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Ann Marie Powers

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Anthropology

State University of New York

at

Stony Brook

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

AT STONY BROOK

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Abstract of the Dissertation
Social Organization in a Newfoundland
Fishing Settlement on the Burin Peninsula

by

Ann Marie Powers

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Anthropology

State University of New York at Stony Brook

1984

This study examines the importance of kinship and marriage for understanding local social organization in a rural fishing settlement on Newfoundland's Burin Peninsula, Baccalaos Cove (pseudonym). It is intended as an addition to the already substantial anthropological literature on Newfoundland's inshore fishermen and as a contribution to the study of kinship in complex societies.

The analysis of the kinship system in Baccalaos Cove follows Levi-Strauss' concepts of mechanical and statistical models and utilizes his ideas on alliance theory, particularly the notion of reciprocity. This analysis is supplemented by using Karl Polanyi's theoretical suggestions to identify the patterns of social structure which organize production.

The historical conditions surrounding settlement in Newfoundland have contributed towards local cognition of the outsider as a stranger. This view was strengthened during the Mercantile Period which existed until the mid-20th Century. The system of payments and credits which indebted the fishermen to the merchants led to the development of a strong skepticism regarding merchants and other outsiders, and local cognition of outsiders as strangers has been reenforced and symbolized in the ritual of mummering.

The family-based inshore fishery in Baccalaos Cove is organized much as it was during the 19th Century. Crews of agnates collectively own and/or control the means of production and the rules governing inheritance, marriage and property rights function to maintain the relations of kinship as relations of production.

The kinship system in Baccalaos Cove has a definite patrilineal bias. Together with the egalitarian ethic and the stranger complex, this bias enables us to understand and interpret social relationships. Agnatic kin are the ideal choice in the composition of fishing crews for various reasons. Affines are not the first choice since they are categorized as strangers--outsiders. However, when and if an affine is chosen as a member of a crew, usually that man is the sister's husband. This is partially due to ties of complementary filiation and

also because in some cases it is an extension of an alliance between the crowds. A possible model of preferential marriage allows us to understand how various crowds establish themselves in wife-giving and wife-receiving relationships.

Although this is not an exhaustive account, it is intended to provide some new insights into the comparative concepts which have been used for the study of rural fishing settlements in complex societies and to present some new areas for future research.

To My Parents
and in memory of
Celestine Edwards, Sr. and Celestine Edwards, Jr.

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I Introduction

This study examines the importance of kinship and marriage for understanding local social organization in a rural fishing settlement on Newfoundland's Burin Peninsula, Baccalaos Cove.¹ It is intended as an addition to the already substantial anthropological literature on Newfoundland's inshore fishermen² (cf. notably Faris 1972; Szwed 1966; Firestone 1967; Stiles 1972; Chiramonte 1970; Andersen and Wadel 1972; Andersen 1979; among others in the Bibliography) and as a contribution to the study of kinship in complex societies.

Baccalaos Cove and The North Atlantic Fringe

This monograph is descriptive, analytical and comparative, but it is not an exhaustive ethnography. It is a detailed account of the inshore fishermen and local social organization in one settlement on the Burin Peninsula of Newfoundland, with an emphasis on kinship and marriage in explaining land use, fishing rights and the organization for production. There are numerous publications which describe the small

¹ All notations appear at the end of the text.

inshore fisheries in Newfoundland and in the North Atlantic region in general (cf. Fox 1978; Messenger 1969; Lofgren 1972, 1979; Goodlad 1972; among others in the Bibliography), yet with the exception of one book on miners (cf. Leyton 1975), none exist for the Burin Peninsula in Newfoundland. It is hoped that this study will make some contribution in rectifying this situation.

Baccalaos Cove is similar to other settlements in its vicinity, but I do not suggest that it is 'typical' of all such coastal outports in Newfoundland.³ In many ways it is, in other ways it is not. At the time of my field work in 1977-1979 the settlement had approximately 1100 residents.

The North Atlantic fringe wherein fishing predominates as the main economic base of the people encompasses a broad spectrum (Figure I). As noted by a number of geographers, marine biologists, and anthropologists (cf. Borgstrom and Heighway 1961; Andersen and Wadel 1972; Faris 1972), the waters which are exploited are a part of continental shelves and present a diverse set of natural and subsequently, cultural ecological conditions. Today, as historically, the cultures of the North Atlantic fishermen are characterized by diversity and uncertainties. Generally, fishing in most of these areas is supplemented

Figure I

Map of North Atlantic Fringe Area (from North Atlantic Fishermen: Anthropological Essays on Modern Fishing. Raoul Andersen and Cato Wadel, eds. Cited with permission. (1972)




Figure I

with small scale horticulture and/or gardening, hunting and cattle or sheep-raising.

The diversity which marks the fishermen of the North Atlantic can be partially explained historically and ecologically. In the case of the Island of Newfoundland (Figure II), with a population of approximately 625,000, the diversity has been present since it was first settled by West Country English, Irish, French, Spanish and Portuguese in the 16th-19th Centuries. According to local myth, and also several historical sources (cf. Faris 1972; Prose 1895), the settlements in Newfoundland are so isolated because the sites were deliberately chosen to hide from the English and French merchants and military, the former of whom made permanent settlement illegal in the early 17th Century. C. Grant Head (1976), a geographer, disputes this claim, along with Matthews (1976), an anthropologist. Head argues that settlement sites were chosen on the basis of ecological advantages; i.e. fishermen learned to locate areas that would provide good fishing, as well as protection from winter storms and floods. The result in either case is that settlements are dispersed and many are still inaccessible by roads.




Figure II

Map of the Island of Newfoundland (from *North Atlantic Maritime Cultures*. Raoul Andersen, ed. 1979. Cited with permission.

Focus of Study

As in many other fishing settlements in the North Atlantic where the population is dispersed into small, isolated communities, Baccalaos Cove is predominantly self-sufficient; although it is closely linked with the larger national economy (cf. Kenny 1963). The present discussion will focus on the inshore fishermen of Baccalaos Cove at the local level.

It has been argued by some (Szwed 1966; Iverson and Matthews 1968; cf. Firth 1966) that fishermen are peasants or that these coastal settlements have a dual economy (cf. Brox 1972; Paine 1971; Wadel 1969). As we examine the history of Newfoundland and its fisheries, it will become apparent that Baccalaos Cove, like other coastal settlements in the North Atlantic, has always had an orientation toward the larger, national society and international markets, as well as maintaining its own self-sufficiency (cf. Wallerstein 1974). Any discussion of local social and economic organization cannot be complete without reference to these links with the larger society and economy. However, my purpose is to examine the dynamics of local social organization and production units--the inshore fishing crews--and not to analyze the economic system of Newfoundland per se. From

this perspective the problem around which the following explanation of social organization in Baccalaos Cove is based and can be set forth.

Egalitarianism as an explanatory concept has been used to explain social relations in Newfoundland outports; as well as in rural communities in Norway, The Faroe Islands and the Shetland Islands. Indeed, the literature which exists on many places in the North Atlantic fringe area is replete with explanations and statements referring to the egalitarian ethic (cf. Barnes 1954; Brox 1964; Blehr 1963, 1964; Lofgren 1972). Many anthropologists, including Faris (1972), Firestone (1967), Szwed (1966) and Nemec (1972) argue that while prestige and wealth differences do exist in Newfoundland outports, the dominant ethic is one of egalitarianism. "In overt behavior, all men (women must be, to some extent, excluded) are regarded as equal and classify themselves in a single social class category" (Faris 1972: 119). The terms of address used and the nature of interpersonal relationships have been suggested to support this idea. By examining the kinship system, crew composition and local economic organization in Baccalaos Cove, we can observe how this ethic prevails. But any discussion of the egalitarian ethic is incomplete without reference to the outside world--strangers--since the people of Baccalaos Cove make

a distinction between themselves and outsiders. This "stranger complex" has been noted in other fishing settlements in Newfoundland (cf. Faris 1972; Firestone 1967; Szwed 1966; Chiramonte 1970) and is a dominant and recurrent theme that pervades many aspects of life in Baccalaos Cove.

In interpreting and explaining this behavior, it is essential to include an account of the historical conditions which have existed, the kinship system, the economic system and the cultural traditions which influence and are in turn influenced by the order of things in Baccalaos Cove, most notably, the ritual of mummering.

Method of Analysis

The discussion of the egalitarian ethic and the kinship system in Baccalaos Cove utilizes Levi-Strauss' (1963, 1969b) concepts of conscious and unconscious models. According to Levi-Strauss (1963) folk models or conscious models are norms that are used to perpetuate social behavior, not explain it. They are the people's own conception of what they think things are like or should be like, or both (cf. Leach 1969). Consequently, the anthropologist cannot rely on the conscious model

as it is very often a 'screen' that hides the underlying structural organization. Yet, the conscious models must be considered as they may be correct, and even if erroneous, the biases themselves are part of the facts which should be investigated to provide insights into the underlying structure (Levi-Strauss 1963: 273-274). The analysis of the egalitarian ethic as a folk model will not provide an explanation for behavior, but will give us some insights into the social structure in Baccalaos Cove.

Both Radcliffe-Brown (1952) and Levi-Strauss (1963) maintain that the purpose of anthropological inquiry is to explain social structure from social relations. In other words, we can derive explanatory models of the society based on empirical data. These models are empirical expedients for understanding how and why the system functions and can elucidate our understanding of social behavior. In discussing unconscious models, Levi-Strauss presents two types--mechanical and statistical models (1963; 1969b). His concepts of mechanical and statistical models have been the source of numerous arguments in the anthropological literature (cf. e.g. Homans and Schneider 1955; Needham 1958, 1962; Nutini 1965; Leach 1969). I follow Levi-Strauss (1965, 1969) wherein he equates mechanical and statistical models with the concepts of the ideal and real. Mechanical models

are unconscious explanatory models which seek to examine social phenomena by analyzing the structural elements of the system (Levi-Strauss 1963; 1969b). Statistical models, which can be generated from the mechanical model, analyze systematic behavioral variations.

The analysis of the kinship system in Baccalaos Cove follows Levi-Strauss' concepts of mechanical and statistical models and utilizes his ideas on alliance theory, particularly the notion of reciprocity (Levi-Strauss 1969b). Further, since the economy is embedded in the social structure, the analysis seeks to identify those aspects of the kinship and economic systems which organize production. In this regard, Karl Polanyi's (1944, 1957) modes of economic integration -- reciprocity, redistribution and [market] exchange -- enable us to identify the patterns of social structure which organize production. It also enables us to focus on local socio-economic organization without biasing the analyses for failing to consider how the fishermen of Baccalaos Cove are tied to the larger society and economy.

The inshore fishermen in Newfoundland have been classified as peasants. But it must be noted that fishermen differ from peasants, i.e. agriculturalists (Wolf 1955) in three distinct ways. First, in the case of the inshore fishermen in Baccalaos Cove, the members of a crew collectively

own and/or control the means of production. Second, there is a higher degree of uncertainty offered by the exploitation of a marine ecological niche. To this extent fishermen are hunters and must fish seasonally (as do the inshore fishermen in Baccalaos Cove), follow the fish on their annual cycles (such as some off-shore fishermen, trawler fishermen, etc.), or supplement their fishing with other economic endeavors, when available--occupational pluralism (cf. Comitas 1973; Andersen and Wadel 1972). In Baccalaos Cove the latter includes hunting, some gardening, and occasional work in the nearby mine. Third, the relationship between the fishermen and merchants on whom they depend for gear and supplies is today, as historically, similar to the relationship between craftsmen and merchants in Europe during the Mercantile Period. Neale (1957: 370) aptly notes how during the Commercial Revolution, product markets were self-regulating markets--as we know them today. But, as in the case of the English woolen market where there existed a feudal system of land tenure and labor was organized by guilds, factor markets [land and labor] did not exist. In Newfoundland, the inshore fishermen organize land and labor themselves, i.e. factor markets are absent. In Baccalaos Cove it is kinship which organizes the relations of production.

II General Background

Topography

The Burin Peninsula (Figure III) on Newfoundland's south coast is approximately 106 miles long and at its widest point, 15 miles across (Horwood 1969: 170). It is composed of pre-Cambrian volcanic rock, with extensive coastal uplifted sedimentary rock. This uplifting is a result of continental plate collision. The Island of Newfoundland is the last mountain in the Appalachian mountain chain and much of the terrain inland on the Burin Peninsula is similar to the above-tree line terrain of the White Mountains of New Hampshire.

There is an average precipitation of 52 inches per year, mostly snow, with a mean temperature of 23° F. and rarely exceeding 75° F. in the summer. Fog is present over 25% of the days and there is a steady breeze in excess of 10 knots from the west, southwest or northwest (Collins, personal communication; Head 1976; Burin Peninsula Municipal Study 1967).

Bare rocks form most of the shoreline outside the harbors and small coves. The sea bottom falls off abruptly from the precipitous shore line and unabated North



Figure III Map of the Burin Peninsula

Atlantic swells pound the exposed rock. The vast majority of the shore line is rock, with only one sandy beach suitable for recreational swimming on the whole of the Peninsula. There are marsh areas throughout the eastern side of the Peninsula, many of which are found in river harbors and larger coves.

In the summer months of June-August, the grassy expanses of barren do not provide an abundance of wild life, with the exception of the ever present sea birds. Where soil does appear inland, thick krumholtz and berry bushes grow in abundance. The locals around Baccalaos Cove supplement their diet with raspberries, blueberries, and bake-apples, which proliferate in the tangled krumholtz. Further inland, the terrain becomes expansive barrens and bogs interspersed around small ponds and variegated by streams. Cracker berries, wild strawberries, leather leaf, kalmia and pitcher plants appear throughout the terrain during the summer.

The winter landscape can best be described as tundra. The boulder strewn barrens afford little shelter for growing trees and the predominant white pines that do grow are small. During the fall and early winter men take trips into the country for wood and to hunt for caribou, native to Newfoundland, partridge, moose, deer and rabbit to supplement household needs. Trips into

the country are often long and arduous, but are an important household production activity.

Baccalaos Cove (Figure IV) is a fishing settlement in Placentia Bay on the eastern shore of the Burin Peninsula of Newfoundland. It is situated at the head of a long narrow inlet which provides a deep, well-protected natural harbor. A natural breakwater near the head creates an inner harbor which provides added shelter. Steep ridges, about 450 feet above sea level, bound the inlet on both sides. Two rivers flow down glacial valleys and empty into the harbor. One of these rivers has a hydro-electric dam which provides electricity to the settlement. There is a man-made lake formed above it. Town sewerage empties into the harbor and fresh water is supplied by a reservoir, with wells dispersed throughout the outport (cf. Burin Peninsula Municipal Study 1967: 2-3).

The majority of the two-story wooden dwellings are located at the head of the harbor on the eastern shore of the inlet. Since the soil conditions and climate on the Burin Peninsula are unsuitable for farming, there is little agriculture. Yet most households do have some cattle, sheep and horses, as well as small garden plots for root crops such as potatoes, turnips and carrots. Together with hunting and berry-




Figure IV Map of Baccalaos Cove

picking, these small gardens supplement household consumption needs.

Social Setting

In 1967 there were 840 residents in Baccalaos Cove, of which 280 were adults between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five (Burin Peninsula Municipal Study 1967: 4). Of the 280 adults, 145 were listed as employed, primarily as inshore fishermen (79%). There were 14 miners and the rest were working elsewhere in Canada (Burin Peninsula Municipal Study 1967: 3).

In 1977-1979 there were about 1100 people in Baccalaos Cove, of which approximately one-third were adults. As most likely the case for the statistics presented in 1967, the figures for the number of men engaged in the inshore fishery in 1977 (81) do not represent the total number of fishermen who are active in Baccalaos Cove. Often, men who receive social assistance will go fishing on a regular basis to supply their own household needs. Although occasionally they will sell some of their surplus fish, their activities and income are not recorded since they are considered to be negligible in comparison to the hauls recorded for the registered crews of trap fishermen. Subsequently,

since fishing predominates, Baccalaos Cove is socially, politically and economically a fishing outport and the people of Baccalaos Cove identify themselves as fishermen.

For the inhabitants of Baccalaos Cove, the outside world is divided into several categories. These are not arbitrary designations, but rather are local distinctions which are expressed by the people and demonstrated in their marriage patterns, social and economic organization and cultural traditions. Local cognition of the outsider--the stranger--as someone who is not to be trusted is pervasive in Newfoundland, and in Baccalaos Cove this has an important influence on daily life. Figure V depicts the socio-economic designations which apply on the Burin Peninsula and as will be discussed later (see Chapters IV and VI), they are closely linked with their conception of affines as strangers.

Within the area marked 'A' are those settlements which once shared a common church and parish and still share the same priest. Their children go to the same high school (grades 9-11), located in St. Lawrence, and intermarriage is frequent. Many of the men from these settlements also worked in the fluorspar mine in St. Lawrence until it was closed in 1977. There have been hostilities between the people from Baccalaos Cove and

Figure V

Map of the Burin Peninsula Depicting Socio-Economic
Boundaries in reference to Baccalaos Cove

Key:

- | | |
|--------|--|
| Area A | Outside Baccalaos Cove but within 25 miles |
| Area B | Baccalaos Cove |
| Area C | Outside Baccalaos Cove but on the Burin Peninsula (further than 25 miles from Baccalaos Cove |
| Area D | Elsewhere in Newfoundland |




Figure V

St. Lawrence for many years, although today the rivalry is not so intense.

The hospital in St. Lawrence, which serves all of Areas A-C is a source of pride, but also a symbol of the rivalry between the two settlements. It was built in 1954 by the American government as a gift to the people of these communities for their heroic efforts in rescuing many of the men aboard two U.S. navy ships, the Truxton and Pollux. These ships went aground just outside Baccalaos Cove during a fierce winter storm on the night of February 18, 1942. When the hospital was erected in St. Lawrence, many of the people in Baccalaos Cove felt slighted, since they had been the first ones on the scene and notified the others (for a full account cf. Edwards 1983). They saw it as another example of the government favoring St. Lawrence. The fact that the fluorspar mine was located there was undoubtedly an important factor in the choice of that site.

Area C designates those communities with whom there is regular, but infrequent, contact. Residents of Baccalaos Cove know people who live there, men and women have married people from these communities and Marystown has become an important service center for the area. Some of the men from Baccalaos Cove work in the fish plant in Marystown during the year or go

fishing on trawlers out of this port, the port in Burin, or the ports in Grand Bank and Fortune.

St. John's, being a little over 250 miles by the high road from Baccalaos Cove, is sometimes visited for a day or two, and today many people in Baccalaos Cove have friends or relatives who live there. However, it is not considered desirable to live there, as there are "too many strangers."

Within Baccalaos Cove kinship continues to structure social relations, especially in the inshore fishery. In his book, Dying Hard: The Ravages of Industrial Carnage (1975), Elliott Leyton focuses on the physical and social affects of the now defunct fluorspar mine on the people of St. Lawrence and its neighboring communities. While his book is a worthwhile contribution, it is not an ethnography, nor was it intended to be one. Rather, his "...concern is to describe a national disaster...It is my hope...that this book will stimulate industrial nations to re-examine their obligations to the men whose bodies are destroyed in the process of creating wealth" (Leyton 1975: 9). Referring to the spouses of miners afflicted with radiation poisoning, however, Leyton writes "...nor will her widowhood be buttressed by the support of the community, for the denuded kinship system of Newfoundland's south coast creates households which are largely isolated

from one another" (Leyton 1975: 16). The oral accounts Leyton recorded and published appear to substantiate his ideas, but in the case of Baccalaos Cove they are misleading. The miners who, as the locals say, are "sheer perishing" from the dust and radiation play an important role in the settlement and these men, their kin and neighbors (fishermen and miners alike), have adapted to their changing status within the community.

Although only about 5% of the adult population from Baccalaos Cove has worked in the mine during any given year (cf. Burin Peninsula Municipal Study 1967), those who have worked there, even for short periods of time, have been affected by the dust and radiation. Once a man has been diagnosed as having silicosis, he waits to be officially "turned down," i.e. to be medically declared as disabled. One must be medically "turned down" to qualify for any compensation or social assistance. Since many of the miners also go fishing, either between shifts or sometimes taking time off when the fish are striking, the loss a man feels is, to cite Leyton (1975: 18) "...most often symbolized by the inevitable forced sale of his dory on that terrible day when he can no longer climb aboard her."

To be "turned down" is tantamount to a sentence of death and for some it is viewed as far worse because in Baccalaos Cove there is great pride taken in a man being

able to work. To be "on the punky" or "on the dole" as social assistance is referred to, is dreaded by most. During this period both the man and his wife enter a new status: she of approaching widowhood (Leyton 1975: 16) and he of social alienation, marked by being confined to his own home or those within a short walking distance away; less contact with fellow kin and fishermen; and restrictions imposed upon fishing and his manhood (cf. also Leyton 1975). For the men, their most frequent companions while they are waiting to die are others like themselves (Leyton 1975: 53, 97). But, these visits are rare, too, for they see in each other an image of their own future. Occasionally, if the day is clear and dry, a miner will leave his house and his endless bottles filled with pills and 'cures' to venture to a local household or club where the men will gather to talk or play cards with some friends. The subject of conversation may be the mine, fishing or most often, local gossip. In terms of communication throughout the outport, the disabled miners are an important link in the gossip network. Many of the elderly look forward to a visit by one of these men in order to learn the latest gossip, and they are a pivotal source of information.

