- Resource System
- Coastal marine ecosystem
- Resource Units
- Demersal and midwater fish stocks
- Location
- West Bengal, India
Jambudwip, an island in the Bay of Bengal, is located about 7 miles to the southwest of Bakkhali in the South 24 Parganas district in the state of West Bengal, India. The original case, which spans from 1967-1968, catalogues an action situation involving approximately 243 fishermen in the village; the resource unit are demersal and midwater fish species. The boundary is based on traditional use and technology limitations. Two distinct types of institutional arrangements exist among the appropriators: 1) a communal form in which all fishers share expenses and profits equally and 2) an entrepreneurial form in which one individual bankrolls the fishing operation, paying the other fishers a wage. Based on the source document, there is insufficient information on whether this case was deemed to be a success or not.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab under Institutional Analysis.
The resource appropriated from Jambudwip Fishery is fish. Fishing grounds are off the southwest coast of Jambudwip Island and extend 3-4 miles offshore. Boundary is based on traditional use and limits of technology which prevents fishermen from wandering too far offshore.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Jambudwip Fishery is fish. Fishing grounds are off the southwest coast of Jambudwip Island and extend 3-4 miles offshore. Boundary is based on traditional use and limits of technology which prevents fishermen from wandering too far offshore.
SCREENER:
Case: Jambudwip Fishery, India
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Jambudwip Fishery, situated in Jambudwip Fishery of India. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Jambudwip Fishery. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Jambudwip Fishery have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
The Jambudwip Fishery covers an unknown area. There are less than 25 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Migrant groups of fishermen each year, for 5 months, fish off the island of Jambudwip. Two distinct types of institutional arrangements exist among the appropriators -- a communal form in which all fishers share expenses and profits equally and an entrepreneurial form in which one individual bankrolls the fishing operation, paying the other fishers a wage.
CITATION(S):
Raychaudhuri, Bikash (1972) THE MOON AND NET: STUDY OF A TRANSIENT COMMUNITY OF FISHERMEN AT JAMBUDWIP. Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India. [HD 8039 .F66 I 766]*
Raychaudhuri, Bikash (1968) "Fishing Rituals of the Marine Fisherfolk." BULLETIN OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA 17(2): 83-116.*
The resource appropriated from Jambudwip Fishery is fish. Fishing grounds are off the southwest coast of Jambudwip Island and extend 3-4 miles offshore. Boundary is based on traditional use and limits of technology which prevents fishermen from wandering too far offshore.
SCREENER:
Case: Jambudwip Fishery, India
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Jambudwip Fishery, situated in Jambudwip Fishery of India. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Jambudwip Fishery. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Jambudwip Fishery have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
The Jambudwip Fishery covers an unknown area. There are less than 25 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Migrant groups of fishermen each year, for 5 months, fish off the island of Jambudwip. Two distinct types of institutional arrangements exist among the appropriators -- a communal form in which all fishers share expenses and profits equally and an entrepreneurial form in which one individual bankrolls the fishing operation, paying the other fishers a wage.
CITATION(S):
Raychaudhuri, Bikash (1972) THE MOON AND NET: STUDY OF A TRANSIENT COMMUNITY OF FISHERMEN AT JAMBUDWIP. Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India. [HD 8039 .F66 I 766]*
Raychaudhuri, Bikash (1968) "Fishing Rituals of the Marine Fisherfolk." BULLETIN OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA 17(2): 83-116.*
RESOURCE INFO:
The resource appropriated from Jambudwip Fishery is fish. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. Fishing grounds are off the southwest coast of Jambudwip Island and extend 3-4 miles offshore. Boundary is based on traditional use and limits of technology which prevents fishermen from wandering too far offshore.
The boundary of this resource has institutional arrangements. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country and are not within any general purpose local jurisdictions. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (highly confident). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (highly confident). The variance in quality between the zones has at some point in time created conflict among appropriators.
