- Resource System
- Coastal marine ecosystem
- Resource Units
- Cod
- Location
- Newfoundland, Canada
The fishing community, Baccalaos Cove, is located in the Placentia Bay on the eastern shore of the Burin Peninsula of Newfoundland, in the eastern part of Canada on the Atlantic coast. The original case, which spans from 1977-1979, catalogues an action situation of approximately 300 fishermen; the resource unit is cod. Depending on the season, different allocation techniques are used for assigning fishing spots; lottery system in summers and "first-in-time, first-in-right" process in the fall.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab under Institutional Analysis.
Based on the source document, this case was deemed to be a governance success.Â
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The resource appropriated from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is cod. The resource is the Baccalaos Cod Fishery which consists of 42 cod trap berths, 22 jigging grounds, and 3 trawling locales. It is situated in Placentia Bay.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is cod. The resource is the Baccalaos Cod Fishery which consists of 42 cod trap berths, 22 jigging grounds, and 3 trawling locales. It is situated in Placentia Bay.
SCREENER:
Case: Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery, Canada
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery, situated in Baccalaos Cove of Canada. More generally, it is located in North America. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is not available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
The Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery covers an unknown area. There are 25-50 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was a moderately abundant supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Fishers from Baccalaos Cove (pseudonym), Newfoundland, take cod in summer using traps. Fishing spots for traps are assigned by lottery. In fall, fishers take cod with handlines, jiggers, and trawls. About 25 good fall spots exists, and they are assigned not by lottery, but by first-in-time, first-in-right for the day.
CITATION(S):
Powers, Ann M. (1984) "Social Organization in a Newfoundland Fishing Settlement on the Burin Peninsula." Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook.*
The resource appropriated from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is cod. The resource is the Baccalaos Cod Fishery which consists of 42 cod trap berths, 22 jigging grounds, and 3 trawling locales. It is situated in Placentia Bay.
SCREENER:
Case: Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery, Canada
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery, situated in Baccalaos Cove of Canada. More generally, it is located in North America. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is not available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
The Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery covers an unknown area. There are 25-50 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was a moderately abundant supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Fishers from Baccalaos Cove (pseudonym), Newfoundland, take cod in summer using traps. Fishing spots for traps are assigned by lottery. In fall, fishers take cod with handlines, jiggers, and trawls. About 25 good fall spots exists, and they are assigned not by lottery, but by first-in-time, first-in-right for the day.
CITATION(S):
Powers, Ann M. (1984) "Social Organization in a Newfoundland Fishing Settlement on the Burin Peninsula." Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook.*
RESOURCE INFO:
The resource appropriated from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is cod. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The resource is the Baccalaos Cod Fishery which consists of 42 cod trap berths, 22 jigging grounds, and 3 trawling locales. It is situated in Placentia Bay.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country and are not within any general purpose local jurisdictions. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (highly confident). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (highly confident). The variance in quality between the zones has not created conflict among appropriators.
There are natural barriers within the resource, and they coincide with microzones (inferred). There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Cod can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of Cod within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of Cod within a single year (inferred). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of Cod from year to year (inferred).
The bottom topography of Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is primarily mud (inferred).
If no rules in use were being followed, the relationship among the appropriation processes would have conflictual effects (inferred).
The boundaries of the production resource and the boundaries of the appropriation resource overlap partially, but they are not equivalent. (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource partially overlap the boundaries of the location, but the two boundaries are not equivalent (educated guess). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource have a relationship to the boundaries of the distribution resource that was not indicated in this case study.
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in "Baccalaos Cove" (pseudonym) and its cod fishery, located on the Burin Penninsula in southern Newfoundland. The village is at the head of a long narrow inlet while the fishery is located in Placentia Bay. The boundaries of the location are natural and institutional. The boundaries include a village (institutional) and a fishery whose boundaries are determined by traditional use patterns and technology. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of cod.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not within any general purpose local jurisdiction. A permanent population lives year round in this location . There is not frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (educated guess). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 1320 milimeters (highly confident). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
The resource appropriated from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is cod. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The resource is the Baccalaos Cod Fishery which consists of 42 cod trap berths, 22 jigging grounds, and 3 trawling locales. It is situated in Placentia Bay.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country and are not within any general purpose local jurisdictions. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (highly confident). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (highly confident). The variance in quality between the zones has not created conflict among appropriators.