Consequently, while the miner is alienated from the

economic activities of daily life within Baccalaos Cove and he and his wife are avoided, they are not rejected. Wives spend much of their time with their mothers and sisters and are given moral support from kin and friends (cf. Powers 1980 for an account of the marginal position of miners in Baccalaos Cove). Indeed, the kinship system in Baccalaos Cove is far from being "denuded."

III History

Historical Background

The history of Newfoundland and the development and exploitation of its fishing resources began with the official voyage of John Cabot in the late 15th Century. It is today widely accepted that Cabot's voyage of 1497 was a follow-up trip to confirm the "discovery" of Newfoundland in 1481 by Englishmen from Bristol (cf. Prowse 1895; Lounsbury 1969). Within 50 years, Europeans, especially Spanish, Portuguese, French and English, began to exploit the vast off-shore fishing grounds that had fish "so plentiful that they sometimes stopped the progress of...ships" (Lounsbury 1969: 19). There is no record of the first European visit to Baccalaos Cove, but the Burin Peninsula is documented by both the French and English by the 17th Century (cf. Leyton 1975; Prowse 1895; Head 1976). The first record of any type of residents at Baccalaos Cove is in 1813, although temporary settlements in St. Lawrence are recorded as early as 1676 (Prowse 1895: 195; 389).

Since permanent settlement was officially prohibited by the English, who had claimed Newfoundland after Sir

Humphrey Gilbert's voyage in 1583, records on scattered settlements are sparse. The Crown, in the interests of her West Country merchants who wanted to monopolize the fishing, issued the Western Charter of 1634 which was renewed in 1661 and 1670. According to the Charter, the Captain of the first boat entering a harbor at the beginning of each fishing season was the Admiral of that harbor and could "seize any piece of foreshore he might select sufficient to cure and dry his cod fish" (Chadwick 1967: 6). The Charter was designed to favor the interests of the Devon merchants and discourage colonization. Among its provisions, no settlers could inhabit any area within six miles of the sea nor could they take the best fishing "rooms" prior to the arrival of fishermen from England (Chadwick 1967: 6).

During the 17th and 18th Centuries the English West Country traders became concerned about French interests, and also those of the London merchants. While the West Country merchants participated in trade with southwestern Europe, they were indifferent to the nationality of the carriers and most of the trading was indirect. The London merchants, however, began sending English "sack ships" to Newfoundland to buy fish and transport it directly to Spain in English vessels (Lounsbury 1969: 37). After a short time, merchants from Bristol and

Southampton followed their example, but the West Country merchants did not.

On the premise that Newfoundland was a "nursery for seamen," the West Country merchants repeatedly blocked attempts at colonization and during Cromwell's administration, a regular convoy service to protect their trading interests was established. The Commander of the convoys was given control over civil administration in Newfoundland, but for the summer months only. In actuality, the inhabitants who lived in Newfoundland year-round (winterers) were ignored (Rothney 1973: 11). Concern over the London merchants increased because the West Country merchants believed that permanent year-round habitations was being supported by the sack ship owners who promoted a system of by-boatkeeping. This was a system whereby London merchants financed independent fishermen to travel to Newfoundland as passengers, had them acquire small vessels and employ cheap labor to catch fish, and then had the fish sold to the London sack ships for direct transport to Europe (cf. Prowse 1895; Lounsbury 1969). Through this practice a two-class system of "masters" and "servants" arose, who lived in Newfoundland year-round. Unlike the Devon merchants, whose fishermen worked on a share system, by-boatkeepers paid wages. Yet, it is the former system

which was maintained well into the 20th Century (see Chapter VII). When the Western Charter was renewed in 1661, by-boatkeepers were forbidden transport to Newfoundland (Rothney 1973: 12).

Concurrently, Louis XIV began to reorganize France's Canadian ventures. In an effort to promote trade for France by protecting her fishing rights and the route to Quebec, colonists were sent to fortify Plaisance (Placentia) on Newfoundland's Burin Peninsula in 1662. Charles II, in an alliance with France, did not dispute French authority over the entire south coast, nor the French control along Newfoundland's northern and western shores (Chadwick 1967: 30; Rothney 1973: 12).

The English settlements on the Avalon Peninsula became the focus for international trade. Throughout the 17th and 18th Centuries, France, England and later, New England, carried on international free trade through these ports, since there were no customs officers and no tax on cod fish (Rothney 1973: 13). With France and England both aspiring for control of the fishery and trade, Newfoundland was in turmoil. The West Country merchants robbed, killed, and plundered the settlers to such an extent that in 1675, upon re-

turning to England, Commodore John Berry reported many misdeeds. In retaliation, the West Country merchants undertook to tear down every house between Cape Race and Bonavista (Rothney 1973: 14; Prowse 1895). It was during this period that many settlers moved to French settlements on the south coast and in and around Placentia. With the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) the French lost Placentia, but retained fishing rights throughout the south coast and on the northern coast.

Settlement

It is around these conditions that permanent habitation was established in Newfoundland. The West Country merchants wanted to monopolize the fishing rights and trade and in their efforts they had the support of the Crown. Supposedly, prohibitions on settlement by non-seamen was England's attempt to conserve her labor force (cf. Prowse 1895). Legislation to prevent settlement was first enacted against the fishermen and when this failed, the prohibition against women remaining year-round was enacted in the latter 18th Century. But the population continued to grow. As Faris (1972:) notes, "the significance of the initial foothold in Newfoundland appears to have been underemphasized by historians, for the explicit prohibitions on settle-

ment after 1633 would surely have had more effect had there not already been settlers on the Island."

By 1800 Newfoundland was still not an official British Colony, but by this time missionaries were arriving, and with them came schools and churches. In 1817 the first year-round Governor for Newfoundland was appointed and by 1819 it was ruled legal for Newfoundland settlers to own their own homes and land. Official acknowledgement of colony status came in 1824 (cf. Story 1969; Gunn 1967; Prowse 1895).

The information available about the local history of the outports is scant, and Baccalaos Cove is no exception. This situation can partially be attributed to lack of official documentation because until the early 19th Century, settlement was not legal and records were not well-kept. Locally, some settlers may not have kept accurate or detailed records fearing reprisals by the British (cf. Faris 1972). However, it is quite plausible that the Records Office in London perhaps holds some information which is generally unavailable (cf. Edwards 1983).

The earliest reference to inhabitants in Baccalaos Cove is in a footnote about privateering: "In 1813 an Irish younster ran away from his master,...and went to (sic) Baccalaos Cove, found an American privateer there,

went on board of her and joined the crew (Prowse 1895: 389). It is likely that the first permanent settlement in Baccalaos Cove was in the early 19th Century. In the neighboring outport of St. Lawrence, summer fishing is recorded as early as the 16th Century (cf. Leyton 1975) and there are numerous accounts of fishing and boat building activities throughout Placentia Bay during the 16th-18th Centuries (cf. Prowse 1895). While population figures are unreliable, Head (1976: 11) notes that of the 650 recorded winterers on the Burin Peninsula and in Placentia Bay in 1687, 256 were in Placentia, the rest being scattered throughout the Burin Peninsula in Marystown, St. Lawrence and Odegin. Like many outports, Baccalaos Cove was settled by immigrants who arrived as sharemen during the early years of the transatlantic fishery, and by those who were expelled from Placentia after 1713 (Horwood 1969: 170). Several of the surnames found today in Baccalaos Cove are those of the earliest settlers in Newfoundland, primarily Irish and English (cf. Seary 1977).

The granting of Representative Government to Newfoundland in 1832 was largely due to the support of the Irish Catholic populace who wanted a place for themselves in an Anglican dominated government (cf. Story 1969). With Representative Government came an increase in religious hostilities and some local

rivalries and many incidences occurred that caused much socio-political unrest, especially in St. John's where the population was ethnically, culturally, and religiously mixed. In 1856, in an attempt to control this rivalry, Newfoundland's educational system was set up along denominational lines that still persist today. Political representation became based upon the proportion of a denomination's share of the population, a policy instituted in an attempt to end the exclusion of Roman Catholics in public office (Story 1969: 27).

Although Baccalaos Cove, like many other outports, was not affected by many of these changes, being religiously and culturally primarily homogeneous, historically, there has been a rivalry between the residents of Baccalaos Cove and the predominantly Anglican neighboring outport of St. Lawrence. The first Catholic Church in Baccalaos Cove was built in 1867, the Catholic school was built four years earlier. Prior to this date, Baccalaos Cove was part of the Burin Peninsula Parish and even after their own church was built, the people were considered to be part of the Catholic parish in St. Lawrence, established in 1849 (cf. Edwards 1983). It was not until 1983 that Baccalaos Cove was considered to have an independent parish.

Baccalaos Cove was not given any official political recognition until 1953, when their first Community Council was incorporated. Prior to that date, the outport was subsumed under the auspices of St. Lawrence. As late as 1967 the Federal Government, in a municipal survey undertaken on the Burin Peninsula, concluded that Baccalaos Cove "...has not been selected in the Regional Plan as a growth point" (Burin Peninsula Municipal Survey 1967: 1). In 1977 there was an unsuccessful attempt made by the Provincial Government to move the school out of Baccalaos Cove and transport the children to schools in St. Lawrence. Consequently, the rivalry between these two outports that began in the early 19th Century continues to effect interrelationships between them and reinforces local cognition of the outsider--the stranger--as someone who is not to be trusted.

By the early 20th Century a railway had been built across the Island and some new industries began, which opened the Island's interior to settlers for the first time (cf. Halpert 1969). But the 1920 deflation and the depression spelled the end of self-government. For the people of Baccalaos Cove and its neighboring communities, November 1929 was especially auspicious. An

earthquake off the Grand Banks sent three tidal waves smashing into the south coast. Their was a loss of property, lives, and an imbalance created in the cod fish feeding grounds for years which resulted in poor voyages and much deprivation for several years afterwards (cf. Leyton 1975).

In 1933 the Amuleree Commission met in St. John's to consider the political and economic situation of the Island. The commission recommended a commission form of government with the United Kingdom assuming responsibility for the finances of Newfoundland until such time as the Island could again be self-supporting. The commission (three Englishmen and three Newfoundlanders) was established in 1943 and continued until 1947 (cf. Mowat and Devisser 1968: 21). The same year, a New York businessman, Walter Siebert, opened the fluorspar mine in St. Lawrence and the first shaft was sunk in 1937. During the early years of operation some men worked without pay "just for to keep her started" (Leyton 1975: 13). As with mines which had been opened in other parts of Newfoundland, this one was worked by fishermen during the off-seasons or on a shift basis, not by professional miners. Wages were low, if they existed at all, and it was not until World War II and Newfoundland's Confederation with Canada in 1949 that any significant changes were brought to the outports.

The return to relative "prosperity" was not due to the work of the commission, but rather to the conditions brought about by World War II. Geographically, the Island occupied a strategic position in the defense of the North Atlantic. As a consequence, both the United States and Canada built and maintained air and naval bases on the Island and, in so doing, brought money into the economy. By the end of the war the people were anxious to be free from the commission rule, and Britain was becoming reluctant to continue to be responsible for Newfoundland. In 1946 a convention met to consider the political and economic future of Newfoundland. It was largely due to the efforts of Joseph Smallwood that Newfoundland joined the Canadian Confederation in 1949 (Mowat and DeVissier 1968: 24).

Baccalaos Cove received its own power supply in the early 1960's and many residents are now recipients of old age pensions, family allowances or unemployment benefits. But these changes have not come easily. During the mid-60's the government instituted a plan known as the Resettlement Program, designed to transform "a peasant subsistence-level society into a market-oriented industrial one" (Iverson and Matthews 1968: 136). The program was designed to move the entire population

of some outports to nearby "growth centers" (cf. Skolnik 1968). At one time Baccalaos Cove was being considered for resettlement, however the residents opposed the plan, as they did in other communities (cf. Matthews 1976). Socially, this program has created a population of many displaced people because aside from the problems of housing and employment, the people who have been re-settled have been uprooted from their traditional livelihood (Matthews 1968: 143; 1976). The financial resources initially allocated for the program were small (Skolnik 1968: 1) and most of the residents had an adverse reaction to the plan (cf. Matthews 1976). Nevertheless, in many parts of Newfoundland whole settlements were relocated and the continuity of their way of life was seriously disrupted.

Trade and Markets

In many ways the economy of the outports today has not changed since the days of the servant fishery of the 17th-18th Centuries and the mercantilistic system which persisted well into the 20th Century. The fishermen brought over to Newfoundland by the West Country merchants were on a share system, and it is this system, adopted by the family-based inshore fishery in

the 19th Century, which exists today. The servant fishery of the competing London merchants paid the fishermen wages. Yet, we must remember that the planters (resident boat owners) and by-boatkeepers (seasonal) did not control the prices which they paid for their supplies, nor the prices received for the fish (cf. Lounsbury 1969; Head 1976). In addition, they had to give the servant fishermen the agreed upon wages, decided before the fishery began, despite the success or failure of the voyage. "In so far as exchange at a set rate is in question, the economy is integrated by the factors which fix that rate, not by the market mechanism" (Polanyi 1968: 255). The prices of food items, supplies and fish were not controlled and determined by a self-regulating market since the boat owners had to purchase supplies and sell their fish to the merchants regardless of the prices the merchants offered. In many respects the servant fishery was similar to the mercantile (truck) system predominant in Newfoundland from the 19th until the mid-20th Century.

In administered trade as found in many archaic economies, there is usually a port of trade which regulates the goods to be traded, provides military security, and also a central administration to organize and control foreign trade and internal production (Polanyi

1957: 23). After the advent of the family-based inshore fishery in the early 19th Century, merchants were able to provide some centralized administration in terms of the redistribution of goods within the outports (see Chapter VII). But for Newfoundland in general, the competing interests of the West Country and London merchants, together with independent European and later American traders during the 17th and 18th Centuries, precluded the enforcement of strict regulations on price, quantity, and types of goods being imported and exported to and from Newfoundland. However, attempts were made at various times to enact such policies to regulate the merchants, trade, and the fishery.

In 1699 the Newfoundland Act tried to provide for the administration of trade by acknowledging the rights of the planters, by-boatkeepers and London merchants to participate in the fishery and conduct trade. While the provisions of the Act confirmed the West Country merchants as managers, in actuality it removed them from any administrative role (Lounsbury 1969: 214). Administration was placed in the control of the fishing admirals, as also dictated in the Western Charter of 1634, and they were to be supervised by the Commodores as representatives of the Crown. But,

scarcely had the law become effective
when it was discovered that fishery

regulations imposed by statute were quite as inoperative as those granted by royal prerogative...Those concerned with its administration were soon found to be remiss in their duties...allowing themselves to be bribed or swayed by personal interest. Moreover, it failed to provide fines or penalties for violations, and contained no provisions for correcting many of the abuses still existing in the fishing industry (Lounsbury 1969: 215).

Although the Act did not specify the regulation of defense, protection against piracy and the curtailment of illegal trade, such regulations were considered to be part of the administrative responsibility of the appointed authorities (Lounsbury 1969: 217). Their efforts, however, seemed to be ineffectual. The Board of Trade made several attempts at legislation to strengthen the Act and supervise trade throughout the 18th Century (cf. Lounsbury 1969: 216, 219, 264, 267), but these were unsuccessful. However, in 1767 a customs house was established in St. John's for the clearance of vessels and their cargo. The initial reaction on the part of merchants and sea captains was negative and many ignored the authorities. Yet, "in spite of the resentment in mercantile and shipping circles, the new officers...were effective in reducing the amount of illegal trade" (Lounsbury 1969: 327).

In view of the above, it is difficult to classify the economy of Newfoundland between the 17th and 18th

Centuries as self-regulating since there were conditions which allowed for exploitation or profiteering, and also constraints on such activities. Wages and prices were not regulated by the market mechanism and Newfoundland was never part of the plantation system of the British colonial interests elsewhere, since its trade in dried cod fish was considered to benefit Great Britain indirectly, as a branch of foreign commerce:

If mercantilism implies a rigid control over the commerce of outlying possessions in the interests of both the mother country and the colony, it never found application in Newfoundland. Technically, a "free fishery" always existed... The laxity of the Act of 1699, the unwillingness of the crown for many years to make any serious attempt to apply the acts of trade there in spite of the tremendous amount of illegal trade that existed, lead to the conclusion that the British government did not desire to apply mercantilist practices in Newfoundland (Lounsbury 1969: 332-335).

The ultimate refusal of merchants to continue to guarantee wages changed the organization of production within the fishery. "English servants refused to sign on for shares or truck (payment in kind)" (Sider 1976: 107). Many planters and by-boatkeepers retired, became local merchants, or became fishermen. In turn, the family-based inshore fishery developed in the early 19th Century and mercantilism predominated.

In the truck system, the fishermen were outfitted on credit against their catch, receiving gear in the spring and foodstuffs in the winter. The fishermen were then obligated to take their fish to the supplying merchant to ensure future supplies and credit (cf. Felt-ham 1959). According to Antler (1977), capitalism had thus penetrated the Newfoundland economy by the 19th Century since the merchant's control over prices of supplies and fish meant that the price of fish was a "disguised wage" and the acceptance of gear and supplies on credit committed the fishermen to the merchants. She argues that the fishermen owned the means of production, but had no rights of disposal over the product of their labor (Antler 1977: 11).

Antler's argument is a cogent one, yet several qualifications must be considered in reference to the history of trading relationships and the price system in Newfoundland. If trade is defined as the peaceful way of acquiring goods that are not locally available, then trade may or may not be part of the market --i.e. the two do not have to be "coterminous" (Polanyi 1969: 22). Polanyi distinguished three types of trade: gift trade, administered trade, and market trade. In the latter, "the range of tradeable goods--the commodities--is practically unlimited. And the supply-demand price

mechanism is adaptable...to every feature or element of trade itself...(1968: 231). By the early 19th Century, land and labor, the social relations of production, were organized in the inshore fishery by ties of kinship, much as they are today in Baccalaos Cove. To cite Neale (1957: 369), the important factor to consider is that "where some markets are self-regulating and others are not...none of the markets can be truly self-regulating, for the limiting elements in the controlled markets will affect the working of all." To explain trade and markets in Newfoundland during the Mercantile Period, therefore, it is necessary to denote the ways in which trade was self-regulating and ways in which it did not approach a self-regulating market system.

In the inshore fishery of the 19th-20th Centuries, the amount of fish produced and distributed was largely beyond the control of the merchants. If the demand for fish was low, the merchants could reject part of the catch. But, if demand increased, the merchants could not similarly command an increase in supply. At times, attempts were made by the fishermen to withhold salt cured fish until a higher price could be received from an independent trader, but the practice was infrequent since the fishermen still had to depend upon the

merchant for the next year's supplies and credit (cf. Sider 1976; Faris 1977). In addition, it is important to realize that the fishermen sold fish--the product of their labor--and not the labor itself. Chayanov noted this and presents it as one of the reasons why peasants cannot be equated with wage laborers or the proletariat (Chayanov 1966: 42; see Chapter VII). Likewise, the merchants often received fish that was surplus, after the needs of the household and the crowd had been provided (cf. Szwed 1967: 50).

As international prices for fish and other food-stuffs fluctuated, the merchants reacted simultaneously and the product markets to a large extent approximated the self-regulating market. For example, the merchants set the prices on supplies and fish, the fish were brought to the merchants and they then culled (sorted and categorized) it according to quality and grade, each grade having an assigned price (Newfoundland Royal Commission Report 1933: 104-105). During World War I, when the demand for fish increased, the merchants adjusted to the situation by introducing the talqual system "and in a short time it became the practice of merchants through the country to fix an average price for fish without regard to quality" (Newfoundland Royal Commission Report 1933: 105). However, it must be noted that

"...factor markets (land, labor, capital) in the economists's sense had not come into existence, except for the Capital Market" (Neale 1957: 370).

Administered trade often functions where the economy is organized by redistribution. Redistribution is defined by Polanyi as "the systematic movement of goods towards an administrative center and their reallocation by the authorities at that center" (Polanyi 1968: 223). Implicit in the redistribution process is that the types of goods and services are determined by the authorities at that center. In administered trade such processes as storage, weighing, checking of quality, "regulation of 'payment'; credits; price differentials" (Polanyi 1957: 262) are carried on vis a vis administrative channels. Higgling-haggling is practiced only on items other than price, "...the rationale of the procedure is, of course, to keep prices unchanged" (Polanyi 1957: 262; see Chapter VII).

