RESOURCE:

The resource appropriated from Ebibara Fishing Ground is shrimp. The fishing grounds of Utsumi-shi include the port and adjacent waters, extending a maximum 3 miles out. The boundary is institutionally defined by rules devised by the prefecture and the Federal government.

SCREENER:

Case: Ebibara Fishing Ground, Japan

The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.

These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Ebibara Fishing Ground, situated in Ebibara (pseudonym) of Japan. More generally, it is located in Orient. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Ebibara Fishing Ground. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Ebibara Fishing Ground have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.

The Ebibara Fishing Ground covers an unknown area. There are 51-100 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was a moderately abundant supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.

Ebibara is one of the two communities contrasted in this work. The local fishing co-op, to which all Ebibara fishers belong, has proprietor rights to nearby fishing grounds explicitly granted by the Japanese government (a move to reduce conflict between fishing villages). The government also regulates types of gear; the co-op establishes most other regulations, provides services such as credit and cold storage, encourages innovative techniques, and lobbies for its members' interests with other fishing co-ops and the government. Despite a proliferation of regulations intended to protect the fishery resource, Ebibara fishers regularly use illegal fishing methods, especially during the "off season" when catches are small, because legal practices provide insufficient income. Enforcement is not strict; instead, the co-op and the prefectural authorities, perceiving there to be too many fishers in relation to the supply of fish, are promoting a plan to encourage some fishers to take up another occupation.

CITATION(S):

Brameld, Theodore (1968) JAPAN: CULTURE, EDUCATION, AND CHANGE IN TWO COMMUNITIES. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.*

RESOURCE INFO:

The resource appropriated from Ebibara Fishing Ground is shrimp. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The fishing grounds of Utsumi-shi include the port and adjacent waters, extending a maximum 3 miles out. The boundary is institutionally defined by rules devised by the prefecture and the Federal government.

The boundary of this resource has institutional arrangements. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.

There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess). The variance in quality between the zones has at some point in time created conflict among appropriators.

There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the shrimp can be controlled (educated guess). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation over space in the availability of shrimp within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of shrimp within a single year (inferred). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of shrimp from year to year (inferred).

The bottom topography of Ebibara Fishing Ground is primarily mud (inferred).

If no rules in use were being followed, the relationship among the appropriation processes would have little adverse effects (ambiguous).

The boundaries of the production resource have a relationship to the boundaries of the appropriation resource that was not indicated in this case study. The boundaries of the production resource have a relationship to the boundaries of the location that was not indicated in this case study. The boundaries of the distribution resource have an unrecorded relationship to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The boundaries of the production resource have a relationship to the boundaries of the distribution resource that was not indicated in this case study.

LOCATION:

The appropriation resources are situated in the city of "Utsumi-shi" (psuedonym) and waters adjacent to its port, not extending more than 3 miles. The boundaries of the location are institutional - the city's boundaries and the fishing ground boundaries are defined by rules devised by Prefecture and Federal governments. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of shrimp (coding), as well as squid, octopus, mackeral, sardines, and clams. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.

The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (highly confident). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (highly confident).

The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is . The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:

January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

RESOURCE:

The resource appropriated from Ebibara Fishing Ground is shrimp. The fishing grounds of Utsumi-shi include the port and adjacent waters, extending a maximum 3 miles out. The boundary is institutionally defined by rules devised by the prefecture and the Federal government.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL:

TYPE OF SITUATION

The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.

EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION

It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 26 to 50 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by an external authority in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because -2.

CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*

For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).

The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:

*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.

The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.

At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in local markets, and also consumed by appropriators and families.

As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there was no information provided in the case study regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are appropriated. As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource. At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred).

INFORMATION LEVELS

There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (confident). No documentation was included in the study regarding whether or not the appropriators of this resource are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource. There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (ambiguous). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (ambiguous). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (ambiguous). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (inferred). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).

POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL

The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. There are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (inferred). Most appropriators sell this resource in one market (educated guess). There appears to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (inferred).

PATTERNS OF INTERACTION

Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not affect communication (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication are not included in the case study.

The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (educated guess). The documents present evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (educated guess). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). There is a considerable range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (inferred). It is very unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).

POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS

At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 101-200 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 201-500, at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and monitors are employees of an external governmental authority (confident). This position monitors rules devised by national collective choice processes (column 1 of the rules form), rules devised by regional collective choice processes (column 2 of the rules form), and rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form).

The appropriators do not monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (educated guess). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. Official monitors are paid in money. Almost all of the monitors were full-time (inferred).

NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS

There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 60.1 - 0 - 0 - 0

EVALUATION OF RESULTS

There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess).

AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS

In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (ambiguous).

The appropriators are doing a generally good job of sustaining the resource, achieving a balance of units, and controlling rule breaking behavior. The evaluation is a result of the number of fishers, the appropriative power, and the time of year. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -2

SUBGROUP:

Participants:

This appropriation group are adult males who fish by trawl and live in Utsumi-shi. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a estimated membership of 101-200.. An estimated 91%-100% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (educated guess).

The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:

Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Oriental. The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Buddahist. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Japanese.

The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 80 groups.

Legal Rights:

Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess).

Stakes and Resources:

The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 201 through 300 years (ambiguous). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (ambiguous). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a high cost (educated guess).

Potential Actions and Levels of Control:

A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (inferred), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.

Technology:

The most recent technological change experienced by this subgroup was 51-75 years ago (confident). (confident). The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (ambiguous).

Strategies Adopted:

During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Resources have not been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (educated guess). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally medium (educated guess). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).

Subgroup Results:

This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (inferred).

RESOURCE:

The resource appropriated from Ebibara Fishing Ground is shrimp. The fishing grounds of Utsumi-shi include the port and adjacent waters, extending a maximum 3 miles out. The boundary is institutionally defined by rules devised by the prefecture and the Federal government.

OPERATIONAL RULES:

Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..

With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.

Boundary Rules

The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.

A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the national, regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring citizenship of a major subdivision of a country. This rule is enforced at the national, regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the national, regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the national, regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring that an appropriator be of a particular race. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the national, regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring an appropriator to obtain a license for entry or for equipment in order to appropriate. This rule is enforced at the national, regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring ownership of shares in an organization. This rule is enforced at the national, regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

Authority and Scope Rules

The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.

The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).

Authority Rules:

There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the national, regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

There is a rule requiring withdrawal units of a certain minimum size, based on technology used. This rule is enforced at the national, regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.

Scope Rules:

Information Rules

There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).

This information was recorded by an AGO.

Payoff Rules

The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Light fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may, for an unclear duration, lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Appropriators can obtain external aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a local (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements with a local (private or public) agency(s) for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.

The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.

Aggregation Rules

Overall Questions About Rules Configuration

The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 26 to 50 years.