The Asian Face of Globalisation:

Reconstructing Identities, Institutions and Resources

The Work of the 2001/2002 API Fellows

Edited by Ricardo G. Abad

2001/2002

Asian Public Intellectuals Program

The Asian Face of Globalisation:
Reconstructing Identities, Institutions and Resources
The Papers of the 2001 API Fellows

Edited by Ricardo G. Abad

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About API

As Asia enters the 21st century, it faces political, economic, and social challenges that transcend national boundaries. To meet these challenges, the region needs a pool of intellectuals willing to be active in the public sphere who can articulate common concerns and propose creative solutions. Recognizing that opportunities for intellectual exchange are currently limited by institutional, linguistic, and cultural parameters, **The Nippon Foundation** has launched the Asian Public Intellectual (API) Fellowships. The Fellowships' primary aims are to promote mutual learning among Asian public intellectuals and contribute to the growth of the wider public spaces in which effective responses to regional needs can be generated.

The **API Senior Fellowship** and the **API Fellowship** are open to academics, media professionals, artists, NGO, activists, social workers, public servants and others with moral authority who are working to shape public opinion and influence policy in their societies. The Fellowships will give these intellectual leaders the opportunity to learn what their counterparts are doing in different cultural and ethnic contexts, generate theoretical ideas to cope with social and economic change, and build the intellectual networks of the future.

Within broad **themes** for the intellectual, cultural, and professional projects determined by the API Executive Committee, Fellows are required to:

- Propose and carry out a project of research and/or professional activities in a participating country or countries other than their native country or country of permanent residence;
- Conduct research and/or professional activities in compliance with the schedule accepted by the Selection Committee;
- Attend the **API Workshop** to exchange results of their research and/or professional activities with other Fellows;
- Disseminate their findings and results to a wider audience;
- Pursue a deeper knowledge of each other, and hence the region.

The Nippon Foundation is an independent, non-profit, grant making organisation that was founded in 1962. It works with other non-profit organisations, non governmental organisations and international organisations, and supports projects both in Japan and overseas. It funds activities in four areas:

1. Social welfare
2. Volunteer support
3. Maritime research and development
4. Overseas cooperative assistance

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Many persons made this book possible – and to them I am most grateful. Tatsuya Tanami, Ragayah Haji Mat Zin, Jose M. Cruz, S.J., and Diana Wong – as members of the First API Workshop Planning Committee – encouraged the publication of this volume, read earlier versions of the workshop's framework, reviewed the introductory essay, and trusted my editorial judgment on the book's contents. Tatsuya Tanami, Director of the Department of International Affairs, Nippon Foundation, also graced this volume with a foreword on the Asian Public Intellectuals program.

While working on the book in the Philippines, I received tremendous support from the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS) of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, and most especially through Dorothy Fernandez-Robert who served as a liaison between me and the fellows, the Nippon Foundation and the publisher. The Philippine office of the API Program was equally very supportive, and I am grateful to Felice Noelle Rodriguez and Russell Tabisula for keeping me in the program's embrace while working on this volume.

Several editors eased the load. Working from Kuala Lumpur, Karen Freeman edited the papers for the Cebu workshop, and re-edited them for this volume to meet space and style requirements. In Manila, Michael Mariano, Mary An Gonzalez, Ramon Fernan II gave the trimmed conference papers a second editorial pass; Andrea Jose made clean copies of the edited papers; and Octavio Cesar Eviota combed each edited manuscript for a final check, priming them for submission to IKMAS and the Malaysian publisher. Wong Siew Lyn, based in Kuala Lumpur, then served as the editorial liaison between me and the Malaysian publisher.

But the API fellows deserve the largest thanks of all: first, for writing their papers and allowing their publication; second, for being patient with editorial suggestions and making revisions whenever necessary; and third, for their trust, cooperation, and good cheer since we first met, by e-mail, several months before the Cebu meeting.

I am honoured to play a small part in their quest for reflexivity among Asian public intellectuals.

Ricardo G. Abad

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FOREWORD

API FELLOWSHIPS: BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION

TATSUYA TANAMI
The Nippon Foundation

Intellectuals and Asia

Asia has experienced tremendous change in the half century since the Second World War. Within that half century, most Asian countries rode a mighty course from de-colonisation to independence and nation building. For some countries, the nation building process encompassed a history of autocracy, with particular emphasis on economic development at the cost of democracy and human rights. In general, however, each Asian country followed its own path to development, and made decisions that entailed considerable sacrifices.

It was within this historical context that first-generation, post-war Asian intellectuals undertook the task of public advocacy, challenging governments and authorities, and literally risking their lives for the public good, while simultaneously espousing social reforms. Although these intellectuals developed and harnessed their knowledge for the public good, their public advocacy was often at odds with the nation-state (or the colonial nation-state) in the political sense. Over the years, however, they managed to build a network of like-minded individuals in the Asian region which, while limited in scale, played the all-important role of an alternative force. Sadly, the network failed to shake the foundations of established ways and effect a significant change in the direction of nations.

New challenges after the cold war

The end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to shift the path of Asian development. Ideological antagonisms gave way to globalisation. The concept of the nation-state began to be questioned, and a transition took place from de-colonisation to de-nationalisation.
New developments in the global arena posed great challenges (both positive and negative) to Asian countries. The attainment of a certain level of economic development was sometimes distorted by the need to sacrifice many basic values. Over the years, while a new future was opening up for the region, various problems suppressed up until the end of the Cold War slowly emerged. Economic woes sparked by the 1997 currency crisis highlighted the fragile foundation on which the swift development of Asian economies was built.

Political leaders, bureaucrats, and intellectuals found it difficult to effectively meet the challenges imposed by such rapid changes. It became virtually impossible for regional collective political systems like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to play an effective role. The network of various think tanks (Track-2, etc.), consisting of government officials, scholars and intellectuals, similarly failed to initiate effective alternative policies.

Still, certain positive changes were experienced. For instance, a new community of non governmental organisations (NGOs), which constitutes part of a new global movement, has developed broadly within Asia. This emergence of a civil society as a new alternative force has been accepted by Asians who have high expectations of its capability to deal with pressing social issues. They also hope that this new alternative force will enhance the power of Asian people to implement social actions that neither governments nor the dormant network of intellectuals (some of whom have become too close to the state bureaucracy) have been able to handle well.

The search for a new intellectual mechanism

But where have all the 'traditional' intellectuals gone? Where are those vanguards of modernisation who legitimised a new social, political and economic order? Is it possible that second and third-generation intellectuals, unlike those of the first generation, are now

fulfilling the role of technocrats rather than espousing public advocacy, i.e. indicating policy alternatives to the authorities in power? Has the number of independent thinkers in Asia gone smaller, while the population of government-patronised intellectuals continue to grow and multiply? Or are the issues in the real world such that 'traditional' intellectuals are no longer needed?

In Asia, a diversity of social institutions, economic systems, cultures, religions, and ethnic groups have learned to coexist. While this rich diversity confers on the region considerable potential, we cannot possibly overlook the various problems it presents, among them being economic disparities, environmental deterioration, and conflicts and strife based on ethnicity, religion, and other cultural attributes. Because of these problems, a fundamental restructuring of the present system must be done. Politics alone cannot address this need for restructuring. Rather, it is the exchange of wisdom through transnational intellectual interactions that holds the promise of initiating basic changes in the system.

Mere exchanges between the best and the brightest of Asia do not, however, necessarily lead to action. The community of post-war Asian intellectuals worked well to create a breeding ground for ideas, but failed to translate those ideas to policies. While new ideas were born, few practical changes followed, possibly because the formulation and implementation of new policies were entrusted entirely to the state, many of which were controlled by leaders who perceived progress as simply economic development and nothing more.

Who, then, can resolve the various problems that currently face us? Can a civil society take over the responsibility for public welfare when the state fails to do so? Who will issue new ideas, and who can implement them? What mechanism is necessary to resolve transnational problems?

In response to these questions, we at The Nippon Foundation believe it is vital to create a new community, or a new intellectual mechanism, to solve regional problems.

The birth of a new fellowship

Since its establishment, The Nippon Foundation has favoured practical approaches to formulating specific solutions to immediate problems. We have promoted projects in partnership with international organisations, governments, and NGOs, focusing on basic human needs and giving the highest priority to problems that need urgent intervention. Believing that one action is better than a hundred discussions, we have especially targeted problems afflicting developing countries, such as starvation, refugee populations, diseases, and basic education. Yet we also realise the importance of addressing the underlying causes of problems and offering fundamental solutions.

In Asia particularly, where social difficulties have increased, we see the need to create a network of people who can understand the essentials of the problem, reflect on them, propose possible solutions, and even take action. Instead of having traditional technocrats or apolitical intellectuals, this network needs intellectual leaders with the commitment and capability to engage in work for the public good. Finding these public intellectuals, and then motivating and organising them in viable networks, has become a key goal, and the fellowship programme we have designed has been the mechanism that best serves this goal.

It has dawned on us that Asian countries have but limited knowledge of their neighbours: to wit, Asia was discovered, studied, and understood by Westerners. As such, information about Asia has come mainly from the West. In the past, declarations that "many Asian intellectuals who received their training in the West share a deep feeling of isolation from the societies they belong(ed) to" were rife. Now we are aware that Asian intellectuals ought to know each other in greater depth and detail and must avoid becoming isolated from their own societies.

To this end, it is necessary that intellectuals be motivated to operate within the region, learning and exchanging on site. It is an idea that has turned out to be a major motivating factor in our decision to create a new project that we came to call the Asian Public Intellectuals or API Fellowship Programme.

The introductory account above may appear overly detailed, but is done for a reason: I wish to stress the fact that these were the thoughts that drove us to start this new project in the summer of 1999. Two words, namely, 'Asia' and 'public', were the bases of our discussions. We saw the pressing need for Asians to develop human resources that could contribute to the public good of

Asia. To develop our concept, we at The Nippon Foundation invited some thirty intellectual leaders from Asian countries to a meeting in September 1999. They included scholars, researchers, critics, artists, foundation officers and NGO activists, all notable for achievements in their respective fields.

All took part in extensive discussions lasting more than two days in order to create the basic concept for The Nippon Foundation Fellowships for Asian Public Intellectuals (API Fellowship). Their discussions centred on such subjects as the intellectual mechanisms and networks required for Asia, the identification of public intellectuals participating in such mechanisms and networks, and the range of issues or themes for research or action.

Some of the intellectual leaders who participated in the brainstorming sessions later played key roles in managing the API Fellowship, among them the late Ishak bin Shari of Malaysia (who regrettably died suddenly in June 2002), Takashi Shiraishi of Japan, and Surichai Wun'Gaeo of Thailand. All participants shared a common awareness of the requirements concerning the following issues:

- An intellectual network made in Asia rather than in the West;
- Programmes embracing broad groups of public intellectuals;
- Programmes broadly targeting not only the people in the centre, but also those at the periphery;
- Flexibility in overcoming language barriers; and
- Programmes prioritising projects beneficial to social reform.

As its ultimate objective, the project sought to create in the region a new pool of public intellectuals who will significantly influence political systems and policies on matters affecting regional and national governance. The project envisioned this pool of intellectuals would influence and guide regional civil societies in tackling important issues faced by each society, and formulating alternative solutions to these problems.

The API Fellowship

Based on the results of the brainstorming sessions, the idea and the framework of the API Fellowship were formed. The first five countries chosen to participate were Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan. This arrangement holds for the first several years of the Fellowship's existence, with a view to increasing the number of participating countries in the future.

Whereas the first four countries have strong potential and a need to identify and nurture public intellectuals, their resources are limited. Meanwhile, Japan has a strong need for partnership with public intellectuals of the four countries.

The Fellowship's composition is divided into two categories: a senior category for talented individuals who have attained a certain level of achievement and are expected to expand their success in the future, and a junior category for young people with promising futures as candidates likely to become public intellectuals. Both groups are expected to learn from each other through various occasions, thereby producing a synergistic effect.

Public intellectuals are defined as "academics, researchers, media professionals, artists, creative writers, NGO activists, social workers, public servants and others with moral authority, who are committed to working for the betterment of society through the application of their professional knowledge, wisdom and experience." We decided that a broad criteria for recruitment be adopted, without limiting participation to specific occupations, professions, or the applicant's level of awareness of particular problems.

In order for participating fellows to have a common basis for challenges and exchanges, in addition to guiding the selection of talented individuals for research and exchange activities, some common themes were raised. It was decided that these themes be subjected to timely updates to meet the changing needs of the times. For the first three years of the Fellowship's existence, three main themes were identified:

- Changing identities and their social, historical, and cultural contexts;
- Reflections on the human condition and the quest for social justice; and
- The current structure of globalisation and possible alternatives.

A unique management mechanism

The management of the programme was entrusted to one

partner institution per country, as follows: the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia in Malaysia; the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Indonesia; the School of Social Science at the Ateneo de Manila University in the Philippines; the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University in Thailand; and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CEAS), Kyoto University in Japan. Each API office had personnel responsible for the following activities: publicity, recruitment, the issuance of application receipts, the selection and dispatch of fellows, and the handling of incoming foreign fellows.

Members of selection committees tasked to choose the fellows in their respective countries came from a wide array of notable public intellectuals of the countries concerned. An international selection committee consisting of people representing partner institutions and public intellectuals typical of the region was also set up.

In addition to handling the programme in Malaysia, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia serves as the overall coordinating organisation for financial administration. Along with the other partner institutions, it plays a major role in administering the programme regionally and nationally, providing detailed responses to requests from the fellows, following up on individual work, and promoting the planning and management of new additional projects related to the API. In short, each partner institution serves as an exchange centre for public intellectuals in its particular country.

Meanwhile, a close relationship exists among the partner institutions of the five countries such that an integrated regional network has been formed. Further, the execution of programmes is expected to strengthen both the human network of individual fellows and the regional network of organisations committed to contribute to the public good through the generation of new ideas.

The launching ceremony and the API declaration

A launching ceremony in Kuala Lumpur on 8 July 2000 officially started the Programme. On that occasion, representatives of the various countries collaboratively articulated the following API Declaration:

We, the representatives from five countries in Asia, are gathered here today to inaugurate a new collaborative endeavour.

As we enter the 21st century, we recommit ourselves to unified action towards a better future for Asia, even as we celebrate our cultural differences.

While we uphold our national borders and traditions, we seek a regional response, aware as we are that the political, economic, and social challenges which our nations face transcend our national boundaries.

Asians unfortunately remain strangers to each other. The lack of familiarity and strong bonds among us prevent us from articulating regional approaches to the difficulties that are upon us.

The challenges we all face are calling for us to come together to fashion a shared, collaborative response. We take on the challenges with confidence because, while we take pride in our differences, we are all unified by a common heritage and spirit that is Asian.

An effective response to regional problems will invariably require the participation of public intellectuals – men and women committed to working in the public sphere and to collaborating beyond traditional boundaries in articulating common concerns, in proposing effective solutions and in fostering a perspective that is regional in scope and universal in value.

We announce herewith the establishment of The Nippon Foundation Fellowships for Asian Public Intellectuals, a programme designed precisely to help build a community of Asians who can think and work in the public sphere. The Programme will be initiated in the five countries we are representing today, and public intellectuals (to be identified) are to be given opportunities for research and professional activities in other participating countries. By promoting mutual understanding and shared learning among Asian public intellectuals, the API Fellowships aim to contribute to the growth of public arenas where effective responses to regional needs can be generated.

All of us gathered here are determined to work together to realise this goal for ourselves, in the hope that our collective effort will bear fruit for the betterment of humanity.

The first year and beyond

Clearly, the Programme emphasises the commitment of public intellectuals to solving regional problems. Of paramount importance (in addition to individual

research) is collaboration, which entails articulating common concerns beyond traditional boundaries, proposing effective solutions, and fostering regional perspectives that are universal in value. Speaking during a workshop attended by the first batch of API Fellows, former Philippine president Corazon C. Aquino said, "It would be good to learn as Asians, from Asians, with Asians." In other words, it is desirable that Asians initiate activities leading to the solutions to problems in a spirit of mutual cooperation, just as it is ideal for Asians to learn from each other.

The first batch of API Fellows comprised an outstanding line-up. Their study papers reveal that their fellowship activities tackled many current problems of the region as found in local Asian settings. In Cebu City, the Philippines, the site of the first workshop for API Fellows held in November 2002, the fellows presented their findings, shared common perceptions and concerns, strengthened contacts with each other, and successfully formed networks in the process. When it ended, the workshop consolidated the friendships and common commitments of the first group of public intellectuals.

Future activities are designed to maintain this momentum, and to make the new public intellectual community grow as a new force of change and reform in the region. The road ahead is a long and arduous one, but we at The Nippon Foundation have strong hopes that we shall successfully negotiate its twists and turns through clear and stormy weather.

MESSAGE

REGAINING LOST ASIAN-NESS: OUR COMMON DESTINY

CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO
Former President, Republic of the Philippines

I am very pleased to be with you this evening and I congratulate The Nippon Foundation for its wonderful initiative to assemble Asia's public intellectuals in a continuing dialogue, building in the process a community of leaders who will articulate our region's concerns and come up with creative solutions.

The world faces challenges in the 21st century that our forefathers never dreamed of. In Asia and everywhere, economic, social and political realities have invaded cultures and lifestyles, transcending national and regional borders.

In the past, we in Asia used to be aware of our neighbours but kept them at arm's length, separated from our daily lives. Today, our world has become borderless. Its natural boundaries, once dictated by geography, culture and language, have been rendered ineffective by advancing globalisation. The convenience of modern travel, the intrusions of cable TV, the Internet, pop music and Hollywood movies have seen to that.

The result is a uniform popular culture that has made of our children generic citizens of the world, whether or not they have physically travelled out of their countries. Bombarded relentlessly by the global mass media, they have embraced values and lifestyles that are alien even to the generation just preceding them.

Even in the farthest reaches of our own countries, in the hinterlands, where our indigenous peoples are trying to live within the ancient rules of their tribes, the young people catch MTV and dream about leaving their villages and joining the rest of the modern world.

To the outside world, it will soon begin to look like this is all there is to Asia – that this rich, diverse and ancient region is nothing but another mass market for pop culture and globalisation – which would be a shame because Asia is the most fascinating part of the world. It is the cradle of civilisation; its history and culture pre-date those of Europe, Africa and the Americas.

Asia is where nearly all of the world's great religions originated. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Confucianism, Taoism and Shintoism were all born in Asia, making it the centre of the greatest and most profound philosophies the world has ever known.

There are diverse races and ethnic groups, languages and cultures found in Asia, each one with fascinating traditions of its own.

Asia is marked by a pluralism of political systems. Across this vast continent, varying grades of democracies co-exist with nations under autocratic rulers, harsh military dictators, and royalty.

For centuries, Asia has been preyed upon by the West, for its spices, its minerals, its precious stones, its cheap labour, and its trade routes, among other things. Centuries of colonisation – all countries in Asia have been colonised, except for Japan and Thailand – have left the continent largely impoverished and ignorant, its peoples and cultures damaged by the impositions of foreigners.

Today, Asian society has a thin layer of very rich people and a broader middle class, but the majority of its people are poor. This continent, which is home to nearly two thirds of the world's population though it covers only 15 per cent of the earth's land surface, has the largest concentration of the world's poor who survive on less than a dollar a day.

Recently, Southeast Asia enjoyed an economic boom, which helped improve living standards and reduce poverty. However, the success was short-lived. During the 1997 financial crisis, much of the gains were lost. And as investors pulled out of the region, poverty began to resurface, with the urban population among the worst affected.

Asia is a continent in conflict, where home-grown insurgencies continue to fester, and disputes between neighbours add to the region's general instability. Given its unhappy past, it is no wonder Asia has become a breeding ground for terrorists, who are, after all, the products of the ancient and modern injustices that the continent's marginalised majority have endured for centuries.

Taken all together, Asia is a heavy brew. Its ingredients are both fascinating and frightening for the ancient culture, history, traditions and values that have so absorbed the attention of scholars and academics are the same elements that make Asian society so combustible.

The Asian Public Intellectual Fellowship Program initiated by Mr. Yohei Sasakawa has its work cut out for it. There is much that we must learn about our region, and it would be good to learn it as Asians, from Asians, with Asians. We must also find our bearings amid the constant intrusions into our cultures and traditions through the centuries up to the present, with strange and confusing – but somehow attractive – alien concepts, trends and values.

I believe the idea of the fellowship is not for us Asians to isolate ourselves by retreating into our comfortable cultural cocoons, shunning globalisation and everything foreign, but to develop and encourage in the region a healthy outlook that The Nippon Foundation describes as "regional in scope and universal in value."

The prospect of intellectual exchange must excite both The Nippon Foundation and its chosen fellows. But more importantly, we hope that the research and interactions result in relevant and effective responses to the real needs of the peoples and nations of Asia – such as poverty, spirituality and people empowerment.

Poverty

No one who visits Asia can avoid seeing the poverty that envelops most of its people. Even before the richness of our history and culture, poverty is the most obvious characteristic of the Asian continent.

Feudal and royal rulers, foreign conquerors and colonizers, low literacy, racial and gender discrimination, unsustainable development models, poor economic policies, environmental abuse, unchecked population growth, natural disasters – you name it – Asia has had it in mega-doses, resulting in poverty not only of the body but also of the spirit. Given these realities, we need to re-take not only our land, our natural resources and control over our lives, we also have to regain our spirit.

We must re-acquaint ourselves with our indigenous ways and search for native alternatives in economics and politics that will give us back our wealth, our identity and our self-respect. We must also re-learn our age-old values so that we can challenge the dehumanising and alien culture of consumerism that seems to have overtaken our lives.

We look to our Asian public intellectuals to take up the historic roots of our poverty and come up with recommendations on how our peoples and governments can address them in ways that are culturally sensitive and environmentally correct.

You may want to look for the best practices in the region and beyond in the struggle against poverty, and the complex human relationships that govern such efforts. Specifically, you may want to find out what makes individuals in such initiatives transcend their personal interests for the welfare of the larger community.

In the process, we hope you will help us regain our lost Asian-ness, our collective Asian spirit.

Asian Spirituality

This brings me to my second concern – spirituality – which, I believe is what has made Asia, poor as we are, endure.