Most of the merchant houses were owned in England and administered by British agents who had no real commitment to Newfoundland or its fishery (Ryan 1972: 96). Consequently, independent traders, who could offer a better price for fish, began operating alongside the merchant houses. It is difficult to assess the extent of their success. It was perhaps quite marginal at

first, at least until the 20th Century, as the fishermen were largely under obligation to the merchants--a situation not unlike other colonial incursions. To cite the complaints of some fishermen (cited in Prowse 1895: 379):

For a number of years back we have been struggling with the world, as we suppose, through the impositions of the merchants and their agents by their exorbitant prices on shop goods and provisions, by which means we are from year to year held in debt so as not daring to find fault, fearing we may starve at the approach of every winter...They take it on themselves to price their goods and ours also as they think most convenient to them.

Payments between the fishermen and merchants in cash were rare. For the merchants, such payments would negate the obligation of a fisherman to a merchant. While theoretically a man could take his catch to any merchant, in actuality this seldom occurred (Szwed 1966: 41). The merchants offered storage, some economic security, goods not otherwise available, and took the responsibility of marketing the fish. In exchange for the locally available surplus fish (after household needs were met), the merchants provided non-locally produced goods (Szwed 1966: 49). That is, credit and 'payments' against it were extended through a system which obligated each to the other, usually being payment in kind. It has been

argued that the less skilled and less productive fishermen were strongly encouraged by the mercantile system (cf. Newfoundland Royal Commission Report 1933), but as Szwed notes (1966: 52), a person would not be carried on credit indefinitely if the merchant believed the fisherman did not want to honor his obligation.

Various Newfoundland commission reports maintained that good fishermen were penalized for their efforts as merchants increased their profits. Although this is correct, I cannot fully concur with Antler's (1977) comments regarding this system and its relationship to the class struggle in Newfoundland outports. According to Antler, the numerous commission reports which charged that the mercantile system led to "laziness, extravagance, dishonesty, carelessness, recklessness, want of energy" (Newfoundland Royal Commission Report also known as the Almuree Commission 1933: 81) on the part of the fishermen exemplifies the existence of a class struggle turned inward (Antler 1977: 10). Although her ideas are insightful, in most outports, fishermen lacked the autonomy economically and socially to develop any sort of "class consciousness" (see Chapters V and VII). Even today there is little opportunity for differential accumulation among the fishermen, because the rules of inheritance and the "inability to embody labor in the resource" constantly act to deter

it (Faris 1977: 247). (For an interesting comparison between the reasons for the eventual success of the Fishermen's Protective Union in the northeast of Newfoundland, as opposed to the southwest coast in the 20th Century, see Neis 1979).

The history of Newfoundland, particularly the Mercantile Period, can only be understood by considering all the elements which affected trade--its administration as well as the organization for production and distribution. The administration of trade within the outports utilized a system of credits and payments and the merchants were responsible for storage, weighing, buying and selling, etc. They were obligated to the fishermen to provide services and non-locally available foodstuffs and gear. Although they had control over prices within the outport, the merchants were subject to the fluctuating prices on the international market and the mechanism of supply and demand did not always apply, since they did not have control over the amount and/or quality of fish they received. Simultaneously, while the merchants had some rights of disposal over the means of production (gear, outfits, etc.), labor--the social relations of production--was beyond their control and was not a commodity. Consequently, any useful explanation must consider the role of the self-regulating market and the development of "capitalism," as well as

the role of other principles which organized the economy for production, such as reciprocity and redistribution. Some of these issues will be discussed in Chapter VII.

The difficult and often rigorous conditions encountered by settlers in Newfoundland continue to structure the relations of the residents of Baccalaos Cove to the outside world. Within the social universe of the outport, outsiders are viewed with skepticism. Having survived hostilities from the British, French, privateers and others, as well as much economic exploitation, these Newfoundlanders, like many others, have adapted by being wary of change and of outsiders--strangers.

IV The Kinship System

The people of Baccalaos Cove are very closely tied to the sea for their livelihood and this relationship is reflected in their connection to the land. The rights they hold in each are complementary and structured by both kinship and the economy. While one can argue that it is "economically-determined factors" (Faris 1972: 94) which bind brothers together in the summer trap fishery, a closer look and analysis of the rules of marriage (see also Chapter VI) reveals that the number of seasons together and chances of a good voyage are related to the structure of the kinship system, as well. Further, it will become clear why affines are a second choice in the formation and composition of fishing crews, a pattern which has been noted in other parts of Newfoundland (Andersen and Wadel 1972).

In other areas of the North Atlantic, male agnates and affines are accorded equal status in crew composition and inheritance (Anderson and Wadel 1972: 148; cf. Rudie 1969). Therefore, it is significant to understand how these differences occur. Several explanations have been offered to account for this variation. The importance of the male sibling set is stressed in much of the literature

on Newfoundland fishermen and reference is often made to the principle of sibling equivalence (cf. Firestone 1967; Nemec 1972). In other areas of the North Atlantic we are informed of a similar principle which extends to first cousins (cf. Pherson 1954) or immediate affines (Blehr 1963; Paine 1965). On this basis, an argument has been presented that the variations in the composition of the fishing crews are due to differences in the organizational expression of the same bilateral social organization (Andersen and Wadel 1972: 148). However, these explanations do not focus on the structure of bilateral kinship. No doubt Pherson (1954) would adhere to this position since he views the structure of bilateral kinship as being centered around the unity and equivalence of the sibling group (cf. Radcliffe-Brown 1950).

There are two fundamental problems in this position as it applies to bilateral kinship organization: (a) it does not fully take into account the developmental cycle (cf. Goody 1958; Fortes 1958); and (b) it essentially claims that society is organized by a series of alliances between sibling groups which bilaterally trace relationships over a network of kinship ties. The problem with this approach is that it assumes the social structure is simply the total network of social relations. Pherson's comment that

the "temporary nature of these alliances gives flexibility to the structure" (Pherson 1954: 202) is correct as far as it goes, but is not a sufficient explanation. In Baccalaos Cove a crew of affines and agnates is, from a structural view, extremely fragile. This is because affines, while kin, are placed in a separate social category which equates them with strangers (see Table I; also Chapters VI and VIII). Since the stranger complex in Newfoundland is so strong and pervasive (cf. Faris 1972; Firestone 1967; 1969; among others), it influences the structural, organizational, and cultural expressions of everyday behavior.

This wariness towards outsiders is also reflected in kinship terms. In some Newfoundland outports, unmarried women are addressed as "maid" (Firestone 1967). In others (cf. Faris 1972), including Baccalaos Cove, elderly married women and men are addressed and referred to as "aunt" and "uncle," regardless of actual genealogical relationships. Although these terms categorize people by age, sex and marital status, one must question if the use of these terms is sufficient reason to argue for the existence of egalitarianism within the outports. To cite Fried (1967: 121), in his discussion of kinship in ranked societies: "It is patent that kinship terminology has

little or no diagnostic value as a criterion of egalitarian, ranked, or stratified organization." For example, it is only people who "belong to" (i.e. were born and raised there) Baccalaos Cove who address elderly men and women with the familiar term aunt or uncle. Outsiders, those who are not from Baccalaos Cove, even though they may now reside there, use the more polite terms "Mr." and "Mrs." to refer to and address the elderly. Faris (1972: 83) refers to this as the "outsider terminology," and notes for Cat Harbour, in northeastern Newfoundland, two terms of reference used for affines and step-kin: "cunny kin," and "fork kin." Both terms are ego-focused and change for each person. During my fieldwork I never heard the term "cunny kin," but in Baccalaos Cove "fork kin" referred to affines of one's own marriage, an offspring's marriage, or a sibling's marriage. This distinction and categorization of affines has important empirical and theoretical implications. Affines are not the ideal choice in crew composition in Baccalaos Cove, nor do they figure in inheritance as a rule.

Faris (1972), Philbrook (1966), Szwed (1966) and Nemec (1972) discuss the strain of interpersonal relationships between brothers and other agnates who fish together. We are informed that this is one reason why

agnatic ties are not widely activated in visiting relationships during the winter. Conversely, the amount of labor needed, the financial pressures and uncertainties of fishing, and the mental and physical strain are said to be an important reason why it is brothers, and not strangers, i.e. affines, who are jointly responsible and fish together. However, there are other reasons why affines are not an ideal choice, as we shall discuss later.

Stiles (1972: 38) informs us that the trend in Island Harbour, on the southeast coast of Newfoundland, has been away from the shared ownership of fishing gear by brothers and agnates towards individual ownership. He attributes this trend and the consequent changes in crew composition to the introduction of new types of equipment and the greater financial risks involved. However, in Baccalaos Cove, as new equipment has been introduced and more capital investment is required, agnatic crews have intensified in most cases. Sometimes, what appears at first to be a split between brothers and agnates in some crews is often part of the developmental cycle of fishing crews in which a man splits from his father and brothers to form a crew of his own with his sons (see Chapter V).

Kinship and Marriage

In his essay "Rethinking Anthropology," Edmund Leach (1961b) concerns himself with various issues concerning the use of models in anthropology. In that essay, he briefly examines what he refers to as the patrilineal ideology of the Sinhalese bilateral kinship system. He maintains that the important question to ask is not whether or not a society can be classified as patrilineal or bilateral, neither or both, but rather, what does patrilineality mean for the society being studied? In 1973 Leach again takes up the question in his discussion of the patrilineal ideology of the English and Sinhalese elites. The bilateral organization of the two systems is stated as given, but their emphasis on patronymic surnames, male inheritance of familial property, and the emphasis on ancestors in the male line all suggest to Leach a strong patrilineal bias. To cite Leach (1973: 58):

My anthropological point is a very general one. I have long maintained that, where the analysis of social systems is concerned, ideas are at least as important as empirical facts. Provided that this point of view is accepted then much of the theory of unilineal descent groups...has application to societies in which, in an empirical sense, unilineal descent does not operate at all.

Following Leach and noting that some other anthropologists writing about Newfoundland find the classification of bilateral or cognatic of little use (cf. Faris 1972; Firestone 1967) in understanding the kinship system in Newfoundland, I shall argue that the kinship system does have a patrilineal ideology despite its bilateral nature.

Clearly, there is a problem in discussing kinship in a western society, as it is assumed that one can find unilineal systems only in non-western societies. While the kinship terminology in Baccalaos Cove does not support a unilineal system, there are folk categories which make it clear that when the kin ties are activated for various economic, marital, religious and other social activities, they are well defined and known by those who use them.

At first glance it appears that the actual biological or blood relationships are the ties which are most important in examining the kinship system. A closer observation reveals that while consanguineal ties predominate in reckoning kinship, a biological relationship does not always imply a subsequent kinship relationship. Likewise, there are kinship categories which are not based on actual biological ties. In other words, we are concerned

with kinship as a social system, not as something sui generis, and one which is inextricably interwoven with residency, inheritance, marriage and surname.

Residency and Surname

In Baccalaos Cove the summer trap fishing crews consist ideally of fathers and sons, and sons inherit the land and fishing gear from their father. The land itself is inherited individually with each brother receiving a separate but equal piece of land when he marries. Until a son's house is completed, he and his new wife will reside in the household of his father. Hence, virilocal residency is the rule and in Baccalaos Cove, as in other Newfoundland outports, one finds a patrilocal residency rule and brothers living adjacent to each other. This patri-extended family pattern with agantic kin residing along a main path has been noted for Ireland and referred to as a branch family (cf. Arensberg and Kimball 1938). Since Baccalaos Cove itself has predominantly southern Irish with some West Country English and French descendants, this pattern is not at all unusual. The land is generally parcelled out by birth order and chance. The eldest son receives the land directly adjacent to the father's. It will be near the waterfront and next to the father's own

house and/or garden. This usual grouping of the patrilocal extended family is most often referred to locally as a crowd (cf. Faris 1972; Firestone 1967; Szwed 1966; Nemem 1972, etc.).

Ultimogeniture is the usual pattern when it comes to the inheritance of the father's house and land, but in cases where an elder brother has remained single, he will usually reside with the parents until their death and it is he who will inherit the rights to the father's house and land. But this occurs only if the youngest brother has his own house and land, which had been given to him by his father, and agrees to the inheritance. In all of the cases where there was a breach in the pattern, the younger brother's offspring (most often males) were given the right to build a house or barn or in some other way use the land that had been given to the single brother. It must be made clear, however, that in the case of females, what is transferred are use rights only. A brother's son can use the land and can transfer his rights in it to his male children. Females cannot transfer rights to their offspring, although an elderly widow can control use rights. As we shall see later, there are several reasons for this. Hence, the single brother's rights to use and disposal over the father's property are conditional

upon his willingness to transfer his rights.

Crowd

The term "crowd" presents a myriad of problems since it has a variety of meanings. James Faris (1972; orig. 1966) was the first anthropologist to define the term in reference to a particular kinship category in Newfoundland, and others studying Newfoundland outports have since followed his example. Faris himself notes (1972: 65) that the term crowd has many meanings which must be understood from the context in which the term is used, e.g. "the crowd at the kick;" "the crowd up the shore;" or "uncle Joe's crowd." In terms of kinship, the crowd has much the same meaning as the English word family. In its broadest sense, it can mean all of one's kinsmen, or it may simply refer to the members of a nuclear family.

As a kinship and territorial category, crowd refers to a group of people who occupy one or adjoining gardens. A garden is any area of land surrounded by a fence. Although fence positions change, with some taken down and new ones built, as a piece of land the garden remains unchanged through generations. Each garden is associated with a group of people who own the land and have the right to build on it. Even in cases where land may be sold,

it is still referred to as the land of the crowd who once owned it. The crowd ideally includes in-marrying females and ideally the members share the same locale and surname. For analytical purposes, Faris (1972: 65-66) designates this as a "general crowd," and distinguishes it from an "effective crowd," those members of the general crowd and others with them who are joined in a common economic endeavor, such as a fishing crew.

In Baccalaos Cove I would often receive in response to my inquiries about the meaning of the term that it could refer to a fishing crew. Until recently, both men and women were active participants in the inshore fishery and while the women were not considered to be part of the fishing crew per se, they did play an important role once the fishermen returned to shore and were thereby considered part of the "shore crowd."

The main problem with the term is that it does have so many meanings, some general and others specific. Two other factors add to the difficulty. First since the native language of the population is English, it is easy for a foreign ethnographer, who is also a native English speaker, to assume the meaning of certain words and phrases, which can bias the analysis. Although the people in Baccalaos Cove know the different meanings attached to certain terms, such nuances are not immediately perceived

by a foreign ethnographer. Even when the various meanings are learned, there is still a problem in understanding when each meaning applies. Newfoundlanders use the term crowd frequently and seem to know the precise meaning in any given context. Other English speakers who do not use the words in such a precise way, especially those regarding kinship, think the terms amorphous at best and much too general to have any analytical value.

Second, the concept of crowd, being a folk category, is subject to the same scrutiny as folk models. As Levi-Strauss (1963) indicates, such models often act as a facade which hide the underlying structural relationships. In the case of Baccalaos Cove it would appear that the concept of crowd as a kinship category functions to integrate those who might otherwise be thought of as outsiders or strangers. On several occasions, specifically when discussing women who had married into Baccalaos Cove, I heard the comment that "you can't blame her; after all, she's not really part of their crowd;" or "she's away from her crowd." In these cases, however, it should be mentioned that the women did not have any children and were new to the settlement. In general conversation such women are referred to as being in their husband's crowd, but not until she has children of her own is a woman legitimized in this category.

Even then, it is not forgotten that she is affiliated with another crowd, although her contact with them after marriage and several children may be minimal, especially when she is from another settlement. The same also applies to men who marry in, but they are never referred to as being in their wife's crowd (except derisively or jokingly). Hence, the category of crowd and use of the term is primarily to express equality when, in fact, affines and non-consanguineal kin are effectively placed in a separate category in such matters as inheritance, crew composition and accusations of wrongdoing. For example, first cousins may marry, as long as they have different surnames, but the woman is placed in the category of affine and is treated by her husband's family as a stranger, an outsider who is not to be trusted.

Although the crowd is a local descent group which incorporates in-marrying spouses, it must be remembered that membership is not automatic. It is land, waterfront rights, surname and residency which provide the basis for crowd membership. As such, the composition and size vary, yet it is structured by definite principles which perpetuate its existence.

The general crowd may be seen as a corporate group in that it is named and the members as a whole have title to the land, waterfront and fishing stages (and

once chosen, berths) of the gardens comprising the crowd, and it endures (cf. Weber 1947; also for Newfoundland see Faris 1972; Firestone 1967; Nemec 1972). However, its existence is not based exclusively on a principle of descent. While they are local descent groups, crowds are not lineages and they owe their continued existence to a combination of factors, most importantly property. To illustrate:

Case 1: Changes in the Composition of the Green Crowd and formation of a garden

Mr. J. came to Baccalaos Cove in 1895 to fish with a crew. He was an orphan from the south coast of Newfoundland and had been raised in Harbour Breton by an aunt and uncle. The uncle met Mr. N. of Baccalaos Cove earlier that year in St. John's and learned that Mr. N.'s crowd (Green crowd) needed an extra hand for the summer trap fishery. An agreement was made between the uncle and Mr. N., and that spring Mr. J. came to Baccalaos Cove. Mr. J. fished that summer with the Green crowd, which consisted of the father (Mr. N.) and four sons. He began courting the daughter of Mr. N. and by the end of the summer they were betrothed. Mr. J. returned to his home for the winter and the following summer came back to Baccalaos Cove to fish with the Green crowd. He married Mr. N.'s daughter at the end of the trap season and they were given a small parcel of land, adjacent to Mr. N.'s, upon which to build a small house. Mr. J. continued to reside in Baccalaos Cove and fished with the Green crowd until his death. His one son, who now lives in the father's house with his wife and son and daughter-in-law, is considered by all to be a member of the Green crowd, even though he does not share their surname.

Case 2: Changes in the Composition of a Garden in the Green Crowd

In the previous example, Mr. N. had four brothers, one of whom was Mr. C. Mr. C. married and had eleven children, including five sons. The eldest son, Mr. S. married and had twelve children--seven sons and five daughters. His eldest daughter, Miss R., married a Norwegian. She and her husband lived with her father and mother for one year, during which time the father agreed to let them build a house in one section of his meadow. It was clearly known and stated at the time that the land was not hers to own, as it was to remain Green land. Mr. A. worked in the St. Lawrence mine for awhile and also did odd repair jobs in Baccalaos Cove.

One winter, Mr. A. did some work for Mr. D., his wife's patrilineal uncle, and in exchange was told he could use Mr. D.'s old skiff the following spring to go fishing. Mr. A. spent about \$400.00 repairing the boat and, as also agreed, he asked his wife's cousin (the son of one of her father's other brothers) to go fishing with him. The cousin, Mr. G., provided some new fishing gear and some gear that he had inherited from his father. It must be noted that during the winter Miss R.'s father, Mr. S., had died (see Figure VI).

A dispute ensued when Mr. G. accused Mr. A. of being unwilling to go fishing on days that the weather was a bit rough and also of refusing to work. One Sunday in July, after fishing together about six weeks, Mr. G. asked Mr. A. to go out with him to shift the location of their nets. Mr. A. refused to go since it was a Sunday and traditionally fishermen will not go out on a Sunday. Mr. A. went down to the stage that evening and learned that Mr. D. had gone out with Mr. G. to shift the nets. The next morning it was foggy and Mr. A. never showed up to go out fishing so Mr. G. went alone. When he got back in, he told Mr. A. that his uncle, Mr. D., had given him the boat to use by himself for the re-

mainder of the summer and that Mr. A. was no longer going to fish with him. That evening, Miss R. went to her uncle's, Mr. D.'s, and said that since the stage her husband and Mr. G. were using had been her father's and since she was now part owner of it, if Mr. G. wanted to fish without her husband, Mr. A., he would have to move his gear out of her father's stage. The problem here was that the stage and adjoining waterfront belonged to all of the Green crowd and the men who fish were allowed full access to it at all times. Miss R. tried to get her mother and brothers to uphold her and expel Mr. G., but the mother would not do so, nor would the brothers, saying that Mr. G. "has a right to it." (and also implying that neither Miss R., nor her husband, Mr. A. had any rights to it without their approval). The resolution was that Mr. A. stopped fishing with Mr. G. and two weeks later went to the mainland seeking employment. Two years later, Miss R. and Mr. A. separated and Miss R. sold the house to one of her brothers and moved to St. John's.

These cases illustrate a variety of principles. While rights to crowd membership are based on a theory of descent, this can be adapted to fit the circumstances, as in Case 1. In both cases, the land was given to daughters for their use only; however, in the first case, the husband was from Newfoundland and was part of the wife's father's crew for many years: i.e. a member of the effective crowd. In the second case the husband was an outsider, not a fisherman, and never a part of any effective crowd. In keeping with the principle of male inheritance, Miss R. sold her house to one of her

brothers when she moved, his right to the land being already acknowledged. Thus, a crowd is that group of near kinsmen with whom there is a good and amicable relationship and from whom one can expect support. Ideally, it includes those sharing common descent. Affines may or may not be considered as members, depending upon the circumstances. While formally it can include kinsmen from other settlements, effectively it does not.