There are natural barriers within the resource, and they coincide with microzones (inferred). There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Cod can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of Cod within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of Cod within a single year (inferred). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of Cod from year to year (inferred).
The bottom topography of Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is primarily mud (inferred).
If no rules in use were being followed, the relationship among the appropriation processes would have conflictual effects (inferred).
The boundaries of the production resource and the boundaries of the appropriation resource overlap partially, but they are not equivalent. (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource partially overlap the boundaries of the location, but the two boundaries are not equivalent (educated guess). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource have a relationship to the boundaries of the distribution resource that was not indicated in this case study.
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in "Baccalaos Cove" (pseudonym) and its cod fishery, located on the Burin Penninsula in southern Newfoundland. The village is at the head of a long narrow inlet while the fishery is located in Placentia Bay. The boundaries of the location are natural and institutional. The boundaries include a village (institutional) and a fishery whose boundaries are determined by traditional use patterns and technology. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of cod.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not within any general purpose local jurisdiction. A permanent population lives year round in this location . There is not frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (educated guess). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 1320 milimeters (highly confident). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is cod. The resource is the Baccalaos Cod Fishery which consists of 42 cod trap berths, 22 jigging grounds, and 3 trawling locales. It is situated in Placentia Bay.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation alone. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not exercising nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de facto) closed access to this resource, but "outsiders" began to appropriate at a moderate level.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 11 to 25 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by local collective choice processes involving others besides the appropriators, in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was moderately abundant (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
It is not indicated whether or not the units were sexually mature at this size or age at the beginning of this period. It is not indicated whether or not the units were sexually mature at this size or age at the end of this period.
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
The information about how units are disposed at the end of the period is missing in case.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (ambiguous). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were not exercising, nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de facto closed access to this resource (confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (educated guess). Some appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (highly confident). There was no information provided to indicate whether or not there are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource. There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (inferred). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (educated guess). There appears to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (highly confident).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (highly confident).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 51-100, at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) is not described in detail in this case study. This position monitors rules devised by regional collective choice processes (column 2 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. The study did not indicate how many of the monitors were full-time.
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 49.1 - 50.1 - -2 - -2
Subgroups 49.1 and 50.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 49.1 and 50.1 do not differ in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The author's focus is on relation between kinship and organization of production, but doesn't really point to any result. Comments recorded regarding evidence that is presented concerning the nature and level of transaction costs are as follows: The evidence presented regarding the nature and level of transaction costs includes information on communication, and trust. This evidence indicates that transaction costs are low.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This group is the men who live in Baccalaos Cove and fish during the summer and fall with jiggers, handlines, and trawls. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 49 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Irish. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Caucasian. Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Catholic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is English.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 20 groups.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is exercised de jure## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (inferred), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This group is the men who live in Baccalaos Cove and fish during the summer with cod traps. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 59 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Irish. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Caucasian. Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Catholic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is English.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 11 groups.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is exercised de jure## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (highly confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (inferred), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to obtain a more favorable situation (regardless of the rules).
Subgroup Results:
By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is cod. The resource is the Baccalaos Cod Fishery which consists of 42 cod trap berths, 22 jigging grounds, and 3 trawling locales. It is situated in Placentia Bay.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation alone. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not exercising nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de facto) closed access to this resource, but "outsiders" began to appropriate at a moderate level.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 11 to 25 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by local collective choice processes involving others besides the appropriators, in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was moderately abundant (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
It is not indicated whether or not the units were sexually mature at this size or age at the beginning of this period. It is not indicated whether or not the units were sexually mature at this size or age at the end of this period.
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
The information about how units are disposed at the end of the period is missing in case.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (ambiguous). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were not exercising, nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de facto closed access to this resource (confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (educated guess). Some appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (highly confident). There was no information provided to indicate whether or not there are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource. There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (inferred). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (educated guess). There appears to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (highly confident).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (highly confident).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 51-100, at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) is not described in detail in this case study. This position monitors rules devised by regional collective choice processes (column 2 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. The study did not indicate how many of the monitors were full-time.