A Jesuit priest defines spirituality as "the basic, practical, existential attitude of human beings which is the consequence and expression of the way in which they understand their existence and the meaning of reality. It is the way they act or react throughout life according to ultimate objectives which flow from their world view."

For a people who lack so much materially, we Asians are rich – in inner resources, in spirituality. In spite of the enormity of our problems, we seem to be able to endure a lot of pain, to hope in the midst of grim realities, and to dream of a better life.

There are those who shake their heads and say that Asians are hopeless day-dreamers, which is why we haven't gotten anywhere. I am afraid they mistake our capacity for long-suffering for weakness, and our spirituality for fatalism. They must learn to see the world through our eyes, in the context of our history.

We know that after pain and suffering comes sweet victory, and that anything worth having is worth striving for. This is what makes our people leave their families to take on lonely jobs as migrants in foreign lands, to earn enough and bring prosperity back to their homes. This is what made my husband, Ninoy Aquino decide to return to our country from comfortable exile in the United States in spite of the possible dangers at home to help Filipinos liberate themselves from the bondage of martial rule.

Before 21 August 1983, the day Ninoy was killed at the Manila International Airport, most of our people patiently endured the misery of martial law. They were also very afraid of going against the dictator. After the assassination of Ninoy, millions of Filipinos finally shed their fears and realised that it was time for change. But we would deal with that in a way that astounded the world and even ourselves. More on this later.

There is much to admire about Asian spirituality. We have a deep sense of the importance of the community over self. We accept, almost without ego, that the whole is greater – more significant than the sum of its parts, that the individual is not as important as society as a whole.

We also have a strong sense of eternity, of knowing we have time because, depending on our religion, we believe in physical or spiritual rebirth. But no matter what our religion, we know that we are not limited to a single lifetime, that there is a better place that awaits those who keep faith with their God.

These beliefs are where we draw our tranquil strength from. These are what make the Asian strong, resilient, and enduring.

But these very strengths can also be our worst enemies. Underneath our calm exterior is the enduring belief by many that we are powerless in the face of fate, and this has made our peoples unassertive, laid back and un-empowered.

Our sense of community, while admirably selfless, can make us conformists, unable or unwilling to rock the boat, even when it is necessary to be subversive. And our sense of eternity, while highly spiritual, robs us of a sense of urgency to make our lives better.

I ask our Asian public intellectuals to explore the phenomenon of Asian spirituality and help convert it into a positive force for our development and prosperity.

People Empowerment

My last concern is people empowerment.

In 1986, the Filipino people unseated a powerful dictator in a manner that was totally unpredicted by scholars and political observers. In fact, even those of us who participated in the peaceful overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos by what has come to be known as the EDSA People Power revolution, were surprised that it was at all possible to do so.

I like to think that the images carried by international television of defenceless citizens in Manila standing up courageously to the soldiers of the dictator inspired imitation throughout the world: the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the people's victory in Belgrade. It may have emboldened that solitary Chinese with a briefcase who stood resolutely on the path of a column of tanks on their way to Tiananmen Square in Beijing in the summer of 1989. Since EDSA in 1986, dictatorships on both sides of the Iron Curtain have fallen before demonstrations of peaceful people power – a force as soft as water and unyielding as stone.

Many scholars have studied the Philippine People Power revolution of 1986 in search of answers to the questions: How did it happen? Was it a fluke? Was it really a revolution or merely a change of leaders? Can this kind of collective energy be harnessed for peaceful and sustainable societal change?

More recently, in 2001, when Filipinos again took to the streets to unseat a corrupt and inept but duly elected president in what was dubbed People Power II, another set of questions was asked: Should people power be encouraged as a legitimate form of political participation for the removal of undesirable public officials? More to the point, the Western media asked, wasn't the overthrow of President Joseph Estrada by people power extra-constitutional and therefore illegal? Some critics in the West said we should have waited. But we believe that time is too precious to waste. Besides, we should not allow any one to mock a constitution by using an impeachment to hide his guilt rather than show his innocence.

Four months later, the marginalised denizens of Manila's slums laid siege to the presidential palace in what they called People Power III, demanding the restoration of their acclaimed leader, the deposed president Estrada. This time, we raised questions like: Who 'owns' people power? Can people power be abused? And, is it still people power when it is used by the opposition for its own purposes?

I pose these questions to you, to examine and debate.

Since 1986, scholars and academics have posited political and sociological explanations for Filipino people power. I have a few thoughts on it myself.

The intense desire for change, I attribute to the loss of freedom of Filipinos during 14 years of repression under martial rule. But the means finally utilised by the people to effect that change, I attribute to our innate spirituality, which is not only Filipino but Asian as well.

For how else can we explain the peaceful nature of our revolt in the light of the brutal abuse of civil rights, the greed and corruption and the economic failure of the hated regime we sought to oust? I submit, it took as much courage to face the armour unleashed by the dictator on the people with statues and rosaries as with guns and grenades. While confronting the dictator's hardware with bullets would have required the mettle of seasoned guerrilla warriors, facing armed military might with prayer and fasting required the audacity and boldness that only faith could make possible.

The confrontation between people power and the armed might of the state could have just as well turned bloody, and a long and punishing civil war could have ensued. But, despite the odds, it did not. I can only think of one explanation – the faith of a peace-loving people in the infinite care of a benevolent God.

To the third display of people power in Manila, however, when the urban poor rose up armed with sticks and stones to demand that their political message be listened to, our initial reaction was, how dare they appropriate people power and abuse it for their political ends! But when the dust cleared, we realised that it was time to fast-track the mobilisation of people power for development and not just for political purposes.

I submit that people power was not a fluke. It was, in fact, the culmination of a movement for social change led by non governmental organisations that has been growing in the Philippines since the Seventies. It was also the beginning of a process of involvement of NGOs in governance. A year after EDSA, the Filipino people rewarded the efforts of NGOs in the movement to oust the dictator by approving the new Constitution which provided for people's participation on all levels of governance through NGOs.

Apart from its initial utility in the removal of a dictator and effecting political change, people power has fully evolved into a force for the empowerment of civil society for social and national development, in particular, the alleviation of poverty.

Today, government and civil society work together, especially to reach grassroots communities and organise them into productive units that are politically and economically empowered. Although the collaboration between government and NGOs is not without its tensions and disagreements, it has become a positive element in the progress of Filipino society.

The same dynamic is becoming a part of the political life in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and other parts of Asia where NGOs have taken root and are fast becoming a positive force in the service of the people. I submit, the complex relationship between people power, poverty alleviation and spirituality is a worthy subject for in-depth study by the API Fellowships.

Conclusion

I don't know about other Asians, but to most Filipinos, until recently, Asia might as well have been the dark continent, a place we hardly knew, even if we lived in the midst of it. As a consequence of 400 years of colonisation, we naturally looked westward, beyond Asia, for our friends and our development models. Though we look Asian and we lived in Asia, we didn't feel Asian.

Happily, that has begun to change. Filipinos have become sharply aware of their neighbours, at least in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) where cooperation among member states has been extended beyond the economic, political and technical, but also among our peoples through tourism and cultural exchanges. We now realise that we share more than a region; we have interrelated cultures and histories, common problems and a common destiny.

We have also learned that the same force of globalisation that we fear has damaged our culture with crass commercialism, has allowed Asia to emerge as a force unto itself in the larger world of business and politics. Even Asian culture – our artistry, our cuisine, our fabrics, our icons and religions have long enjoyed worldwide recognition.

The Nippon Foundation's Asian Public Intellectuals Fellowship Program should take us further in this direction. But my fervent hope is that through this ever-growing pool of Asian public intellectuals, Asia's uniqueness and complexity can be preserved, and its many voices magnified and heard around the world, as we join the often confusing and dehumanising tide of globalisation.

Congratulations to the Fellowship and I wish you success in your forum. To Mr. Sasakawa and The Nippon Foundation, I salute your selfless efforts in making the planet Earth a better place for everyone. I believe I speak for the peoples of the countries represented in the Asian Public Intellectual Fellowships when I say thank you for caring enough for our region and for the world.

MESSAGE

MAKING A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE

YOHEI SASAKAWA
Nippon Foundation

Today, the pioneer Asian Public Intellectuals (API) shall convene for the first time for an exchange of ideas. I am deeply honoured to be here to greet you.

The API Fellowship Program was conceptualised four years ago in Tokyo by a small group of leading intellectuals from around Southeast Asia and Japan. They met to discuss the rapid march of globalisation and the way it has had an enormous impact on the lives of people in Asia.

At the meeting, it was found that various issues of common concern that transcended national boundaries have emerged. These included not only such things as economic and political issues, but extended as well to the environment, migrant workers, and ethnic, religious and cultural conflicts. Further, it was agreed that the most serious of all of the problems was destitution and the widening gap between the rich and the poor.

Another problem they discussed was that within Asia, the countries' knowledge of each other is surprisingly limited. It might be fair to say that we have tried to understand and interpret each other mainly through the eyes of Western scholars.

One of the proposals of the meeting was to create a new mechanism within the region to build a pool of proactive and committed intellectual leaders and to unite them as a new regional force to cope with these complex and intertwined problems.

The next question asked was, "In an age such as this, what kind of people does our region need? What is missing from existing regional networks?" Both questions can be answered with one term: Public Intellectuals.

These ideas gave birth to the API Fellowship Programme, which was then officially launched in July of 2000.

Looking at what we have witnessed and experienced in these past few years, I think this programme is very timely and significant. We must unite our efforts to address the challenges faced by the region. We can no longer merely look at the West or the East. We must look to our neighbours. We need to have more committed public intellectuals for the region, who I define as "those who can apply their professional knowledge and experience to the common good in a proactive and practical manner."

Since its initiation, the API Fellowship Program has flourished steadily, thanks to the dedicated efforts of our partner institutions in the five participating countries. It is most gratifying to look out tonight at you, the very first API fellows. You have already finished your fellowships and accomplished a great deal. From tomorrow you will engage in discussion, exchanging your findings and seeking solutions for the region's common issues. I am sure they will be milestones on the road toward a prosperous future for Asia.

It is significant that the Philippines is hosting this first workshop of Asian Public Intellectuals because this nation has produced many prominent public intellectuals who have served their people.

This evening, we are honoured to have with us the distinguished public intellectual and leader of the 1986 revolution who restored democracy to the Philippines: President Corazon C. Aquino.

The moral authority and commitment to the betterment of society that President Aquino represents is the essence of the public intellectual's mission. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to President Aquino for

taking from her precious time to attend this meeting.

The Philippines has another significance for my own work as well. This morning I visited Eversley Childs Sanatorium in Cebu Island which is the second largest hospital and community for the leprosy patients in this country. This is the place where the cure for leprosy was developed.

Among The Nippon Foundation's numerous activities, the elimination of leprosy is one of its most important projects. It is my life's work as well. As the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Special Ambassador for the Elimination of Leprosy, I have been leading activities around the world in order to achieve elimination by the year 2005. As you may know, this disease generates social discrimination based upon prejudice.

Leprosy is today a curable disease. With Multi Drug Therapy, or MDT, you can be cured within a year. The Nippon Foundation has provided free MDT all over the world for the past five years. As a result, the disease has been eliminated in 116 countries. In fact, this MDT was developed here at the Eversley Childs Sanatorium between 1981 and 1986 with our foundation's support. Thanks to the dedicated efforts of the researchers there, leprosy has become a curable disease. Cebu Island indeed has made a deeply significant contribution, changing the very history of this centuries-old disease. I am delighted that the Cebu Island that means a great deal to me was chosen as the place for this historical first API Workshop.

The API Fellows gathered here represent a diversity of personal and professional backgrounds. The issues they have espoused are widely varied as well, showing the complexities of our regional situation. All of you have made great accomplishments in your respective fields and issues. I hope that in this workshop, each of you will share the fruits of your research and creative activities, nurturing strong bonds along the way and helping to construct a cohesive network for the peace and prosperity of the Asian societies of the future.

In closing, I would like to thank the members of the API International Selection Committee and the members of the Partner Institutions for their commitment and cooperation. Last but not least, I would especially like to thank the people who worked very hard to organise this workshop for their tremendous efforts made behind the scenes: the people of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and the Ateneo de Manila University who jointly organised the Ad-hoc Committee and the Secretariat.

GLOBALISATION AND REFLEXIVITY AMONG ASIAN INTELLECTUALS

RICARDO G. ABAD

In January 2001, the Nippon Foundation chose twenty-six individuals from Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand to be the first fellows of the Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Program. These public intellectuals – a diverse group of academics, artists, civil servants, NGO workers, a priest and a monk whose works were making significant inroads in the public life of their own countries – received grants to do research in a participating Asian country or countries other than their own.

The cross-cultural project, the Foundation hoped, would enable Asians to learn from fellow Asians, and in the words of the API Declaration, "contribute to the growth of public spaces in which effective responses to regional needs can be generated." In November 2002, twenty-two of the twenty-six fellows met in Cebu City, the Philippines, to share the results of their studies. This book compiles the papers presented during that workshop.

Three themes underlie the papers. The first recognises globalisation's powerful presence in the region. The second points to the contradictory, often dislocating, consequences of globalisation on Asian societies. The third articulates possible solutions to reduce the dislocations brought about by global forces in the region. All three themes mark the workshop's – and the book's – three major divisions: process, outcomes, and possibilities.

THE GLOBALISATION PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW

Globalisation, following Lowell Dittmer (2002:21), may be understood as "the increasing scale and speed of exchanges of people, products, services, capital, and ideas across international borders." A related formulation sees it as "a process fuelled by, and resulting in, increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, information, and culture (Held et al. 1996:16)." In this process, activated by Western-led economic liberalisation, the financial component is the most important because of the ease with which money can be transmitted, converted, and circulated in international markets. Since this financial exchange involves nations, economic transactions inevitably interface with political institutions.

But as financial and market arrangements become more and more dependent on the decisions of regional and supranational bodies, political institutions like the state, though still possessing considerable authority, diminish in influence (MacEwan 1999). With state power checked, the flow of products, services, ideas, and eventually, people, easily follows cash and interacts with local conditions and agents. Globalisation thus entails, as Malcolm Waters (1995:7-10) points out, a mesh of economic, political, and cultural exchanges across time and space. In the same way, Gilpin (1987:389) and Giddens (1997:582) can speak of globalisation as an "increasing interdependence of national economies" or a "growing interdependence between different peoples, regions, and countries in the world."

Globalisation is hardly a new phenomenon. Centuries ago, religions like Islam and Christianity, as well as political ideologies like Marxism, spread like bushfire across continents. In turn, the active movement of commodities across land and sea has been ongoing since the colonial days, while the mass migrations of people during the past two centuries have been amply documented. What makes the contemporary experience of globalisation peculiar is the scale and speed of these flows. The scale or magnitude of economic, political and social exchanges within and across societies is greater today than at any other time in history. Likewise, the

speed with which these exchanges take place, thanks to advances in information technology, has obscured the barriers of time and space, leading to what Robertson (1992:8) calls 'a compression of the world' and what Bauman (2000), in more graphic terms, dubs 'liquid modernity'.

The increased scale and speed of these global flows have not spared Asian societies. As a result of globalisation, people around the world have become cognisant of Asian cultures — a recognition attributed to the rise in power and importance of several Asian regions as trading and economic blocs, and to the birth of the so-called 'Asian tiger' economies (Birch et al. 2001:vii).

Globalisation has prompted the region's people to grapple with translocal phenomena in their everyday lives, and in the process create a new culture that is neither global nor local, but 'glocal' (Yamashita 2003:6-8). Little wonder then why Catarina Kinnvall (2002:4) argues that while expressions of globalisation should be seen in a variety of contexts – economic, political, social – these expressions "must be conceptualised as a relationship between the global and the local." Local practice must be linked to a set of meanings that the practice entails for its actors and its audience. Or as Mauro Guillén (2001:255) puts it, one needs to consider the role that agency, interest, and resistance play in shaping these global flows.

The positions of Kinnvall and Guillén hew close to the view of critical realists who see globalisation as a 'structure' or set of arrangements that possesses within it a mechanism capable of producing particular events given a specific context, or a cluster of economic, political, and social conditions (Sayer 1992:85-117). In these positions, globalisation cannot be seen in binary fashion, merely as the solution to underdevelopment, for example, or simply as another form of Western colonisation. Neither can the effects of globalisation be read solely as a process leading toward the homogenisation of cultures or one that ushers only social and personal fragmentation.

The investigative task, as Andrew Sayer (2000:23) suggests, should aim to locate and explain various contexts, mechanisms, and events. Globalisation, as Pieterse (1996:556) observes, does not posit a naked choice between celebration and condemnation. Rather, global flows need to be confronted, engaged, as well as given shape and form (Guillén 200:255). Given the openness and complexity of social systems in which these mechanisms take place, the list of possibilities or outcomes is likely to be long and, if we may add, diverse and unique.

Illustrative cases in the Asian context

The book's opening pair of essays drives home these points and set the tone of this volume: they reveal how global forces are woven into the local practices, and how the prospects for the future, while constrained by global pressure, still leave room for new hybrid arrangements to emerge. The first essay, by the economist Jomo Kwame Sundaram, demonstrates these points on the secular plane, while Phra Paisal Visalo, a Buddhist monk, offers examples from the realm of the sacred.

Consider, for example, the subject of Jomo's paper: the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis that saw several Asian countries on the brink of economic collapse. Thousands of workers were laid off because of the crisis, many companies went bankrupt, and the value of shares and money sank to its lowest point after 30 years of continuous growth.

Analysts who study the crisis point its cause to a deadly interface between global and local practices. Ditmar (2001:27) observes, for instance, that the major problems in Asia at the time were two-fold: "debt was concentrated in short-term liabilities, and reserve assets were low." The first problem reflects Asia's integration in the global economy, specifically as recipients of huge amounts of short-term investments from other countries. The American policy of financial liberalisation and freer capital flows abetted this infusion of funds.

The second problem, in turn, had a local origin: Asia's emerging economies, following Japan's lead, favoured banks over equity markets for financial intermediation, resulting in a dearth of public debt available for trade. Cronyism aggravated the situation; by releasing loans and investments to favoured interest groups, Asian economies experienced a high debt-to-equity ratio that made these economies vulnerable to interest rate shocks. And the shock did come – when businesses defaulted in Thailand and Korea, international investors quickly withdrew and further aggravated the crisis.

In his essay, Jomo Kwame Sundaram looks at the prospects for economic recovery in Thailand, Indonesia,

and Malaysia – the three Southeast Asian economies most severely affected by the financial crisis. His focus: technological upgrading and investment policy regimes. He first discusses the constrained national economic situations that compelled the three economies to seek emergency loans and structural adjustment packages from international financial institutions. He then points out that Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia had to abide by the strict conditionalities of these relief programmes. These terms, according to Jomo, "severely reduced the scope for selective interventions so crucial to the catching up achieved in the East Asian miracle."

But given the fact that Asian economies have different capacities and capabilities, global economic forces tend to affect them in different ways. Consequently, some economies may recover faster than others. Moreover, assuming that the demands imposed by international financial institutions stay the same, initiatives for development may come largely from within the country, specifically after "consideration of the microeconomic basis for the viability of particular policies and institutions." Given the different capacities and capabilities of Asian economies, Jomo advises us to expect uneven development as well as a diverse range of local responses to a global financial process.

Phra Paisal Visalo, the abbot of Wat Pasukato, studies local responses as well, but this time with regard to how Asian religions have negotiated with global forces over time. His essay makes an excellent counterpoint to the unexamined belief that Asian religions are fixed, directly traceable to an original point thousands of years ago, and untainted by contact with the outside world (Birch et al. 2001:100–2).

What Phra Paisal actually finds is that Asian religions – Islam in Indonesia, Roman Catholicism in the Philippines, and Buddhism in Japan – are markedly responsive to external influences, the most notable of which, to date, has been globalisation. Far from weakening the grip of religion, these global forces have occasioned a revival of religion in Asian societies, a revival that appears in three major forms, namely: the resurgence of religious fundamentalism, the explosion of new religions, and the growth of religion for consumerism. Phra Phaisal does not welcome all these developments since some of the religious responses spawned by globalisation may, in fact, breed more violence and foster greater consumerism. The abbot calls, instead, for reforms that will enable religious organisations to redirect globalisation to the betterment of humanity and most especially, of people in the grassroots.

THE OUTCOMES OF GLOBALISATION

Global economic flows not only connect with religion to produce this re-enchantment with transcendence, they also influence other social concerns, among them the recovery of social institutions, the recuperation of resources, and the reconfiguration of identities. This interaction between global forces and social concerns, in fact, comprises the major theme of the papers written by the API fellows, and has led workshop committee to use *The Asian Face of Globalisation: Reconstructing Resources, Institutions, and Identities* as the theme of the first API workshop, and to suggest it as the title of this volume as well. Underlying the papers of this volume are three key observations:

- Global economic flows have made it difficult for nations to contain ideas, information, money, or even people within their geographic boundaries.
- Just as these global economic flows may render possible the achievement of double-digit economic gains, they may also bring with them gross inequalities on a massive scale.
- Social dislocations have dramatic consequences on a people's sense of themselves. They have made many communities – upland and lowland groups, migrants and non-migrants – feel increasingly rootless, alienated, psychologically distant, and poor (Birch et al. 2001:171).

This sense of precariousness underlies the essays that describe the consequences of globalisation in three areas: human and physical resources, social institutions, and sense of identity.

Human resources

In past decades, the massive flows of people across borders have reconstructed cities to the point that fewer and fewer parts of the world can lay claim to any sense of racial or ethnic homogeneity. Indeed, the diaspora – or group of migrants who set up their own 'homes away from home' in search of a viable economic life – has become the order of the day (Appadurai 1993:424), and has placed considerable strain on both the sovereignty of the host state and on the identity of migrant peoples (Birch et al. 2001:177). The observation that "approximately

seventy-two percent of women migrant workers in the world are Asian" (Matsui 1999) adds gender as a major factor in this global search for possibility.

Two papers in this volume explore the diasporic situation of Asian communities in another Asian country. The first, by Pataya Ruenkaew, focuses on Thai migrants in Japan. The second, by Pande K. Trimayumi, deals with a multiplicity of situations: the Burmese in Thailand, the Indonesians in Malaysia, and the Filipinos who return from overseas work in many countries, chiefly Hong Kong, Italy, and Singapore.