Residence, Inheritance and Land Tenure

As noted earlier, the branch family is the most common residency pattern found in Baccalaos Cove. There are three main types of households within Baccalaos Cove. While there is a developmental cycle of domestic groups, the ideal household is type one which is a basic elementary family: a man, his wife and their unmarried offspring. When a young man is betrothed, he will begin to build his own house, but the newly married couple usually reside with the groom's parents until the house is completed. Thus, type two households include two elementary families living in the same house and sharing a common hearth (cf. also Firestone 1967; Faris 1972). The son and his wife share a separate

pantry and bedroom, but all use the large main kitchen and parlor. A house and its site are ideally inherited by the youngest son, but if both parents are living when he marries, he will usually build a house of his own on land given to him by his father. The parental house is then inherited by (a) the youngest son, who can allocate use rights to it to any member of his crowd, e.g. a son, daughter or brother; (b) a single brother; or (c) an older brother who married later. If the house is inherited by the youngest son and is then sold, an event which is occurring more often, the new owners must move it to their own parcel of land. As will be demonstrated in Case 3, there is a strong moral prohibition against land being used, purchased, or controlled by the members of another crowd.

Type three households include an elementary family living with a single surviving parent. Most often, it is the son who is to inherit the father's and mother's house who continues to reside there upon the death of either parent. There were a few cases in Baccalaos Cove where one of the wife's parents came to live with her and her husband, but in each case both the mother and daughter were from Baccalaos Cove. One variation on this type of household is when the grandchildren live with the grandparents. This occurs usually in

cases of illegitimacy, or upon the death of both parents.

Sons ideally inherit land equally. Females do not inherit if males are living. They may be given use rights, but ownership is clearly in the patriline (see Case 2). Until the mid-20th Century, each crowd in Baccalaos Cove held land adjacent to the waterfront and it was allocated into strips giving each son and/or brother direct access to the waterfront. However, because of the demands of inheritance, this is no longer possible in each instance. Land may be allocated with no direct access to the sea, but all sons are assured of their rights to the stages and the sea by being given equal access to and use of the patriline's waterfront. The size of the holdings have decreased to accommodate the rules of inheritance, but the rules remain the same.

Diagram I gives an example of the traditional division of land circa 1945. The youngest son was given a parcel of land on which to build because both parents were living at the time of the marriage and the son's wife did not want to continue residing with his parents until their death. This particular case demonstrates many principles functioning in Baccalaos Cove and requires a lengthy explanation:


Diagram I

Traditional Division of Land in Baccalaos Cove circa 1945

Key:

A	Father's
B	Second eldest son's
C	Eldest son's
D	Third eldest son's
E	Youngest son's
F	Fourth eldest son's

----- path (no fence)
 xxxxxxxxxx fence



Case 3: Segmentation and Changes in the
Garden of the Brown Crowd

When the youngest son of Mr. C. wanted to build a house of his own, as his wife no longer wanted to live in the same household with his parents, Mr. C. was confronted with a problem. His land had already been divided among his other four sons, with the understanding that his youngest son, a miner, would inherit Mr. C.'s own house and land. The youngest son had received some additional meadow land and this share was subsequently increased to accommodate the building of a house. One son had left Newfoundland and returned home, unmarried, after twenty-five years. It was he, rather than the youngest son, who subsequently inherited the father's house and land.

The land of the Brown crowd was divided as illustrated in Diagram I. By 1945 each of the sons was considered to have title to the land given to him by his father. In 1953 the second eldest son moved his family to the mainland and, since the father was alive at the time, received the father's permission to sell the house and house site. The strip of land on the waterfront was then divided between the father and his eldest and third eldest sons. The meadow was divided among all of the remaining sons and the second eldest was given some monetary compensation. This son's house and land was sold to a member of the Blue Crowd, Mr. K., a man who was born and reared in Baccalaos Cove, but who needed a house and land because his crowd had resided in Baccalaos Cove less than 50 years and his father's property and waterfront holdings were small.

When Mr. K. purchased the house, a fence was built between the father's house and the second eldest son's house and meadow, and also between the eldest son's meadow and the second eldest son's house (now Mr. K.'s). In 1963, the third eldest son, concerned about his own four sons having enough waterfront, made an agreement with his second cousin (his mother's brother's daughter's son). In

exchange for his meadow, the third eldest son received some additional waterfront property which his second cousin had rights of disposal over. Two years later, the cousin built a house in the meadow which formerly belonged to a member of the Brown crowd. Another fence was then built separating the land between the third eldest son's former meadow from the eldest son's meadow on one side, and the youngest son's house and meadow on the other side. In 1973, Mr. K. sold the house he had purchased in 1953 to the youngest son of Mr. C.'s youngest son. The land was back in the hands and control of the Brown crowd.

It should be noted that the youngest son's parcel of meadow land was larger than the parcels "shared up" among the other brothers, since he had to also build a house on that land. In 1975, upon the marriage of the youngest son's daughter to a man who was landless, the girl's father gave her permission to erect a house in part of his meadow. When doing my field work in 1977 - 1979, the man's two other daughters married and were given use rights to build on land belonging to the brother who had remained a bachelor and eventually inherited the parental house and land. With the exception of the son who purchased the house back from Mr. K., the youngest son of Mr. C. had only one other son, and the rest of his children were females.

Ideally, land is transmitted to male heirs only. Yet in this case, since the son was moving away from Baccalaos Cove, he was given permission to dispose of his land rather than try to manage it from a distance. While a man would usually try to sell his house and land to someone in his own crowd, such sales are often

difficult to negotiate. The outright gift of land does occur, but (aside from inheritance) it is rare, and land is never given to someone who is not a member of the crowd. As in Case 2, we have here a case of usufruct land rights being given to female members of the crowd. Men who live on their wife's father's land hope that the land will ultimately be inherited by the wife, or that they will be allowed to purchase it. In eight documented cases where this occurred, there were either no sons, or the sons had moved away and did not claim their rights to the land, or the son-in-law fished with his wife's crowd and so was thought of as a member of the crowd, even though he had a different surname (see Case 1). However, there was mention made that an absentee son and his male children had a right to the land and could claim it at anytime, although I have no record of this happening in Baccalaos Cove. In one case a sister had her brother sign a legal document relinquishing any future claims to the land by him or his heirs. But with these exceptions, it is use rights only which a female may be given, and that is at the discretion of her father and brothers (and grandfather, if he is still alive). In all the cases cited here, the land which the females were given use rights to was meadow land, and this land is not regarded as worth much since

it has no direct access to the sea.

While all of the cases demonstrate changes within a particular garden, the last one illustrates the different phases in the developmental cycle of garden structures. Those gardens having one house are most often the result of the segmentation of a larger garden into two or more. But the building of a new house does not always mean a new fence will be erected. We shall discuss later the correlations between residency and fishing crews. But, although the ideal is seldom realized, that ideal is that there is never more than one effective crowd per garden, regardless of the number of houses in it (cf. Faris 1972).

Within the past decade there has been an attempt by several women, all of whom had moved away from Baccalaos Cove to the mainland or to the United States, to claim a share of their father's house and land. With only one exception, all such attempts were unsuccessful. In the case of the one woman who did receive a share, I later learned she had paid her brothers for the land she claimed. Thus, while many variations do occur, the principle of male inheritance continues to structure social relations and rights to land. Although no official legal documents define the inheritance of land, the knowledge of who holds title to what land

is clearly understood.

Marriage Rules and Categories

Marriage patterns in Baccalaos Cove are closely tied to the stranger complex. There is a strong preference to marry a local girl, although because of exogamic restrictions this is not always possible. Table I depicts local cognition and preference. While an affine may "belong to the place," he/she is still a stranger, i.e. from a different crowd. As we have seen, crowd membership is not automatic. It is land, residence, rights to the waterfront, and also surname which all provide the basis for inclusion in a particular category and upon which marriage rules and prohibitions are based.

Table II documents the origins of spouses in 100 marriages between 1885-1979, in which at least one partner was born and raised in Baccalaos Cove. The figures demonstrate that the admonition and preference to marry someone "close" has been upheld. While my sample may not be regarded as strictly random, it was selected from a genealogy of approximately 3,000 individuals, and no bias was intended. Although 49% of the people married "out," Table III shows that

Table I

Local Cognition and Preference of
Marriage Spouses in Baccalaos Cove
(see Figure V, Chapter II)

	<u>Marriage Preferences</u>
AFFINES ↑ ↓ STRANGERS	someone who "belongs to the place"
	someone from Area A
	someone who is biologically related but does not "belong to the place"
	someone from Area C
	someone from Placentia Bay
	someone from elsewhere in Newfoundland
	"black strangers"- - someone who is not from Newfoundland or a non-Catholic*

* There are preferences within this category as well based upon ethnicity and religious affiliation.

Table II

Analysis of 100 Marriages at Various Dates Between
1885 and 1979 wherein at least one spouse was born
and raised in Baccalaos Cove
(see Figure V, Chapter II)

Origin of Other Spouse	<u>Post Marital Residence</u>		
	<u>Virilocal</u>	<u>Uxorilocal</u>	<u>Neolocal</u>
Baccalaos Cove	51	46 (90%)	3
Area A	33	25 (76%)	8
Area C	5	2	1
Area D	4	2	-
Elsewhere	7	4	-
	<u>100</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>12</u>
			<u>9</u>

men tend to stay in Baccalaos Cove and marry women who live within their local socio-economic boundaries (see Figure V, Chapter II). It can also be seen that more females than males married into Baccalaos Cove. Since it is the males who inherit property and fishing rights, they are most likely to marry someone from Baccalaos Cove or nearby, live locally and/or marry a woman from a family with whom there have been alliances and marriages with in prior generations (see Chapter VI). Within fishing crews which have affines, they are usually affines from crowds with which there have been alliances and inter-marriages in previous generations and sometimes these affines may be incorporated into the crowd with whom they are fishing. In those cases where a man has married into Baccalaos Cove, it is generally a man without property or inheritance prospects who will do so. In most cases, the girl may have no brothers and the father has no sons with whom to fish, and she and her husband carry on the crowd and the parental home. Of these 100 marriages which trace through four generations, 15 are with first or second cousins (Table IV). The actual percentages of marriages with cousins is probably higher, but beyond second cousins kinship relationships are not formally recognized. Nevertheless, local people are aware of more distant relationships as

Table III

Spouses from Outside Baccalaos Cove
but within Area A (see Figure V, Chapter II)

<u>Post-Marital Residence</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Males</u>
Virilocal	20	5
Uxorilocal	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>
	23	10

Table IV

Cousin Marriage, Sister Exchange and
Brother-Sister Exchange

First Cousins	2	[15]
Second Cousins	13	
Sister Exchange	5	
Brother-Sister Exchange (two brothers marrying two sisters)	18	

they say: "sure, if you don't marry someone who is in some way your relation, you wouldn't have anyone here to marry at all."

The marriage rules and prohibitions in Baccalaos Cove are not noted on the basis of kinship relations per se, but on the facts of crowd membership. As will be elaborated upon in Chapter VI, the rules of exogamy, which act to reduce the number of possible local choices of mates, are closely tied to residency and surname. Marriage between a man and his MBD (or between a woman and her FZS) is possible, since the relationship is often not recognized as one of prohibitive first cousin marriage because "he/she is from a different crowd and garden." Both the MBD and FBD are cousins, but it is considered wrong for a man to marry his FBD because they share the same crowd affiliation. In the one case of FBD marriage in Baccalaos Cove that I am aware, the couple had been ostracized, moved away, and the man returned again only upon the death of his wife. Although there were no cases in my sample of 100 marriages with the FZD or MZD (or MBS or MZS), such marriages are not specifically prohibited, since these individuals live in different gardens are from different crowds (cf. also Faris 1972). In 12 of

the 13 cases of second cousin marriage, the man and woman were from different crowds and thus not in the prohibited category of possible marriage partner.

In the case of double cousins, the rules of exogamy which function in Baccalaos Cove are closely tied to the alliance system which will be examined in Chapter VI. Double cousins are the offspring of brother-sister exchange and sister exchange. The progeny of such marriages are bilateral cousins: i.e. in the case of sister exchange the children are both FZCh and MBCh; in the case of brother-sister exchange (two brothers marrying two sisters) the children are simultaneously FBCh and MZCh. In Baccalaos Cove the offspring of brother-sister exchange are prohibited from marrying, since they share the same garden and surname. However, their children, in turn, can marry, if they come from different crowds (see Figure VII). Yet these marriages are considered "close," because they are the progeny of double cousins who were from the same crowd.

In the sample of 100 marriages, there are five cases of sister exchange. In Baccalaos Cove there are some crews which for various reasons are not composed of all brothers or agnates and thus will have an affine as a member of the crew. In most cases where the composition of the crew persists over time, it is when the affine

is also the sister's husband; and usually that affine is from a crowd which is in a wife-receiving relationship to his wife's crowd. Consequently, sister exchange can be interpreted as the reciprocal exchange of women for economic reasons. But, we must remember that this type of marriage creates wife-receivers who are simultaneously wife-givers. The offspring of sister exchange are also double cousins and marriages between them are infrequent because such marriages would create a marriage cycle of restricted exchange, rather than generalized exchange as will be presented in Chapter VI. It is the latter which creates more integration among the members of a society (cf. Levi-Strauss 1969b: 480).

In response to queries as to who is a second cousin I received several replies. One is based on shared generational level; for example, FFBChCh, MMZChCh, etc. In other words, the children of first cousins are considered to be second cousins to each other (cf. Schusky 1972). The other response, which some believed concurred with Canon Law, is that second cousins are FBChCh, MBChCh, etc. In other words, ego's first cousin's child would be a second cousin to him. According to The New Catholic Encyclopedia (Henry 1967, Vol. IV: 193), this latter definition coincides with the Church's interpretation of second cousin based on "degree of consanguinity," however,

the meaning is still vague. In most cases in Baccalaos Cove it is the first definition of second cousin given above which was the most frequent response.⁴

The kinship system in Baccalaos Cove appears, at first glance, to be a bilateral system, but such a description is too amorphous. There is a patrilineal bias which structures land use, water rights, inheritance, and marriage rules. This patrilineal ideology also structures and organizes fishing crews and together with the stranger complex shapes the order of things in Baccalaos Cove. There is never a perfect functional fit between the systems of inheritance, land tenure and kinship. They are always being modified, as the aforementioned case studies demonstrate. Nevertheless, the continuity of the system is governed by this patrilineal ideology which integrates social behavior in Baccalaos Cove.

Figure VI

Participants in Case Study 2:
Changes in the Composition of
a Garden in the Green Crowd





Figure VII (Double Cousins)



V The Inshore Fishery

Throughout Newfoundland's history the inshore fishery has been the mainstay of the local economy. Ironically, the small boats that contributed to the inshore fisherman's success through the early 20th Century and which for years had been more efficient than the English and European ship fisheries, were by the early 20th Century to find themselves unable to match the efforts of the European deep-sea trawlers (cf. Story 1969). As late as 1933 over 75% of the fish landed in Newfoundland was taken from inshore waters (Story 1969: 32). But the collapse of the foreign markets for dried cod during the 1920's, and the Great Depression, saw a gradual shift in demand towards fresh fish on the world market. Neither Newfoundland's government nor its merchants were in a financial position to maintain a year-round deep-sea fishing fleet or a processing plant to compete with the mechanized foreign fleets which began to come to that "great ship moored near the Banks" to fish the waters year-round (Story 1969: 31-32). Moreover, because of the seasonal changes and limitations, the inshore fishermen are unable to fish year-round.

The changes brought about by the advent of World War II enabled Newfoundland to sustain its own year-round deep-sea fishery for the first time. This was due to several reasons: (a) fish prices and demand reached an all time high; (b) both the United States and Canada established air and naval bases in Newfoundland which brought money into the economy; and (c) Newfoundland joined the Canadian Confederation in 1949. As of 1966 Newfoundland trawlers accounted for nearly 49% of the fish landed in Newfoundland (cf. Innis 1940; Pazdior 1966; Story 1969).

While some of the men from Baccalaos Cove fish on these trawlers year-round, the summer trap fishery remains a vital and viable part of the local economy and social system. During the mid-1960's and early 70's Baccalaos Cove had the largest inshore fishery on the Burin Peninsula in terms of the amount of fish landed there by the fishermen.⁵ During the summer voyage of 1977 there were 11 trap crews (59 men) and 9 crews (20 men) fishing without cod traps. In addition, there were two men fishing alone.

The end of the summer voyage and the beginning of fall fishing saw the break-up of all the trap crews. At that time 38 men left the skiffs (leaving 21), and 24 men, who had not been on the summer voyage, began

fishing. In addition, two of the small boat crews continued fishing together. This left a total of 49 men in 20 crews and one man fishing alone during the fall. The reasons for the break-up of the trap crews and re-composition of the fall crews are primarily economic. Large crews are not necessary during the fall fishery as the nets, hand lines, jiggers and other gear used are not as cumbersome nor as expensive as the gear used for trapping. Hence, many fishermen own their own gear. Likewise, in terms of the tasks to be performed, it is possible to work and fish alone during the fall (cf. also Faris 1972). Indeed, the crews in the fall are generally comprised of men who use common transport back and forth to the fishing grounds and save money by sharing fuel costs; but mostly their efforts are independent of one another. The men do assist each other when nets or lines must be moved or get tangled or damaged; and if someone from the boat should lose his nets during a storm, he will usually remain with the crew and receive a share from the other members. Thus, while the fall crews are not formed to complete a large and costly fishing outfit, as during the summers, there is the reciprocal sharing of tasks and maintenance among those who fish from the same boat during the fall; and at least half of the crews are crews of agnates. In 1977 there were two fall fishing

crews composed of a man and his deceased brother's son(s). The uncles owned the boat and gear but divided the shares equally, in a manner similar to the traditional division of shares in the trap fishery.

The seasonal change in crew composition is quite different from the changes in trap crews as a result of cleavage among the members. Ideally, the crews in the latter are interrelated by residency, surname and inheritance. But actual composition in both cases depends on economics, availability of men, and conflicting differences.

The Sea

The sea is a primary force in Baccalaos Cove and affects the relationship of the people to the land and to each other. It is the source of their livelihood and affects local folk taxonomy. As romantic as this may seem, however, the work of a fisherman is hard, often perilous, and performed under severe conditions. During the months of the summer trap voyage (May-August) especially, daily conversation among the men is about the sea and local weather conditions. It is not unusual to hear particular stories about the sea repeatedly, since the fishermen have a deep respect for the sea and know it is its own master. It is taken as part of their world view that some men are "nervous" on the water or "lose their nerve" for it, but

such comments are not meant to be derogatory. Rather, they demonstrate the awareness the people have of their environment and the harshness it sometimes brings to them.

Linguistic usages that intrigue many visitors to Newfoundland also reflect the prevailing importance of the sea and seafaring practices. When headed south or west, Newfoundlanders say they are going "up" and when going north or east they will tell you they are going "down." These expressions are used locally within Baccalaos Cove to designate different geographical locations. If you are going southwest from Baccalaos Cove you are headed "up the shore." Conversely, if you are going northeast from Baccalaos Cove you are going "down to" a specific location. Such expressions come from the days of sailing ships. Although the men of Baccalaos Cove today do not think of themselves as sailors, sailing and the sea are an integral part of Newfoundland history and tradition. There were sailing schooners fishing outside of Baccalaos Cove and mooring in the harbor until the early 1930's and many of the nautical terms found their way into the daily vernacular. Since the prevailing winds are from the south-southwest, boats sailing into the wind are beating "up" wind and those heading north-northeast are running "down" wind. In a different sort of transferral of terminology, one

"gets aboard" an automobile and sits either "aft" or "ford." Many other examples could be adduced to demonstrate how ever present and important the sea is in the life of the people, especially those based upon the distinction between salt vs. fresh water (cf. Faris 1972).

Fishing Berths and Fishing Grounds

On the fishing grounds outside of Baccalaos Cove there are forty-two trap berths which are exploited on a regular basis; but new berths are found and old ones abandoned depending upon how the fish strike over several seasons. A trap berth is an area designated for those fishermen using traps to catch and haul the fish. These berths and their locations are known by all the local (and neighboring outport) fishermen and their use by trap fishermen only is known and accepted. The berths, which are located near a rock or a body of land to allow the fishermen to attach their traps, range in depth from 12-16 fathoms of water and are contiguous. The traps themselves are put into position once the crew has been formed and they go out to place their marker

on the berth(s) they claim for use during that season. Throughout the inshore fisheries in Newfoundland the fishermen abide by hereditary rules of tenure (cf. Firestone 1967), annual draws, first laid rights and other customary claims (cf. Andersen 1979 for a comparative review). In Baccalaos Cove trap berths were traditionally selected on a first-come basis. After placing their marker on a berth(s), the crew had four days in which to set their trap(s) in place. If no trap was set in the berth within that time, the berth was again considered as open. A crew generally had first claim to (a) a berth that a member of their crowd had found or (b) a berth that their forefathers had regularly exploited; but there were no specific rules of inheritance rights to berths (cf. Firestone 1967 for a discussion of inheritance of fishing berths in a northern outpost).