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 49.1 - 50.1 - -2 - -2
Subgroups 49.1 and 50.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 49.1 and 50.1 do not differ in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The author's focus is on relation between kinship and organization of production, but doesn't really point to any result. Comments recorded regarding evidence that is presented concerning the nature and level of transaction costs are as follows: The evidence presented regarding the nature and level of transaction costs includes information on communication, and trust. This evidence indicates that transaction costs are low.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This group is the men who live in Baccalaos Cove and fish during the summer and fall with jiggers, handlines, and trawls. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 49 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Irish. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Caucasian. Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Catholic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is English.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 20 groups.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is exercised de jure## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (inferred), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This group is the men who live in Baccalaos Cove and fish during the summer with cod traps. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 59 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Irish. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Caucasian. Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Catholic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is English.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 11 groups.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is exercised de jure## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (highly confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (inferred), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (inferred), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to obtain a more favorable situation (regardless of the rules).
Subgroup Results:
By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is cod. The resource is the Baccalaos Cod Fishery which consists of 42 cod trap berths, 22 jigging grounds, and 3 trawling locales. It is situated in Placentia Bay.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location but the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a major subdivision of a country. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting ownership of some other form of limited property related to the appropriation from the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights are transmitted for an entire household or production unit (such as a boat) from one generation to another.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, or returned to others on a temporary basis, but not permanently severed.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the set of local appropriators determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
There are two arrangements by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.The arrangements are applied depending upon who owns equipment and who fishes with it. The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
100%
If the owner fishes with sharemen, then the catch is equally divided into x shares. Each sharemen receives a share and then the owner receives a share. If the owner is in debt over the gear, the holder of the debt receives a share.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location but the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a major subdivision of a country. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting ownership of some other form of limited property related to the appropriation from the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring that an appropriator be of a particular race. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting continued usage of resource entry rights. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring registration on an eligibility list. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring the obtaining of access right through a lottery. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights are transmitted for an entire household or production unit (such as a boat) from one generation to another.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, or returned to others on a temporary basis, but not permanently severed.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the set of local appropriators determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on periodic lottery. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on periodic lottery. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
There are two arrangements by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.The arrangements are applied depending on whether or not fishers own the equipment they use. The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
100%
While the author states that ownership is a share system, it doesn't appear to be so. Ideally, the father owns the equipment and he and his sons fish together. When his sons have sons old enough to fish then he divides up his equipment among his sons so they can begin their own crews. While they fish collectively, men do not own collectively. Often times sons will bring in some of their own to their father's team. The second way of organizing division of the catch is for the owner to divide the catch into x equal shares. Each shareman receives a share and the owner receives a share. The boat receives a share, and if the owner is in debt for the gear, then the holder of the debt receives a share. There is not enough information to determine the number of sharemen per team, whether owner is in debt, etc.
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
The resource appropriated from Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery is cod. The resource is the Baccalaos Cod Fishery which consists of 42 cod trap berths, 22 jigging grounds, and 3 trawling locales. It is situated in Placentia Bay.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location but the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a major subdivision of a country. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting ownership of some other form of limited property related to the appropriation from the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights are transmitted for an entire household or production unit (such as a boat) from one generation to another.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, or returned to others on a temporary basis, but not permanently severed.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the set of local appropriators determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
There are two arrangements by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.The arrangements are applied depending upon who owns equipment and who fishes with it. The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
100%
If the owner fishes with sharemen, then the catch is equally divided into x shares. Each sharemen receives a share and then the owner receives a share. If the owner is in debt over the gear, the holder of the debt receives a share.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location but the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a major subdivision of a country. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting ownership of some other form of limited property related to the appropriation from the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring that an appropriator be of a particular race. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting continued usage of resource entry rights. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring registration on an eligibility list. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring the obtaining of access right through a lottery. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights are transmitted for an entire household or production unit (such as a boat) from one generation to another.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, or returned to others on a temporary basis, but not permanently severed.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the set of local appropriators determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on periodic lottery. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on periodic lottery. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
There are two arrangements by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.The arrangements are applied depending on whether or not fishers own the equipment they use. The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
100%
While the author states that ownership is a share system, it doesn't appear to be so. Ideally, the father owns the equipment and he and his sons fish together. When his sons have sons old enough to fish then he divides up his equipment among his sons so they can begin their own crews. While they fish collectively, men do not own collectively. Often times sons will bring in some of their own to their father's team. The second way of organizing division of the catch is for the owner to divide the catch into x equal shares. Each shareman receives a share and the owner receives a share. The boat receives a share, and if the owner is in debt for the gear, then the holder of the debt receives a share. There is not enough information to determine the number of sharemen per team, whether owner is in debt, etc.