Thai migrants, both male and female, started to enter Japan legally in the early 1980s as job trainees in the mother companies of Japanese corporations with offices in Thailand, as students in Japanese language schools, or as brides of Japanese citizens. Simultaneously, however, illegal migration to Japan also began, particularly through brokers connected with criminal syndicates – a situation brought about, in part, by the absence of a policy to accept unskilled foreign workers and the non-existence of overseas labour contracts between Japan and other countries. These illegal entrants later find work in either the construction or service sectors. Many Thai women, for instance, have become sex workers through this route. By and large, covert entries like theirs make it difficult to monitor the actual number of Thai migrants in Japan, although a review of available data evidently shows that many Thais, most of them women, overstay in Japan.

Ruenkaew's in-depth interviews with a sample of these women migrants indicate how these lives have grown vulnerable to exploitation and sickness. Yet the women are determined to make it in the host country. Their insecurities have been soothed, in great part, by the growth of a Thai community in Japan.

The vulnerability of female migrant workers takes a wider dimension in Pande K. Trimayuni's investigation in three Asian countries: the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. Both Thailand and Malaysia receive migrants, while the Philippines is a major sending country of women workers. Different though the receiving country may be, the experiences of these women migrant workers are similar to those of the Thais in Japan, whose lives have been made onerous by economic hardship, insecure by political neglect, and threatened by disease, in this case HIV/AIDS. What is intriguing about these infected cases is that only a few of these migrants are, or become, sex workers.

Thus, HIV/AIDS is not typically transmitted in line with jobs as commercial sex workers, but is a manifestation of these women's overall vulnerability in migrant situations. Their status as domestic helpers, factory workers, or waitresses makes them susceptible to situations that invite rape and other forms of sexual violence, or compels them to patronise poor health facilities where blood transfusions are suspect. Compounding these harsh structural arrangements are the migrants' bouts of boredom, loneliness, and homesickness that prompt casual sexual liaisons. Their inadequate knowledge of HIV/AIDS and of ways to prevent its transmission adds insult to injury.

It is clear from the work of Ruenkaew and Trimayuni that the global movement of people to areas of high-economic opportunity parallels the movement of dispossessed rural migrants who inhabit the depressed areas of Asian cities: the country of destination, like the urban slum or squatter area, has become both the migrant's source of salvation and tragedy (Abad 1991). The diaspora represents hope for a better life, while at the same time, given instances of economic exploitation, sexual violence and disease, comes to represent the roots of their tragedy as well. Both Ruenkaew and Trimayuni advocate the active intervention by host and sending countries to ease the plight of migrant workers, particularly of female migrant workers, whose shoulders carry the burden of earning for their families back home.

Natural resources

Threats to survival also confront the forests and the seas, as well as the communities that rely heavily on these ecological resources. Henry Chan trekked the uplands of Thailand and Indonesia and found that the demands of the market economy have seriously degraded the forest environment. Excessive logging and land clearance operations for the sake of cash crops, compounded by decades of bad governance, rent-seeking by interest groups, and exploitation by many community leaders, have denuded the forests, as well as jeopardised the cultural and economic lives of indigenous peoples.

Surmiati Ali, in turn, saw that the introduction of new fishing technology in fishing communities in Malaysia and Thailand has intensified the extraction of marine

resources. In Thailand, this extraction has been so severe as to deplete the area's marine resource base and put at risk the economic survival of villagers. In Rusembilae, a Thai village, commercial fishermen have taken possession of modern fishing gear, and with their large and well-equipped boats, established virtual dominion of traditional fishing grounds. Protesting this invasion, villagers have persuaded Thai authorities to ban the use of the destructive push nets but for naught. Commercial fishermen merely ignore the law and continue to fish in troubled waters, leaving traditional fishermen at the mercy of capitalists.

A contrasting picture emerges in Tanjang Dahan, a Malaysian fishing community, where despite technological innovations and the resulting increase in the extraction of marine resources, traditional fishermen have managed to rationalise the use of their resources. Surmiati Ali found that in this Malaysian village, fishermen formed unions to set limits to the size and volume of catch, ensure respect for territorial boundaries, preserve breeding grounds, build artificial reefs, and cooperate with organisations and agencies that protect marine resources.

Surmiati Ali's case studies show that technology is not necessarily the Trojan horse of modern life. Rather, what spells peril or progress for a community is the interaction between technology and the social context to which it is introduced. And a social context characterised by free and rational discourse is apparently key to handling the problem. It is this ability to rationalise discourse so that one party can appreciate the perspective of the other party and work out non-zero sum games to solve problems that underlies Henry Chan's 'moral conflict' approach in dealing with contentious issues in forestry. His case studies on Indonesia and Thailand appear to prove him right, and deserve continued application.

Social institutions

A globalised culture, says Waters (1995:126), admits a continuous flow of ideas, information, commitment, values, and tastes mediated, among others, through mobile individuals, symbolic tokens, and products of electronic technology. These flows force an interaction with local cultures that may lead to a reassertion of traditional principles (as in the case of religious fundamentalism) or a process of hybridisation where one culture absorbs elements of another (as in the case of modern fishing technology). The same flows may also lead to the development of a transnational culture that is not linked exclusively to a particular nation-state-society (as in the case of supranational lending institutions).

Regardless of the scenario, however, an interaction is never always smooth or even; it is often fraught with tension and conflict – as shown, for instance, in earlier papers on forest degradation, marine resource depletion, and migrant communities. This is not surprising if one likens the globalisation of culture, the way Peter Berger (2002:9) does, as a 'cultural earthquake' that affects virtually every part of the world. When an earthquake hits, different people respond in different ways. Similarly, when the 'earthquake' of globalisation hits, different people respond in different ways: they may accept its terms, resist its force, or find a balance between the forces of the new with the forces of the familiar – or as Berger puts it, responses that lie between supine acceptance and militant rejection.

Asian institutions, particularly the arts, manage to confront these changes, even as this sector has yielded the staunchest critics of such global forces. Wong Soak Koon, for example, acknowledges the ability of global forces to homogenize cultures and reinforce social inequalities within those cultures. Yet she is similarly aware of the vernacularisation of globalisation and resorts to this alternative force to enable students to be critical of the ways global forces homogenize culture and weaken the people's sense of national identity. Armed with Freirean psychology and selective elements of the New London Group of Multiliteracies, Soak Koon enjoined Malaysian and Filipino students to read each other's literary texts, compare them with their respective local texts, and arrive at an understanding of how Asians confront the modern world and establish their own sense of nation. By fostering cultural literacy, Soak Koon attempts to breed among students a special vigilance for the hierarchies and hegemonies ushered by the globalisation process.

Nick Deocampo wants a similar kind of vigilance for Asian cinema. He decries the global dominance of Hollywood and the decline of the film industries in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. He reels at the fact that the image of Asia projected in international film festivals and conferences largely stems from the cinemas of the three Chinas, Japan, and South Korea. And he laments the absence of national

cinemas, especially when one considers that local movies have become staple sources of entertainment in many Asian countries and can exert a powerful force for strengthening national identity.

But there's hope. The advance of technology and access to capital, Deocampo observes, have spawned new films and new filmmakers from places away from capital cities. Deocampo has also discovered the imaginary as a tool for filmmakers like him to address things that Asians lack, or those that relate to a people's dreams, aspirations, and desires. It is the honing of the imaginary, the cleansing of its negative manifestations, and its replacement by truthful, even critical, images that will beget the greening of Asia's celluloid forest.

Soak Koon and Deocampo advocate the need to resist global forces which threaten to decimate expressions of local or national solidarity, finding in literature and film the means to assert expressions of local culture in a global setting. Their papers articulate the tension between the global and the local, with global forces exerting a predatory presence over local voices.

For his part, Fusakonosuke Natsume observes that in the world of popular culture, and of the *manga* comic culture in particular, the situation is far more complicated. While *manga* comics have a Japanese origin, their spread and penetration of different Asian countries – Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, China among others – have cast doubt on their historical origin. Thailand and Indonesia, for instance, produce their own versions of *manga* , and among readers in these societies, distinctions are made between local and Japanese comic books, each one supposedly having its own origins. This distinction, notes Fusakonosuke, creates a dual culture where young people of the middle or upper classes prefer Japanese *manga* , while those in the lower class brackets read the more affordable local versions.

The formation of a dual culture and the popularity of local versions of *manga* comic books imply that the globalisation of popular culture is a cross-cultural phenomenon. In this phenomenon, global flows do not simply flow one way – from core to periphery for example – but take on multiple directions depending on the clash and mix of the different cultural elements involved. Fusakonosuke's work also illustrates the phenomenon of 'subglobalizations', which Berger (2002:14) defines as "movements with a regional than a global reach that nevertheless are instrumental in connecting the societies on which they impinge with the emerging global culture."

The spread and popularity of *manga* comic book images across countries – or for that matter, of selected images in the mass media, including cinema, television and music – reflect a 'mediascape' that has been increasingly governed by global production and distribution companies (Appadurai 1990). Governance comes in many forms, among them the stringent application of laws on intellectual property rights and the forging of strategic linkages with local media and marketing firms. It also requires a law enforcement agency committed to the protection of official global-local arrangements. Such protection may not always be present. In some instances, new practices arise that legal and law enforcement agencies are unprepared to handle. In other instances, as in the case study presented by Yasuhiro Mizutani, the agency may lack a basic professional commitment to impersonal law, a lack rooted in that agency's very history.

Mizutani investigates the historical role played by the Thai police in keeping public order, focusing on the period between 1930 and 1950. Using data inventively culled from 'funeral books', he finds a police institution built on personalistic, rather than universalistic, norms. The institution may be highly organised and strong enough to repel the army in case of a coup, but its actual operations – in terms of appointments, promotions, and transfers, among others – work along patterns set by traditional patron-client ties. No system of checks and balances exists, and corruption is endemic.

Not surprisingly, policemen are valued less for their just enforcement of the law than for their nak leng or personal qualities like toughness and bravery, while yet remaining loyal to friends. The result is a police force that is at the behest of the elite rather than the people – a state of affairs that, Mizutani believes, still thrives today despite various attempts at reform. Clearly, present police practices must be rationalised and the police made accountable to the public. Failure to implement this weakens the legitimacy of the police, and in the long run, that of the state itself.

Identity

The state's loss of legitimacy, in fact, helps to fuel assertions of local identity. For while globalisation promotes openness and exchange, it also stimulates chauvinism and nationalism, especially in states that are incapable, or perceived to be incapable, of serving the needs of marginalised groups. As Kinnvall and Jönsson (2001:258) argue, changes wrought by global forces come quickly, and people who feel lost in the new world will try hard to cling to the roots of the old world. Thus, an ethnic community or a minority group may search, define, or invoke its traditional identity when it feels that the group is being marginalised in cultural, economic, and/or political terms. This assertion of identity may also arise in opposition to a hegemonic state discourse that allows these groups little or no power to shape that discourse. Either way, the quest for identity is a quest for security in a world shaken by global forces, and in governments whose agents are seen to lack the legitimacy to correct the situation.

Many of the studies conducted by the first batch of API fellows deal with issues of identity among aggrieved groups, many of which, although not quite all, are ethnic minorities. One such aggrieved group is the Mandailing, who inhabit the southwestern corner of the province of North Sumatra, and who, for centuries, have migrated throughout the Indonesian archipelago and the Malay Peninsula. Despite their significant contributions to art, literature, and politics, the Mandailing have been culturally marginalised in Indonesia and Malaysia. In both these countries, the state discourse on ethnicity has rendered the group invisible by either lumping them as belonging to a dominant Malay category, or in the case of Indonesia, by designating them part of the Batak group. Compounding this invisibility is a campaign to promote the notion of a *Melaya inklusif* or an inclusive Malay identity, based on the perception that the native peoples of Indonesia and Malaysia all come from the Malay race or stock.

Abdur-Razzaq Lubis has taken upon himself the task of restoring the Mandailing identity, buoyed by international efforts to revive the traditions of indigenous communities and to protect human diversity. His tenure as an API fellow found him engaged in several activities to restore the Mandailing identity: gathering information, attending conferences, setting up exhibits, creating websites, promoting local arts and tourism, organising a network of scholars, and encouraging religious pilgrimages. He has also helped the Mandailing recover their traditional practice of consultative governance, develop strategies for environmental management, and find ways to blend traditional customs with Islamic teaching.

The Pattani Muslims of Southern Thailand are yet another equally aggrieved group. A majority in the province of Pattani, they are nevertheless a distinct minority in Buddhist Thailand, and have been made subject to state campaigns that gloss over their Muslim traditions. One such campaign, reports Sri Nuryanti, is the Siamisation programme that sought to establish a uniformity of Thai practices in the nation, among them: the demand of devotion to Buddha, an adherence to Buddhist daily activities, and the adoption of the Thai language and a dominant Thai culture, including the use of Thai names. Similarly, a national educational policy promotes the establishment of secular schooling even in Muslim areas, thus diminishing the influence of Islamic schools and Islamic instruction in the area.

This blanket Siamisation policy thus represents a form of cultural discrimination that extends to the social and economic spheres: relative to the general population, for example, the Pattani Muslims have lower levels of education, poorer job opportunities, and undoubtedly, more dismal pay, thereby relegating them to the lower rungs of the social hierarchy. According to Nuryanti, scholars or intellectuals take either a traditional or a non-traditional position on various aspects of Pattani's marginal status. The Pattani Muslims, in turn, have launched a resistance movement – a show of force that the Thai government has contained, at least for the moment. Still, the experience of exclusion, both real and perceived, lingers.

Similar experiences of exclusion beset the people of Aceh, such that violent confrontations between rebel forces and government troops have ensued. According to Prangtip Daorueng, the first disagreement between Aceh and Indonesia flared in 1948 when Aceh was designated a sub-province of North Sumatra. This decision to have Aceh designated an independent province on account of the cultural and social differences between Aceh and the rest of North Sumatra ran counter to the desire of the influential Association of All-Aceh Islamic Scholars. A 1956 promise granting Aceh autonomous status was reneged on in 1959 when President Sukarno set up a highly centralised system of governance. His

successor, President Suharto, retained the centralist policy, and exacerbated an already hostile situation laden with human rights violations, military abuse, and exploitation from multinational corporations.

In response, the Acehnese launched the Free Aceh Movement, a resistance force against state power, in 1976. Although the movement grew in strength, its demands were never fully met during the Suharto regime. But while the post-Suharto government has shown signs of resolving the conflict, per Daorueng's assessment, the end of this civil strife will come not from a strengthening of a local identity, but from the termination of repressive national policies, the search for non-military solutions, and the promotion of justice and equity for the Acehnese. These are among the challenges of the present government in dealing with the Aceh case.

The three aggrieved groups – the Mandailing, the Pattani Muslims, and the Acehnese – have each chosen to assert their respective ethnic identities through strategies of resistance against a powerful state. This resistance has brought into relief issues related to resource allocation and political participation. It has also underscored the fact that the state usually serves as the official appropriator of scarce resources, and is thus a key actor in ethnic relations. But the state, as Miriam Coronel Ferrer (1999:7) notes, need not always be the locus of inter-ethnic studies since social and cultural forces also exert a powerful role in the everyday life of indigenous people.

In addition, resistance against the state need not be the only option. Herry Yogaswara found that indigenous peoples of the Cordillera in northern Philippines, after engaging in violent resistance against the state since the Spanish colonial period, have settled down in the last two decades, preferring instead to resolve community problems through local organisations and political manoeuvres. Colin Nicholas argues, for his part, that the chances for security in the lives of Thailand's hill tribes rests on a more responsive leadership. In turn, Benny Subianto finds that the Chinese in the Philippines advanced in status when they seized political and economic opportunities that knocked on their doors.

The Indonesian anthropologist Herry Yogaswara went to the Cordillera Mountains of Kalinga province in the Philippines where he lived with the Banao, an indigenous community that is undergoing a process of de-traditionalisation. He observed that the Banao have adapted their traditional customs to the demands of modern education, Christianity (the community is more than three-fourths Anglican), intermarriage, and development projects. He also found that the Banao interact more with representatives of state and civil society on critical issues like ancestral domain, regional autonomy, and the Indigenous People Rights Act.

But Yogaswara is quick to point out that amidst these forces of change, the Banao tradition, while not totally obliterated, now merely serves as one of several possible options people use in their drive to secure a better life. Where dealings with non-governmental organisations are concerned, the Banao are quick to invoke traditional customs in the resolution of boundary problems or in celebrating feast days, in staking their claims on ancestral lands, or to ensure the continued flow of electricity in the village.

Identity construction thus takes on a dramaturgical dimension (Woodward 2000:18), as the Banao people adjust their ethnic mask to the needs of the situation. And if the masks are many, suggesting that ethnic identities can be multiple, a balancing act of sorts is necessary to control each dramaturgical performance. The Banao take great care, for example, in balancing their performance in local politics where they have to contend simultaneously with representatives of a shadow government (namely the New People's Army, a rebel force) and the official local government authority.

Indigenous leaders also need to perform a similar balancing act if they want to accommodate to global forces without stripping themselves of all traces of their ethnic identity – a process Colin Nicholas has termed 'de-culturalisation'. Nicholas himself has experienced instances where indigenous leaders, working with external interests, made the survival of their people a goal secondary to their own economic pursuit.

Conditions of modernity, Nicholas says, created situations where external groups intrude on ethnic communities to claim their lands and resources, make them a target of consumer goods, or even more benevolently, to introduce them to new religions or educational systems. Some of these groups also venture to identify from within the local community, members who eventually become the new indigenous leaders.

These new indigenous leaders eventually imbibe notions of power and control from outside, and soon find themselves alienated from community traditions and community interests. The ethnic community is then further marginalised as a result, and with it, a gradual loss of ethnic identity takes place.

To halt this trend, Nicholas advocates an 'indigenous intellectualism', that is to say the acquisition among leaders of a frame of mind that is "able to find answers to problems and situations from within the indigenous tradition." This is the other balancing act that transpires: it not so much negotiates with different versions of the state, as the Banao people do in the Cordillera, but creates critical collaborators in the service of the local community. It entails a recovery of tradition, or a return to "those spiritual values and living philosophies that kept indigenous communities intact, equitable, and sustainable." Nicholas himself met some of these enlightened leaders while on fieldwork among the hill tribes of Northern Thailand, and realises that these persons, men and women, can be found in today's global world. Indigenous leaders like them enable their ethnic communities to endure the onslaught of external interests over time.

The Chinese in the Philippines have also shown great resilience to the whips and scourges of history. But the gains that they have amassed over the years, according to the historian Benny Subianto, have not completely obliterated their status as 'the other' in Philippine society, making their experience a good lesson in the struggle for ethnic identity. Mostly traders during the pre-colonial times, many immigrant Chinese married local Filipinos, to produce Chinese *mestizos* who, during the Spanish colonial era, had the advantage of being able to own land, study, become retail traders themselves, and prosper economically even when the Spanish government barred the entry of Chinese immigrants in the 1760s. Then when the ban on Chinese immigration was lifted in 1850, the *mestizos* shifted their economic base from trading to landholding and commercial agriculture, leaving the new immigrants to take over the trading business.

But the Chinese, as a whole, remained marginal to mainstream Philippine life – a situation that stayed virtually unchanged when the Americans became the country's colonial ruler. Ultimately, the American regime proved beneficial to the Chinese who seized the opportunity to enter, and eventually dominate, the retail trade when the Americans abolished tax farming. The Chinese also studied American ways, and used this knowledge to publish Chinese newspapers, build Chinese schools, and form Chinese associations – all of which strengthened the Chinese's sense of identity. Unfortunately for them, post-independence life failed to boost the status of the Chinese as the national government nationalised retail trade and prohibited Chinese-Filipinos from controlling the wholesale selling of rice and corn.

The reign of President Ferdinand Marcos then dawned and erased these obstacles. Eager to weaken the political and economic oligarchy in the country, Marcos encouraged the growth of Chinese business enterprises. Eager, too, to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, the President launched a mass naturalisation policy that benefited large numbers of alien Chinese residents in the country. Thereafter, several Chinese prospered and proceeded to become the country's leading capitalists. Slowly but surely, many Chinese families began to leave the ghettoes and were assimilated into the Filipino mainstream, lived in modern subdivisions and sent their children to exclusive private schools.

Still and all, the Chinese, says Subianto, remain a stranger in Philippine society to this day. They have become, for example, scapegoats for the failure of some economic policies, and prime targets of organised kidnapping for ransom schemes. The economic success of this minority group has failed, in this case, to completely blot out its aggrieved status. What explains the phenomenon?

One reason, Tatsuki Kataoka suggests, may lie in the nature of the assimilation process. In his work with two hill tribes of Thailand, Kataoka challenges the notion that ethnic identity is fluid in the sense that one identity is simply replaced by another. In one village, for example, the Lahu people who accepted Chinese religious tradition did not become any less Lahu or any more Chinese. Similarly, the Chinese who 'have become Lahu' did so while maintaining their Chinese traditions. Thus, as Kataoka observes, "ethnic identification can be added without the switching of custom, and sometimes it can remain the same even when customs are switched."

Similarly, in another village, the Lahu who accepted Christianity did not replace traditional custom, but, rather, segregated this into religion (which included Christian beliefs and practices) and secular custom. The Lahu Christians thus remain Lahu in much the same way, perhaps, as the Chinese in the Philippines have remained Chinese, despite their having made significant inroads into the mainstream – they still remain Chinese with all the advantages or disadvantages accruing to that identity in Philippine society. It is, therefore, not surprising, as Subianto reports, that in the face of kidnapping threats, the Chinese in the Philippines retain their cultural belief that money will solve everything. It is very likely as well that their willingness to pay ransom and their reluctance to report cases to law enforcers, whether rightly or wrongly, have made them the 'perfect targets' of such violence.

Kataoka's awareness of the nuances underlying ethnic identity prompts him to refine the concepts of alternative knowledge or local wisdom as advanced in intellectual circles. Seeking from the Lahu an alternative knowledge regarding forest management, for example, will generate responses regarding Lahu theodicy rather than on native ways of forest keeping. Similarly, attempts to conflate local wisdom with national culture will mean little in imagining a national identity unless the state takes into account communities like the hill tribes in creating a 'pluralistic bottom-up image of the nation'.