Until the early thirties, schooners from other parts of Newfoundland and abroad would come into the waters near Baccalaos Cove and compete for the trap berths. If a crew from Baccalaos Cove found another trap adjacent to their own, they would often cut its moorings. Sometimes the outsiders would retaliate and sometimes not, but there was always a bitterness and "hard words" for the interlopers (outsiders). Legally, anyone had a

right to fish where he wanted, but locally the fishermen from Baccalaos Cove respected each others' rights. Occasionally there were feuds and one of the berths received the name of "blood gulch" because blood was shed over it. When a man once tried to buy a berth, he was unable to do so legally or locally. Thus, while there were no legal rules pertaining to rights to a berth, customary rights and prohibitions were generally honored.

Prior to the introduction of a lottery system for berths in 1962, a crew would place its marker(s) and set its trap(s) as early as March 15th. Fishing usually didn't begin until the end of May, however, shortly after the capelin would "strike." Since cod feed on capelin, the fishermen predict what their summer fishing might be like, indicated by the amount of capelin "coming to the land" by the end of May. Although the lottery system has aided the fishermen of Baccalaos Cove, many believe that it also has its drawbacks. The introduction of the lottery has spared expensive gear, since when the traps were set early in the spring to protect the berths from outsiders, they were often damaged by storms or even other crews from outside. However, the lottery gives the crew until the 28th of May to place their marker(s), and then the traditional four days to set their trap(s) in place. If they have not set the traps by that date,

the berth is again open to any other crew, either from Baccalaos Cove or elsewhere. But while many fishermen claim the lottery does protect their gear and their berths, it may also be one of the reasons why the fish are now more scarce.

Before the lottery, crews chose their berths based upon how good a berth had been in the past, on how good they figured it might be that year, or because their fathers before them had fished there. As a result, there was some trial and error. Crews would sometimes move their traps several times if they were not doing well, and at other times they would leave a berth open throughout a voyage. Consequently, some very good berths were not regularly exploited throughout each fishing season. Since the lottery, this is rare, because the berths to be utilized are now chosen by the Lottery Committee of local fishermen who enter only the best berths in the drawing. Thus, prior to the lottery there was an ecological randomness and balance which prevented the fish supply from becoming depleted, while still providing the fishermen with a good voyage (cf. Moore 1969).

Each of the berths placed in the lottery drawing is named, numbered and registered. The committee, chosen by a vote among the fishermen, selects the berths entered according to the number of crews that will be fishing that year. In 1977 there were eleven trap crews and 33 berths

placed in the drawing, which is supervised by a representative from the Department of Fisheries of Canada. On or before the 28th of February the crews gather to select their berths for the upcoming voyage. In 1977 the first drawing was for the eleven best berths. The skipper of each crew draws a number and the one with the lowest number may select one of the first eleven berths, then the next lowest, etc. In other words, a crew can choose any berth that has not already been chosen by a crew with a lower number. The decision as to which berth to choose is decided upon by the crew, although the skipper makes the final decision. After the first drawing there is a second one for the next best eleven berths and so on. In 1977 each crew was able to choose three berths in which to set their marker(s) and/or trap(s) by May 28th. Some claimed two or three, others claimed only one. There is still an element of chance due to random selection because the better crews may not always get the better berths to exploit and vice-versa, however, the best berths are usually exploited throughout the voyage. The crews also have the option to move their traps at any time throughout the season to a berth that has not been claimed either because it was not entered in the lottery, it was not claimed by the crew who selected it, or because the crew who had

been there "shifted" their trap.

There is no legally sanctioned lottery system for the fishing grounds exploited by those fishermen using hand lines, nets, jiggers or trawls. In Baccalaos Cove there are 22 named "offer" or "jigging" grounds and three trawling locales. Most of these fishing grounds are further from shore and range in depth from 8-28 fathoms. The competition for these areas is more intense because the traditional rules regarding rights are not the same as those for the trap berths. Generally, men from Baccalaos Cove will not interfere with the nets or lines of another crew, but fishermen from other settlements will sometimes set their lines nearby. Customarily, trap berths are honored and the fishermen will not set their lines or nets in a berth unless it remains open after the deadline date. When this occurs, trap crews still have priority and if a trap crew decides to move their trap to a berth occupied by other non-trap fishermen, the latter will relocate. In exchange, the trap crew will give the fishermen forfeiting the berth a share of their haul for the rest of the season. Similarly, trawls can be used on any of the jigging grounds after the fish stop taking the jigger.

Until the lottery, there were no legal rules regarding rights to a trap berth. Custom dictated that markers

be honored for four days and that certain crowds had priority over certain berths. Beyond these observances, competition for fishing berths was ongoing and intense. The lottery system ensures the fishermen of Baccalaos Cove that they will have first rights to their berths until May 28th. This protects the berths outside Baccalaos Cove from encroachment by other crews and gives the fishermen the time needed to prepare for the summer voyage, while also reducing the possibility of damage to the traps from setting them too early in the spring. As Andersen (1979): 329) notes, the inshore fishermen in Newfoundland are far from being "...wholly at the mercy of biological and environmental uncertainties...the fishermen of Newfoundland and elsewhere have developed a variety of techniques by which they influence, if not directly allocate and balance their numbers and effort against fishing opportunities."

Fishing Crews: The Developmental Cycle

Following Faris 1972: 54) I shall use the term segmentation to refer to the division of one garden into two or more by the building of a fence, using the term cleavage to refer to the permanent division of the fishing crew; i.e. the effective crowd. Ideally, the developmental

cycle of a fishing crew correlates with the above and as natural cleavage within a crew occurs, the segmentation of a garden accompanies it (cf. Faris 1972; Firestone 1967; Nemec 1972). In Baccalaos Cove the cycle is as follows: a man begins fishing with his sons, all of whom will be equal shareholders in the crew (see Chapter VII). The father holds the gear and relinquishes portions of it as inheritance to his sons as they marry, build a house, and have sons old enough to go fishing. A man will take his share of gear from his father, add to it, and form his own crew with his sons. When this cleavage occurs, a fence will subsequently be built separating the son's house from his father's and other brothers' and a new fishing stage will be built. In actuality this ideal cycle is seldom realized for several reasons. In Baccalaos Cove there are crews whose members come from different crowds and others whose members are from the same crowd but from different gardens. The latter is the result of cleavages within crews in prior generations. That is, agnatic kin fish together although they come from different gardens separated by fences built in earlier generations (cf. also Faris 1972: 92ff.). Some of these fences are the result of crews following the ideal developmental cycle, and others were built for reasons such as in the case of the Brown crowd (see Case 3, Chapter IV).

Another reason for the discrepancy between the ideal and real is inheritance. Within the ideal developmental cycle of a fishing crew the members as a whole share the gear and hold it as corporate property. That is, the effective crowd jointly holds rights to the gear. Nemec (1972: 25) found that such gear is inherited by the sons as a whole in an outport on the Avalon Peninsula - a form of impartible inheritance by the male sibling set. The sons have usufruct rights individually, but ownership is collective. However, in Baccalaos Cove, as in other areas of Newfoundland (cf. Firestone 1967; Faris 1972; Szwed 1966; Nemec 1972), when a son cleaves from a crew to go fishing with his own sons, he does receive a share of the gear. Problems arise when a son leaves a crew prematurely, or when the father dies before allocating the gear into shares. In the first case a son often will not receive any gear from his father. In the latter, the brothers will try to come to some agreement among themselves. Thus, until he retires, or until his death, it is the father who controls the fishing outfit and the sons have usufruct rights to it. While a father tries to divide the gear equally, there is always the chance of a breach between brothers when one leaves, because each portion of the fishing outfit is dependent upon the others and the

loss of any one part upsets this balance. Inheritance creates solidarity between brothers, but can also create a permanent cleavage within a crew and cause hard feelings between its members (cf. Nemec 1972; Firestone 1967; Faris 1972). The most notable example of this was in the case of the Gray crowd.

Case 4: Cleavage Within the Fishing Crew
of the Gray Crowd

Mr. J. had five sons fishing with him, each of whom married and built a house on land given to them by their father. There were no fences in the garden circa 1954. At the time of the cleavage there were six houses in the garden. The eldest son, Mr. E., had three sons and since they were old enough to go fishing, he left his father's crew, asked a patrilateral cousin to join him, and formed his own crew. As customary, the father gave Mr. E. his share of gear from his crew, but Mr. E.'s wife wasn't "satisfied" with her husband's share. An argument ensued between Mr. E.'s wife and the wife of another brother, Mr. A. Shortly thereafter a fence was erected separating Mr. E.'s house from those of his father and brothers. As of 1977-1979 two other fences had been built in the garden as a result of natural cleavages, but the children of Mr. E. will not fish with any of Mr. A.'s sons, although they do fish with other patrilateral cousins and agnates.

Since patrilateral cousins often fish together, being members of the same crowd, this case demonstrates how cleavage within a crew can occur and affect later generations that had nothing to do with it. It also explains how agnatic kin can fish together without

residing in the same garden. Most importantly, the case points out the problems with affines. Whenever this story was related, I was told "she (Mr. E.'s wife) was a stranger and too uppity," meaning that the wife, a woman from St. John's, was the reasons for the permanent cleavage among the crowd. Hence, economically determined factors are some of the reasons why brothers fish together, and also why they sometimes split up. But usually even crews composed of members from different crowds have two or three agnatic kin together. As one skipper/owner with no sons explained it: "the best crews are those of all your own and if you can't have that, you try to come close to it." It is generally agreed that members of the same crowd work better together and look after each other. They not only make sure that a son can provide for his own family, they also contribute to the winter fish supply of the crowd members who are elderly, widowed or ill.

Another factor contributing to the actual pattern is demographic. Sometimes a man will have no sons, or his sons go away to the University or to work in the nearby mine in St. Lawrence. This is one reason why some crews had "sharemen," i.e. men who fished with a crew for a fixed share of the catch, but who were not actual shareholders (see Chapter VII). Before the opening

of the fluorspar mine in St. Lawrence in the late 1930's the crews from Baccalaos Cove were ideally composed of a father and sons or other agnatic kin. When the mine opened and there was an opportunity to work year-round for "regular" money, some of the men went to work there. The shift schedule in the mine enabled quite a few of the men to continue fishing as well. The fishermen agreed, however, that once the mine opened it was difficult to have a crew of "all your own crowd" each year. During the early seventies, as the mine was beginning to deaccelerate, many of the miners from Baccalaos Cove, St. Lawrence, and elsewhere, returned to fishing. The money they had earned working in the mine allowed some to purchase a complete fishing outfit (partially on credit) and enabled others to "go in with" their brothers who were already fishing and contribute to the fishing outfit such new equipment as fish finders, two-way radios, loran and radar.

In Baccalaos Cove there are two crews with both loran and radar and one crew with radar. The crews with loran still participate in the lottery, although they seldom keep their berths for the whole season. The other fishermen are aware of the fact that these men are fishing elsewhere, but the precise location is unknown. As Stiles (1972) reports for a southwestern settlement, crews with

radios are quite secretive in their communications since they do not want the other fishermen to know their location. This secrecy applies to most exchanges of information in Baccalaos Cove. Anyone who is particularly adept at giving news without giving any vital information is considered "deep" and is respected for his foresight. This is especially the case when local people are dealing with strangers. One incident I observed while in the field will illustrate this well:

One day the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Mounties) came into Baccalaos Cove seeking information about some rum-runners. They questioned a number of men, including the fisherman whose house I was residing in at the time. The man was cordial to the Mounties, but simply answered "yes" or "no" to their questions and did not volunteer any information. The Mounties had questioned several people and were leaving the settlement, with little information, when they stopped on the road beside a meadow where a man was cutting hay. This man was known for being a little "simple" and the Mounties apparently figured they could get some information from him. They queried the man for about ten minutes and were getting rather annoyed with him. One of the Mounties finally said, "you know, Mr. E., there are a lot of fools around here." To wit, Mr. E. replied, "yes, sir, and there's just a fence between us!"

As will be discussed in Chapter VII, secrecy regarding relationships with outsiders is always adhered to; but within the settlement, among themselves, there is little that is ever really unknown. Wives and children are

frequently the source of information within Baccalaos Cove, but such exchanges are always secrets.

The division of shares within the trap crews and crew composition (see Chapter VII) have been affected by the mine and Newfoundland's Confederation with Canada, but the ideal of a crew of patrikin remains constant. In 1977 two of the eleven trap crews were composed of men who were all from the same crowd as depicted in Table V (see crews III and IX). Crews I and IX are the crews with loran and radar, suggesting that as financial pressures have increased, brothers and agatic kin may be more likely to fish together. In all of the crews there was a crowd link between two or more of the members (si hu, wi bro, etc.) and 51% of the men fishing in crews were from the same crowd as the skipper/owner.

Each crew has a skipper who ostensibly is the man who makes the decisions during the voyage. Traditionally, the father was the skipper in a crew of sons. Yet, even today, the authority of the skipper/owner is not as great as might be presumed and his decisions are based on consultation with his crew. If one experienced crew member objects, the decision is changed. The skippers/owners in 1977-1979 followed traditional authority rights and crews rarely had a disagreement because of a conflict

with the skipper (cf. Nemec 1972; Faris 1972; Firestone 1967).

Of the nine crews fishing without cod traps during the summer of 1977, three were crews of brothers and the others were composed of members who had a crowd link to each other. After the break up of the summer crews for fall fishing, two of the above crews remained intact. The 21 men from the trap fishery who went fall fishing reformed into new crews. Seven of the 20 fall fishing crews were composed entirely of men who had "trapped" together the previous summer (approximately one-third). The remaining 13 crews were composed of agnates (6) or of agnates and affines (7). Hence, while economic factors may not be as crucial in the fall fishery as they are for the summer voyage, ties of kinship are still an important factor in crew formation during the fall.


Kinship is an integral part of the inshore fishery and the analysis of the kinship system is essential for understanding local social organization and economic relationships in Baccalaos Cove. Consequently, the following two Chapters (VI and VII) will focus on the structure of these relationships as they affect local social and economic organization and other aspects of life in Baccalaos Cove.

Table V


Composition of Trap Crews in Baccalaos Cove in 1977

Key: solid (filled-in) figures - crew members
 striped figures - skipper/owner(s)
 ----- mating (no marriage)
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx - step siblings
 ////////////////////////// - half siblings

Crew I



Crew II



Crew III






Table V

Crew IV



Crew V



Crew VI






Table V (cont.)

Crew VII



Crew VIII



Crew IX





Table V (cont.)

Crew I



Crew XI




Table V (cont.)

VI Alliance in Baccalaos Cove

In analyzing the composition of the fishing crews one can observe that some affines in Crews I and IV are also second cousins, and with the exception of Crew XI, the affines in the remaining eight crews are related to the skipper/owner through marriages in prior generations. Recalling that the only stated negative rule of marriage in Bacallaos Cove is with the FBD, i.e. a girl from one's own crowd, we might look at the kinship terminology to see if this gives any indication as to marriage preferences.

Kinship Terminology

The kinship terminology in Baccalaos Cove is a variant of the Eskimo classificatory system: (a) as with our own system, the terms for members of the nuclear family (F,M,S,D,B,Z) are not used for anyone outside the nuclear family; (b) on the patrilineal side there is the identification of affines with consanguineal kin. For example, FZH siblings and their spouses and FFZH siblings and spouses are categorized as aunt and uncle. On the matrilineal side there is some

indication that the MBW siblings and spouses are also categorized as aunt and uncle, but the data is insufficient to generalize; (c) ego refers to and addresses his or her collaterals and their spouses as aunt and uncle in the +1 generation. In the +2 and +3 generations the same terms apply, unless the spouse is not from Baccalaos Cove. If they are not from Baccalaos Cove, they are addressed and referred to as "Mr." and "Mrs." (see Chapter IV). This same distinction of affines also applies in the +1 generation if ego is not a resident of Baccalaos Cove. For example, if a woman marries and moves to her husband's settlement, upon returning to Baccalaos Cove her children will refer to and address affines in the +1 generation as "Mr." or "Mrs." We might be able to consider these terms in view of the frequency of certain kinds of marriages in Baccalaos Cove, but the implications can best be understood only in connection with alliance theory.

Alliance Theory

When Levi-Strauss published his magnum opus, The Elementary Structures of Kinship (orig. 1949; English translation 1969), he presented a new perspective on the study of kinship and social structure in general--

alliance theory. Indeed, as Murphy (1970: 164) notes, "it is at once the most important anthropological study of kinship since Lewis Henry Morgan's Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family (1871)." Levi-Strauss' theory of alliance enables us to create analytical models to be used as heuristic devices in the study and explanation of social structure. He is concerned with empirical data only to the extent that it can facilitate the formulation of such models and enhance our understanding of the structure. To cite Barnes' (1971: 108-109) interpretation:

Marriage rules, and presumably other parts of social structure, belong to that social world that Mauss saw as a "world of symbolic relationships" and where, says Levi-Strauss, the symbols are more real than the things they symbolize (1950a: xv, xxxii). Social structure is a model; models are not abstractions and they alone are truly real (1953b: 115). On the other hand, "the term 'social structure' has nothing whatever to do with empirical reality but with models that are built up after it." (1963a: 279).

Les Structures deals primarily with elementary kinship structures, cross-cousin marriages and the structural implications of both. It is therefore essential to consider the "fundamental structures of the human mind" to which Levi-Strauss refers in explaining the existence and operation of these kinship and marital systems. These are:

...the exigency of the rule as a rule; the notion of reciprocity regarded as the most immediate form of integrating the opposition between the self and others; and finally, the synthetic nature of the gift, i.e. that the agreed transfer of a valuable from one individual to another makes these individuals into partners, and adds a new quality to the valuable transferred (Levi-Strauss 1969b: 84).

Levi-Strauss places a great emphasis on reciprocity, a concept derived from Marcel Mauss (1954). For him, the alliances which are established by the reciprocal exchange of gifts are more important than the gifts themselves, for the gifts become valuable only in view of the partnerships and subsequent alliances which are created or maintained. Reciprocity is thus the basis for alliances and for Levi-Strauss women are the most important items of exchange since they, more than any other valuable, serve to unite groups in a more concrete and permanent fashion. This is because groups of men are dependent upon each other for wives and subsequently, offspring (Levi-Strauss 1969b: 62-68).

In his discussion of elementary kinship structures, Levi-Strauss makes a distinction between prescription and preference. According to his explanation, the former implies obligation, because where there is a prescriptive marriage system the people "do what they say they must" (Levi-Strauss 1969: xxxi). In a preferential marriage

system the "proportion of marriages between a certain type of real or classificatory relative...is higher than were it the result of chance, whether the members of the group are aware of this or not" (Levi-Strauss 1969: xxxiv). Further, the difference between the two types is based upon how they are conceptualized, for "even a preferential system is prescriptive at the level of the model, while even a prescriptive system cannot but be preferential at the level of reality"(emphasis original, Levi-Strauss 1965: 17). In other words, prescriptive and preferential systems correspond to what Levi-Strauss calls mechanical and statistical models (Levi-Strauss 1965: 18). Consequently, an elementary system can be preferential or prescriptive (Levi-Strauss 1969: xxxiv) as long as the marriage is to one who stands in "a particular social group or to a given category of kinship, in other words, because the relationship between the inter-marrying pair is defined in terms pertaining to the social structure" (Levi-Strauss 1965: 18). In a complex structure the reasons for the prescription or preference in marriage are not defined structurally. That is, there are other criteria upon which marriage choices are made, such as the girl is pretty or rich, etc. (Levi-Strauss 1965: 18; cf. also 1969).

The concepts of elementary and complex structures

enable us to examine and understand marriage systems. The problem is, however, whether or not we can include modern societies in such an investigation (Levi-Strauss 1965: 18). In analyzing this problem Levi-Strauss argues that the Crow-Omaha systems are transitional ones because they articulate one to the other:

In fact the Crow-Omaha systems still belong to the elementary structures from the point of view of the marriage prohibitions they frame in sociological terms, but they already belong to the complex structures from the point of view of the probabilist alliance network which they produce. In my terminology, they use a negative mechanical model at the level of the norm, to generate a positive, statistical model at the level of the facts (Levi-Strauss 1965: 19).

In his chapter on "The Transition to Complex Structures," Levi-Strauss (1969b) notes that while marriage alliances may not be fixed in terms of descent groups which place people in a certain category as they are in Crow-Omaha systems, we might look at marriage from the point of view of population "isolates." An isolate is a relatively stable group of intermarrying people which varies in size from 900-3000. Consequently, the range of marriage choice is not unlimited, but restricted by the size of this unit and "a man's category of potential spouses is to some extent determined by the previous marriage choices of his ancestral consanguines" (Fox 1967: 328).

