RESOURCE:

The resource appropriated from Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery is lobster. The resource of interest is Ascension Bay, located in Quintana Roo State, Mexico.

SCREENER:

Case: Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery, Mexico

The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.

These documents describe seven resources in detail. The primary resource is the Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery, situated in Andres Quintana Roo of Mexico. More generally, it is located in Central America & Caribbean. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.

At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was a moderately abundant supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.

Miller gives a description of the scalefish, lobster, conch, shrimp, turtle, and coral fisheries off the Caribbean coast of Andres Quintana Roo State, Mexico. All fisheries, except for scalefish, are organized by coops or firms. He provides information on rules, technology, marketing, and production, with particularly detailed information on the scalefish and lobster fisheries organized by the Andres Quintana Roo Coop, the Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery organized by the Vigia Chico Coop, and the Amberjack fishery. The other fisheries are only briefly described, and in general Miller provides little information on the condition of the resources. The most interesting case is the Ascension Bay lobsterfishery in which members of the coop own their lobster territories and trade and sell them. [Note: the Amberjack Fishery will not be coded because it does not meet our definition of a CPR dilemma.]

CITATION(S):

Miller, David (1982) "Mexico's Caribbean Fishery: Recent Change and Current Issues." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

Miller, David (1988) "Technology, Territoriality and Ecology: The Evolution of Mexico's Caribbean Spiny Lobster Fishery." M.S. thesis, State University of New York at Cortland.*

RESOURCE INFO:

The resource appropriated from Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery is lobster. It is produced biologically and is a renewable stationary unit. The resource of interest is Ascension Bay, located in Quintana Roo State, Mexico.

The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country and are not within any general purpose local jurisdictions. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.

There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (highly confident). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (inferred). The variance in quality between the zones has at some point in time created conflict among appropriators (inferred).

There are natural barriers within the resource, and they coincide with microzones (inferred). There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the lobster can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of lobster within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of lobster within a single year (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of lobster from year to year.

The bottom topography of Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery is primarily rock (confident).

The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (inferred). The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource (inferred).

LOCATION:

The appropriation resources are situated in Ascension Bay, which is itself located in Quintana Roo State in Mexico. The Bay is bounded on the north by Punta Allen and on the south by Punta Herro. It empties into the Caribbean Sea on the east. The boundaries of the location are both physical and institutional. The Bay's boundaries are physical and through the creation of coops, a single coop was given control of the Bay. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of lobster (coding), as well as scalefish. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.

The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not within any general purpose local jurisdiction. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). Additionally, the most common mode of transportation in this region is -1. This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (educated guess).

The latitude of this location is -1, and its longitude is -1. The elevation of this location is -1 meters. The highest elevation is -1. The lowest elevation of this location is -1. The region's average annual rainfall is unknown. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is unknown. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:

January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

RESOURCE:

The resource appropriated from Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery is lobster. The resource of interest is Ascension Bay, located in Quintana Roo State, Mexico.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL:

TYPE OF SITUATION

The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.

EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION

It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 11 to 25 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by the appropriators in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was an enhancement of physical capabilities to withdraw units (e.g. introduction of turbine pump) from the resource during the time of this study. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.

CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*

For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (confident). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was moderately abundant (confident). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was moderately abundant (educated guess).

The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:

At the beginning of this period, the units were sexually mature at this size or age (inferred). At the end of this period, the units were sexually mature at this size or age (inferred).

*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.

At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly sold in external markets, and also sold in local markets, and consumed by appropriators and families.

At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in external markets, and also sold in local markets, and consumed by appropriators and families.

As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (inferred). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (inferred). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there was no information provided in the case study regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are appropriated. As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, holding all inputs constant the same or greater amounts of resource units were not withdrawn with fewer appropriator teams and/or equipment, and there was no rent dissipation (educated guess). At the end of this study, holding all inputs constant the same or greater amounts of resource units were not withdrawn with fewer appropriator teams and/or equipment, and there was no rent dissipation (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred).

INFORMATION LEVELS

There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (confident). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (inferred). There was no information provided to indicate whether or not there are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource. There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (inferred). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).

POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL

The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in one market (inferred). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.

PATTERNS OF INTERACTION

The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related primarily to other local resources (inferred). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (inferred). There is a moderate range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (educated guess).

POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS

At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators (educated guess). There was a general estimate of 101-200 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the end of the period. The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and monitors are employees of an external governmental authority (confident). This position monitors rules devised by national collective choice processes (column 1 of the rules form), rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form), and rules-in-use.

The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. Almost all of the monitors were full-time (ambiguous).

NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS

There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 96.1 - -2 - -2 - -2

EVALUATION OF RESULTS

The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.

AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS

In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).

There is a favorable evaluation of the system by fishers. It may be difficult to determine whether fluctuations in lobster population are due to overfishing or physical/natural caused fluctuations.

SUBGROUP:

Participants:

This appropriation group are members of the Vigia Chico co-op. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). At the start of this group the membership was estimated to be 51-100. This group ended with a membership of 110 (highly confident).

The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:

Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Spanish.

The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 110 groups.

Legal Rights:

Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are held de jure (highly confident).

Stakes and Resources:

The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 26 through 50 years (confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (inferred). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a high cost (educated guess).

Potential Actions and Levels of Control:

A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (inferred), time limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).

Technology:

The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).

Strategies Adopted:

At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was accelerating (inferred). During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).

Subgroup Results:

This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has become larger (highly confident).

RESOURCE:

The resource appropriated from Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery is lobster. The resource of interest is Ascension Bay, located in Quintana Roo State, Mexico.

OPERATIONAL RULES:

Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.

With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.

Boundary Rules

The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.

The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.

A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring citizenship of a major subdivision of a country. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring an appropriator to obtain a license for entry or for equipment in order to appropriate. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.

Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.

When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the set of local appropriators determines to whom such rights can be transferred.

Authority and Scope Rules

The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.

The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).

Authority Rules:

The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.

There is a rule requiring withdrawal only during specific seasons, set annually/periodically by an external public official. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..

There is a rule permitting withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on the historical pattern of appropriation. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on the historical pattern of appropriation. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on the historical pattern of appropriation. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

There is a rule requiring withdrawal units of a certain minimum size, set annually/periodically by an external public official. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.

Scope Rules:

The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.

There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, set annually/periodically by an external public official. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

Information Rules

There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

This information was recorded by an AGO.

Payoff Rules

The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Heavy fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may permanently lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units.

The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.

Aggregation Rules

Overall Questions About Rules Configuration

The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 26 to 50 years.