Cecile de la Paz will no doubt agree with Kataoka's point. In her investigation of museum practices in Japan and the Philippines, de la Paz worked on the premise that a museum is a contested and negotiated space where different groups of people, ethnic communities included, can locate a nation's identity or identities. How then have the two countries dealt with the issue of identity in their museums? What kind of aesthetics are being constructed and for what purpose?

Several findings emerge from de la Paz's field observations, archival research, and informant interviews. For one, she notes, Japan and the Philippines are aware that museums serve as markers of a nation's achievements and that the sites chosen for these museums are also symbolic of the cultural claims of a nation's economic and political centres.

But while Japan, particularly its urban areas, experienced a museum boom from the 1970s to the 1990s, thereby giving urban residents a sense of 'commonality and communality', the Philippines has been slow to enhance museum structures and practices for various reasons: first, the training of museum professionals has just began; second, museums lack funding; and third, the state at both the local and the national levels does not have a cohesive cultural agenda that will guide museum development. But even more basic is the lack of public appreciation: without a group tour, it is difficult to persuade Filipinos to visit a museum. In contrast, the Japanese see the museum as a likely place to visit in their leisure time. Nevertheless, Filipino museums showcase the ethnic diversity of the country, and appropriate various ethnic emblems and objects as the basis of the Philippine nation.

A similar pattern appears in the display of *mingei* (folk crafts) in Japan, where the use of *mingei* objects, like pottery, in a home or restaurant as part of the aesthetics of food preparation serves to bring ethnicity into the consciousness of the urbanite. In the Philippines, meanwhile, folk crafts began to inspire the creation of a national culture only in the 1970s – initially as part of an effort to use folk cultural emblems to boost tourism, and then as icons for political activists who were fed up with Western symbols of social transformation. Other sites for displaying folk crafts have not fared well in the country: one site, for instance, has well lost its credibility as its staff members display a keener interest in selling souvenir items than in connecting cultural objects to the modern experience. Another site is too inaccessible to the public, while still another has a display that smacks of exoticism, extols a 'narrative of loss', and fails to make the exhibit resonate in contemporary times.

There are, however, some community museums that do show promise, but the others tend to reify objects or generate more interest among visitors than among local residents who feel that museum objects are not worth seeing since these are readily found in everyday life. In Japan, meanwhile, the process of reification can occur when the state encourages a group of crafts people to manufacture particular kinds of mingei to serve the tourist market. This incentive discourages experimentation and stifles artistic transformation.

Here, then, is one of de la Paz's key points: that in order to turn museums into live cultural spaces for engagement, one must organise a museum audience as a community that has a stake in the representation of their culture

vis-à-vis the larger society. That representation must be fluid as well to account for changes in a community's view of itself, and of the shifting nature of its interaction with the larger society. A museum's display of everyday life will be valid, she concludes, "if it articulates unsaid hopes and tensions in civil society – the past and the present clearly connected, the centre and peripheral actively resolved."

Possibilities for change

The six papers on identity are one in claiming that any change for the better must entail the task of accommodating the interests of minorities in the world of the majority. Collaboration and dialogue are essential, and ways to establish the security of a way of life amidst global changes remain of paramount importance in the national and local development agenda. Such ideals underlie the remaining papers of the workshop.

Two papers champion a collaboration of like minds in the process of change. Another two advocate specific structures or mechanisms to guide efforts in social transformation. Altogether, these four papers propose Asian possibilities for local action in global settings.

René B. Javellana, S.J. shares de la Paz's interest in defining the national imaginary, and his route to that destination is not through work with museums, but via a larger effort at heritage conservation. In most of Asia, with its rich cultural diversity, this effort has just begun. Many issues abound: What constitutes heritage? Who defines heritage and decides which sites will be conserved? What are the roles of the state and private organisations in this effort? How does the conservation of sites, products, and practices reflect a nation's understanding of itself? Like museums, then, heritage sites, products and practices are also contested and negotiated spaces. Javellana examines heritage conservation efforts in Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. He finds that efforts at conservation are uneven by country, but singular in terms of the dedication of heritage conservation groups or HCGs, most of which are non governmental organisations.

Japan is a pioneer in heritage conservation, its work tracing back to the Meiji period. It has a legal framework for classifying heritage sites, an extensive network of public museums, and a strong commitment to the conservation of Japanese culture and heritage. It also has many active HCGs supplementing the work of the state, going so far as to push the national imaginary to focus on aspects of heritage that have been rendered invisible in the past, as in the case of the Ainu and the Okinawan. Thailand does not have the same resources as Japan has, but the state and the monarchy have been able to maintain heritage institutions and support HCGs and private institutions like the Siam Society, which are dedicated to heritage promotion and even the defence of threatened heritage sites.

Despite this, little, too, has been done to address the heritage of Thailand's ethnic minorities. Indonesia, in turn, is replete with HCGs, in large part because of the perceived inadequacy of the state in heritage conservation. These HCGs actively engender public appreciation for heritage sites through lectures, walking tours, and festivals. These efforts, however, have to contend with the state's conflation of heritage conservation and tourism, thus fostering a commoditisation of culture. In Malaysia, heritage conservation falls within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture, but the work of the state has been uneven, thus leaving much of the task of conservation to HCGs, most notably the Penang Heritage Trust (PHT), a model in the region.

All in all, Javellana sees the work of heritage conservation groups as daunting, involving as it does the tasks of documenting heritage sites, and interpreting what heritage means to a country. Future work will involve sustaining and enlarging the movement through more extensive networking, maximizing technology for documentation and information dissemination, linking with academia, and public education. In short, having a heritage conservation movement to gather several conservation-minded groups to define, save, and protect a nation's heritage against destructive global forces is imperative.

Pibhop Dhongchai also believes in the efficacy of social movements to resist destructive global forces. Globalisation, he claims, has released a Pandora's box of social sins, like consumer greed and environmental degradation, that generate still further sins, like a slavish dependency on material goods or a widening gap between people and nature on the one hand, and between people and other people on the other. The state, in turn, has been unable to contain this Pandora's box: its system of representative democracy has been subverted to serve elite interests in much the same

way that many civil society groups, run by middle-class people, have allied with state interests.

Fortunately, as Dhongchai found, alternative social movements thrive in such Asian countries as Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. These groups, run by grassroots people and members of the 'progressive middle class', tackle four concerns – alternative education, alternative farming, alternative communities, and alternative banking – each one following programmes and practices that diverge from national or state models. By providing alternative options for people, these movements also seek to widen the public space for democratic discourse. Closing this democratic space, Dhonghchai warns, will only unleash violence of the kind witnessed in the September 11 tragedy – or closer to Asia, the Tiananmen crackdown by the Chinese government.

Sukran Rojanapaiwong shares Dhongchai's concern for alternative models while examining printed publications on environmental protection released by NGOs. Three of these publications (Suhay, Feedback, and Indigenous Perspectives) come from the Philippines, while one (Utusan Konsumer) originates from Malaysia. While these publications vary in size, format, style, audience, and circulation, all of them give importance to environmental issues and aim to attain a 'better and fairer society'. Rojanapaiwong believes that globalisation, accompanied by capitalism-dominated development, has blunted the critical edge of mainstream mass media and has forced NGOs to produce their own media where they can critique state policies and programmes on development.

But this is easier said than done, for as Rojanapaiwong observes, all publications suffer from financial instability. Moreover, except for Utusan Konsumer, the rest have an overburdened staff, limited circulation, and a narrow audience base – limitations that make it difficult for the NGOs' message to reach the larger audience where it can win more sympathisers.

It is vital, therefore, for NGO media publications to reinvent themselves in light of professional journalistic practice by considering market audiences carefully, thinking creatively of ways to achieve financial stability, reformatting style and content, and by obtaining professional training. Along these areas, much can be learned from mainstream media, albeit with a difference: Rojanapaiwong dreams of a daily or weekly newspaper that operates like a conventional one, except that it would have with a strong commitment to populist development goals.

Learning from others, in this case from the experience of another Asian country, underlies the last paper on federalism. The Filipino psychologist Cristina Jayme Montiel spent her fellowship research period in Malaysia, the only Southeast Asian nation that runs on a federal structure of government. Aware that debates on the prospects of shifting to federalism are ongoing in her native Philippines, Montiel conducted in-depth interviews with four key players involved in the task of federalising Malaysia, spoke with academicians and non-academicians about Malaysian political life, and reviewed published and televised reports – all these in an effort to observe Asian-style federalism in action and to draw inputs for Philippine debate.

She summarises her findings in a list of ten insights, underlying which are three themes: the participation of local communities, sensitivity to local and global power configurations, and attention to transition politics. She sees many advantages to federalism, among them the recognition of local identities and the decentralisation of political power – insights she has shared with various groups in her country.

Montiel's personal efforts to promote a greater awareness of federalism as an alternative political structure for the Philippines parallel the work of the other Asian Public Intellectuals who, like her, combine reflection and action in the quest for a more equitable Asia. For the most part, the API fellows have spoken and acted in behalf of the underdog – the marginalised community, the disenfranchised body, the belittled sector of national life, the oppressed group, or the unpopular cause.

Much in the spirit of Yohei Sasakawa, President of the Nippon Foundation, who has devoted himself to the cause of a stigmatised minority, the API fellows have also embraced the cause of the underprivileged and have given them a voice in this global age. But even more than that, they have broken the bondage of insular thinking. By spending time to observe and reflect on the conditions in another country, and by using information generated thus to understand the conditions of their home country, the API fellows have enhanced their abilities to confront regional issues, and

to imagine ways to reconstruct identities, institutions, and resources. Ironically, globalisation has given these fellows, and Asians as a whole, a common set of opportunities and challenges to face in the decades ahead. This exchange among public intellectuals is an occasion, to quote former Philippine President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino in her opening address, to "regain our lost Asian-ness, our collective Asian spirit."

The present continues to be the best of times and the worst of times. Earlier, we took globalisation to mean "the increasing scale and speed of exchanges of people, products, services, capital, and ideas across international borders." Beyond a larger scale and greater speed, however, globalisation also begets what Robertson (1992:8) calls an 'intensification of consciousness', or a state of heightened cognition or awareness that the world has truly become a global village. In this state, events in one part of this village have consequences on lives in other parts of the village. This state of heightened awareness gives contemporary society its uniquely reflexive character (Kinnvall 2002:5) and moves it toward a more democratic one, as people begin to recognise different voices and give each voice due respect.

A more democratic ethos also enhances material life: by undermining cronyism and regulations that choked Asian economies, the Asian financial crisis has helped to create a more level playing field and liberated the energies of citizens to recover from earlier losses (Kristof and WuDunn 2000). But alongside this awareness of a movement towards greater democracy, we also realise, if not actually experience, the pain wreaked by the distortions of globalisation. Liberation co-exists with oppression; with celebration comes condemnation. The present thus remains the best of times and the worst of times.

One path to salvation is greater reflexivity – the path, as Tatsuya Tanami implies in his foreword, chosen by the Asian Public Intellectuals Program. As more and more people, institutions, and movements from local, national, regional, and cross-regional communities search for a modus vivendi and a 'milieu' (Dürrschmidt 2000) suitable to the global age, diverse peoples with diverse desires may reach accord not through subjugation but through accommodation, not through violence but through negotiation, not through the quest for ideological uniformity but through the pursuit of democratic pluralism. These advocates represent, in the words of Walden Bello (2002:30), the forces of genuine solidarity and community who step in to "convince the disenchanted that another, better world is indeed possible for the alternative is, as in the 1930s, seeing the vacuum filled by terrorists, demagogues of the religious and secular right, and the purveyors of irrationality and nihilism."

The Asian Public Intellectuals Fellowship Program is part of this global effort to build "another, better world," and particularly, to the creation of a reflexive community of Asian thinkers and doers who come together to address the region's critical concerns. This book is a modest contribution to the construction of this community.

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SOUTH EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE CRISIS

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INTRODUCTION

The currency and financial crises in Southeast Asia suggest that the region's economic miracle had been built on shaky and unsustainable foundations. Growth before the crises in Malaysia and Thailand had been heavily reliant on foreign resources, both capital and labour. Limited investments and inappropriate biases in human resource development had held back industrial and technological capabilities throughout the region. Southeast Asia's resource wealth and relatively cheap labour sustained production enclaves for the export of agricultural, forest, mineral and, more recently, manufactured products. However, only a few groups linked to those in political power captured much of the wealth generated. They nevertheless contributed to growth by reinvesting – albeit mainly in the 'protected' national economy – in import-substituting industries, commerce, services, and privatised utilities and infrastructure.

East Asia's macroeconomic fundamentals were generally sound at the time of the crash. Low inflation and falling unemployment had characterised the region's economies over the preceding decade. Savings rates had continued to rise despite already being among the highest in the world. However, fundamental weaknesses in the real economy slowed down growth in the mid-1990s. The shift to knowledge and skill-intensive production and the emergence of China and India as major low wage production sites threatened export-oriented manufacturing in the region. Unlike the Northeast Asian economies, the Southeast Asian countries had not developed the institutions needed to generate rapid technological change.

This paper assesses the prospects for sustained development in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia – the three Southeast Asian economies most adversely affected by the financial crises of 1997-98. Globalisation, including international financial liberalisation, has reduced the scope for the kind of selective government interventions that proved so crucial to the East Asian miracle. The process of accelerated economic growth is uneven and far from smooth, thereby leaving considerable room for similar initiatives that are more appropriate to new circumstances as they emerge. Following a brief note on the depreciation of exchange rates, this paper considers two initiatives: technological upgrading for sustainable development and the nature of investment policy regimes in an integrated global economy.

EXCHANGE RATE DEPRECIATION WITHOUT INCREASE IN EXPORTS

Cheaper currencies after the 1997 crisis led to little improvement in foreign direct investments (FDI) in Southeast Asia. Unlike gradual currency depreciations, which can attract capital from abroad, especially when accompanied by strong macroeconomic fundamentals, volatile currency movements tend to discourage such inflows. Sound macroeconomic fundamentals previous to the crisis tended to strengthen Southeast Asian currency values. The 1997/98 currency devaluations lowered domestic production costs in Southeast Asia vis-à-vis North America and Europe.

However, the regional nature of the crises and the continuing Japanese economic stagnation reduced regional demand for exports, a market that had become increasingly important in the wake of growing regional economic integration. Besides, because many foreign subsidiaries in Southeast Asia have low value-added production processes, with strong vertical linkages to their mother firms or industrial group, the devaluations neither lowered demand for imports nor increased export demand as much as might be expected from

the changes in relative prices. However, the recovery in world demand for electronics since late 1998 has contributed greatly to economic recovery in the region, especially in Malaysia and the Republic of Korea. Sticky wage rates, however, are likely to reduce the foreign exchange earnings to be gained with the devalued currencies.

Over-expansion in construction and lending for non-productive purposes had limited Southeast Asian financing of manufacturing growth even before the crisis. Speculation in real estate and stocks had attracted a lot of financing from banks and other financial institutions. To make matters worse, the limited Southeast Asian capacities to internally provide services and construction materials aggravated trade imbalances. Instead, construction and services were responsible for massive increases in import bills in the early and mid-1990s. With the post-crises decline in FDI and exports, domestic demand for services and construction plummeted. To boost markets and reflate their economies, some governments (especially Malaysia) have encouraged continued lending for asset purchases, both in the stock and property markets.

THE NEED FOR TECHNOLOGICAL UPGRADING FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Industrial policy in the Republic of Korea and elsewhere in Northeast Asia ensured the strong institutional support that drove technical change. The Republic of Korea, as well as Japan and Taiwan, have successfully developed the necessary institutions to not only speed up the absorption and development of technologies, but also to strengthen their technological capacities and capabilities more generally.

This institutional building has generally failed to materialise in most of Southeast Asia. Singapore has been the exception, successfully developing and maintaining institutions necessary to sustain its leading role as the regional hub for medium to high technology-intensive production and services. Slow technological deepening in the real sector in the Southeast Asia has limited the region's growth potential. Institutional deficiencies are evident in the lack of support for technological deepening, human resources development, technology diffusion mechanisms, as well as disciplinary mechanisms (Jomo and Felker 1999; Rasiah 2001).

Ambitious and expensive technological-deepening institutions and mechanisms were, in fact, introduced in both Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1990s, without much concern for ensuring international competitiveness in the medium term. Serious flaws restricted their impact. Rising production costs and tough external competition forced Malaysia to review its export strategies and domestic capabilities. Growth in foreign-dominated export-processing activities largely involved the expansion of relatively low value-added production. With labour reserves exhausted, the premium for skilled workers has gone up in Malaysia and Thailand. Cheap labour imports from neighbouring countries, on the other hand, have held down unskilled workers' wages and removed the motivation for labour-intensive firms to upgrade their process technologies (Edwards in Jomo and Felker 1999).

Achieving higher productivity inevitably requires complementary developments in human resource capabilities. Given the problems of getting firms to invest in training workers, there is a strong need to stimulate state-business collaboration in creating institutions that would enhance human resources for technological upgrading. In Northeast Asia, the numbers of engineers and research and development (R&D) scientists and technicians rose quickly due to attractive incentives offered by the government. Southeast Asia outside of Singapore has lacked comparable support. While official measures of technology transfers have undoubtedly increased in Southeast Asia region, institution building to facilitate local technology absorption and development has been weak (Jomo and Felker 1999).

The region likewise does not have effective mechanisms to profit from technology transfers. In Northeast Asia, governments established institutions to assist local licensees in their bargaining with foreign licensers and to speed up absorption and development of desired technological capabilities (Amsden 1989; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990). Performance standards were implemented to ensure minimal waste of resources. High-performing Asian economies (HPAEs) drew heavily on foreign technology while limiting foreign ownership of industry in order to promote domestic industrial capital.

Both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan initially invited foreign investments in order to establish new export-oriented industries such as electronics, but

they restricted FDI over time while accessing foreign technology through licensing. Southeast Asia's export-led boom before the crisis, on the other hand, was driven mainly by massive foreign investments. This passive reliance on foreign capital and technology inflows generated little more than direct employment. Furthermore, limited domestic capabilities meant that resource outflows in the form of payments for imports and profit repatriation reduced the potential benefits of industrialisation. Transnational corporations were reluctant to source more inputs locally, but local firms also did not adequately develop productive capabilities to increase their participation in foreign firms' value-added chains. Industrial policies failed to cultivate and strengthen the capacity of local firms to take advantage of domestic content stipulations.

To varying degrees, the other Southeast Asian economies have sought to emulate Singapore. Singapore initiated its 'second industrial revolution' after achieving full employment in the late 1970s and, beginning in 1986, sought to establish itself as the best location for the regional headquarters of transnational corporations. Unlike the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Singapore adopted an FDI-led path to export-oriented industrialisation in the late 1960, partly for political reasons (Rodan 1989). Yet, despite its desire for foreign investment, Singapore was not opposed to government intervention. The Singaporean state shaped the investment environment by providing a range of facilities, infrastructure, subsidies, and complementary public investments (Chng et al. 1997; Low 2001). Singapore's experience clearly demonstrated that the scope for proactive investment policy in a liberal ownership regime was much greater than commonly presumed.

Consequently, greater attention was given to the dynamic effects of new investment projects, even extending to matters such as market access, technology transfer and human resource development. Such considerations for evaluating investment performance became far more important during the decade-long boom prior to the 1997/98 crises. While capital formation, employment generation and foreign exchange earnings were not irrelevant, governments did become more selective in their investment promotion efforts, largely with a view to maximizing value added and positive externalities over time.

The new emphasis on investment externalities shifted the objective of investment promotion policies from particular industries to industrial clusters of complementary assembly, component production and producer-service activities. Emphasis shifted from maximizing new green-field FDI in export-oriented industries to encouraging reinvestment by established producers in deepening their local operations, upgrading skills, forming domestic economy linkages, and gaining a larger share of their parent companies' global operations.

INVESTMENT REGIME IN AN INTEGRATED GLOBAL ECONOMY

Investment policy regimes are usually seen as lying somewhere along a continuum defined by restrictive policies on one end, to liberal and incentive-neutral policies on the other, with the analytical focus on regulations that shape entry barriers. From this perspective, the main trend since the mid-1980s has been the relaxation of restrictive regulations on foreign ownership. So-called trade-related investment measures such as local content, foreign exchange balancing and technology transfer requirements have been relaxed.

However, three issues have compromised this trend towards open investment regimes. First, liberalisation has occurred unevenly across sectors and countries. Although general investment barriers have been relaxed, the remaining restrictions have become more significant, sending clear signals about policy priorities and concerns. After Singapore, Malaysia had the most open investment regime, allowing wholly foreign-owned firms to operate in the export-oriented manufacturing sector with minimal restrictions. Following the crises, Thailand and Indonesia have opened up their financial and other services sector to foreign mergers and acquisitions, while Malaysia has been more cautious in this regard.

Second, exemptions from (national) equity ownership requirements have been tied to exports and other more specific policy goals. For example, unlimited foreign ownership was allowed in export-oriented industries, but not for import-substituting production. Integration into the global economy in the 1980s and 1990s did not spur incentive neutrality and market-determined specialisation. Instead, government policies responded to the fresh opportunities offered by transnational firms' new strategies vis-à-vis the globalisation of industrial production.

Third, governments in the region have used investment subsidies such as tax holidays, exemptions and deductions, rather than entry restrictions to promote particular industries or to impose specific performance requirements (Felker and Jomo 1999). While such subsidies have been conventionally viewed as due to (socially inefficient) competition among prospective host governments, they have enabled host economies to promote certain industries to some advantage when investment externalities exceed subsidy costs, for example owing to scale or agglomeration economies.

It has also been argued that investment incentives compensate transnational corporations for their search costs and the extra risks involved in transferring advanced production facilities to new locations (UNCTAD 1998:97-106). Generally, governments in the region have used investment incentives to signal their commitment to attracting and retaining investors. Unlike investment restrictions and direct export subsidies, many investment subsidies are not proscribed by existing World Trade Organisation (WTO) provisions.