For Levi-Strauss 1963: 387), the length of the marriage cycle, which can only be examined with the use of genealogies, can reveal what a particular marital preference may be, over time. This approach enables us to examine complex societies from the point of view of alliance theory. Admittedly, such complex systems are different from those reported for elementary systems and the approach is incomplete as the length of the marriage cycle cannot be known without the use of extensive genealogies. However, in examining the data from Baccalaos Cove, we can make a beginning and suggest some possibilities.

Marriage Systems in Baccalaos Cove

In our sample of 100 marriages, there are 18 cases of two brothers marrying two sisters and 5 cases of sister exchange. Diagram II presents some of those marriages from our sample, chosen at random. Since there are no positive stated rules of marriage in Baccalaos Cove, we might be inclined to dismiss the system as a complex one with no clearly discernible pattern. However, there is a high frequency of specific kinds of marriages which may be interpreted as serving to create, maintain and extend alliances through genera-

tions.


As discussed in Chapter IV, the crowd is a local descent group which can incorporate in-marrying spouses. However, it is closely tied to residency, surname, rights to land and waterfront. Likewise, there is an ideal of a crew of agnates for the inshore trap fishing, which cannot always be realized. When a crew does acquire another member, the preferred choice appears to be the sister's husband, or a man who is in that category and can thereby be incorporated into a general crowd, or be part of the effective crowd during a summer voyage.

With the exception of sister exchange, women generally move in one direction in each generation with marriage creating an alliance between the groups participating in the exchange (see Diagram III). In some cases groups do exchange women back and forth but such exchanges usually occur after one generation is skipped. Thus it appears that local descent groups (i.e. crowds)⁶ do establish themselves in relationships where there are wife-givers and wife-receivers, as is the case in an elementary kinship system. But we are dealing with a complex system which is not unilineal, but does have a patrilineal bias and which is apparently in the process of change.


There are currently in Baccalaos Cove 12 children who were born out of wedlock. This is not unusual in

one sense; the genealogical data indicates that matings without marriage have occurred before. Nevertheless, in Baccalaos Cove as elsewhere in Newfoundland (cf. for example Faris 1972), marriage usually takes place once a woman is pregnant. When inquiring why there were no marriages in the cases I knew of where a child had been born out of wedlock, I was told that the man or woman was "not good enough" for the other, e.g. "The Browns thought themselves too good for us." That is, despite the ethic of egalitarianism, status differentials do appear to be an important factor in choice of spouse. According to Levi-Strauss, systems of generalized exchange, such as found in elementary structures, can break down for this reason because wife-givers and wife-receivers "gradually gain differences in status from the very fact of the formula of exchange" (Levi-Strauss 1969b: 474). Thus, it might be argued that in some cases the marriages were not allowed because the potential spouse was not in the appropriate category; or because of status differentials, the system is beginning to change; or it may have always been the same. It is of interest to note that in the cases where marriage did not occur, the children had no rights to the genitor's land and/or property and were raised by their mother's crowd. Sometimes, such a child is "adopted" by a sister and inherits accordingly.⁷


In the genealogical data I have gathered there is a high incidence of marriage between a woman and her FZSWB, or a man who is in that category of relationship to her (or, between a man and his MBDHZ, or a woman in that category of relationship to him). Diagram III shows a cycle of generalized exchange over four generations. Although at the level of the model the cycle can continue indefinitely, in actuality it does not and there are cases in which the groups do become wife-givers and wife-receivers to one another. Groups which have created alliances by establishing themselves as wife-givers and wife-receivers, extend and perpetuate them in subsequent generations. Thus we have:



In the next generation, the -0- generation, we have the following:




In the -0- generational level groups who are wife-givers and wife-receivers in the previous generation establish such a relationship with another group in the cycle. In generation +1 for example;




with new groups being incorporated in a similar manner.

In the -0- generation there are five new groups added to the exchange cycle. In the next descending generation, the same thing occurs:



One may ask: how does this correlate with the genealogical data? The genealogical data demonstrates a fairly high frequency of marriage between the FZHVS and the MBWBD and also between the FZHVS and the FBWBD. From a descent point of view, a female ego marrying a real FZHVS or FZHVS is marrying into the category of a FZSWB. In each generation the wife-giving and wife-receiving relationship remains the same as those from previous generations. Looking at Diagram III, in the

-1 generation N gives a woman to B. However, a woman from N could also marry a man from J, because in the previous generation, the -0- generation, N gave a woman to I and I gave a woman to J. The pattern would be:



Therefore, in the next ascending generation, +1, we can infer that N gave a woman to J; or N could have given a woman to I. In other words, as we analyze the marriages, the cycle which emerges is that a woman can marry any man in her generation, or any generation, who is in the appropriate category of a FZSWB, or a man can marry any woman who is in the category of a MBDHZ.

Within this model a woman can marry the FZS and a man can marry the MBD and the prohibition against marrying someone who is from your own crowd would be upheld. But since this is a complex system, the data is not sufficient to argue this as a system of preferential marriage such as those found in elementary structures, although it is a possible model to be considered and further research is needed to develop and analyze it fully. There are, for example, cases where wife-receivers become wife-givers to the same group after one generation is skipped, in which case there would be a cycle of in-

direct generalized exchange that might be functioning, as well. Or, the system could be going through a transformation. However, the marriage pattern suggests that there is a preferential marriage system whereby a man will marry a woman from the same category that his group had received one from in prior generations, or by establishing such a relationship with a woman who is placed in that category.⁸

Crew Composition and Affines

Men prefer to fish with agnatic kin for a variety of reasons. Aside from those mentioned in Chapters IV and V, brothers, fathers, and sons not only make sure that they can provide for their own family, they also contribute to the support of each other's. If a man dies, his agnates will contribute towards providing for his family. Members of the crowd are economically, socially and morally responsible to one another. When a man receives a woman from another crowd, it is his agnatic kin who are responsible for her and her children, if he should die. But the woman is still a member of her father's crowd and there are ties with them as well.

In the case of the two trap crews in which there had been a "falling out" between the members during the

summer of 1977, the difficulty was with the man who was the skipper's wife's brother--or the brother of a woman who had married into the skipper's crowd. It appears that when an affine is a member of a crew, he should preferably be a man who comes from a group (crowd) that is in a wife-receiving relationship to the skipper's, e.g. the sister's husband. In Chapter IV, Case 1 we saw how a man came to Baccalaos Cove to fish with a crew of father and sons, married on of the sisters, and was incorporated into the wife's crowd by being given a parcel of land and rights to the waterfront. However, a man who is from Baccalaos Cove may go fishing with his wife's brothers without being incorporated into her crowd. Often, he does so because he has received a woman from them, they are shorthanded, and he does not have a share in a crew of his own patrikin. The sister's husband most often has waterfront rights and may have some gear which he can contribute to his wife's brothers' crew. In exchange for receiving a woman, the man will contribute his gear and his labor to his wife's crowd and in turn, he can contribute towards the support and maintenance of some of the members of his own crowd. Likewise, the wife's brothers are able to keep their sister as part of their shore crowd (see Chapter V).

There are crews who have fishing with them their sister's sons. This may be seen as a reaffirmation of the alliance between a boy's crowd and his FWB crowd. The close relationship between a man and his sister's children, or between a boy and his mother's brother, has been noted by Radcliffe-Brown (1952), Malinowski (1929) and others. It is not only a tie of affinity or complementary filiation, however; it is an extension of the alliance relationship. In Baccalaos Cove sister's son will often go hunting, berry picking, and chopping wood with his maternal uncle. As a boy grows older, this tie is extended to the sons of the mother's brother and they often go "courting" together. It is not unusual to find cases in Baccalaos Cove in which two male cross cousins marry sisters and become members of the same trap crew for several summers. As strong as the preference for agentic kin based crews may be, the sister's husband and sister's son are often included, if affines are included within a crew. Aside from the above explanations, this is also partially accounted for by the fact that grandchildren spend much of their time with their grandparents, especially when young. If their mother is from Baccalaos Cove, a child will quite often spend time with both his matrilineal and patrilineal grandparents, since daughters will visit their

mother daily, and men visit them most evenings during the fall, winter and spring. Consequently, children are raised with both their matrilineal and patrilineal cousins and have ties to both.

Terminology and Alliance

In comparing the marital system with the terminological system it appears that the categorization of the father's sister's husband's siblings as aunt and uncle designates that this is a group from which a woman can choose a potential spouse, as the man would be in the category of FZSWB. As noted in the earlier discussion of the marriage system, in the -1 generation N can marry any man who is in the category of FZSWB and be marrying in accordance with the preference and patterns which have been observed. Unfortunately, the data for the terminology on the matrilineal side is vague and incomplete. Some informants said they did use the terms aunt and uncle for their MBW siblings and spouses; others did not. The system may be in a state of change and no specific conclusions can be made until more data is gathered and analyzed. Indeed, the preferential marriage system depicted above is only a suggestion of an ideal model of indirect generalized exchange which demands further analysis through more extensive genealogical and terminological information.

The patrilateral bias in the kinship system in Baccalaos Cove is evident in their rules of residency, inheritance, property rights and crew composition. Men need to form alliances with other groups to obtain women and subsequently offspring to maintain their ideal of having an all agantic fishing crew. At the same time, although affines are not the first choice in the composition of fishing crews, affines from groups with whom an alliance has been created by having given a woman to them are the preferred affines. Structurally, they are in a different category from those affines with whom one is in a wife-receiving relationship, and the alliances are an integral part of the social and subsequently, economic systems.

Partial Genealo

Diagram II




Diagram III






Diagram III

Diagram II
Baccalaos Cove Depicting Various Marriages



Differential Marriage with the FZSWB

VII Economic Organization

Methodology

There has been little consensus in the anthropological literature as to the scope, limits and concepts which should be utilized in the study of economic organization, and even less agreement on the methodology and focus of such analyses. This situation is primarily a result of lack of agreement and misinterpretation as to the applicability of modern economic theory to the study of pre-literate, archaic and peasant economies and has important implications for the following analysis of local economic organization in Baccalaos Cove.

While Malinowski is often cited as the "father" of economic anthropology (cf. Firth 1959; Dalton 1971), the writings of such scholars as Sir Henry Maine (1861), Morgan (1877), Marx (1904) and Max Weber (1947) among others, have had a significant influence on some later theoretical ideas. Malinowski's ideas, as set forth in Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922) and subsequent publications (1926, 1935), have served as a guideline for later anthropologists interested in economic organization. He dispelled

the myth of the "economic man," demonstrated that a distinct methodology for studying pre-literate economics was needed, and made it clear that economic activity in primitive societies must be viewed within the context of social relationships (cf. Dalton 1968; Firth 1959).

Both his views and those of Thurnwald (1915, 1932) have since been developed by Karl Polanyi.

Although later anthropologists (cf. Goodfellow 1939; Herskovits 1940; Firth 1939, 1946) accepted Malinowski's basic premises, both Herskovits (1952) and Firth (1959) were later to argue that certain concepts from modern economic theory could be usefully applied to the study of all economies. With the publication of Polanyi's The Great Transformation (1944) and Trade and Market in the Early Empires (1957, co-edited with Arensberg and Pearson), the issue of the validity and usefulness of applying modern economic theory to the study of pre-literate, archaic and peasant economies intensified. According to Polanyi, the analytical concepts of modern economic theory have been derived from and specifically for societies which are dominated by price-making markets. Therefore, these concepts cannot be usefully applied to the study of societies where such market exchange is absent or present only in some sectors of the economy.

Polanyi argues that the term economic has two meanings:

The substantive meaning of economic derives from man's dependence for his livelihood upon nature and his fellows...the formal meaning of economic derives from the logical character of the means-ends relationship...It refers to a definite situation of choice, namely, that between the different uses of means induced by an insufficiency of means (Polanyi 1968: 216; orig. 1953).

Given these definitions, Polanyi argues that only the substantive meaning of the term can yield the concepts and heuristic tools necessary for studying economies of the past and present. However, he is clearly not postulating only one meaning for the term economic, nor does he negate situations of choice or the facts of scarcity.⁹ Rather, he suggests a distinction between the analysis of economic processes on the one hand and economic analysis on the other, the latter of which can only be usefully undertaken in societies where there is a system of price-making markets. In such societies, the economy is integrated by the fluctuating prices engendered from exchange; but this situation usefully applies only where "scarcity induces choices" arising where there are differential means and ends and the choices are analyzed as acts of "economizing" (Polanyi 1968: 217-222). Further, as Neale (1957: 369) indicates in Trade and Market..., there are some societies where there are both types of

markets, and the limiting elements controlling the non-price making markets must be considered in interpreting the economic relationships.

For Polanyi, what is paramount in organizing land and labor for production and distribution are status arrangements and concomitant social obligations (cf. Maine 1861). It is only where man is freed from social obligations that one can speak of acts for profit or gain, and it is only in contract (vs. status) societies where price-making markets exist throughout that we may quantify these acts and usefully apply the concepts of formal economic theory.

According to Polanyi (1944, 1957, 1968), there are three dominant "modes of economic integration" which can be discerned in observing and analyzing economies of the past and present. Since these different principles can and do occur together in a society, Polanyi designates "...that one as dominant which integrates the factors of production, land and labor, with the rest of the economy" (Polanyi 1968: 223). These three forms of integration, all of which necessitate a prior structural arrangement to function as integrating modes, are reciprocity, redistribution and [price-making] market exchange. The economy is "embedded" in the social structure and the rules of social organization are the rules which also

govern the economy. Simple personal exchange or sharing between individuals does not denote reciprocity, redistribution or exchange. The transactions must be institutionalized within the society.

Following Marx, a mode of production is the way the social relations of production (e.g. division of labor, rights to resources) combine with the forces of production (technology, skills, instruments of production, natural resources and knowledge of their use) (cf. Godelier 1978: 764). Those social relationships which also function as the system of relations of production and distribution are the institutions which will be dominant in the society and are important for understanding the mode of production (Godelier 1975: 13). Therefore, to analyze the economy one must look at the interrelationship between technology, ecology and social structure and identify "the patterns of the social structure according to which production is organized. The three principles put forth by Polanyi serve to describe what in Marxist terminology are called relations of production" (cf. Carrasco, n.d.: 10).

In applying these ideas to interpret socio-economic organization in Baccalaos Cove the issue of whether or not fishermen can be considered as peasants again arises (see Chapter I). I do not intend to address the issue further; however, in Baccalaos Cove the fishermen have been oriented towards their own subsistence and have

always been tied to the national economy and larger society to varying degrees. However one chooses to define the term, Thorner's statement regarding peasant economies demonstrates that the categorization of these economies as "dual" or "part culture" and "part society" does not really assist our analysis. Thorner's ideas are useful in studying the fishermen of Baccalaos Cove:

We are sure to deceive ourselves if we think of peasant economies as oriented exclusively towards their own subsistence and term 'capitalist' any orientation towards the 'market.' It is more reasonable to start by assuming that, for many centuries, peasant economies have had both orientations. (cited in Wallerstein 1974: 18).

Dalton (1971) and others (cf. Durrenberger 1984) have stated that Polanyi does not consider the peasant economy and Tannenbaum (1984) argues that Marx views peasant economic organization only in conjunction with the structure of the system of which it is a part. Her critique serves to demonstrate what she views as the difference between Marx and A.V. Chayanov, a Russian agrarian economist, who was a member of the so-called organization and production school of peasant economics (cf. Chayanov 1966; Durrenberger 1984).

Chayanov presented a theory for the study of peasant household economies and, like the substantivists, held that standard economic theory was inappropriate to the

study of peasant households since they often lacked some of the categories typically found in capitalistic economies--capital, wages, interest and rent:

We take the motivation of the peasant's economic activity not as that of an entrepreneur who as a result of investment of his capital receives the difference between gross income and production overheads, but rather as the motivation of the worker on a peculiar piece-rate system which allowshim alone to determine the time and intensity of his work. (Chayanov 1966: 42).

Like the fishermen of Baccalaos Cove, peasants sell the product of their labor, not the labor itself. To equate peasants with wage-laborers is a fiction. If such factors of production as land and labor are not commodities, then the system cannot be analyzed as a capitalistic system nor can standard economic theory be usefully applied to fully understand economic organization within this sector of the society (cf. also Godelier 1972).

Marx's interest was in understanding the overall political economy; Chayanov focused on the organization for production within the peasant household. Neither was unaware of the other sectors of the economy and their ideas, together with those of Polanyi's, offer a good approach for understanding economic organization in Baccalaos Cove.

Reciprocity, Redistribution and [Market] Exchange

A very strong moral ambiguity exists in Baccalaos Cove which influences socio-economic interactions. While there is an ethic of egalitarianism, it is actually a fiction. Hard work and industriousness are commended, but not if it is considered to be at the expense of others within the outport. The crews which have loran and radar, for example, are considered by some to be greedy and have been called "fish killers," a term which "implies a violation of the ethic prohibiting aggression ...(and also) skillful and successful fishing" (Faris 1972: 126, parentheses mine). It is within this value system that any economic processes must be analyzed.

Reciprocity entails the exchange of goods and services between people or groups who are bound in a non-market relationship. The exchange does not create the relationship, but is part of it (cf. Polanyi 1957; Bohannan 1968). Polanyi notes that in non-market economies reciprocity and redistribution generally occur together and argues that "reciprocity as a form of integration gains greatly in power through its capacity of employing both redistribution and [market] exchange as subordinate methods" (Polanyi 1957: 253, brackets mine). Polanyi

sees the power of the self-regulating market as a ruling force in the economy increasing as land and labor become commodities to be purchased on the market (Polanyi 1957: 253 ff.). He notes that in market exchange higgling-haggling is the essence of bargaining behavior with gain being the goal of both parties (Polanyi 1957: 225).

In Baccalaos Cove higgling-haggling can occur, but the notion of profit or gain is absent. Since money is now more widespread within the outports and is sometimes an element in exchange, the interpretation of some exchanges has been compared to contracts in market exchange systems and have been analyzed accordingly. To illustrate:

Case 5: The Exchange of Services Between Second Cousins in Baccalaos Cove

Mr. G. is known to be very "handy" at fixing cars. Mr. H. mentions in conversation with Mr. G. one day that his car is in need of some repairs. Mr. G. offers to look at the car and a few days later, repairs it. Mr. H. thanks him and offers him \$25.00. Mr. G. does not accept it, saying he was "glad to be able to help." Mr. H. insists that since Mr. G.'s work is so good he should take something for his services. This discussion continued for awhile, with each party arguing his case. The outcome was that Mr. G. agreed to take something (not specified) later on, "something for the children."

The argument has been presented that these types of exchanges are similar to contracts; but since the buyer

and seller are higgling-hagglng with both setting low prices while negotiating for their own advantage, it has been referred to as "inverted bargaining" (cf. Szwed 1966: 56; Faris 1972; Chiramonte 1970). However, in analyzing this type of interaction, the so-called "price-setting" is not the important factor to consider. It is a type of generalized exchange and both parties know that there is implicit within the agreement the obligation to reciprocate, or pay-back. Although there are instances where one party may try to profit by the exchange, they are infrequent. There are strong social sanctions of gossip and withdrawal for those who do not reciprocate or are considered to have taken "unfair" advantage (Faris 1972: 125; Szwed 1966). Although general purpose money has been introduced, these exchanges are organized by reciprocity. The traditional values prevail and in many cases today reciprocity is still based on the exchange of goods and services (see Case 2, Chapter IV) and often the reciprocity takes the form of "open" or generalized exchange (cf. Sahllns 1965).

The people of Baccalaos Cove approach their interactions with outsiders in much the same vague, ambiguous manner, with the difference being that they do not trust the stranger. Fairness in dealing with them is respected and rewarded, but not anticipated. While secrecy is an

important element in much of their behavior, within the outport, among their own, nothing is ever really unknown. Secrecy helps to protect them from outsiders and also serves to perpetuate the ethic of egalitarianism. Nevertheless, social sanctions prohibit maximization from being a goal. In their interactions with strangers they often now know what the fair rate for some services may be (e.g. boat building), but this information is used to protect themselves, and not for profit or gain, *per se*.

Since the effective crowd or crew is the primary unit of production in Baccalaos Cove, its members, together with the male members of the general crowd, organize land and labor for production and distribution (see Chapter V). Collectively they share the expenses and maintenance of the boat and gear and the tasks of hauling, processing, curing and "making" the fish. They also assist each other in varied activities such as housebuilding, cutting hay, caring for livestock and provisioning for winter by curing fish and hunting and gathering in the country.

