (ambiguous). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly legumes, and also grains other than paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the Clients. They are individuals who had no primary rights but must apply for secondary water rights to individuals with primary rights. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 70 (educated guess).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Sonjo. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years. Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 10%-25% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after all other subgroups have withdrawn (i.e. tailenders) (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly legumes, and also grains other than paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (ambiguous). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (ambiguous). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Kheri Irrigation is water. The following study discusses an irrigation system that consists of a furrow and sluices that divert water from a stream and three springs to the adjacent farmland.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a certain class. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to one or more members of within a family.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be transferred to members of a family but not outside the family.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, labor force is organized in relatively small teams.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. The decisions of the council are based on the democratic principle of equal votes for all members. Normally, a unanimous vote is desired on all important questions. As an individual, a mwenamiji has no special authority over his fellow villagers. (p.14
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a certain class. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to one or more members of within a family.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be transferred to members of a family but not outside the family.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the 2nd most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the second most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, labor force is organized in relatively small teams.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a certain class. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
An entry fee or license is required or permitted and the upper limit of licenses issued severely restricts the number of potential appropriators who could appropriate from this resource.
The sum of the fees and licenses is moderate given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is moderate given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
Entry rights cannot be inherited.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the 3rd most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the third most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, labor force is organized in relatively small teams.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
An entry fee or license is required or permitted and the upper limit of licenses issued is likely to lead to the exclusion of some potential appropriators.
The sum of the fees and licenses is moderate given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is moderate given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the 4th most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, based on unincluded, specific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the fourth most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, labor force is organized in relatively small teams.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
The resource appropriated from Kheri Irrigation is water. The following study discusses an irrigation system that consists of a furrow and sluices that divert water from a stream and three springs to the adjacent farmland.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a certain class. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to one or more members of within a family.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be transferred to members of a family but not outside the family.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, labor force is organized in relatively small teams.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. The decisions of the council are based on the democratic principle of equal votes for all members. Normally, a unanimous vote is desired on all important questions. As an individual, a mwenamiji has no special authority over his fellow villagers. (p.14
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a certain class. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to one or more members of within a family.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be transferred to members of a family but not outside the family.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the 2nd most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the second most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, labor force is organized in relatively small teams.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a certain class. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
An entry fee or license is required or permitted and the upper limit of licenses issued severely restricts the number of potential appropriators who could appropriate from this resource.
The sum of the fees and licenses is moderate given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is moderate given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
Entry rights cannot be inherited.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the 3rd most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the third most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, labor force is organized in relatively small teams.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
An entry fee or license is required or permitted and the upper limit of licenses issued is likely to lead to the exclusion of some potential appropriators.
The sum of the fees and licenses is moderate given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is moderate given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the 4th most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, based on unincluded, specific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the fourth most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, labor force is organized in relatively small teams.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
Original Kheri Irrigation System (up to 1990)
Resource System
Irrigation water for subsistence crops
Resource Users
Farmers (wenamiji and wakiama)
Public Infrastructure Providers
wenamiji or heriditary "water managers"
Public Infrastructure
Sluices, and hill furrow canals.
Rules for allocation of irrigation water during times of scarcity
Relationship 1
Occasional scarcity
Relationship 2
wenamiji make decisions of management while others can voice their opinions
Relationship 3
managed by wenamiji and wakiama. Repairs and mainteanance is done by farmers and the warrior class (young adults)
Relationship 4
Some water loss in canals - efficiency maintained by irrigating fields by blocks.
Relationship 5
(none specified)Relationship 6
Farmers are involved in co-production, maintenance, and engage in monitoring
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
variable rainfall
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
state-forced cash crop production
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
state regulation of management regime delegitimized local rules-system
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Changes during neoliberal reform of Tanzania (1980s and 1990s)
Resource System
Irrigation water
Resource Users
Increased population of farmers
Public Infrastructure Providers
From wenamiji managed to a joint management system. The wenamiji are given the task of ensuring orderly use of irrigation water, while an appointed District Chairman ensures equitable distribution
Public Infrastructure
Same system of sluices and hill canal furrows
Relationship 1
Increasing scarcity due to higher demand. This is because of higher population and the use of more water intensive cash crops. Increased rate of water theft.
Relationship 2
Users can express their concerns to the wenamiji or the chairman. Greater state control decreased the perceived legitimacy of the wenamiji.
Relationship 3
THe wenamiji attempted to commodify water due to scarcity. The state attempted to assume greater control.
Relationship 4
Same as before
Relationship 5
Decreased perceived legitimacy of wenamiji fails to limit water theft.
Relationship 6
Same as before
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Less water per person available due to use of water intensive cash crops and population.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Schlager E, Arizona State University.
Brady U, Arizona State University.
. 1963. The Sonjo of Tanganyika: An Anthrpological Study of an Irrigation-Based Society.
. 1998. Water scarcity, property rights regimes and irrigation management in Sonjo, Tanzania. Journal of Development Studies. 34:86-116.