Current reform programmes prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exclude a priori the possibility that government investment policies encourage technology transfer, linkage formation, skill development and other externalities. In the wake of the East Asian crisis, the IMF has urged or even required countries to dismantle or reduce such subsidies. However, an important requirement for sustainable recovery is stronger expertise and more flexibility in public agencies overseeing industrial development. As they lose some policy instruments for promoting and shaping industrialisation, Southeast Asian governments will need to retain and hone the remaining instruments in order to cope with new challenges.

As investment policy goals have shifted, policy instruments have changed accordingly. Negative restrictions, such as foreign ownership limits and local content requirements, have been or are currently being phased out in most sectors, although significant exceptions remain. Tax holidays have also become less important insofar as most governments offer them to varying degrees. Instead, some governments have begun providing infrastructure and services designed to enhance their investment environments, attract desired investments, and induce positive externalities. These services include:

1) One-stop facilitation of administrative approvals.
2) Provision of specialised physical, customs-related, and technical infrastructure.
3) Support for labour procurement and skills development.
4) Matching of investors with local suppliers.
5) Other services relating to investors' routine operations, such as immigration, customs and other tax services, as well as trouble-shooting administrative problems with other government bureaucracies.

The implementation of these new investment policies has involved daunting political and administrative challenges, requiring government investment agencies to develop greater expertise and flexibility rather than take on a sector-neutral and passive policy stance. Reshaping national investment environments in line with new investor demands requires understanding the great variation within particular industries, the logistical needs and strategic concerns of transnational businesses, and the rapidly changing international investment environment. Changing the main task of investment policy from regulation to promotion, and now the provision of services, requires changing often deeply entrenched institutions and organisational cultures within the relevant bureaucracies. Hence, new investment policies have often involved creating new specialised agencies, authorities and administrative zones.

This situation poses difficult challenges for countries with weak skill endowments, particularly related to engineering. Foreign investment is expected to catalyze industrial development, but these countries have limited complementary capabilities to offer. They have few technologically advanced producers able to integrate easily into the international supply chains of transnational corporations. Furthermore, the efforts of transnational corporations to develop internationally integrated production specialisation may constrain host-country efforts to promote domestic linkages and spillovers.

Although some transnational corporations have begun to devolve functions like procurement, marketing, design, and even R&D to their Southeast Asian operations, certain functions remain centralised in regional headquarters in Singapore or Hong Kong.

Most subsidiaries in other Southeast Asian countries lack the authority to make important decisions. As a consequence, they may not even have the independence to develop new supply sources for anything other than the simplest components.

These challenges point to the potential scope for policy initiative by governments and private entrepreneurs in enhancing the gains from FDI under a liberal investment regime. However, government efforts to foster linkages, skills formation, and technology spillovers have so far met with considerable difficulties. Clearly, FDI alone cannot ensure the development of capabilities, as is often presumed. Instead, dynamic externalities from foreign investments are more likely to occur in host environments that already posses the appropriate skills, infrastructure, and supplier and technical capacities. In less conducive environments, export-manufacturing FDI may not generate the desired consequences, and those countries remain primarily low-skill, import-dependent enclaves, as in Mexico.

A country's comparative advantage as a location for production linked to transnational corporations increasingly depends on factors that affect those corporations' costs and competitive advantages. Besides political stability and investment security, transnational corporations are increasingly concerned about the quality of physical infrastructure and administrative systems, skill endowments, and proximity to quality suppliers. Host governments require considerable public expertise, institutional flexibility, and judicious investments in skill and technical capacities to ensure a mutually advantageous investment environment. Authorities will undoubtedly continue to seek new ways of encouraging industrial and technological progress. Overcapacity in several manufacturing sectors and slow recovery in Japan probably mean that the new manufacturing FDI will not quickly resume the dizzying rates seen in the decade preceding the crisis.

But a more worrying development is the shift in FDI flows towards mergers and acquisitions and away from new green-field investments or even reinvestments of profits. Such trends have important implications for the development of industrial and technological capabilities. While facilitating investments has become central to recovery efforts throughout the region, the new situation also poses significant downside risks. For example, opportunities for more value-added activities, such as design and R&D, may be constrained by the new strategies and internal organisation of transnational corporations.

For other reasons, too, it is unlikely that nuanced proactive investment policies will continue to shape new investment trends. The region's opening to export-oriented FDI in the past did not result in the same sort of industrial linkages and technology development found in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, because of poorer policy, weaker institutional support and fewer capabilities. Whatever the potential advantages of mergers and acquisitions, it is unlikely that these will be fully realised without appropriate institutional support, skills, policy incentives, and the ability to extract and capture rents. The building of new investment-management capabilities continues to face formidable difficulties. Assisting governments to regulate foreign investment is low on the agenda of the powerful international financial institutions as well as most domestic reformers.

In Indonesia, the desire to restore investor confidence is likely to constrain government policy activism for some time. Although there are some signs of emerging public-private coordination in fostering skills and technology development in Thailand, some of the indigenous industrial capacities built up in recent years have been lost with the closing of many firms.

Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir's rejection of orthodox prescriptions for economic restructuring in Malaysia has mainly protected financial and other non-manufacturing interests. Although the government retains important policy instruments, efforts to revive growth in the short term have forced Malaysia to liberalise its de facto investment policy regime. Prospects for rebuilding investment-management capacities have also been clouded by current multilateral efforts to proscribe discretionary government interventions and regulations affecting investment flows. Establishing a multilateral investment regime even more restrictive of national government initiative may reduce the potential for abuses of investment policy. The main effect will be the loss of an important tool for fostering long-term industrial development.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Some popular accounts of the East Asian miracle economies portrayed them as geese flying in the

slipstream of the lead goose, Japan. Many implied that they were mere Japanese clones or 'wannabes'. Even serious scholars of the region had written of a yen bloc, for instance, despite the fact that most Japanese corporations used the US dollar to denominate their internal transactions, and most monetary authorities in the region, including Japan, never sought the internationalisation of their currencies. In short, the picture of East Asian homogeneity has been grossly exaggerated.

Although there was no one development model for the eight HPAEs, all experienced rapid growth due to high savings and investment rates, as well as efficient labour utilisation and human resource development. Exports were important in all these countries, although most were far from being open economies. It is now generally agreed that international financial liberalisation was the principal cause of the 1997 Asian crisis, though those in favour of such liberalisation would argue that the problems involved improper sequencing and/or inadequate prudential supervision rather than liberalisation per se. Such international financial liberalisation generally began in the region from around the mid-1980s, and certainly cannot be considered part and parcel of the development strategies responsible for the rapid growth, industrialisation and structural changes before that time.

Returning to the various institutional features that made possible the East Asian miracle is, for several reasons, no longer an option. The international economic environment has changed quite radically in the past fifteen years. International economic governance was profoundly altered with the IMF's stabilisation programmes and the World Bank's structural adjustment packages in the wake of the debt crises of the 1980s. New conditionalities have been imposed in the region by the Bretton Woods institutions, together with the emergency credit facilities provided to Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and Thailand during the 1997/98 crises.

It is increasingly recognised that economic liberalisation and such conditionalities have had adverse consequences for growth, let alone distribution. International economic liberalisation has been further advanced by other institutions and processes, most notably the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations with the advent of WTO in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the needs and requirements of the HPAEs have changed over time; given their variety, there is no single universal set of institutional reforms commonly applicable to all these economies.

However, bank-based financial systems are still more likely to serve the developmental finance requirements of these economies. The scope for directed credit (praised in World Bank, 1993) and financial restraint has been considerably reduced by internal as well as international financial liberalisation. Instead, with the Financial Services Agreement under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the imminent broadening of the IMF's mandate to also cover the capital account, there is likely to be greater pressure to promote and open up capital markets in the region.

As with finance, there is little conclusive evidence of the superiority of Anglo-American corporate governance. Nevertheless, the Fund and the World Bank continue to press for corporate governance reforms and corresponding conditionalities imposed during the East Asian crises, insisting that such changes are necessary for economic recovery. However, the relatively stronger economic recoveries in Malaysia and the Republic of Korea have had little to do with such reforms and were primarily due to successful, Keynesian-style, counter-cyclical reflationary policies. East Asian business relations – once celebrated as synergistic social capital – has since come to be denounced as 'crony capitalism', and ostensibly responsible for the crisis. The family firm, a feature of early capitalist development in much of the world, has also been targeted for reform as if it were responsible for the abuses associated with parasitic 'cronyism'.

Economic liberalisation more generally has greatly reduced the scope for industrial policy or selective government interventions. Yet, the World Bank's advocacy of poverty targeting – for example, in connection with its social safety net programmes – has underscored the legitimacy of such selectivity, besides implicitly acknowledging government capacity to do so reasonably well.

Despite the recent push for trade liberalisation as well as abandonment of several General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) arrangements that acknowledged and sought to compensate for different national

economic capabilities, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) annual Trade and Development Reports have continued to affirm the remaining scope for trade-related industrial policy. Similarly, the work of Stiglitz and others have reiterated not only the need but also the potential for finance-related industrial policy.

This paper has considered some recent developments in Southeast Asian investment regimes in line with industrial policy that is contrary to the advice of the major international financial institutions. The scope for corresponding technology policy has also been identified despite the strengthening of corporate intellectual property rights. Human resource development is probably the area for industrial policy initiatives least fettered by recent liberalisation trends, despite the World Bank's advocacy of non-subsidisation of post-primary education and recent trends in education and health care privatisation. Ensuring a return to the high productive investment rates of the past is helped by the continued high domestic savings rates in the region in spite of the devastating social impact of the 1997/98 crises.

It is now generally acknowledged that much of the additional funding made available by foreign bank borrowings as well as portfolio investment inflows into the region helped fuel asset price bubbles, which later burst with catastrophic consequences. Yet, financial liberalisation in the region has been furthered – rather than checked – in the aftermath of the crises, mainly due to the conditionalities imposed by the Fund as well as the need for foreign funds infusion to help economic recovery.

In the unlikely event that the Europeans and the Japanese do not resist the continued promotion of the Anglo-American capitalist norms for the rest of the world, it is quite likely that we will witness a greater degree of conformity and uniformity in the formal rules and institutions of the economy. But such conformity may remain superficial, rather than become substantial. More likely, the Anglo-American norms may take root unevenly in different situations depending on changing historical, economic, political, cultural, social and other environmental factors. In the same way that Islam once spread rapidly across North Africa, providing a common legal and cultural basis for long-distance trade, the English language and Anglo-American norms may well become universal in the forthcoming era. But just as the acceptance of Islam has resulted in a great variety of Muslim cultural expression and behavioural norms, a twenty-first century Anglo-American global capitalism may still be quite diverse.

Neo-liberal globalisation of Anglo-American capitalism seems likely to continue in the near future. These trends will probably be led by the two Bretton Woods institutions plus the WTO. Nevertheless, there continues to be some diversity of opinion within as well as among these institutions, which is likely to be reflected in policy prescriptions. The WTO's formal democracy provides some basis for reformist initiatives, while the Fund and the World Bank will continue to be under pressure to become more accountable, if not democratic.

As noted earlier, the aftermath of the debt crises of the early and mid-1980s saw stabilisation programmes and structural adjustment packages begin this process of liberalisation and globalisation. This was especially true of the most heavily indebted economies, which had to approach the Bretton Woods institutions for emergency credit facilities, and were therefore obliged to accept the accompanying conditionalities. The currency and financial crises of the 1990s have seen similar outcomes, with East Asian governments obliged to accept, implement and enforce conditionalities imposed by the Fund, the United States Treasury, as well as other foreign government agencies.

But the circumstances underlying the extension of the neo-liberal globalisation agenda underscore the constraints that also subject governments. Not only is there growing resentment over such impositions within the countries concerned, but there is also growing international understanding and wariness of the underlying interests and agendas involved. In other words, every success also hardens resistance. This alone will ensure that the future of liberalisation is far from assured and unlikely to be either smooth or even. In the improbable scenario that all developing countries are compelled to subject themselves to such conditionalities, the outcomes are unlikely to be the same. Initial conditions can account for many variations, as we have seen from our very limited sample of four East Asian economies. Different economies have developed various levels of capacities and capabilities, and may therefore be affected rather differently by liberalisation

and globalisation.

Sequencing will also give rise to differences. There are at least several different sequencing issues; that of different aspects of domestic and external liberalisation may involve many different permutations. Policy makers for those economies that liberalise later are also in a position to learn from the experiences of those before them, and thus to anticipate and prepare themselves better.

The mixed consequences and experiences of liberalisation and globalisation thus far have also greatly undermined the previously smug self-confidence of what has been termed the Washington Consensus. With the benefit of hindsight, Stiglitz's (1998) predictions of a post-Washington Consensus may well have been premature. The circumstances of his departure from the World Bank and the more recent controversy over the contents of the World Development Report for the year 2000 on poverty are important reminders of the continued hegemony of the Washington Consensus, albeit slightly chastened.

Hence, it is not a self-confident, unchallenged and unproblematic consensus, but rather one that is increasingly vulnerable, not least because of developments in East Asia. The earlier appreciation of the East Asian miracle posed an important challenge to the economic neo-liberalism underlying the stabilisation programmes and structural adjustment packages of the 1980s and 1990s. While the East Asian debacle of 1997/98 has been invoked to negate much of that earlier analytical challenge, it has also raised troubling questions about financial liberalisation. While much of the earlier criticisms of liberalisation and economic globalisation came from outside the mainstream of contemporary economic thinking, recent debate and dissent over financial and capital account liberalisation, as well as the role of the Bretton Woods institutions, has involved orthodox economists, including many who have been strong advocates of liberalisation with regard to international trade, investment and other economic areas.

While there is unlikely to be any imminent radical change in the international financial architecture, as the threat posed by and the memory of the East Asian financial crises recede, it is unlikely that there will be a return to the smug and simple-minded advocacy of economic liberalisation on all fronts, as in the recent past. Much more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of economic liberalisation and its consequences may therefore have a greater intellectual and policy-making impact.

However, while the economic convergence promised by neo-liberal economic globalisation is unlikely – not only because it is mythical, but also because there can never be the truly level playing field promised by liberalisation – one cannot deny that even partial liberalisation has limited the range of options as well as the variety of possible economic arrangements. The changed institutional or systemic ecology permits fewer species to survive.

But variety, albeit increasingly limited, can and will exist. In these circumstances, it is increasingly probable that systemic differences will be less stark and obvious. But this will perhaps compel closer attention to the remaining variety as well as the remaining scope for diversity, which should in turn lead to more careful attention to detail and to greater appreciation of the sources of efficacy of policy instruments. Hence, it seems likely that there will be less interest in alternative economic models or systems, but more consideration of the microeconomic bases for the viability of particular policies and institutions. This could, in turn, lead to a much more eclectic mixture of policies and institutions, and hence, to a greater variety of systems or models.

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THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGION IN THE AGE OF THE GLOBALISATION: LESSONS FROM INDONESIA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND JAPAN

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INTRODUCTION

Globalisation is not a recent phenomenon. The current situation, however, is unique mainly because of its intensity and its pervasive influence: it goes beyond the borders of nations and into every aspect of modern life. This is primarily due to advances in technology and the virtual downfall of communism.

Globalisation is a powerful force that has affected the world in profound and wide-ranging ways. It does not only have a deep impact on the economy, but also on various aspects of life and society, including religion. There is, for example, the globalisation of humanist values, i.e. human rights, equality, democracy and feminism, which have enriched religion and civil society. The global network of telecommunications and transportation enables many religions to spread around the world, making their visions and core values easily accessible. Globalisation also enables religious groups and civil societies around the world to connect and cooperate as a global force in challenging greedy corporate capitalism. At the same time, globalisation has made many religions more materialistic and some religions become obsolete.

This paper explores the interface between religion and globalisation in three Asian countries – Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan. It will identify the impact of globalisation on religion and religious responses to globalisation. This will enable us to have a deeper understanding of the potential of religion and how to make it more relevant to the world in the age of globalisation.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Research was done in Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan, from 15 January to 30 June 2002. These countries were chosen because of their different cultural backgrounds representing the influences of different religions, i.e. Islam, Christianity and Buddhism.

Indonesia

Islam has played an important role in the political and social life of Indonesia. Rather than be confined to the private realm like many religions, Islam's influence in Indonesia is manifested in various dimensions of public affairs. This can be seen, for instance, in the fact that the largest mass-based nationwide organisations in Indonesia are all Islamic.

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are the largest mass-based organisations in the country that identify themselves with Islam. Both claim to have dozens of millions of supporters. They not only promote Islamic beliefs, but are also actively involved in social welfare, education, health care, business and politics.
In studying the relationship of Islam and globalisation, I wanted to find out what NU and Muhammadiyah's response is to this phenomenon, starting with the issue of modernity.

For many outsiders, Islam seems to be against or is incompatible with modernity and its core values, i.e. democracy, human rights, feminism, liberalism, pluralism and capitalism. Contrary to general belief, I found that Islam in Indonesia absorbs or is influenced by modernity. A good example is NU.

NU is usually regarded as a 'traditionalist' Islamic organisation. It was established in 1926 with the aim of defending 'traditionalism' and orthodox Islam from the attack of the growing modernist movement. The traditional Islam that NU defends is one that gives authority and leadership to traditional scholars or *kiai*. *Kiai* are in a privileged position as they are the only ones capable of interpreting Islamic law. In preserving

orthodoxy, NU has established religious boarding schools or *pesantren* where future *kiai* study under senior religious scholars and spiritual leaders. The traditional curriculum, strict discipline and traditional lifestyle in almost two hundred thousand *pesantren* all over the country are other reasons for NU's reputation as a traditionalist Islamic organisation.

Despite its mission as the defender of tradition against modernity, NU has embraced or absorbed many modern values. It has, for instance, a tolerant or liberal attitude towards other spiritual traditions, including indigenous ones. NU, and its former leader, ex-president Abdurrahman Wahid, are strong advocates of pluralism in Indonesia where Muslims and non-Muslims co-exist peacefully. NU also adjusts itself to political, economic and social changes in the country. Apart from supporting democracy since the Suharto era, NU has adapted itself in accordance with economic development. One of its initiatives during the past ten years is creating small-scale projects in the fields of banking, agro-industry, and co-operatives to ensure that its membership benefits from the country's rapid economic growth. In the field of education, NU has reformed *pesantren* by adding secular subjects to the traditional religious curriculum.

Interestingly, anti-modern Islamic groups, instead of growing from a traditionalist background like NU's, comprise those who graduated from modern universities or have backgrounds in modern education. Those interviewed said that many fundamentalists or extreme Muslims graduated from secular universities such as Universitas Gadjah Mada or Institut Teknologi Bandung. An NU member in Yogyakarta said that it is very rare for students from *pesantren* or Islamic universities (IAIN) to join fundamentalist groups. According to them, those who have a comprehensive and proper understanding of Islam would not turn to fundamentalism. Only those who have a partial knowledge of Islam would be drawn to fundamentalism. That is why fundamentalism appeals to the graduates from secular faculties in secular institutes.

This explanation can be applied to members of Muhammadiyah, which is the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah has a reputation as a 'modern' Islamic organisation. Being modernist, Muhammadiyah was against traditionalists from the beginning of its establishment in 1912. It was because of attacks from modernist organisations like Muhammadiyah that NU was established to defend traditionalism.

Muhammadiyah uses modern education as its base. While NU is famous for its *pesantren*, Muhammadiyah has been recognised for its efforts in modern high schools, colleges and universities. According to NU members, Muhammadiyah is less tolerant towards other spiritual traditions. Local tradition is rejected in Muhammadiyah's attempt to establish 'pure' Islam in Indonesia. Any practice which mixes local tradition with Islam, though acceptable to NU, is criticised and disregarded by Muhammadiyah. With this narrow-minded perspective and the partial knowledge of Islam derived from modern institutes, Muhammadiyah members are easily drawn to fundamentalism.

In short, Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism in Indonesia are the products of modernity. Modern education has contributed a lot to the growth of these factions of Islam. An Islamic scholar from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences said that secular universities were the centres of Muslim radicals. The campaign for the Muslim women's veil in Indonesia started twenty years ago in these universities. Until then, women donned the veils or scarves only when they went to *pesantren* or religious schools. After the campaign, initiated by radical students in secular universities, women started to wear the veil when in public, including when they shopped or watched movies. This radical movement also successfully demanded that university administrators provide places of worship on campuses. It was not long before this movement spread beyond the campuses. Places of worship can now be found in virtually every public place and office.

The rise of Islam in Indonesia indicates that modernity and Islam can co-exist. The rise of modernity does not always mean the decline of religion as anticipated by secularisation theory. Contrary to general belief, modernity can contribute to the growth of religion or religious movements. NU is an example of traditional religious organisations that have expanded their activities and increased their influence by employing modern strategies and operations.

Based on the attitude of NU towards modernity, it is logical to say that traditional Islamic organisations are not against globalisation. With its policy to support economic development of the country in connection

with the global market economy, NU has embraced economic globalisation as part of reality. As for Muhammadiyah, its response to economic globalisation seems to be the same as NU. Both traditional and modernist Islam organisations, however, are not happy with cultural globalisation, which is identified with Westernisation and consumerism. This sentiment is also shared by fundamentalist groups like Laskar Jihad. Globalisation, however, has positive cultural effects in making the Islamic world a tighter-knit community and in having more confidence in itself. Wearing the veil or Islamic dress is no longer regarded as inferior to wearing western dress.

Regarding Islamic dress and its relationship to globalisation, a point needs to be mentioned here. The veil is now popular and is even sought after by highly educated women and those in high society circles. In Indonesia, expensive veils designed by prominent artists, influenced by fashion designers in New York or Paris, can be found in luxurious department stores and have become the symbol of high social status. Expensive veils and Islamic dress have been transformed into commodities for consumption by the middle class, in a similar fashion to brand names. This is undoubtedly the effect of consumerism which is conveyed through globalisation. The role of consumerism in defining and transforming religions will be further discussed later.

The Philippines

I arrived in Manila in early February, just a few weeks before the sixteenth anniversary of People Power I. This bloodless 'revolution' that overthrew one of the strongest dictatorial regimes in Asia became possible not only because of the people's power but also because of the crucial influence of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, which has played an important role in many political crises that often ended in 'peace'.