Today, the fish which is hauled during the summer voyage in Baccalaos Cove is mainly sold fresh to the fish plants and to those companies or foreign trawlers who come into the outport. When fish was dried and cured, the women who were the wives, daughters and sisters of the members of the crew were mainly responsible for this

work and comprised what was known as the shore crowd. This cooperative and reciprocal exchange of labor is still present, but is initiated in such activities as berry picking, turning the hay, tending the cattle and gardening. Thus, to the extent that the male and female members of the effective crowd pooled their labor and redistributed and reciprocated the products of such labor, one can readily see the significance of both of these principles within the household economy of Baccalaos Cove.

Traditionally, each member of the crew in Baccalaos Cove received fish (share) for household consumption based upon the size of his family and the number of people from his crowd who contributed to the shore crowd. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter VI, when a crew had a sister's husband as a member, this enabled them to keep their sister as part of their shore crowd and benefitted the crew, as well as the general crowd of which the agnatic members were a part. Formerly, shareholders, being equal partners in the crew, received an equal share of the voyage after the division of expenses. At the end of the voyage, after the fish was dried, cured, weighed and sold, the shares would be distributed. Sharemen, on the other hand, usually received a fixed share (in quintals)¹⁰ regardless of how

good or bad the voyage had been that year. Since sharemen usually came from another settlement, their room and board was provided by the full shareholders in the crew, each taking his turn in giving the men food and shelter. If the shareman was from the outport, his fixed share of the voyage would be higher, since room and board would be unnecessary. In matters of expenses and maintenance, the crew of shareholders was responsible for the means of production, as well as the relations of production, with kinship serving to articulate one to the other.

However, while the inshore fishermen owned the means of production and organized the relations of production, their rights of disposal over their fish beyond household consumption needs and the needs of the crowd, were largely beyond their control. As discussed in Chapter III, the merchants held control over the prices of supplies and fish and it is this control to which Antler refers in her argument regarding the penetration of capitalism into the Newfoundland economy by the 19th Century (cf. Antler 1977). Her argument is essentially based on that aspect of production which concerns itself with the distribution of the products of labor, supplies, and services.

Redistribution has been defined as "the systematic movement of goods towards an administrative center and their reallocation by the authorities at that center"(Polanyi

1968: 223). Where redistribution prevails as an integrative mode of economic exchange, as for example among the Inca where goods would be brought to a government storehouse, or among the Trobrianders where tribute would be given to the chief, there are three criteria implicit in the process: (a) there are social sanctions which enforce the redistribution and a person's status is the regulating factor. "redistribution obtains within a group to the extent to which the allocation of goods is collected in one hand and takes place by virtue of custom, law or ad hoc central decision;" (Polanyi 1968: 225) (b) the goods which are brought to the center are usually the same goods which are reallocated, albeit differentially; and (c) the types of goods and services are determined by the authorities at that center.

In discussing the role of merchants in southwestern Newfoundland prior to the 1930's, Szwed (1966: 50) argues for their role as cultural brokers who provided contact with the larger society and regards them as centers of redistribution for the allocation of goods. Certainly there is a process of goods being circulated, because in exchange for the locally available surplus fish, the merchants provided non-locally produced goods (Szwed 1966: 49). But there is a qualitative distinction between the distribution and circulation of goods on the one hand,

and redistribution as a mode of economic integration, on the other. Within the outports the merchants offered storage, some economic security, goods not otherwise available and took the responsibility of marketing the fish. In addition, the system of credit and payments (mostly in kind) against it were extended through a dyadic relationships which obligated each to the other. In this respect the merchants did serve as centers of redistribution. Likewise, custom and at times, ad hoc central decision did control the types of goods and services which the merchants distributed (and set equivalencies prevailed; e.g. a yaffle (handful) of fish in exchange for a certain amount of cloth). However, the merchants did not have control over the types of goods which they received, nor the quantity and quality of the fish. That is, there were no set or socially established amounts set each voyage. Merchants served as cultural mediators by providing contact with the larger society and economy, marketing the fish, and providing goods not locally available. And, they were able to maximize their profits by keeping the fishermen indebted to them. Consequently, reciprocity organized land and labor for production, but redistribution and market exchange organized the distribution of the products of labor and integrated the outports with the larger society.

The division of shares within a crew today in Baccalaos

Cove is based upon the amount of fish sold after each day's haul. Among a crew of shareholders, the traditional division of shares obtains. In a crew of sharemen, each fisherman receives an equal share and the skipper/owner receives a share for himself and a share for his boat and gear. If he is indebted to a merchant for items such as an additional trap, he will get a third share, which the merchant takes until the gear is paid off. The fish which is not sold is divided equally between all the members of the crew to salt, cure and store for the winter in the common stores and/or stages which belong to the members of their crowd. If any one brother or kinsmen should need fish, he can rely on this supply. In some crews there is the shared ownership of resources and once a son or brother leaves a crew to establish his own, he is given the same access to the waterfront and the same rights of disposal over it according to the traditional rules of inheritance. Ideally, crews continue to be composed of agnatic kin. Those crews which cannot meet this ideal (see Chapter V), approach it as closely as possible. However, in a number of the crews there are now only one or two members who are the owners of the means of production; yet the crew as a whole contributes towards the maintenance of the gear and supplies

(means of production) because the extra share which the skipper/owner receives is taken from the total catch, before any division of shares. The obligations of kinship and the reciprocal nature and structure of social relationships in Baccalaos Cove continue to organize relations of production in the inshore fishery.

Many of the fishermen today receive most of their payments in cash from the companies, merchants or buyers who purchase their fish. But, the power and influence of the merchants and the legacy of their control continues to play an important role in Baccalaos Cove. Most fishermen are still in debt for their gear and supplies either to a merchant, bank or finance company. In their cognition of the outsider as a stranger, the merchants and others who now assume part of their role either by supplying gear (or money for gear) or buying fish, are regarded with skepticism. Cash transactions are infrequent on a daily basis and are considered as a symbol of the outside world--strangers. In Baccalaos Cove this is often demonstrated by knocking on a door to enter a home. This only occurs if the person entering is a stranger. As anyone who has ever lived in an outport in Newfoundland learns, it is only strangers who will knock upon entering a house, but surely no one from the settlement, a friend, or a kinsman.

But, mummers, strangers, and those entering for purposes of a cash transaction will always knock. The ritual of mummering is a reaffirmation of local cognition of the outsider as a stranger (see Chapter VIII). As Faris (1972: 141) noted for Cat Harbour, "a person in the community who wishes to establish one of these 'stranger like' relationships will signal this by knocking, just as the outsider and the mummer do..."

Merchants are outsiders who live locally and occupy a position of influence and authority. Sider (1976: 112) views the merchant as "the one exception" to egalitarianism within the outports. In Baccalaos Cove there are hierarchical arrangements which exist and the sons and daughters of merchants are prohibited from marrying the offspring of fishermen, although such marriages will sometimes occur. There are also other differences which exist although "these differences...are not used to crystallize class distinctions between persons...as differential gains are not at the expense of one person in the community vis a vis another, except in the case of merchants" (Faris 1972: 144).

Entrepreneurship

Egalitarianism is a folk model within Baccalaos Cove,

and although a fiction, it is an ethic which the people try to maintain. They are aware of differences among them, but relegate them to a minor role. The one fisherman in Baccalaos Cove who has no sons is the wealthiest man in the harbor. One often hear comments such as "what does he want all that money for" and "what good is it to him?" At the same time he is respected for being a hard worker and for always including within his crew men from Baccalaos Cove. Furthermore, he does not act to make a profit or gain at the expense of others within the settlement, nor does he display his wealth. That is, he does not pursue his entrepreneurial interests within the outport. It is this same rationale which explains the behavior and role of the skipper/owner(s) who receive an extra share of the haul for assuming the risks and responsibilities for the boat and gear. The potential for entrepreneurial pursuits may be present, but he and the members of his crew have mutual and reciprocal obligations upon which each must rely. Other anthropologists writing about the economy of Newfoundland outports have argued that there is an entrepreneurial elite within the settlements (cf. Szwed 1966; Faris 1972; Chiramonte 1970. Although in Baccalaos Cove merchants who have come from outside the community do occupy such

a position, other local shop merchants and shop keepers cannot be so readily categorized. For them, as well as for the skipper/owner(s), the potential to pursue entrepreneurial activities may be present, but their realization of them is most often blocked (Brox 1963: 23).

Following Belshaw (1955), Barth has defined an entrepreneur as "someone who takes the initiative in administering resources, and pursues an expansive economic policy" (Barth 1963: 5). An entrepreneur is innovative, interested in maximizing profits and willing to take risks in the management of an enterprise. According to Barth (1963: 5-10), entrepreneurship must be viewed as an activity--a process of transactions between persons. He argues that it is not a status or role which relates to rights and obligations, but as aspect of a role involving action and activities. In Baccalaos Cove entrepreneurship is an activity, but entrepreneurs also occupy a status position with concomitant rights and obligations. While the skipper/owner may be viewed as a cultural broker (cf. Paine 1971), his activities are integrated within a definite status position.

In the analytical model which Barth proposes he argues that social "costs" (i.e. ties of kinship and friendship) must be considered, together with a consideration of "...the place of the product of an enterprise

in the whole system (Barth 1963: 18). Relying upon Bohannan's (1955) categorization of the division of a society's exchangeable goods and services into separate spheres where those from one sphere can be converted into another, Barth proposes that entrepreneurship may be seen in the same way. Additionally, he presents examples to demonstrate how social "assets" can be converted into money and vice/versa.

However, within the Newfoundland economy there are few opportunities to convert labor and/or products into cash. The low prices given for cod fish in Newfoundland compared to the prices received in other countries on the world market are one example of the "boundaries" to conversion (Brox 1972: 70-75). Likewise, in Baccalaos Cove, as in many other outports, labor is not a commodity which can be readily converted into money. Fishermen, for example, do not receive a wage, but credit and/or cash for the product of their labor. In other words, there are limited and indirect means by which fishermen can convert social "assets" into money.

As noted, there are some crews which continue to share the ownership of the means of production, while others do not. The opening of the fluorspar mine in St. Lawrence in the 1930's and increased educational programs

offered by Newfoundland's Confederation with Canada in 1949 gave men opportunities to go elsewhere in search of jobs or training. This affected the traditional composition of the crews, but the ideal of a crew of patrikin remained an important part of their value system. Crews which became "crosshanded"¹¹ adapted by taking on more sharemen, since fewer agnatic kin were available to be shareholders. Other crews either disbanded and sold their gear, or reorganized themselves by taking positions as sharemen or shareholders in other crews, usually a crew with other patrikin. When the mine began to deaccelerate and eventually closed, many of the men from Baccalaos Cove, who had worked there and were still relatively healthy, returned to fishing on a regular basis. Some began fishing with their brothers and pooled their resources, while others purchased an outfit on credit and formed their own crews. As a result, in Baccalaos Cove there are crews which for various historical, economic, demographic and social reasons have one or two owners, but the values and obligations inherent in the traditional system are prevalent and act to deter entrepreneurial activities.

For example, there are some crews who sometimes have a larger haul because of technological innovations which

have been adopted, but this is not the primary reason for the innovations. As in the past, crews which have a good year usually save the money to offset a bad year. They do not reinvest unless gear needs to be replaced (cf. also Faris 1972). The skipper/owner may hope to have a higher yield, but like the other members of the crew, he still has social obligations to fulfill and is subject to the prices set by the fish plants, merchants or others who buy the fish; the uncertainty of the demand and supply on the world market; ecological constraints; and the merchants and bankers who outfit him on credit. Historically, socially, and culturally the role and status accorded the skipper/owner blocks his ability to pursue his role as that of an entrepreneur.

The same logic exists with small local shopkeepers who provide foostuffs, on credit, to various kin and neighbors. Often, the shopkeepers themselves have little capital and there is a limit to the number of people to whom they can extend credit. This may account for the multiplicity of small shops (11), as no one shopkeeper can extend credit to everyone in the outport (cf. Ward 1967). Together with the small shops, many of which are operated out of the home, there are three larger general stores which provide food and other

supplies such as clothing, on credit. Despite local criticisms that these men are "like the merchants," they are subject to an intricate network of kinship and friendship ties and accompanying social sanctions. At times, they do extend credit differentially and lower their prices for kinsmen. As with outside merchants, cash transactions in these general stores and small shops are infrequent. This is not only due to the skepticism which the local people have about money (i.e. cash), but also to the obligations between the local merchants and their clients, since cash transactions would change the nature of their relationship by releasing each from their obligation to the other. Although these local merchants have entrepreneurial values and are placed in a separate category, they are not an "entrepreneurial elite." Unlike the outside merchants, local shopkeepers and merchants function within a value system which does not condone opportunism. Therefore, the concept of entrepreneurship within Baccalaos Cove can only be understood by recognizing that where these entrepreneurs exist, they have a specific status and role within the settlement. Further, within the framework of rules which govern social organization in Baccalaos Cove, they are not free to pursue an "expansive economic policy."

'Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose'

The opening of the fluorspar mine and subsequent opportunities for employment in fish processing plants and on trawlers brought an increasing amount of cash into the local economy of Baccalaos Cove. Together with numerous transfer payments initiated after Newfoundland's Confederation with Canada, it appeared that the local economy would undergo a transformation. This did not occur. To be sure, there have been changes, adaptations and some apparent transformations, but there has also been continuity. Traditional values and ideologies continue to structure rules of inheritance, marriage, and crew composition. Likewise, the choices available for young men (and women) to receive educational or vocational training and seek employment elsewhere have alleviated some of the problems that could have arisen by increased population pressure on limited resources.

During the interim of the mine's operation, some of the men from Baccalaos Cove alternated between mining and fishing. Yet at no time did the people ever think of themselves as anything but fishermen. Those who worked in the mine were sometimes envied for having some type of year-round income; but the baby bonus, unemployment benefits and other transfer payments, which supplemented

the households during the winter, were seen to provide similar benefits without the threat of "perishing" from working in the mine and incurring silicosis or other associated diseases.

Marx acknowledged that the laws of capitalistic economic theory are not universally valid and that one must deal with particular historical situations and particular social structures (Marx 1904; Hobsbawm 1964; Aaron 1968). If we consider that the production factors which the rural population in Newfoundland control hold no value in the urban market and that household are insulated from the market sphere (Brox 1972: 70-75), the analysis of the household economy in Baccalaos Cove can best be understood apart from references to formal economic theory. "A change in market prices does not lead to a spontaneous relocation of production factors... but rather to adaptations of the internal household economy" (Brox 1972: 75). Within Baccalaos Cove these adaptations have taken place according to pre-existing structural arrangements. This cultural continuity can be seen in the way production continues to be organized by reciprocity and redistribution and structured by ties of kinship. Within Baccalaos Cove social and economic organization are essentially as they were since the family-based inshore fishery developed in the 19th Century.

VIII The Ritual of Mumming¹²

Baccalaos Cove, like many coastal fishing outports throughout Newfoundland, has had a history of limited and restricted contact with other settlements and is today still largely self-sufficient, although closely linked with the larger, national economy for trade and supplies. It may perhaps be argued that it was a combination of the isolation and the historical conditions existing at the time of early settlement which accounts for the "stranger complex" and which eventually enabled the ritual of mumming to be adopted in the early 19th Century (cf. Sider 1976).

In a collection of seminal essays, Clifford Geertz (1973) presents a symbolic interpretation of culture and society which demonstrates how social relationships and rituals shape the social order and are, in turn, shaped by it. His theoretical suggestions, among others, can be applied to construct "a reading of what happens" (Geertz 1973: 18) with Christmas mumming or janneying, a custom which is still practiced in Baccalaos Cove. According to some sources (cf. Halpert and Story 1969), mumming is on the decline in Newfoundland due to increasing industrialization and the

concomittant increase in contact local people in isolated settlements have with outsiders. Yet, it will be argued that mummering does and will continue to fit into the "fabric of meaning" (Geertz 1973: 145) of Newfoundland culture and society.

Mummering at Christmas not only describes the social order, but continually shapes it. As for strangers, one often hears the comment that "you don't know who they are or what they might do." This is also the case with mummers and generally is the reason given by a host who hesitates to invite them in and/or will admit them only after persistence on the part of the mummers. Some people will not allow the mummers to enter their home at all, just as they will not invite a real stranger into their home until more is known about them. Local attitudes towards affines, especially those who are "not from the place," are comparable to those towards strangers--outsiders, as discussed earlier. Although in Baccalaos Cove there are local rules of exogamy based upon residency and surname, marriages to local women are preferred since women (and men) from other localities are considered as outsiders, i.e. strangers. In Baccalaos Cove men are advised not to marry a stranger as, to cite Faris who found a similar admonition in a Northeastern outport, "you

can't trust them (Faris 1972: 138).

The art of masking, putting on costumes and disguises and the presence of frightening figures in pivotal rituals is well documented in the anthropological, historical, and folkloric literature. Indeed, Christmas mummering in the form of the house visit dates back to the early 1800's and, in accordance with Newfoundland history, reportedly originated in the British Isles (Halpert 1969: 38).

In Baccalaos Cove, mummering occurs during the twelve days of Christmas--December 26 through January 6. Although mummers make house calls every night during the Christmastide, it is on and after the night of January 1st that the mummers' visits become more intensified and frequent. Such visits, especially by adults, occur most often after midnight. The mummers usually gather in groups of two or more each night. However, a person will often change the people with whom he'll mummer from night to night in order to better conceal his/her identity from those whose house is entered for a visit several nights in succession. If the people in the house guess the identity of one mummer, it often leads them to attempt and correctly guess the identity of the others. Since people customarily mummer along kinship, residential or friendship lines,

changing partners is part of the disguise and, hence, part of the ritual.

Mummers meet at the house of one of the group and disguise themselves by putting on old clothing or wrapping sheets and muslin around them. Men sometimes dress up as women and women disguise themselves as men, wearing the fishing gear of oil skins, rubbers and mitts. The mummer's face is blackened or covered with a veil, fastened securely, in order to be safely concealed. They change their gait (the mummers' walk) and, if possible, their height (by stooping over or adding stuffing inside their boots to make themselves taller). Most of all the mummers disguise their voices in what is known as "mummer talk," a garbled speech which is spoke while breathing in, talking quickly, and using a high-pitched voice. This ingressive speech pattern, when mastered, makes it impossible to identify the voice of a particular person and is considered by many to be a sure sign of a good mummer. Many times only one or two of the mummers in a group will be the spokesman for all, as they might be considered the best at disguising their voice. Indeed, I was told that if I went mummering, I would have to be a silent mummer since it was considered that I would be unable to speak mummer talk and would probably give myself and those accompanying me away almost immediately.

Perhaps the most important element in this ritual is the "split" of wood which is carried around and used to knock on the doors of the houses to be visited while asking "mummers allowed?" This request is often made more than once before the mummers are permitted to enter. If the hosts do not wish to have the mummers come in, they will not respond to the knocking at the door. This knock at the door is essential to interpret the ritual of mummering. As discussed in Chapter VII, locals do not knock upon entering a house for a visit. It is only strangers who will knock on the door. The knocking is indicative of an outside relationship--something new and/or out of the ordinary (cf. Faris 1972: 141).

The usual daily house visit is a very common occurrence in Newfoundland during the year, but moreso at Christmas. Women prepare for Christmas by baking fruit cakes, sweet bread and biscuits. Men prepare by having some alcoholic beverages to serve. In Baccalaos Cove, men often make trips to the French island of St. Pierre for this purpose. During the summer it is the women who do most of the visiting, since the men are occupied with fishing. When the men do get together, it is often in one of the local small shops or a local club (commonly the Royal Canadian Legion). During Christmas, however, and particularly after Midnight

Mass, both men and women will visit close kin and partying and visiting will continue all through the night and throughout the twelve days of Christmas.

The appearance and/or anticipation of a visit from mummers is not spoken of at all but it is understood that mummers will arrive. People walk in and out of the house, sit down to talk and visit in the kitchen, which is the room where most of the daily life of the family goes on during the year, and will occasionally drink a little. If a loud knock is suddenly heard at the door accompanied by a cry of "mummers allowed?" the household falls silent. If the mummers are allowed in, they will be greeted with a reply of "mummers allowed, come on in," or someone goes to the door to let them in. In many ways the mummers are treated as invited guests and once they enter a house, the mummers will be invited to sit down. The spokesman will talk with the host and some of the mummers will be questioned. They may be asked to dance or perform in some other way (give a recitation or sing). If they oblige, each mummer tries to imitate the dance steps of another to confuse the host and the others present and prevent them from guessing the true identity of the mummers. It must be remembered that in small, fairly isolated outports, people often know each other

by their gait or certain other traits they might possess. Thus, part of the mummers' disguise depends on mimicing the identity of another. It is said (cf. Halpert 1969: 44) that at times mummers take advantage of their disguises to grumble or be hostile, but this was not what I found to be the case in Baccalaos Cove and seems to have been infrequent (Ben-Dor 1969). In most reports of such activities the disturbances were during the mummers' parade, which is a separate event from the mummers' house visit. Parades in which hostilities did break out were mostly in and around the City of St. John's, the capital of the Province (cf. Story 1969: 27).