There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the fish can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of fish within the resource (highly confident). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of fish within a single year (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of fish from year to year (inferred).
The bottom topography of Jambudwip Fishery is primarily mud (inferred).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the location. Rather, the location is within the boundaries of the appropriation resource (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource partially overlap the boundaries of the location, but the two boundaries are not equivalent (educated guess). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource have a relationship to the boundaries of the distribution resource that was not indicated in this case study.
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated on the southwestern tip of Jambudwip Island, extending from the southwest coast of the island to about 4 miles offshore. The boundaries of the location are primarily institutional with the fishing camps and the fishing ground boundaries based on traditional usage. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of a general fishery.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not within any general purpose local jurisdiction. A permanent population does not live year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is . The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
The resource appropriated from Jambudwip Fishery is fish. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. Fishing grounds are off the southwest coast of Jambudwip Island and extend 3-4 miles offshore. Boundary is based on traditional use and limits of technology which prevents fishermen from wandering too far offshore.
The boundary of this resource has institutional arrangements. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country and are not within any general purpose local jurisdictions. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (highly confident). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (highly confident). The variance in quality between the zones has at some point in time created conflict among appropriators.
There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the fish can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of fish within the resource (highly confident). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of fish within a single year (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of fish from year to year (inferred).
The bottom topography of Jambudwip Fishery is primarily mud (inferred).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the location. Rather, the location is within the boundaries of the appropriation resource (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource partially overlap the boundaries of the location, but the two boundaries are not equivalent (educated guess). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource have a relationship to the boundaries of the distribution resource that was not indicated in this case study.
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated on the southwestern tip of Jambudwip Island, extending from the southwest coast of the island to about 4 miles offshore. The boundaries of the location are primarily institutional with the fishing camps and the fishing ground boundaries based on traditional usage. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of a general fishery.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not within any general purpose local jurisdiction. A permanent population does not live year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is . The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Jambudwip Fishery is fish. Fishing grounds are off the southwest coast of Jambudwip Island and extend 3-4 miles offshore. Boundary is based on traditional use and limits of technology which prevents fishermen from wandering too far offshore.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not indicated as either attempting, or failing to attempt to exercise access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de facto) closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1968. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because group moved to Jambudwip and first started using the resource in 1964..
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was not included in the case information.
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in local markets, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there was no information provided in the case study regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are appropriated. As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource. At the end of this period there was no information provided as to whether or not owners are exercising or attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de facto closed access to this resource (confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (confident). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (inferred). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are not "officials" (educated guess). The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource at a frequency which was not included in the case study. The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (highly confident).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (confident). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (highly confident).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related to other local resources, as well as evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (confident). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (highly confident). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). There is a limited range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (educated guess). It is unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 25-50, at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist. This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 35.1 - 36.1 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 35.1 and 36.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 35.1 and 36.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The results gathered were favorable for the level of technical externalities, and trust. They were not favorable for the category of income. This is based on access to private ordering systems, and th emoral integrity of the poor. The author evaluates efficiency in a functionalist manner. The actions of the fishing teams all have a purpose and that is to fish efficiently. The author doesn't present indicators of efficiency, he only expresses that it achieves medium efficiency..
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 95. An estimated 26%-50% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Pakistani. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are of the cast Kaibarta (fishing caste). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Hindu. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident).
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 7 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on exchange relationships (highly confident).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de facto (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de facto rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). More than one year is needed to build or to earn enough income to purchase the equipment for an appropriation team (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The most recent technological change experienced by this subgroup was 1-10 years ago (inferred). Considering other technologies that have not changed, this technology has been in use for 1-10 years (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). Members of this group have not increased their use of alternative sources of supply of this unit (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (highly confident).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 26%-50% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 148. An estimated 26%-50% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Pakistani. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are of the cast Raibarta (fishing caste). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Hindu. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident).