The impressive role of the Catholic Church in People Power I has inspired many people, especially intellectuals and political activists, to abandon Marxism or the leftist movement and embrace Christianity instead. Various groups inspired by Christianity were formed to do social work among the poor in cities and rural areas. Faith and prayer are regarded as an integral part of the struggle for justice and welfare of the people.

During the time of preparations for the People Power I celebration on many university campuses, I witnessed one of the largest religious gatherings in Manila. Every Saturday night, hundreds of thousands of people from various parts of the country come to meet and listen to the sermon of a man named Mike Velarde. These people are just a small fraction of a large religious movement, the El Shaddai, that claims a constituency of eight to ten million members worldwide. This huge gathering is not interested at all in People Power. They come to pray and receive blessings from Brother Mike. Besides listening to the preaching of Brother Mike, many followers are invited to share their stories about the power of God that works in their lives through spiritual, emotional and physical healing. Members of the El Shaddai believe that any miracle is possible through the power of the Holy Spirit which is within every believer of Jesus Christ.

The gathering, which lasts five to six hours, ends with the practice of tithing, which is a major attraction in the movement. It is believed to be a tool of 'economic empowerment' that will bring fortune and material prosperity to the believers. This practice is encouraged by Brother Mike who always mentions in his sermons how his financial problems were solved when he began to tithe.

Though the El Shaddai regards itself as part of the Catholic Church, it has its own structure and set of practices separate from the Church. It has parish-based local chapters, as well as non-parish-based communities or prayer groups numbering more than a thousand. Its followers celebrate a weekly mass, hold healing rallies, and conduct prayer meetings. The fact that this movement can draw millions of people from the ordinary parish church indicates that the former is more attractive and appealing to the people.

In other words, the established church fails to meet their needs. A Catholic scholar said that the church has lost touch with the people: its conventional-style sermons are very formal, it is rigid in its dogma, and it focuses only on the spiritual dimension while ignoring the physical and material needs of the people. This sermon style does not appeal much to the poor. But in El Shaddai gatherings, members are entertained by music and show business-oriented sermons which place an emphasis on the financial problems of the members. This explains the popularity of the El Shaddai among the poor and lower middle class.

The El Shaddai is just one of many new religious movements that have grown parallel to the established Catholic Church. Despite the Church's unique position in public affairs, its position as the sole authority on the religious and spiritual life of the Filipino is on the decline. Many people turn to other religious movements, many of which are charismatic ones, not only for hope and relief from hardship in life as do members of the El Shaddai, but also for an alternative source of meaning in life or guidelines for living in the changing world.

Filipino society is now undergoing dramatic change: the rapid economic change through market-driven economic development not only creates a wider gap between the rich and poor, and thus supplies a lot of members to movements like the El Shaddai, but also escalates the process of social stratification and the increase in diversity. Globalisation has played an important role in creating fertile conditions for such economic, social and cultural change. It is difficult for any established church to maintain its sole authority on religious matters in an increasingly diversified society, which is the case in the Philippines given the emergence of new religious movements.

The pervasive consumerism which is part of cultural globalisation has an effect on religion. Under the influence of consumerism, material prosperity and quick fortune become the goals of life. With this attitude, people expect religion to make them rich and prosperous. Religious groups that promise quick prosperity attract huge numbers and tend to grow quickly. This is one of the main reasons why groups preaching 'prosperity theology' like El Shaddai, can draw millions of followers in less than ten years. It is safe to say that prosperity theology is now a global phenomenon.

Japan

Japan is a country where established spiritual tradition has lost its vitality. The main function of Buddhist priests of virtually all sects is to perform funeral ceremonies and provide death anniversary services. Their responsibility has more to do with the dead and the next world than the living and this world. Apart from ritualistic services, no social role is expected from priests. Buddhism is therefore reduced to a funeral religion.

Japan has proved that Buddhism can survive in a highly developed country. The case of Japan shows us that even in a prosperous and technologically advanced society people still need religion, however ritualistic or otherworldly it is. In fact, Buddhism works well with Japanese society: Buddhist funerals have become big business involving huge amounts of money on which several business sectors depend. Funerals themselves have become a business in which priests sell religious services. Even posthumous Buddhist names for the dead are rated and ranked according to the amount of money offered by the relatives. In other words, funerals in Buddhism are well-twinned with a capitalist economy. Secularised traditional Japanese Buddhism and its decline in public influence seem to confirm secularisation theory.

That is only half the picture, however. The other half is the rise and diffusion of a new kind of Buddhism which is a part of new religious movements in Japan. The religious passion of the Japanese has not died yet; it just flows through new outlets. Since World War II, new religions "sprouted one after another, like bamboo shoots after rain," as Kazahara (2001) observed. Many new Buddhist movements have developed into mass-based organisations, among which are Soka Gakkai and Rissho Koseikai. Both organisations not only try to integrate Buddhism into the daily life of their members, but also participate in public affairs. Both are engaged in peace and humanitarian activities, domestically and internationally. Soka Gakkai extends its agenda into politics through its unofficial arm, the Komeito party.

These new religious organisations gained a lot of followers during the rapid process of modernisation in Japan, after World War II, which has seen the decline of the agricultural sector and more migration to cities. It was not long before these people experienced alienation and economic hardships in modern urban culture. They longed for traditional values and communal relationships which were eroded in the big cities. It was new religious organisations that met these needs: Soka Gakkai grew very quickly from a tiny band of followers in 1951 to eight million members in 1980.

According to Prof. Hashizume, a prominent sociologist at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, Soka Gakkai's members are mostly people from the lower middle class who migrated from rural areas to cities and were beset with economic problems as well as a sense of alienation. Soka Gakkai not only provides them a place for relationships where they can feel the sense of community, but also gives them hope to relieve their

economic burden. Soka Gakkai is an example of new Buddhist organisations that are concerned about this life and worldly achievements rather than on ancestor worship and the next life. Such worldly orientation is undoubtedly one of the influences of modernity in religion.

Soka Gakkai is also an example of how globalisation can affect religion. Despite the fact that the vast majority of its members are Japanese, the group regards itself as an international movement. Internationalism is stressed by virtually every branch of Soka Gakkai: during the past few decades, it has extended its branches all over the world. In 1992, the group claimed to have about 1.26 million believers in about 120 branches worldwide. The religious beliefs of Soka Gakkai have become increasingly globalised, at least among its members around the world. This is also true of the El Shaddai, which has spread from the Philippines to different parts of the world. Globalisation not only brings the centre to the periphery, but also brings the periphery to the centre. Through this process, many religious organisations in Asia become internationalised within a few decades.

Many religious organisations in Japan, though not internationalised in terms of membership or structure, are internationalists in terms of concern. Many are concerned about the suffering of people in other countries like Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Nepal and those in Africa. Some organised humanitarian projects in these countries and others like them give financial and technical aid through local groups. These organisations are run either by members of religious establishments, like AYUS and Shanti, whose members are mostly priests from Jodoshu and Sotoshu Buddhism, or by new religious movements, like the Niwano Peace Foundation, an official arm of Rissho Koseikai.

A new trend of spirituality or religious passion, however, developed in Japan with new religions and cults experiencing constant growth. The sprouting of new religious groups led to the phenomenon dubbed as 'the rush hour of gods'. But after the Aum Shin Rikyo incident in which the actions of a doomsday cult led to numerous casualties, the Japanese public became suspicious of new religions and cults. People became reluctant to join those groups and as a result, new religious organisations came to a standstill. Religious passion, which previously flowed through these new religious organisations, started to look for new expression. For the youth, spirituality became increasingly personalised or more individualistic. More and more people prefer to have their spiritual passion manifested in personal lifestyle. The collective spiritual quest, as practiced by older generations, is being replaced by individual endeavour.

According to Prof. Nakazawa of Chuo University, the religious passion of the younger Japanese generation is now expressed through Internet communication and through new novels or literature. Recent novels by Yoshimoto Banana and Randy Taguchi, which have an air of mysticism and occultism, are cited as examples of this phenomenon. Their popularity is clue to the fact that they activate spiritual curiosity and meet the spiritual needs of young people, who long for a certain mysticism and for cultural roots that appeal to the heart. But they also want the freedom to explore and pursue the spiritual quest on their own, rather than follow anybody or be restricted by any organisational rule.

Apart from the Aum Shin Rikyo incident, individualism, which is a dominant value in the age of globalisation, is one of the major factors leading to the change of the spiritual quest. New liberalism in the economy, free market ideology, and consumerism are globalised values that worship individualism. Today, in the age of globalisation, it is almost impossible to escape the influence of individualism on various aspects of life, including religion and spirituality. In the last two hundred years, Japan has witnessed a constant shift in religiosity, from Buddhism to new religions and individual spirituality. Globalisation is not the end of the spiritual passion of the Japanese people. The most that globalisation and modernisation can do is to change the expression or form of spiritual passion. The rest is beyond the power of this global process.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

On top of interviews and exposure to events and activities, research was conducted. My research covered religious dynamics around the world in relation to globalisation. This enabled me to put into a global context what I found in Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan. In other words, my research helped me to understand the religious dynamics in these Asian countries as an integral part of a global phenomenon. What follows are my general observations on the dynamics of religion in the age of globalisation.

THE REVIVAL OF RELIGION

Contrary to the prophecy of many academics, religion did not begin to disappear in the twentieth century. Countries around the world have experienced a religious revival in different manifestations. During the past three decades, the number of Christians in Asia and Africa multiplied three times over to 300 and 360 million respectively. In the US, the Christian Right has developed into an influential movement. Islam is another religion that has spread rapidly and extensively in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and former Soviet republics. Buddhism is also gaining popularity in the West and is constantly being revived in Buddhist-dominant countries in Asia.

The following factors contributing to the revival of religion are closely related to modernisation and are reinforced by globalisation:

1. *The disruption of traditional communities.*

Modernisation has contributed to the decline or disintegration of traditional communities, resulting in mass migration to cities. Many who are feeling rootless and alienated from urban culture, and losing all sense of belonging, find comfort in religion. Many religious groups help them to adjust to modernity and give them a sense of belonging. In the Middle East, an Islamic lifestyle helps the people to make the transition from rural to modern urban culture (Armstrong 2000). Meeting the psychological needs of these people is the main reason for the growth of religious movements around the world. One example, besides Soka Gakkai, is the Christian Right movement whose expansion is strong among low-middle class people and service workers who have recently migrated to metropolitan areas (Castells 1997).

2. *Economic marginalisation and political repression.*

Governments' failure to improve the economic situation of their people and the increasing polarisation in the process of modernisation and development have paved the way for religion to play a social role and gain recognition, especially among the poor and the marginalised. For example, in the face of political chaos and crushing poverty, Africans find they can seek material assistance and relief from churches (Woodward 2001). Although many organisations do not provide material assistance, they promise prosperity and hope of economic relief; this is enough to draw a massive number of followers: the Winner's Church in Nigeria for example, is one of Africa's fastest growing churches. Within a dozen years it has opened branches in thirty-two countries on the continent. Similar to El Shaddai, it preaches prosperity to its members who come for salvation from economic hardship (Onishi 2002).

In the Arab world where freedom is restricted and few pathways are allowed for dissent, the mosques have turned into places to discuss politics (Zakaria 2001). Islam has become a powerful ideology in challenging corrupt governments, while Islamic organisations serve as the only outlet for opposition. The more repression issues from the government and foreign forces, the more popular the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas and Hizbullah) becomes. Their popularity however, is earned not only through their active involvement in dissenting politics, but also through their social services, medical assistance and temporary housing provided to the poor.

3. *The offensive thrust of secularism and liberalism.*

Modernisation is always accompanied with the propagation of secularism and liberalism, which goes against some religious values. In the process of modernisation, religion has been gradually marginalised or even repressed.

In an atmosphere where there is widespread practice of sexual permissiveness and the promulgation of pro-abortion acts, US courts have ruled that religion be confined to private life and that prayer be disallowed in public schools. These are some reasons that convince many Christians that their religion is being destroyed. This is also true of Muslims who experienced this secular offensive in countries like Turkey, Egypt and Iran. In Iran, the Shah forbade women to wear the veil. In Egypt, Islam was regarded by Nasser as the cause of the nation's ills and was made subordinate to the secular state. Fearing that Islam was about to be eliminated, many Muslims began to fight for the survival of the faith, thus, precipitating the rise of the Islamic fundamentalist movements. As with the Christians in the US, these fundamentalists felt that "only a dark and turbulent sea of despair stretches endlessly ahead…unless we fight (Armstrong 2000)."

4. *Mental stress and spiritual problems.*

Under the influence of modernity, worldly achievement and material prosperity have become the main aim of life, while inner peace is ignored. However, after attaining worldly achievement, many people do not

feel happiness. Unsatiated desire drives them endlessly to pursue a dream which is never fulfilled. Extreme materialism drives people to stress, anxiety, restlessness and the feeling of emptiness. These people feel the need for inner peace that is never achieved through incessant material acquisition. Religion provides these people the inner peace and the sense of personal fulfilment they need.

Buddhism is popular in the West mainly because of its meditation technique that can relieve stress and restore internal balance. People who feel insecure with the uncontrollable and unpredictable fluctuations in business and in personal life in this globalised world have increasingly resorted to praying to God and Allah.

RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION

Religious revival in this globalised world has three new manifestations:

1. *The rise of religious fundamentalism.*

The existence of religious fundamentalist movements is a modern phenomenon, which has increasingly strengthened in the age of globalisation. Despite the anti-modern attitude of these movements, they are a product of modernity. The influences of modernity can be found, for instance, in fundamentalism's literal reading of scripture, its pragmatic rationalism, its nationalist attitude and its modern strategies and operations. This is not surprising because leaders of fundamentalist movements are mostly products of modern education as can be seen in the case of fundamentalist and radical Islamic groups in Indonesia as previously mentioned.

Although religious fundamentalism originated before the age of globalisation, it has developed into a powerful force today. Its expansion is undoubtedly the consequence of globalisation, which contributes to the growth of fundamentalist movements in three ways:

- The pervasiveness of secularism and liberalism.
  Secularism and liberalism have spread and penetrated every corner of the world through a global network of communications and through global tourism. The most prominent secular value that comes from these global networks is a consumerism that worships sensual gratification at the expense of religious values. The aggressive invasion of consumerist values heightens the fear of religious conservatives that their religion is being destroyed and that the only way to preserve the faith is to unite and fight back.

- The spread of a conspiracy theory.
  A belief that is firmly held by most fundamentalist movements is the theory that a conspiracy of evil forces is planning to destroy their religion. Globalisation does nothing but encourage this belief. Christian fundamentalists in the US, for example, believe that the 'world government' enacted by the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organisation is at work to destroy their country and their religion (Castells 1997). Islamic fundamentalists share this view, believing that the global network led by the US and Israel conspires to destroy the Islamic world.

- The loss of certainty and control over life.
  People feel the loss of certainty and are confused in the face of rapid changes in the globalised world. To regain a sense of certainty, many people turn to religion for a clear explanation of what is going on in the world. Fundamentalism can meet this need very well since it has clear and simple answers to every question people have in mind. Political, social and economic chaos can be explained, for example, by the conspiracy theory, through apocalyptic prophecy, or as god's punishment for a sinful world.

2. *The explosion of new religions.*

Apart from the rise of fundamentalism, the explosion of new religions is another prominent religious phenomenon in this globalised world. While fundamentalism is an attempt to return to the past with its traditional values and regards itself as part of conventional religious institutions, new religions separate themselves from the conventional ones and develop their own identities. Though some of them still identify themselves with established religions (Buddhism, Christianity and Islam), many movements start brand new religions with their own belief systems, symbols, texts and supreme entities.

According to the World Christian Encyclopaedia, there are 9,900 distinct religions in the world today, with two or three new religions being created every day. Some studies estimate that there are more than ten thousand

new religions. In Japan, the estimated number of new religions varies from eight hundred to a few thousand (Wilson 1999). This does not include new groups or denominations. Including these would multiply the numbers three to four times, since in Christianity alone the number of new denominations or churches independent of the main branches is already up to 33,000.

The explosion of new religions reflects the failure of conventional religious institutions in responding to the needs of people. Rapid societal changes escalated by globalisation make it difficult for established institutions to adjust themselves. Most of them still cling to obsolete traditions and world views, while many are plagued with scandals and corruption. This paves the way for new religions or new denominations which make quick adjustments to growth and draw more followers. Key to the success of these new religions and new churches in Africa, for example, is their ability to help people meet all their needs, including that of finding a mate (Lester 2002).

New religions respond not only to spiritual, but also to social and economic or material needs. Although some do not give material assistance, they do give hope to followers that their economic burden will be relieved by an act of god. The El Shaddai and the Winner's Church are clear examples of successful new religious groups in developing countries. In a developed country like the US, one of the fastest-growing churches is the 'megachurch' which provides space for family gatherings and facilities for sport and entertainment. It also arranges meetings for people to help each other, thus creating a sense of community which is lost in modern cities (Trueheart 1996).

3. *The growth of religion for consumerism*.

Amidst the revival of religion around the world is the pervasion of consumerism which, through corporate-driven globalisation, has developed into a global culture in its own right. To many people these phenomena seem contradictory since religion is regarded as a spiritual matter while consumerism is about materialism. This distinction, however, is irrelevant in the age of globalisation since many religions today promote consumerism or transform into consumerism with a religious cloak.

Consumerism is a powerful world-view that has deep effects on the attitude and the way of life of people. Through the consumerist attitude, virtually everything is transformed into a commodity for sale. Health, education, culture, happiness, relationship and identity are all for sale or believed to be accessible in the market. With money, anything can be bought for consumption. Prosperity or material acquisition becomes the goal of life.

This attitude has influenced people's approach to religion. Religion is expected to give blessings for prosperity, rather than provide a refuge for inner peace. Even among those who desire the latter, money is regarded as the means to spiritual fulfilment. Spiritual experience is something that can be realised, not by practice or making an effort, but by buying, through a 'donation'. It is not surprising that a lot of religious groups adjust themselves to this consumerist mentality by becoming a 'consumer religion', or a religion that promises material success by selling religious services. It is no wonder why religions both new and conventional exist and sprout in a highly consumerised country like Japan, where sacred objects are popular and a funeral service can cost a million dollars or more.

Some characteristics of consumer religion are: the focus on materialistic values; the use of money as the main tool, which is instant and convenient; the creation of more need to 'consume' religious services; and an individualistic orientation.

Consumer religion can be found among both conventional religions and new religions. Dhammakaya (Thailand), Foguangshan (Taiwan), El Shaddai, and the Winner's Church are examples of consumer religions that are popular around the world.

IMPLICATIONS

Religion forever

Religion is an undeniable reality in the globalised world: in fact, it is here to stay. We are all religious animals. Deep in our hearts, we all feel the need for religion. Religion, however, has various forms. It may manifest itself in conventional forms or secular ones. Among the latter ones are nationalism and communism, which, although originating as political ideologies, fulfilled and still fulfil the religious role for millions. That is why people are (were) willing to die for it. This is also true of consumerism.

However technologically advanced we are, we cannot escape from our spirituality. The spiritual drive always plays a role in our life, consciously or unconsciously. Although our effort may look secular, it is always driven by spiritual yearnings. Desire for immortality, salvation, self-fulfilment, and being real and grounded, are all spiritual yearnings that are behind our individual and collective struggles.

Even science and technological progress in the West, as David Noble suggests, has its true inspiration in the quest for transcendence and salvation (Noble 1997). David Loy, from a Buddhist perspective, points out that the growth of nation states, corporate capitalism, and mechanistic science was driven by the collective attempt to resolve spiritual lack, which was once taken care of by the pre-Reformation Catholic Church. He concludes, "The history of the West is not a story of gradual secularisation, for we can never escape the burden of our lack and the need to transcend it (Loy 2002)."

To acknowledge and understand our spiritual need is the key to a good life; to ignore or reject it is to let it drive us unconsciously and perversely. Such ignorance also leads us to the worship of quasi-religions which promise secular redemption. Consumerism is now the most powerful quasi-religion, its growth being driven by unacknowledged spiritual hunger. The problem with such a quasi-religion like consumerism is that it can give us temporary comfort, but leaves us in endless hunger. On top of that, the endless craving it stimulates leads to social disintegration and environmental destruction on a global scale.

The need for religious reform

We need a religion that understands our spiritual needs and that can help us fulfil them. Many religious organisations, especially the established ones, have failed to do this. Preserving obsolete traditions and privileges is their top priority. Moreover, they have exploited the spiritual need of followers to their own advantage. Religious reform is therefore badly needed. To be able to quench spiritual hunger, religious organisations themselves have to be inspired and be spiritually enriched. That means they have to be free from materialism and consumerism. This also applies to new religious organisations, many of which have developed into establishments and enjoy privileges as well as material fortunes.

Spiritually enriched religions and religious organisations not only provide inspiring and healthy alternatives to consumer religion but also to consumerism as a religion. Rather than the outcome of a spiritual vacuum, the pervasion of consumerism is the consequence of spiritual hunger. To people who are spiritually fulfilled, consumerism has no appeal at all. A religion that can meet spiritual needs is therefore the powerful force necessary to check the growth of consumerism and limit its destructive effects. For civil society to survive the pervasive invasion of consumerism, it needs to cooperate with spiritually enriched religions and support religious reform. For civil society to avoid being overwhelmed by consumerism, it has to be spiritually informed. To struggle against consumerism without inner peace or spiritual immunity is to risk being consumed by consumerism or getting burnt out.

Catering to material and social needs

Spiritually enriched religions, however, should not confine themselves to spiritual matters. Catering to the material and social needs is a mission that religion cannot ignore, especially in this globalised world. During the past few decades corporate-driven globalisation has contributed significantly to the spread of poverty and polarisation on a global scale. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), from 1970 to 1985, the global GNP increased by 40 per cent, yet the number of poor people increased by 17 per cent. Even in a rich country like the US, poverty has increased and the gap between the rich and the poor has widened. The richest one per cent increased their wealth by 28.3 percent from 1983 to 1992, while the bottom 40 per cent of American families saw their assets decline by 49.7 per cent during the same period (Castells 1998).