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
Baccalaos Cove Cod Fishery
Resource System
Resource system (natural infrastructure):
- Marine ecosystem and food web
Resource units:
- Cod (main target resource)
- Capelin (small fish that feed Cod)
Resource Users
There are three main subgroups that are important in this case:
- Fishermen (11 crews (59 men) engaged in summer cod-trapping w/ traps & 9 crews (20 men) fishing w/out traps; and 49 engaged in fall cod fishing grounds) organized into fishing crews, or crowds (occupants of a single or group of "gardens," i.e. family compounds separated by a fence, with the same surname fishing together)
- Hired sharemen (from outside the community)
- Shore crowd (fish processing crew, mainly wives and female relatives of fishermen)
Public Infrastructure Providers
National/provincial level
- Department of Fisheries of Canada has elected representative that overseas the Lottery Committee
Community/local level
- The Lottery Committee controls trap berth site allocation amongst fishermen
- Generally, fishery is characterized by an absence of authority positions and lack of local government.
Public Infrastructure
Hard public infrastructure
- Trap berths
Soft public infrastructure
- Fishery drawing system for the assignment of summer cod trapping berths
- Formalized rules of kinship which tie sea access and participation in fishing crowds to land ownership
Relationship 1
RU => R:
- Resource users extract cod for commercial sale to international markets and at home consumption
R => RU (potential disservices/negative feedback):
- Marine ecosystem dynamics provide/modify the availability of target resources in the fishery
Relationship 2
RU=>PIP:
National/provincial level
- Not applicable.
Community/local level
- Not applicable.
PIP=>RU:
National/provincial level
- Not applicable.
Community/local level
- Not applicable.
Relationship 3
PIP => PI (hard)
- No known interaction/influence.
PIP => PI (soft)
- No known interaction/influence.
PI (soft) => PIP
- Fishery drawing system for cod trap berths formally established into statutory law by the Canadian Department of Fisheries
PI (hard) => PIP
- No known interaction/influence
Relationship 4
PI (hard) => R:
- No known interaction/influence.
PI (soft)=>R:
- No known interaction/influence.
R=> PI (soft):
- The biophysical context of the peninsula has enabled Baccalaos fishermen to limit access by outsiders to the cod trap fishery.
R => PI (hard):
- No known interaction/influence.
Relationship 5
Link 1=>PI (soft):
- No known interaction/influence.
PI (soft)=>Link 1:
- Strict social norms, which limit participation in fishing crew to land owning "crowds" limits size of fishing crew exploiting the resoure and relying on the system, despite population growth from "strangers"
PI (hard) => Link 1:
- Lack of public facilities (e.g. freezing plants, storage chambers, and trawlers) restrict fishermen from exploiting deeper water or other fish stocks making them more dependent on merchants as "gatekeepers" and internationally valuable cod.
Link 1 => PI (hard)
- No known influence.
Relationship 6
PI (soft) => RU:
- No known interaction.
RU => PI (soft):
- No known interaction.
PI (hard) => RU:
- No known interaction.
RU => PI (hard)
- No known interaction.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
None specified in the text.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
None specified in the text.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Local mine gives community members alternative employment opportunities, but also brings non-community members into close contact with fishermen (though there were no stated conflicts that arise from such interactions stated in the case).
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
None specified in the text.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
boats, cod traps, fishing nets, hand lines, jiggers and other fishing gear
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Schlager E, University of Arizona.
Brady U, Arizona State University.
Lambert L, Arizona State University.
. 1984. Social Organization in a Newfoundland Fishing Settlement on the Burin Peninsula. State University of New York at Stony Brook. PhD