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 10 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on exchange relationships (highly confident).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de facto (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de facto rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (highly confident). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (highly confident). Less than 10% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (inferred). More than one year is needed to build or to earn enough income to purchase the equipment for an appropriation team (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The most recent technological change experienced by this subgroup was 1-10 years ago (inferred). Considering other technologies that have not changed, this technology has been in use for 1-10 years (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). Members of this group have not increased their use of alternative sources of supply of this unit (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (highly confident).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 51%-75% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Jambudwip Fishery is fish. Fishing grounds are off the southwest coast of Jambudwip Island and extend 3-4 miles offshore. Boundary is based on traditional use and limits of technology which prevents fishermen from wandering too far offshore.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not indicated as either attempting, or failing to attempt to exercise access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de facto) closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1968. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because group moved to Jambudwip and first started using the resource in 1964..
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was not included in the case information.
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in local markets, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there was no information provided in the case study regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are appropriated. As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource. At the end of this period there was no information provided as to whether or not owners are exercising or attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de facto closed access to this resource (confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (confident). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (inferred). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are not "officials" (educated guess). The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource at a frequency which was not included in the case study. The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (highly confident).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (confident). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (highly confident).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related to other local resources, as well as evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (confident). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (highly confident). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). There is a limited range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (educated guess). It is unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 25-50, at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist. This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 35.1 - 36.1 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 35.1 and 36.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 35.1 and 36.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The results gathered were favorable for the level of technical externalities, and trust. They were not favorable for the category of income. This is based on access to private ordering systems, and th emoral integrity of the poor. The author evaluates efficiency in a functionalist manner. The actions of the fishing teams all have a purpose and that is to fish efficiently. The author doesn't present indicators of efficiency, he only expresses that it achieves medium efficiency..
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 95. An estimated 26%-50% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Pakistani. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are of the cast Kaibarta (fishing caste). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Hindu. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident).
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 7 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on exchange relationships (highly confident).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de facto (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de facto rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). More than one year is needed to build or to earn enough income to purchase the equipment for an appropriation team (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The most recent technological change experienced by this subgroup was 1-10 years ago (inferred). Considering other technologies that have not changed, this technology has been in use for 1-10 years (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). Members of this group have not increased their use of alternative sources of supply of this unit (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (highly confident).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 26%-50% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 148. An estimated 26%-50% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Pakistani. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are of the cast Raibarta (fishing caste). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Hindu. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident).
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 10 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on exchange relationships (highly confident).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de facto (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de facto rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (highly confident). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (highly confident). Less than 10% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (inferred). More than one year is needed to build or to earn enough income to purchase the equipment for an appropriation team (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The most recent technological change experienced by this subgroup was 1-10 years ago (inferred). Considering other technologies that have not changed, this technology has been in use for 1-10 years (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). Members of this group have not increased their use of alternative sources of supply of this unit (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (highly confident).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 51%-75% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Jambudwip Fishery is fish. Fishing grounds are off the southwest coast of Jambudwip Island and extend 3-4 miles offshore. Boundary is based on traditional use and limits of technology which prevents fishermen from wandering too far offshore.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a caste. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an ethnic group. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring that an appropriator be of a particular race. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring continued usage of resource entry rights. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
There are no rules-in-use related to inheritance of entry rights.
5
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules apply, skip to the next section.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
There exists a rule requiring recording appropriators' claims to the flow of units from the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
There exists a rule requiring recording the quantity of assets in use. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
Payoff Rules
Heavy fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators are party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements with a national (private or public) agency(s) for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a caste. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an ethnic group. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring that an appropriator be of a particular race. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring continued usage of resource entry rights. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
There are no rules-in-use related to inheritance of entry rights.