The increase in cases of poverty and inequality in almost every country demands the care of religion. It also gives religion a chance to play a positive role in society and consequently, the chance to grow and become more relevant.

Globalisation from the grassroots

Although the growth of consumerism and the spread of poverty are the consequences of globalisation, it does not mean that religion should be against globalisation. Globalisation, though reversible, is a reality that is difficult to avoid. To be against globalisation at all cost may push one to the other extreme, i.e. religious

fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is not a healthy response to globalisation: it grows out of fear and full of a rage that easily leads to violence. Although fighting for the survival of their religion, fundamentalist movements frequently act contrarily to their religious values, i.e. compassion and tolerance. Fundamentalism also creates division in society, through its narrow and rigid distinctions between 'we' and 'others'.

Rather than go against globalisation at all costs, we should redirect it for the benefit of all humanity. Instead of allowing globalisation from CEO boardrooms to exploit the world, a globalisation from the grassroots needs to be developed to stop destruction and to restore balance in nature and harmony in the world.

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HUMAN RESOURCES

TOWARDS THE FORMATION OF A COMMUNITY: THAI MIGRANTS IN JAPAN

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INTRODUCTION

In the public's perception, the issue of transnational migration from Thailand to Japan is often associated with the traffic of Thai women for prostitution and their reportedly sad living conditions in the host country. The sensational characteristics of such stories have attracted much attention in the media so much so that other aspects of this population movement have been obscured. The literature shows, for instance, that Thai men also migrate for employment in Japan and many Thai women work in areas other than the sex industry. These groups of Thai migrants face problems which are different from those of the sex workers, but they are of equal importance and require public interest and policy concern in order to devise measures to alleviate their plight.

This paper discusses the process of migration from Thailand to Japan. Particular attention is paid to the formation of a Thai community in Japan.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

In July and August 2001, interviews were conducted with Thai women in the Aichi, Ibaraki, Kanagawa, Mie, Tochigi and Tokyo Prefectures. Contacts with these Thais were arranged by local informants, e.g. by non governmental organisations (NGOs) and Thai women working voluntarily as counsellors. In the process of sample selection, I tried as much as possible to follow the principle of theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1979:45f). Altogether, twenty women employed in different occupations were interviewed.

The research project is designed as a qualitative study employing biographical and narrative interviews as research techniques. The interviews were conducted in Thai. Following the technique of narrative interviews (Schütze 1977), I asked the women to tell me their life stories from their childhood up to the day of the interview, concentrating on their decision to migrate. The women told their stories without interruption. Notes on the following were recorded: personal and family life, internal migration history, motives for migrating, venue of migration and experiences in Japan. After the narration, if anything was still unclear or had not yet been mentioned, I would then ask questions.

Besides these interviews, data on Thai migrants (both male and female) were collected through observation in Thai food stores, restaurants, the Thai embassy and through expert interviews with NGO staff, the consul of the Thai embassy and Thai counsellors. In addition, findings of other studies (e.g. Ito 2000; Kiatipong 2000; Phannee 2000) were considered in the discussion for the completion of the context.

THE MIGRATION FROM THAILAND TO JAPAN

The number of Thai migrants in Japan

According to Wichit and Pawana (1997:26), the beginning of legal labour migration from Thailand to Japan dates back to 1979. Since then, Japanese multinational corporations have obtained permission from the Thai government to send their Thai employees to undergo training in their mother corporations in Japan. Along with this labour migration, the illegal recruitment of Thai labour, especially women for prostitution, began in 1981. Annual statistics on Thai entry into, and exit from Japan from 1980 to 2000 are presented in Figure 1.

Data indicates that the number of new Thai entrants has increased in a relatively steady manner from 1980 to 1989. In 1991, when the economic boom in Japan reached its peak, the number of Thais entering Japan rose and exceeded 100,000, but thereafter, within five years it sharply declined by nearly half. According

Figure 1: Thai Migrants in Japan



Source: Ministry of Justice, Annual Report of Statistics on Legal Migrants, 1981-2000

Figure 2: Female Thai Migrants in Japan



Source: Ministry of Justice, Annual Report of Statistics on Legal Migrants, 198 1-2000
Note: Figures for 1995 not available.

Figure 3: Male Thai Migrants in Japan



Source: Ministry of Justice, Annual Report of Statistics on Legal Migrants, 198 1-2000
Note: Figures for 1995 not available.

to Chiaki Ito (Ito 2000:15), this decrease stems from changes in Japanese immigration policy during the early 1990s, specifically the strict approval procedure for visa application and tightened control at the entry points. After 1996, the number of Thai immigrants increased slightly but constantly.

In terms of gender distribution, the same dynamic character appears for both sexes (Figures 2 and 3). From 1980 to 1997 the number of entries into and exits from Japan by male Thais were higher than those of females, but from 1998 onwards the numbers were lower. The charts show that the fluctuation of male Thai migrants is higher but that women, though they arrive less frequently (Figures 4 and 5), have a longer duration of stay. Information from NGOs and the Thai embassy hint at an increase in unlawful entries and disguised entries with passports of other nationalities. These entries do not appear in the statistics cited. The number of Thais entering Japan thus must be higher than what official statistics show.

Statistics of Thai nationals exiting Japan reveal that the number of Thai new entrants exceeds those leaving the country. About half the overstayers are women. In 1994, there were 46,973 Thai overstayers in Japan, of whom 25,905 were women (Ito 2000:16). The other entries into and exits from the country of Thai migrants in Japan in Figure 4 show that female migrants slightly exceed males.





A very rough approximation of the number of Thai overstayers is shown in Figure 5. Here, it can be estimated that until the year 2000, about 100,000 Thai overstayers lived in Japan, and about 60% of them were women. To obtain accurate estimates, the number of people who have changed their visa status and who have been deported, both of which can influence the number of exits, need to be taken into account in the calculation. But since data on these numbers is unavailable, a more accurate estimate of the number of Thai overstayers is impossible.

Japanese immigration law requires migrants staying in Japan for over 90 days to register with the local government. This includes immigrants without legal status (only a few do). The majority of registered migrants are those with legal status. In 1999, there was a registered Thai population of 25,253 in Japan, 6,760 of whom were men and 18,493 were women (Statistics on foreigners registered in Japan, 1999). These official figures conceal, however, the number of overstayers and those who did not report to officials. That being the case, it is hard to quote the exact number of Thais in Japan and especially a breakdown by sex. Available figures also reveal that Japan is the preferred destination of male labour migrants from Thailand and about 40% of the Thai population working and living in Japan are men.

Factors associated with migration

From an economic point of view (cf. Ravenstein 1889; Borjas 1989), people emigrate in search of better economic opportunities than those available to them in their country of origin. In the case of Thai migration to Japan, this assumption seems to be confirmed. The findings of this study and of others (Ito 2000; Kiattipong 2000; Phannee 2000; Seksin 1998) reveal that expectations of economic improvement and highly paid jobs are among the important motives of Thais to leave for Japan.

It is not surprising that some migrants, especially females, are seduced by friends, acquaintances or unscrupulous brokers with the promise of a chance to earn a large amount of money in a short time (Pataya 2001:55; Phannee 2000:249). Interestingly, this economic motivation does not imply that migration to Japan is caused by poverty. What migrants feel is missing in Thailand is the opportunity to build a secure economic existence. Moving to Japan is considered a shortcut to earn money easily and quickly in order to establish themselves – to buy a house or land, perhaps, or to start their own businesses using their earnings in Japan.

Though economic motives are crucial, they are not the sole and decisive reason to leave Thailand. Interview data suggests that non-economic factors, particularly family responsibilities, exert a great influence on the decision to emigrate. Accounts by single mothers, i.e. women who are divorced, separated or widowed and the sole breadwinner for their children, point out that the economic security obtained from transnational migration can lead to the economic and social advancement of their children. The unattached women believe that besides providing support to their parents, their sojourn in Japan also offers an avenue to prosperity for their siblings. The remittances from Japan can be used for higher education, which in turn could yield better jobs and income. Many women recruit their brothers, sisters or even daughters to work with them.

Zlotnik (1995:265) points out that among women, migration and marital dissolution are closely linked,

since those who are separated or divorced are more likely to migrate than women in stable unions. This is true of Thai female migrants to Japan, particularly single mothers. For many women, transnational migration also seems to be an escape route from a family crisis.

Phannee (2000:259f) considers changes in Thailand's rural sector a precondition for migration. Moving abroad is understood as an avenue to wealth. Many people belonging to lower classes dream of migration. Under the bright lights hypothesis, the desire for a change in life, particularly from rural to urban areas, can be understood as a motive for migration (May and Skeldon 1977). Migrants are attracted by social opportunities offered in cities (Arnold and Cochrane 1980; Yap 1977).

However, the most decisive factor making migration possible is the embeddedness of social and kinship networks. The transnational migration of Thais to Japan constitutes chain migration. The pioneer migrants function as a social network, maintaining links with the home community, and providing information about living and working conditions and on modalities of entrance into the target country. They organise the trip, help newcomers adjust at the place of destination, and even recruit more persons. With these networks, the migration of Thais becomes self-sustaining. In many cases, such networks function more efficiently than the way brokers organised the migration process earlier. In addition, recruitment by relatives is free of charge, although the migrants have to pay for other costs and the arrangement of documents.

Venues of migration

Japan has no policy of accepting unskilled foreign workers despite the fact that medium and small businesses are faced with labour shortage. There are no official overseas labour contracts between Thailand and Japan. Many Thais enter Japan through venues facilitated by brokers who are part of transnational criminal networks. In general, they gain information on economic opportunities in Japan through network contacts. Brokers then make arrangements for travel and job placement, obtaining the necessary documents including visas, contacting job brokers in Japan and so on.

In other studies (HRW 2000; Phannee 2000), Thai brokers and agents have ties, and even work with underworld gangs such as Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Snake Head and other transnational organised criminal syndicates. This claim is confirmed in the cases of my interviewees where routes of travel were analysed. Many women left Bangkok with their own passports, but received new ones in other countries like Hong Kong, Taiwan or Malaysia. The new passport has a visa for Japan. If no passport can be obtained, other means of unlawful entry are considered. Information from NGOs and the Thai Embassy shows that because of the fewer number of visas granted to Thais and the strict immigration control, new methods and routes have been developed for entry to Japan. For example, some Thais have flown to Korea where no visa is required for Thais; in Korea, human smuggling gangs put migrants on shipping containers bound for Japan.

Another avenue for working in Japan is enrolment in a Japanese language school. According to Komai (1995:54), the category of *shugakusei* is given to people who come to study in a variety of schools other than the institutions of higher education specified in the School Education Law, or vocational and special schools. Most people entering the country with this status become students in a Japanese school and at the same time, are covert working migrants. The *shugakusei* as a convenient vehicle to work in Japan is promoted by brokers and recruiting schools that advertise the slogan 'you can get a part-time job in Japan while you study' (Komai 1995:55). According to interview data, Thai migrants were also attracted by these advertisements in a Thai daily newspaper and by Thai brokers.

Another reason for some Thai women to go to Japan is marriage. These women enter Japan by accompanying their Japanese husbands or fiancés. Most of the women meet their husbands-to-be in Thailand, through a friend's introduction or while working in tourist centres. In this regard they resemble Thai women in Germany (Pataya 2001). Interview data also suggests that expectations of economic betterment are regarded as the motive. In Thailand, these women feel no economic progress. For some women, marrying Japanese men is a means to retire from prostitution without loosing economic security (Pataya 2001).

Life in Japan

In Japan most Thai migrant workers find employment in the service sector – restaurants, snack bars, and for men only, construction sites, manufacturing plants that

require intensive manual work, and food processing factories (see also Ito 2002; Seksin 1998).

But since the beginning of Thai migration to Japan, many Thai women have also gone to Japan as sex workers. The sex workers I interviewed entered Japan from 1984 to 1992, and from 1990 to 1992 – these were the years considered as the golden era for Thai sex workers to earn big money in a short time. Most of the women did not know what kind of work they were going to do until they were taken to snack bars to work as snack hostesses. Data from the Human Rights Watch (2000) reveals that until the 1990s women from Thailand were still deceived in this way to enter Japan. This indicates the continued recruitment of Thai women for sexual services in Japan, the end of which cannot be foreseen in the near future.

After being placed as snack bar hostesses, the women are charged the same amount as the sum paid by the bar owner to the broker. The women have to repay this amount or debt through sex work, often under coercive conditions. The amount of time it takes women to repay their debt varies from one month to nearly one year. Within this time the women are relatively free to choose their clients or which day to work. They can also send remittances to their families in Thailand. After paying their debt, most of the women continue their work in the same snack bar for a while and then move somewhere else.

Those in the category of covert labourers, *shugakusei*, are allowed to work part-time (about five hours daily). However, most of them spend more time working than they are allowed because the income from five hours of work does not adequately cover living expenses and is insufficient to send remittances home. The typical job they undertake at the beginning is washing dishes and assisting in the kitchen of an *Izagaya* (a small restaurant) or Thai restaurants. Later, when their Japanese improves, they become waitresses. At present, *shugakusei* is still a vehicle for Thais and other foreigners to immigrate and work legally in Japan.

Most of the Thai migrant workers complain about bad working conditions. They say their wages do not cover their living expenses and so they are forced to take jobs in different places, or do overtime or work even on holidays. Some face discrimination in their work places. For example, in a restaurant, the Japanese workers are allowed to take a drink free of charge, whereas the foreign workers have to pay for it. Migrant workers understand this as racial discrimination. There are also abuses of human rights and employees' violation of labour laws such as fraud, unreasonable dismissal or even sexual abuse of Thai migrant workers (Ito 2000:49).

The majority of Thai workers do not know Japanese before entering the country. In Japan, they do not go for language classes. Some have no opportunity to learn Japanese. Others have no interest in learning the language, only to earn a lot of money. Thus, for many Thai migrants, language seems to be a problem, leading to a lack of knowledge about rights, laws and procedures that is necessary for living in Japan. Without a proper knowledge of Japanese, Thai migrants have to depend on someone possessing such knowledge if they want to travel, or send money home, or go to see the doctor or contact the authorities. This dependence makes them vulnerable to exploitation and fraud.

Only the *shugakusei*, trainees, and brides enter the country with a valid visa and obtain legal status while living in Japan. Most Thai migrants come to Japan as tourists and overstay, or enter the country through unlawful methods. To these migrants, their status as illegal aliens or undocumented migrants pose additional difficulties. They have to avoid the immigration police for fear of being arrested and deported to Thailand. In turn, employers exploit their illegal status because as undocumented migrants they dare not complain to the authorities. In addition, hardly any Thai migrant worker obtains access to insurance. Since medical treatment in Japan is expensive, without proper compensation it is very hard to live in Japan in case of accident or illness.

The migrants' lives and living conditions are dynamic; they change over time and over circumstances. As time goes by, some sex workers are able to repay their debts and send remittances home. Some women quit their jobs in snack bars, marry Japanese and establish their own businesses. They start vending from a bicycle, then with a van, and later with good fortune, even open a Thai shop or restaurant. In contrast, some women I interviewed entered the country legally, obtained the promised job, but were fired in their early 60s. They became members of the Thai population with no legal status.

In my observations, a similar pattern operates among

male Thai migrants. After adjusting themselves to the new environment, some males earn enough to remit home and to save. They then start their own businesses, mostly targeted at Thai migrants, e.g. mobile Thai shops delivering Thai food and all kinds of stuff for other Thais in remote areas. Such shops also offer services such as money transfer, Thai VDO rental, money lending and job broker services. These Thai shops and restaurants eventually become centres where Thai migrants (legal or illegal status) gather to carry out their businesses.

The legal status of Thai migrant workers also goes through changes. At the time of the interviews, most of the women had married Japanese men and obtained a spouse visa that enabled them to stay and work legally. For my interview samples, I found that to obtain a secure legal status is an important motive for the marriage. The women utilised marriage as a means to obtain a residence and work permit, possibly because this is the only legal path open to them in Japanese immigration law. Given the barriers of the immigration policies of many countries, marriage is a means to legal immigration coupled with the expectations of social and economic achievement. It has been found that the number of intermarriages between Thai women and Japanese nationals is increasing.

Men, too, can change their legal status through marriage. But owing to a lack of data on intermarriages between Thai men and Japanese nationals, no conclusion can be drawn on how many male Thai migrants take this path. Clearly, however, marriage as a means to obtaining legal status seems to be a specific female strategy of migration.

Many Thai migrant workers fall into a pitiable plight. They are apprehended and deported home. Several are able to avoid deportation but are unable to have their status changed and remain illegal aliens. A good number of migrants with initially valid visas for contract labour also become illegal aliens later. Because of the complicated procedure, many employers do not make any attempts to obtain visa extensions and let their workers overstay. Many contract workers are drawn to the high income and opt to overstay after their contracts lapse.

Thus, with regard to transitions of legal status, there are three possibilities, all of which are chosen by Thai migrants (see figure 6 for an illustration of the flow):

1. To pass from illegal to legal status through marriage, a strategy mainly pursued by women.
2. To forego legal status after initially holding a valid visa and to pass into illegal status because of overstaying the visa.
3. To remain illegal.

A THAI COMMUNITY

Studies on Thai communities outside Thailand are in their initial phases. Despite the fact that for some decades Thais have emigrated to and settled down mainly in

Figure 6: Transitions of Legal Status



industrialised countries, scholars are reluctant to regard the Thai community abroad as a research topic. This may be so because they still adhere to the conventional concept that 'community' is restricted to a collective in a specific locality with clear boundaries.

Recently, however, some scholars like Han Ten Brummelhuis (1999) and Suriya and Pattana (1996) have moved away from the conventional concept. Elias (1974) came up with the concept in which a community has to be understood within the context of complex and differentiated societies. Accordingly, Brummelhuis (1999:174) refers to the community, specifically, the Thais in the Netherlands, as a series of common qualities and a specific potential for social action.

Similarly, Suriya and Pattana apply the concept of 'community of interest' and Benedict Anderson's (1991) 'imagined community' to define a Thai community in Japan. They argue that the community of Thai migrant workers in Japan has not been built in the sense of a conventional community which considers the emergence of a community from clear geographical boundaries where people live together, but rather is a group of people whose relationship and interaction are based on common interest and the imagination of common historical consciousness and culture shared by them (Suriya and Pattana 1996:35).

According to Brummelhuis (1999:174-175) and Suriya and Pattana (1996:27) such a community must have the following characteristics:
1. Common space with common boundaries. This does not necessarily refer to a territory or locality that is dominated or exclusively occupied by the members of the community. It is sufficient that their interaction emerges within the territory of the host country.
2. Objective and subjective common characteristics. These can refer to culture, belief, a way of life, language, habits, and the like.
3. Some form of interdependency, i.e. things binding a group together. To Brummelhuis this can mean knowledge needed for survival or adjusting oneself in the host country, while to Suriya and Pattana, it can be the interest and imagination they share.

I agree with these scholars that the concept of conventional community is quite restricted and useless to apply to the formation of the Thai community outside Thailand. In many host countries, mainly in industrialised societies, Thais do not live in ghettoes but in various parts of the country, and yet they interact and are involved in common social action. Though they might sometimes stay in the same apartment or be very close to each other, this is not the criterion that defines a clear locality. It is more fruitful to move away from the conventional definition of community and adapt broad concepts like those mentioned to explain the formation of a Thai community in receiving countries.

Following the idea that the concept of community can be applied to a group with a series of common qualities and a specific potential for social action, I argue that a Thai community exists in Japan because the migrants share common qualities and perform social action together. Additionally the Thai community possesses the three following requirements for being a community according to the notions advanced by Brummelhuis and Suriya/ Pattana:

1. *Common space with common boundaries*. Thai migrants interact as Thais within Japanese territory. As mentioned, the migration of many Thais to Japan is facilitated by social networks, i.e. relatives and friends. Even after arrival they continue to remain in contact with relatives and friends even if they stay in various parts of the country. Communication is upheld through telephone, fax or mobile phone. Transport facilities also help them to interact and maintain contact with each other.

Similar to the findings of Suriya and Pattana (1996:27), my data points out that the Thai community has its centres in Thai food shops, restaurants, Thai temples and certain other places where money transfer is practiced or where gambling takes place, such as in hostess bars. In these places, exchange of information and/or gossip takes place while business is carried out. Recently, the Thai newspaper Bangkok Times and a Thai-Japanese magazine called Wai Wai Thailand, published in Tokyo, have become new exchange and communication forums for Thais.

Significant evidence of interaction among Thai migrants in Japan also comes from common activities like the celebration of Thai festivals, e.g. Songkarn (Thai new year) and Loy Krathong (the festival on the full moon of the twelfth lunar month). Such celebrations take place in the form of a huge party that includes Thai

dancing, music bands and a beauty contest. Active participation in these activities indicates the vitality of the Thai community in Japan.

2. *Objective and subjective common characteristics of first generation Thais in Japan are clearly evident*. The migrants speak and use a common language which contains not only Thai but also many specific terms developed by them and understood only among them. The use of such a vocabulary helps to ease communication. For example, the word *bai* (a classifier for a sheet of paper) is applied for a 10,000-Yen bank note because Thai migrants have little knowledge of Japanese and counting a large sum of money is troublesome for them. It is easier to say 10 *bais* when talking about 100,000 Yen. The use of these specific terms also serves the purpose of self-protection from trouble. During an interview that took place in a coffee shop, for instance, my interviewee used *ai ko* or *ko kai* (the first Thai alphabet) when referring to Yakuza or a member of this gang so that others around her would not understand. She said she did not want to get in trouble with the Yakuza.

Additionally, Thai migrants consume Thai food and many other products from Thailand, listen to Thai music and watch Thai dramas broadcast on Thai television and recorded on VDO for rent. Another indication of 'Thai-ness' is the adherence to Buddhism, particularly the practice of rituals. In most apartments, the Thais display a statue of Buddha or a photo of a famous monk. In business establishments one can see on display propitious objects like a photo of King Rama V or a statue or photo of Nang Kwak (a goddess). Many migrants pray daily and beg the King or the deity to bring them good luck and large earnings as well as to keep the immigration police away. Very often they also make a vow to these propitious images to help them overcome difficulties. In crisis situations particularly, the belief in Buddhism seems to provide Thai migrants a great sense of security.