There are several aspects of the mummers' visits which are important in interpreting this ritual: the "false face," the knock at the door, the secrecy surrounding it, and the time of the year in which mummering takes place and the time of their arrival for a house visit. The "false face" is perhaps the most significant aspect of the disguise since it not only conceals an individual's identity, but is designed to deceive the host and his guests. Strangers are regarded with skepticism, especially those who are "black ones" or "black strangers" (someone whom they do not know at all nor have any knowledge about, or someone who is placed in that category

as depicted in Table I, Chapter IV). Subsequently, mummers can be regarded to fulfill the same role. They are indeed "black ones." The ritual knock at the door is also important, as it is only strangers who are known to knock, as mentioned earlier. Usually, many questions and inquiries are made to learn something about an outsider or stranger in Baccalaos Cove and, similarly, the host to a group of mummers will question them to try to solve the mystery of the masked guests and ascertain their identity.

To fully understand mummering it must be understood within the context in which it occurs. Most Newfoundlanders fear the dark and do not like to travel alone at night. The mummers visit only at night, usually after midnight, i.e. during a transitional phase. Further, it is a ritual which occurs at a liminal time of the year--the transition to the New Year (cf. Turner 1977: 145-162). Just as strangers are in a liminal state, the same holds true for the mummers. Both are questioned, prodded, and given hospitality to learn more about them. They are indeed marginal figures.

When and if a mummer is correctly identified, he and those with him may or may not reveal their true identity. But more often than not, they do make themselves known. In either case, the mummers are offered

food and drink and then they will leave. If their identity is not guessed and remains unknown, the mummers leave rather quickly. Sometimes they may even tell their host where they will go next. Once the mummers leave there is much discussion on how much fun the group of mummers happened to be and also speculation as to how well the next host will do is ascertaining the identity of the mummers. Interestingly, mummers are never referred to as a crowd--always as a group, or a bunch. Sometimes those present will talk about the superb disguises and of how much they were fooled. Inevitably, the topic of conversation when the mummers leave is focused upon those who left without being definitely identified. Those present will boast about how they knew who it was all along, but didn't want to ruin the fun, and proceed to talk about how good they were in the past in guessing the identity of the mummers.

When the mummers leave a house they will often boast of their own disguises and of how good they were at keeping their "false face." Sometimes they will admonish one another for "giving them away" or else commend each other on their performances in fooling their host and his guests. If they should meet with other mummers, the groups may split. Again, this is to confuse the hosts, since at the end of a night

some mummers may return to a house which they had visited earlier. Husbands and wives have been known to go back to their own homes and fool each other. In Baccalaos Cove many of the women from "up" and "down" the harbor do not see each other throughout the year because there is much to be done within the household during the fishery and little time for a lengthy visit. It seems that mummers who reside up the harbor will go mummering down the harbor, and vice-versa. The mummers feel their identity is less likely to be revealed in such cases. The same does not seem to hold for the routine Christmas house visiting, however, as most of these follow close kinship and residential lines.

As noted, there have been cases where mummers were known to become boisterous and, at times, fighting broke out among them on the main roads and pathways. But such fighting was rare and most of it took place between Catholics and Protestants living near each other. For the most part, however, such activities are now uncommon. Yet, this is not to say that religious animosities do not exist, for they have been there since Newfoundland was first settled and persist to this day. The history of religious rivalries in Newfoundland began with the passage in Britain of the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829. As discussed in

Chapter III, Irish Catholics who arrived in Newfoundland during the 18th and 19th centuries decided that they wanted some representation. The granting of Representative Government in 1832 was fostered by the Catholic populace and from its inception, religious differences manifested themselves more openly and developed into more serious socio-political problems (Story 1969: 26). One very apparent consequence of these differences is that the many scattered outports are ethnically and religiously homogeneous.

Since Baccalaos Cove is a Catholic outport, the idea of a Catholic marrying a Protestant is considered "shocking" and is believed to bring misfortune to those who do go against the norm. Belief is so strong that when a mixed marriage results in offspring who have some physical anomalies, it is believed that the couple have brought it upon themselves. As noted by a local writer (MacLay Byrnes 1931) Newfoundlanders "...had a strong religious strain, mingled with a sort of fatalism, due no doubt to the many unavoidable dangers in their lives." Indeed, self control is highly valued and pervades the Newfoundlanders world view and any behavior which goes contrary to this view is believed to bring misfortune. The local admonition

to marry someone close is also connected to these religious differences. To marry a non-Catholic, therefore, is the equivalent of marrying a "black stranger," (see Chapter IV, Table I). Consequently, local values and fears are depicted in their world view and symbolized in the ritual of mummering (cf. Geertz 1973).

In 1861 there was a statutory ban placed on mummering in Newfoundland, which in many ways is comparable to the public hanging of Father Christmas in Dijon, France in 1951 (cf. Levi-Strauss 1963b). In Dijon, the clergy tried to destroy what it felt was one of the last and strongest footholds of paganism in modern society. Yet in trying to put an end to Father Christmas, the clergy succeeded only in restoring his glory and perpetuating his importance (Levi-Strauss 1963b: 8). Similarly, in Newfoundland the ban on mummering only served to perpetuate its existence and in urban areas where religious animosities were heightened by divided religious denominations, attackers often disguised themselves like mummers (cf. Halpert and Story 1969) thereby perpetuating the conflicts and the view of strangers as those who are "not of our kind" and "not to be trusted."

There have been several explanations postulated to

account for the mummering ritual; e.g. that it serves as a form of social control since children are often frightened and feel threatened by mummers and by strangers. Indeed, it is not unusual for women to admonish their children with the comment that "the mummers" or the "boo man" or the "stranger" will take them away if they are not good (cf. also Chiramonte 1969; Ben-Dor 1969; Faris 1969). Another reason given is the idea that mummering and the aggressive play sometimes accompanying it are a psychological mechanism to release hostility and in-group aggression (cf. Szwed 1969). But these interpretations do not explain how mummering symbolizes and reaffirms the local cognition of outsiders as strangers.

Mummering can best be understood by recognizing the role it has in reproducing the relations of production and reaffirming kinship ties (Sider 1976: 102-125). The end of the summer voyage and start of fall fishing means that brothers, agnates and/or members of the same crew have less contact with each other on a daily basis. Nemec (1972) attributes the decline in contact to the strain of interpersonal relationships between brothers--i.e. tensions which may have arisen can be dissipated during the late fall and early winter by avoidance. In Baccalaos Cove brothers and agnates who have fished

together will often go hunting together during the fall; therefore, I do not fully concur with Nemec's interpretation. However, households do become more insular during the fall and early winter and contact is more infrequent. It is during Christmas that many of the kinship and friendship ties are reactivated in the form of the house visit. These visits enable men to prepare for the next season's summer voyage and during and after Christmas is when decisions will be made regarding crew composition and the necessary gear repairs to be made by the crew during the coming spring to prepare for the summer voyage.

Sider (1976) views mummering as serving the same function as the Christmas house visit because it enables men and women to interact in an atmosphere of play where tensions are eased:

"Guess who I am?" -- a game that mummers might be playing on themselves as well as others--is also "guess what kind of relationship we might have?" Mummering provides a social, community wide, and egalitarian framework for the redistribution of work relations--(and)--an occasion for a village wide focus on social relations. (Sider 1976: 122-123).

Consequently, mummering is an important element of local socio-economic organization.

Symbolically, the ritual of mummering also reaffirms local cognition of the outsider as a stranger. Firestone

(1969: 73) argues that mummers and strangers are functionally equivalent, but that this does not mean that the people "consciously feel that mummers symbolize strangers." Faris (1969: 134) concurs with this interpretation but thinks Firestone has made a definitive case for the conceptual similarities between the two and that "the cognition of the stranger, symbolized in the mummer, has rather wide and significant structural implications." For Faris (1969) the stranger falls into a category of persons whom Newfoundlanders generally fear and of whom they are wary. When local people go mummering and take on their disguises they adopt what he refers to as a sanctioned role reversal which enables them, in their polluted state, to take on the attributes of strangers. To elaborate on these arguments, mummering might be seen as a "metasocial commentary" upon the way in which Newfoundland society categorizes its people and then organizes "the major part of collective existence around that assortment" (Geertz 1973: 448). Mummering is a Newfoundland reading of their own experiences "...a story they tell themselves about themselves" (Geertz 1973: 468). Consequently, mummers do not merely symbolize strangers. What sets mummering apart as a ritual which both shapes and is shaped by the social order is that in the initial phases of its performance,

upon entering a home and before their identity is known, mummers are strangers.

Although mummering is infrequent among adults in Baccalaos Cove, I do not concur with Sider's argument that mummering has declined because of the decline of the family-based inshore fishery. In Baccalaos Cove the inshore fishery continue to be quite viable and the ideology of having a crew of patrikin is still predominant. Mummering occurs mostly among adolescents and young adults. Although they are not real strangers, during the liminal period of time when the ritual occurs, mummers occupy the realm of the sacred and symbolize strangers. Therefore, they express the difference in status between small children and adults on the one hand (cf. Levi-Strauss 1963), and outsiders i.e. real stranger, and locals on the other. Mummering is part of the rite of passage into the adult world. For children, mummers represent the unknown stranger who is feared and respected. "The children are excluded from the company of men by their ignorance of certain secrets or their belief--carefully fostered--in some illusion which the adults reveal at an opportune moment, thereby sanctioning the admission of the younger generation into their own" (Levi-Strauss 1963b: 6). The

secrecy which surrounds mummering fosters the illusion that mummers are strangers and also reaffirms the importance of secrecy in every day life, especially in regard to outsiders.

The behavior of the mummers during the twelve days of Christmas is sanctioned and expected. Real strangers (merchants, affines, non-Newfoundlanders, etc.) are very much a part of the social order and occupy an important category by which the people of Baccalaos Cove order their behavior. The ritual of mummering is an important aspect of the socio-cultural system which symbolizes and perpetuates local cognition of the outsider as a stranger (see also Table I, Chapter IV), and also acts to reaffirm the relations of production, e.g. kinship. Together, these elements contribute to the structure which organizes social and economic relations in Baccalaos Cove.

IX Conclusion

There are some anthropologists who have classified rural fishing communities as peasants and/or have maintained that they have a dual economy. It has been the argument in this study that such classifications do not readily facilitate the analysis of social relationships in Baccalaos Cove. Like many other rural fishing settlements in the North Atlantic, the people of Baccalaos Cove have always been oriented towards their own subsistence while being tied to the larger society. This is demonstrable by studying the local social and economic organization in terms of the kinship system which structures these relationships and the dyadic relationship between fishermen and merchants. In this description and explanation of social organization I have attempted to be explicit about the theory and methods utilized. The ethic of egalitarianism has been considered because it is an important folk model which the people themselves try to perpetuate. Although it is a fiction, the ethic does give us some insight into understanding how local distinctions and categorizations are made.

The historical conditions surrounding settlement in Newfoundland contributed towards the local cognition of the outsider as a stranger. This view was strengthened

during the Mercantile Period which existed well into the 20th Century. During this period the family-based inshore fishery developed and the fishermen were obligated to the merchant through a system of credits and payments to be outfitted in the spring with gear and receive food and other supplies during the winter. Although merchants were to some extent obligated to the fishermen, the fishermen were more dependent upon them and were subjected to many abuses within the system. The merchants did not control the means of production or relations of production, since both were organized by ties of kinship. However, they did have control over the disposal of the products of labor once household consumption needs were met. Consequently, the fishermen regarded the merchants with a skepticism which continues today in the relationship between local people and merchants and other outsiders--i.e. strangers. This cognition is reenforced, dramatized and symbolized explicitly in the ritual of mummering; but there are other ways in which this can be observed by analyzing the way social behavior is structured and organized in Baccalaos Cove.

The family-based inshore fishery in Baccalaos Cove is organized much as it was during the 19th Century. Crews of agnates collectively own and/or control the means of production and the rules governing inheritance,

land tenure, and use rights function to maintain the relations of kinship as the relations of production (cf. Godelier 1975: 13-14). Therefore, if one is referring to the way land and labor are organized in Baccalaos Cove for production, then reciprocity and redistribution must be considered as important principles which organize the local economy. But since merchants and presently other fish buyers are responsible for marketing the fish and are subject to the fluctuating prices on the international market, the fishermen continue to have little or no control over the disposal or distribution of the products of their labor beyond household consumption needs.¹³ Any useful explanation of the local economy, therefore, needs to consider the role of the self-regulating market regarding distribution; but since land and labor are not commodities, the system cannot be analyzed as a capitalistic system nor can standard economic theory be usefully applied to fully understand economic organization within this sector of the society.

To describe the kinship system in Baccalaos Cove as bilateral is too ambiguous because there is a strong patrilineal bias which, together with the stranger complex, enables us to understand and interpret social relations. Agnatic kin are the ideal choice in the composition of fishing crews. This is partially due to: (a) the rules of inheritance and other rules relating to access to the

means of production; (b) the reciprocal exchange of labor upon which production is organized since the members of each crowd are responsible for the maintenance of the crowd as a whole; and (c) because anyone else is considered as an outsider, including affines, since they are members of different crowds and subsequently are not the first choice in crew composition. In addition, there is a strong admonition to marry a local girl, but the rules of exogamy do not always make this possible. Affines and other outsiders are therefore categorized accordingly, based upon where they were born and raised in Newfoundland, residency, kinship affiliations, religion and ethnicity. Affines who are from Baccalaos Cove are also considered as strangers because they are members of different crowds.

The general crowd is a local descent group which can incorporate in-marrying spouses, but membership is also tied to residency, surname and property rights. Crews which for varied reasons cannot meet the ideal of having all agnatic kin as members (i.e. male members of the same crowd) will sometimes include affines. Frequently, the affine chosen is the sister's husband. This is because there are ties of complementary filiation between the MB and ZS and in some cases because this relationship is an extension of the alliance relationship which

often exists between the crowds. In Chapter VI a possible model of preferential marriage between the FZSWB and the MBDHZ is presented and discussed. This marital system creates a cycle of generalized exchange which enables members of the various crowds within Baccalaos Cove to establish themselves in wife-giving and wife-receiving relationships. Acknowledging that this is a complex system and that more genealogical data is needed to fully explain it, the model can help us to understand how the sister's husband might be the preferred affine for inclusion in a crew. Structurally, he is an outsider--a member of a different crowd. However, his crowd may be in a wife-receiving relationship to the crowd from which he has received a woman and there are mutual rights and responsibilities between them. This model does not always apply, but it can provide a basis for further research in interpreting how or why certain affines are chosen over others, if a crew cannot meet the stated ideal of having all agantic kin. It may also possibly offer some new insights into the applicability of Levi-Strauss' (1969) ideas to the study of complex structures in general (cf. also Fox 1978).

Since 1949 and Confederation with Canada many Newfoundland settlements have become more accessible to the outside world and to neighboring outports. Such

access has brought the people of Baccalaos Cove into contact with strangers more often, especially during the summer months when campers and tourists travel throughout the Province. Although such contact may be brief and limited, it is no longer an occasional event. Adults deal with outsiders and have come to expect them with more frequency; however, in Baccalaos Cove one hears the comment that "there are a lot of strangers around this year." The possibility of more outsiders coming in increases all the time. For example, the nearby mine in St. Lawrence is currently being surveyed by a British Company and may re-open shortly (Collins, personal communication). Yet, local cognition of the outsider as a stranger and one who is not to be trusted is not likely to change. The people of Baccalaos Cove have adapted in the past by categorizing outsiders and affines on a continuum of "types" of strangers which structures the way they order their relationships with the outside world. This enables strangers to be marginally integrated into social life in Baccalaos Cove and accounts for much of their cultural continuity.

Since this is a complex society which is part of the western world, local social and economic organization has often been analyzed according to the principles of standard economic theory. In addition, the lack of a

unilineal descent system has resulted in some accounts which often overlook the role of marriage alliances and the patrilineal bias which structures and organizes social relations. This study focuses on those aspects of the social structure upon which social relationships are based. Although it is not an exhaustive account, it is hoped that it has given some new insights into the comparative concepts which have been used for the study of rural fishing settlements in complex societies and also presented some new areas for further research.

Footnotes

1. Baccalaos Cove is a pseudonym for the fishing settlement which is the primary focus of this study. The names of the people have been changed to preserve anonymity, and the names of the various crowds to which reference is made in the text have been given color codes; for example, The Blue Crowd. This idea follows Faris' example (1972).
2. Inshore fishermen are defined here as men who fish in waters $1\frac{1}{2}$ -4 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the harbor. Prior to the introduction of engines in the 1920's, the fishermen would row out to the traps and row back. In Baccalaos Cove and generally throughout Newfoundland, when one speaks of fish, they mean cod fish.
3. The term, outport, is used to refer to the small coastal settlements throughout Newfoundland.
4. In his discussion of marriage cycles among the Tory Islanders, Robin Fox notes that "although there is no rule of marriage with a second cousin, there is a de facto cycling effect that will produce one." (Fox 1978: 190).
5. This information comes from informants who worked as supervisors in the fish plant in Baccalaos Cove during this time. Within the past fifteen years, the inshore fishery has been hampered by large dragger fleets (mostly foreign) which prosecute the fishery in a predatory way (cf. Andersen and Wadel 1972) and by the failure of the State to enforce regulations and limits (cf. Faris 1977).
6. For analytical purposes, I follow Levi-Strauss (1969) in using the term group, rather than the local categorical term, crowd. The following discussion presents a model of generalized exchange. Although sister exchange does occur, the implications of this type of marriage are not considered herein, since as it involves the direct exchange of women between groups, it creates a cycle of restricted exchange, and must be analyzed accordingly.
7. Adoptions are usually not authorized through legal channels, but the children inherit as members of the family (crowd) which adopts them. Most often, a child is adopted by a sibling who has no offspring.
8. As Fox (1978: 191) indicates for the Tory Islanders, "we are used to looking at such cycling in systems that prescribe cousin marriage. What we see here is that in a small community...such marriage cycles are inevitable with only a negative rule.:

9. Polanyi's substantivist position has been a source of controversy in the anthropological literature. The proponents of the formalist position agree that the economy must be seen within the context of social relationships, but argue that certain aspects of behavior can be isolated and analyzed in accordance with the principles of "economizing" and "maximizing," both of which imply the existence of motives for profit or gain. While the debate still persists today among some scholars, it should be noted that no resolution is possible until the participants realize that they have been arguing at cross-purposes.
10. A quintal is a unit of measure by which fish was weighed and shares distributed. A quintal of dried, salted cod fish is the equivalent of 112lbs.
11. The term crosshanded applies to fishermen who are fishing alone and to those fishermen who are not members of a crew but will "stand by" and go out to a trap and take the balance of a haul once the trap crew who owns the trap has hauled it and finds they are "log-loaded" (weighed down).
12. Sections of this chapter have appeared in an article I wrote entitled "Maritime Canadians and the Quest for Meaning," in Understanding Religion and Culture: Anthropological and Theological Perspectives, John H. Morgan (ed.) University Press of America, 1979. I thank Prof. Morgan for granting me permission to use my article in whole or part in the dissertation. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Prof. Raoul Andersen of Memorial University of Newfoundland for granting me his permission to use maps from two of his publications, as noted in the text. I also thank Prof. Robert Paine, editor of the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) in Newfoundland, for granting me permission to use one of Prof. Andersen's maps, and Mouton Publishers in West Germany, for granting me permission to use the other map.
13. In 1977-1978 the fish plant in Baccalaos Cove accepted fish of all sizes. In 1977 the fishermen were given 9.5¢ per pound for fresh fish over 18 inches, 4.5¢ per pound for smaller fish, and 8¢ per pound straight (an average price--no culling). In 1982, the fish

plant in Baccalaos Cove would not take any fish under 18 inches, nor would any other fish plant or buyer in the area. However, a foreign trawler came into port for a one month duration during the summer and offered to purchase all the fish from each day's haul, regardless of size. Although they offered less money per pound, many of the fishermen sold their fish directly to them. In 1983 the same situation prevailed. But, the foreign trawler which came into port in 1983 would not take any fish under the 'regulated' size as set by the local fish plant, and offered the same price per pound as the fish plants. As a result, in 1983 the fishermen tried to cull some of their haul before landing it at the fish plant. Some of this fish was cut, salted, dried and sold to buyers in Fortune or Grand Bank or kept for their winter supply. The smallest fish were kept to make 'rounders' (very small fish which is salted and dried--but not de-boned--and used solely for household consumption. To my knowledge, there has never been a market for rounders in Newfoundland). However, when the haul was landed and culled by the men working in the fish plant, the smaller fish were discarded for being of unacceptable size and many of the smaller fish could be seen floating on the water after a day's hauls were landed.

In 1977 the trap fishermen averaged approximately 400,000 pounds per boat. Dividing this by the average of six shares, the fishermen received about \$5,300.00 each during the summer voyage. The average skiff is approximately 30' long.

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