5
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
There exists a rule requiring recording appropriators' claims to the flow of units from the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
There exists a rule requiring recording the quantity of assets in use. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
Payoff Rules
Appropriators may, for an unclear duration, lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Appropriators are party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements with a national (private or public) agency(s) for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
The resource appropriated from Jambudwip Fishery is fish. Fishing grounds are off the southwest coast of Jambudwip Island and extend 3-4 miles offshore. Boundary is based on traditional use and limits of technology which prevents fishermen from wandering too far offshore.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a caste. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an ethnic group. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring that an appropriator be of a particular race. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring continued usage of resource entry rights. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
There are no rules-in-use related to inheritance of entry rights.
5
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules apply, skip to the next section.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
There exists a rule requiring recording appropriators' claims to the flow of units from the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
There exists a rule requiring recording the quantity of assets in use. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
Payoff Rules
Heavy fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators are party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements with a national (private or public) agency(s) for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a caste. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an ethnic group. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring that an appropriator be of a particular race. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring continued usage of resource entry rights. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
There are no rules-in-use related to inheritance of entry rights.
5
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
There exists a rule requiring recording appropriators' claims to the flow of units from the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
There exists a rule requiring recording the quantity of assets in use. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
Payoff Rules
Appropriators may, for an unclear duration, lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Appropriators are party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements with a national (private or public) agency(s) for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
Institutional Analysis of Jambudwip Marine Fishery, India
Resource System
Fishery
Resource Users
Fisherfolk from different villages of West Bengal, Bihar, and Orrisa
Public Infrastructure Providers
Bahardar (leader of the unit)
Mahajans (money lenders)
Panchayat (8 group of members: 4 Bahardars and 4 ordinary crewmember)
Public Infrastructure
Boat
Fishing Net
Fisherfolk convention (norms)
Relationship 1
Fisherfolk extract resources (fishes) by using boats and fishing nets.
Relationship 2
Bahardar recruit his crewmembers to go fish in the Jambudwip island. There are no lisence required to fish. Fisherfolks are from 26 different villages of West Bengal, Bihar, and Orrisa.
Relationship 3
Bahardar provides for his crewmen. He is responsible for his unit.
Panchyat creates rules and regulations mostly norms in an event of conflict.
No government body involved.
Relationship 4
Fishing season is from October to February.
There is no rules on appropriation or monitoring sanctions.
Relationship 5
The fishing season lasts for only 4 months (Oct - February).
There is no catch limits.
Relationship 6
The resource users (Fisherfolk) are the ones who provide publlic infrastructures
Bahardar provide for his unit.
Panchayat (group of Bahardars and crewmen) create rules and regulations (mostly informal)
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Climate Change
Commercialization of fishery
Sea level changes
Pollution of khunti (camp ground), shores, and the sea.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Climate Change
New job opportunities or other livelihood options
Intervention of local, state, or federal government
Fishing routes
Migration both in and out.
Interstate policy intervention (Because fisherfolk here are from 3 different states)
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Very similar to that of link 7 because public infrastructure are limited and the providers are the users themselves
New job opportunities or other livelihood options
Intervention of local, state, or federal government
Fishing routes
Migration both in and out.
Interstate policy intervention (Because fisherfolk here are from 3 different states)
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Change in governing body.
Requirement of lisence.
New job opportunities or other livelihood options
Intervention of local, state, or federal government
Fishing routes
Migration both in and out.
Interstate policy intervention (Because fisherfolk here are from 3 different states)
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
The bahardar recruits people related to him or from his same villages if possible.
The money lender and bahardar does not communicate directly or contact directly. They communicate via agents.
Panchayat is formed by bahardars and crew members from different units.
Bahardar develops ceremonial relationship with people living closer to fishing ground to store his luggages.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Anderies JM, Arizona State University.
Brady U, Arizona State University.
Gurung T, Arizona State University.
. 1972. The Moon and Net: Study of a Transient Community of Fishermen at Jambudwip.
. 1968. Fishing Rituals of the Marine Fisherfolk. Bulletin of the Anthropological Survey of India. 17(2):83-116.