3. *Some form of interdependence*. For most Thai workers the goal of migration to Japan is to earn a large amount of money for remittance to Thailand. To achieve this, they have to stay and work in Japan as long as they can. As mentioned, many Thai migrants have a language problem in their initial period in Japan. Because of this problem, they find it difficult to adjust and easily feel excluded. The consumption of Thai food products, as well as the mass media, and the interaction with other Thais brings them a bit closer to home and provides them a feeling of belonging to Thai society. As bonds form, other needs emerge – the need for advice and support on survival strategies, for obtaining products from Thailand, for help in money transfer and the like. Based on such needs, many businesses are developed, for example, translation and legal counselling services and Thai shops. Thai migrants come to depend on other Thais who possess the knowledge of survival strategies and businesses opportunities. Thais who own businesses, such as money transfer bureaus, depend on fellow migrants as their clients.

The sense of inclusion is very important because without it, Thai migrants become insecure. To belong, Thai migrants have to maintain good relationships with one another. In a sense, then, Thai migrants are emotionally dependent on each other – they prefer being dependent but included, to being excluded. Being excluded can bring about difficulties in survival. For instance, a Thai woman detainee would have been freed if someone had paid the small penalty for her offence. Nobody wanted to do so because of her bad reputation. It would have been a different story if the woman was more closely linked to the community.

Based on the criteria described above, the formation of a Thai community is clearly underway. That community may still be in the beginning phase but is likely to develop like many other Thai diasporas. Restoring a Thai way of life is not the goal of these groups; rather, it serves the purpose of surviving in a foreign land. Work and a chance to remain in Japan seem to be the common desire of Thai migrants and to fulfil it they have learned that they need one another because, particularly for those without legal status, they cannot expect any support from either the state or outsiders. In this sense the community is a kind of self-protection or self-built resistance which provides the members with a sense of security or self-reliance, particularly in a crisis situation, and at the same time, a mechanism to achieve their migration goals and to stay in Japan as long as possible.

Suriya and Pattana (1996:26) identify the community of Thai migrant workers in Japan as a 'marginal community' which consists of the five following groups:

a) hostesses, women working as entertainers in a bar, snack or karaoke shop;

b) *gen ba*, male labourers;
c) *hosuto*, male entertainers serving female clients;
d) *mamasan*, female owners of snack bars superintending hostesses; and
e) *okusan*, wives of Japanese nationals.

Unlike Suriya and Pattana, I would not consider the Thai community in Japan marginal because of the following reasons:

1. The term 'marginal' has a negative connotation. It refers to disadvantage, discrimination and exclusion. This can lead to a view of migrants as victimised. As a result, their potential to overcome their plight and to foster social integration may be misrepresented. Measures to help them will be ill-directed and will not help realise the migrant's potential. My argument is that migrants possess a potential to change their situation and to integrate with the host society. Policy makers who devise help measures for migrants must keep this in mind.

2. The findings of Wichit and Pawana (1997) reveal that besides the five groups of Thais mentioned, there are many Thai migrants in professional occupations who enjoy high recognition. To include this group I will use the wording 'Thai community' for Thai migrants in Japan.

From a legal point of view, the Thai community can be classified into two types, the one with legal status and the other without. The former group consists of persons with a spouse visa, covert *shugakusei* labourers, contract workers, trainees and people in professional occupations. The last category refers to sex workers and all undocumented migrants as well as children born to illegal Thai migrants. Though legal status distinguishes two groups, in the community sense, both groups belong to the Thai community. There is interaction and interdependence among them.

Very often the group with legal status is in possession of knowledge, of the Japanese language and of ways to deal with authorities, among others. This group provides those without legal status with translation and counselling services, and sometimes even assistance to start a business. In the Bangkok Times and Wai Wai Thailand, one can find advertisements for such services. The difficulties of one group have contributed to the founding of many businesses by the others. They share common interests and depend on one another. In many social activities such as the celebration of Thai festivals or religious rites the two groups take part, both as participants and organisers.

Data obtained from interviews and from observation show that the Thai migrants have been entering Japan since the 1980s and many of them have remained in the country to date. Over time these migrants have built a Thai community. Asked whether they, particularly the undocumented migrants, want to return to Thailand, many reply that they choose to stay in Japan even though they have no resident permit. Some feel that they cannot return because their goal of economic security has not been achieved. They also believe that no good jobs are available for them in Thailand. They realise as well that once they leave Japan, it will be very difficult to return. There is an indication that many Thai migrants, both with and without legal status, have settled down in Japan for a long time.

In a Thai shop, I met a Thai man in his early 40s. He had come in the mid-1980s and has remained there illegally since. Gradually he started a business, a family, had children and recruited his relatives to work for him. As proof of his settlement in Japan one may cite the immigration of his 75-year-old mother. She became an illegal migrant and has stayed with him for more than five years now.

Another instance in the formation of a Thai community is that of a Thai restaurant in Ibaraki. The owner entered Japan in 1983 and worked as a hostess in a snack bar. Later, she married a Japanese, her former client, obtained her resident visa and gradually established her business: first in food selling, then a Thai shop, and then a restaurant. She recruited one brother and two sisters to work for her. All of them are illegal migrants as are most of her Thai clients. The Thai community will thus remain in Japan because an increasing number of Thai migrants, regardless of their legal status, have chosen to settle down there.

Accordingly, Thai migrants in Japan have become strangers, but strangers in Simmel's (1965) usage: "The stranger here is not the one often described in the past who comes today and goes tomorrow, but the one who comes today and stays tomorrow."

Most Thai migrants came as workers with the intention of earning enough money and returning home. Over time and under certain circumstances (marriage or owning businesses) they have become settlers. They have become part of Japanese society. This holds true for other nationalities in Japan as well. But Thai community members with residence permits will experience fewer problems than those without permits and can even receive state support. Migrants with no legal status – among them those of working age, aged people, stateless children born to illegal Thai couples, undocumented Thai mothers and Japanese fathers – will face difficulties and may cause social problems for Japanese society unless measures to solve the problems are devised.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Since the early 1980s Thais have migrated to Japan as trainees, sex workers, as well as workers in construction, small manufacturing, and service sectors. Some have used the status of *shugakusei* as a vehicle to be a covert migrant worker in Japan. Some, like the *shugakusei*, stay with legal permits, others stay without permits and are technically illegal migrants. The statistical data show as well that women do not dominate Thai labour migration to Japan. In fact, about 40 percent of Thai migrants in Japan are men. The migration is mainly motivated by prospects of high income that can lead to economic and social advancement, not only for the migrants but also for their children, their parents and siblings.

Though they face difficulties, Thai migrants choose to stay in Japan. Gradually, they recruit relatives and friends, and establish their own businesses. In Japanese territory they interact as Thai, share common objectives and subjective characteristics, and depend on one another for survival in Japan. As a result, a Thai community has emerged as a mechanism to achieve legal protection, self-reliance, a sense of security, and social support in reaching its goals of migration.

The migration from Thailand to Japan has been viewed as a movement of workers, if not labourers, but hardly of humans. Workers are those who come and go after the completion of their jobs. Thai migrants are humans who immigrate and want to settle down. This aspect has been neglected in past studies and should be the focus of future research on the Thai ethnic community. Such research is also necessary for Thai and Japanese policy makers to devise measures to solve migration and migration-related problems so that migrants do not become marginalised.

Migration from Thailand is not the only phenomenon of movement of people across nations in the contemporary world. A similar process of the formation of foreign communities is found in many countries. However, the problems of labour migrants can be misrepresented and the solution for such dilemmas might be ill-directed unless one sees labour migrants as human beings and migration as a dynamic process. Migrants have the potential to change their situations.

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HUMAN RESOURCES

THE HIV VULNERABILITY OF FEMALE ASIAN MIGRANT WORKERS: EXAMPLES FROM THE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND AND MALAYSIA

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> "If I die, I want my body cremated and the ashes spread out. I really don't want to be buried. I don't want when people see my grave, they will say, this is the grave of a woman who die because of HIV."
> – Interview with a woman migrant worker from the Philippines living with HIV/AIDS.

INTRODUCTION

Migrant workers in Asia are highly vulnerable[1] to Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). In the light of the rising HIV epidemic in Asia, migrant workers are at high risk of contracting the virus because they have limited knowledge of HIV transmission and prevention, their risk perception is low, and their knowledge of the use of condoms is deficient. In the Asian context, information regarding health matters including HIV is rarely available in the local language. Furthermore, access to health service is difficult for many migrants for various reasons. Some of the more important reasons are the inability to communicate with healthcare providers due to language problems and cultural misunderstanding, the lack of translation services, and the high cost of health care for non-nationals.[2]

The number of female Asian migrant workers has been increasing every year, especially since the economic crisis hit Asian countries in 1997. This increase is not accompanied by sufficient protection for these women. People's perceptions (because of social and cultural constructions) of women and their biological conditions become reasons that make women more vulnerable to discrimination, manipulation and violence that in turn lead to their susceptibility to HIV/AIDS. This study examines the HIV vulnerability of female Asian migrant workers in the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. The objectives of this research are:

1. To identify factors that make female Asian migrant workers vulnerable to HIV/AIDS.
2. To understand the conditions of migrant workers in the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia.
3. To assess the differences and similarities relating to HIV vulnerability of migrant workers in those countries.

LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This study took seven and a half months and was conducted in the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. Even though the limitations were already covered by pre- and post-contacts with colleagues from the respective countries, this study still has the following limitations:

1. Limitation of time (especially since this issue is very sensitive and complicated. It needs more study and understanding).
2. Situational limitation (most of the respondents in the receiving countries, Thailand and Malaysia, were undocumented migrant workers).
3. Limitation of language (especially in Thailand).
4. Field limitations (the limitation of field observations cannot be described perfectly and comprehensively with regard to HIV/AIDS vulnerability).
5. Method and analysis limitations. Since the HIV/AIDS vulnerability of female migrant workers is a very complicated issue, this study might have its limitation in terms of choices of methods used, a weak analysis, or the bias of the researcher.

This study found that it is not possible to make a comparison among the countries since each country has its own characteristics and uniqueness with regard to the situations of migrant workers and HIV. The situation

in the Philippines (as a sending country) compared to the situation in Thailand and Malaysia (as receiving countries) is different. In the Philippines, this study emphasised the pre-employment and re-integration of female migrant workers, while in Thailand and Malaysia, the study focused on post-arrival or onsite situations. This paper will look into common issues arising from these countries that raise certain concerns and need intervention.

This is qualitative research. Data collection was done through interviews, focus group discussions (FGD), observation, and assessment of existing quantitative and qualitative data.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The Philippines

There are an estimated seven million Filipinos working overseas in 182 countries. They make up 10 percent of the country's population and 20 percent of its labour force. Female migrant workers comprised 61 percent of all land-based new hires in 1998. The percentage share of deployed female migrant workers has steadily increased from a mere 12 percent in 1975 to 47 percent in 1987, to 58 percent in 1995 and 61 percent today.[3] These figures show a continuing trend of feminisation of overseas employment.[4]

Most female Filipino migrant workers are working in Hong Kong, Italy, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Kuwait, Canada, and the US.[5]

Countries with the Biggest Number of Female Filipino Migrant Workers[6] (Kanlungan estimates based on nongovernmental and governmental sources)

No	Country	Number
1	Hong Kong	152 000
2	Italy	150 000
3	Singapore	100 000
4	Taiwan	75 000
5	Malaysia	72 000
6	Saudi Arabia	62 000
7	Japan	45 000
8	Kuwait	39 000
9	Canada	25 000
10	USA	10 000

Pre-employment situations

Just as with other sending countries in Asia, economic difficulty is the strongest factor that drives female Filipino migrant workers abroad. This reason does not only apply to those with low education but also to women who have graduated from universities. They hope to get more money from working abroad and therefore ignore all hazards and risks.

The tendency of internal migration is also quite high in the Philippines. People from undeveloped areas (for example, the Visayas) look for jobs in other regions such as Metro Manila, Baguio, and Davao. Interviews with internal migrant workers revealed that they would have actually preferred to work outside the country had there been a chance to do so.

With regard to working abroad, besides those who go through agencies, many prospective migrant workers prefer to use a visitor's visa. For those using legal procedures, they go through a Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar (PDOS). The PDOS is conducted by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Some private agencies have also been given the authority by the government to carry out the PDOS[8]. However, field observations found the training and seminars of the PDOS inadequate.

Based on observations of three HIV/AIDS seminars conducted in different places, it was found that the comprehensiveness of information given by instructors was not similar.

In one observation of a PDOS in Metro Manila, the instructor delivered HIV/AIDS information quite clearly. Various methods were used, including discussions, role-plays, testimonies of returnee migrant workers living with HIV/AIDS, and exercises (using a condom properly). It was obvious that testimonies and exercises are good ways of raising the awareness of migrant workers concerning HIV/AIDS.

In some sessions, information given by the instructor created misunderstanding. For example, it was said that tears and kisses do not transmit HIV. Another instructor was reluctant to introduce the importance of using condoms to avoid sexually transmitted diseases. Only the need for self-control on the part of migrant workers when working abroad was emphasised.

Compared to the last decade in the Philippines, agencies now include HIV/AIDS issues in their PDOS programmes. The government set up the PNAC (Philippine National AIDS Council) in 1998, a body that comprises government agencies and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), whose responsibility is to monitor all HIV/AIDS programs nationwide. The PNAC has the authority to issue licences to clinics for testing and monitoring any violation of the Republic Act.[9]

Re-integration

Based on in-depth interviews with migrant workers living with HIV/AIDS, it was found that the circumstances in which they got infected were varied (all names are fictitious):

1. Ann was infected through a blood transfusion while working as a domestic worker in Hong Kong.
2. Suzy contracted AIDS from her boyfriend while working as a waitress in Hong Kong.
3. Marie was raped by her male employer while working as a domestic worker in Qatar.
4. Susan contracted AIDS from her boyfriend while working as a domestic worker in Malaysia.
5. Diana was infected because of her permissive sexual behaviour while working as a waitress in Malaysia.

All the female migrant workers with HIV/AIDS who were interviewed admitted that they were not knowledgeable about HIV/AIDS until they got infected. The re-integration process is a difficult situation for migrant workers living with HIV/AIDS. The knowledge that they are infected by a very dangerous virus is very hard on them. The situation is worse if no counselling is available for them: many go through denial or think about committing suicide. In these situations, support groups are very helpful. Concerned NGOs (PAFPI, Pinoi Plus Association, and Achieve Inc.) and churches in the Philippines play an important role in supporting migrant workers living with HIV/AIDS.

Thailand

The study in Thailand focused on female Burmese migrant workers. The existence of migrant workers from Burma is the most important issue when discussing migrant labour in Thailand. Burmese make up the largest number of migrant workers in Thailand and most of them are illegal immigrants. Geographically, the two countries are close to one another. The present political situation in Burma is of additional concern.

It was estimated that the number of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand in 2000 was about one million. Many employers prefer Burmese workers because of cheap wages, the fact that they never ask for holidays, and their flexible work time.

The spread of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand is due to the close vicinity of the borderline to the areas of origin of Burmese migrants.[10] In Bangkok, most Burmese migrant workers are from the Mon ethnic group; in Chiang Mai, however, most of them are from the Shan ethnic group. Many of the Shan people came to Thailand in 1986 because of the political situation at home. The Thai government provides camps for the Burmese; however, the refugee camps are only available for the Karen, Karenni and Mon ethnic groups.

Risks and hazards

The health situation of migrant workers in Thailand is of serious concern. The common dangerous diseases faced by migrant workers are Malaria, Tuberculosis (TB), and sexually transmitted infections (STIs). This situation is more of a concern in the border areas where the situation is unstable. Illegal migrants are arrested frequently, and since their status is illegal, they become more vulnerable to abuse and violence.

There are some volunteer camps that take care of the health of migrant workers although migrants are not considered refugees. Burma Border Consortium (BBC), for example, has clinics in Fang and Buenglieng to help migrant workers.

Sexuality: Knowledge, awareness and behaviour

Most Burmese migrant workers do not understand the dangers of HIV/AIDS.[11] Some of them think that HIV is a disease transmitted by water or wind, or that it is a sex worker's disease, and as such cannot be transmitted to them. Some understand HIV/AIDS through information obtained from NGOs or the radio.

An NGO working for Burmese women in Mae Sot (Thailand-Burma borderline) stated that the situation in factory compounds is alarming since women and men in many factories live in the same compound. This situation gets worse because these migrant workers are not aware of the importance of condoms. Consequently, many cases of unwanted pregnancies and STIs arise.

Many female Burmese migrant workers perform risky

abortions. Some of them use bamboo shoots or sticks with traditional Chinese medicine to penetrate their genital areas to abort the foetuses. Some seek the help of midwives or traditional healers. Many of them bleed to death due to unhealthy treatments and conditions.

Here are some reasons why these migrant workers perform unsanitary abortions:

1. Abortion is illegal in Thailand.
2. It is very difficult for these workers to access information and state health services because of their illegal status.
3. Most factories refuse to employ pregnant women and will terminate the employment of those found to be pregnant.
4. In order to hide the pregnancy. Many Burmese women have relationships with fellow migrant workers or Thai men and will be embarrassed if their families found out.
5. Unwanted pregnancy of trafficked person/forced sex worker.
6. Rape.

Female Burmese migrant workers are very vulnerable to rape both on the way to Thailand or when returning to Burma. This is why many of them are willing to pay a broker about 6000-8000 Baht (about US$139-186) to protect them during the trip.

Living and working conditions

Burmese migrant workers usually come to Thailand in groups. Since they do not have enough money and possess no Thai identification (ID) card, they rent a room together. One room might accommodate about 20 people, both men and women. They become vulnerable to promiscuous activities. Some women choose to have a partner or a husband to protect them from other men. Some Burmese join their relatives who are already living in Thailand. If they do locate their relatives in Thailand (since they are illegal and mobile), they would then have to look for a job. Brokers often offer help: some brokers even offer rewards to Burmese to persuade them to go to Thailand.

There are two ways to pass through the Burma-Thailand border. The first way is by using an immigration pass that is good only for one day with the condition that one is not permitted to go beyond the border areas.

Another way is by using a one-month visa.

Thailand needs these migrant workers. Its industrial sectors are supported by these migrant workers since there is a lack of Thai people willing to work as low wage workers in factories. There are factories that provide dormitories or compounds for their workers. Men and women are sometimes placed in the same compound. Those renting outside the factory pay around 400-600 Baht (around US$9-14) per month for a room and share the room with their friends. Female migrant workers working in construction sites work in groups and live in compounds provided by their employers.

Mode of medication

There are still many female migrant workers who are afraid to go to a clinic to consult with a doctor since they are illegal migrants. They prefer in this case to use traditional medicine. In this situation, the role of Burmese NGOs is very significant since the migrant workers would be willing to see a doctor if accompanied by an NGO activist. If they go to a clinic, they have to pay around 50 Baht (around US$1).

Perception of condoms

Traditionally, Burmese men perceive contraception as the responsibility of women and are reluctant to use a condom. The common perception is that a condom is not natural. This situation challenges NGOs to find ways to raise the awareness of condom use. Rather than distributing condoms directly to workers who, in many instances, exhibit shame in accepting them, one of the strategies is to make condoms available at the factory compound where the workers can get some at their own discretion.[12]

Campaign and distribution of condoms

Apart from NGOs, the government also plays an important role in campaigning for the use of condoms. Sometimes, there are complaints from users regarding the quality of free condoms. However, some NGOs said that if the quality of distributed condoms was not good, the government would change the distributor of condoms for the sake of better quality. The government also launched a campaign for 100 per cent condom use. A variety of mass media outlets in the service of the HIV/AIDS campaign were employed: radio programmes, television programmes, pamphlets and brochures. In some restaurants and hotels in Thailand, medium-quality condoms are available for free. In some five-star hotels, however, good quality condoms are provided in each room.

Malaysia

This study focuses on the situation of female migrant workers from Indonesia. Malaysia is one of the favourite host countries for Indonesian migrant workers. About 45 percent of Indonesian migrant workers go to Malaysia; 40 percent of them are women. It is also estimated that 86 percent of those working in Malaysia are illegal migrant workers.[13]

Based on statistics issued by Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia (Malaysian Immigration Office), the number of Indonesian migrant workers working in Malaysia in 1999 was 697,219.[14] This statistic is not very reliable because it is believed that half of the Indonesian workers in Malaysia are illegal since the two countries are very close culturally and geographically.

Female Indonesian migrant workers work in various sectors in Malaysia such as in factories, households, restaurants, or entertainment. Some are fairly well educated and some are even university graduates; they, however, work in factories or households in Malaysia and get the same wages as their fellow migrant workers with lower education.

Risks and hazards

All work sectors where female Indonesian migrant workers are involved, are vulnerable to violence and STIs such as HIV/AIDS. In terms of HIV vulnerability, there are differences in the types of vulnerability. For *pekerja kilang* (factory workers) who stay in hostels (and who generally are legal migrant workers), their vulnerability is more on a free choice basis depending on how they protect themselves from outside influences. The story could be different if they were not employed in a factory.

For those who work as domestic workers, aside from personal problems, there are outside influences like the employer, the family of the employer, neighbours, or strangers, all of whom are potentially able to commit abuses against these workers. On the other hand, social support systems such as NGOs are very limited in Malaysia. There are some NGOs that are active in supporting migrant workers, such as Tenaganita and the Women's Aid Organisation (WAO).

Running away is a critical situation with the Indonesian domestic workers in Malaysia who do so because of ill-treatment by the employer. Based on interviews with Indonesian domestic workers who are survivors of violence in Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Johor, it was found that they were abused when they asked strangers for help.

Nana (not her real name), 17, said that she was raped when she ran away from her employer's house. She said that her employer forced her to work in two places, i.e. in her employer's restaurant and at home. She had very limited time for herself so she decided to escape. Unfortunately, a person she met who promised to help eventually raped her.

Irma (not her real name) ran away from her employer's house because she was forced to cook pork. She met a man who promised to give her a job, but he then forced her to become a sex worker in Chow Kit.

Some female Indonesian migrant workers were trapped by drugs (called *dadah*). Generally, the drug users are those who work at entertainment sites.

Sexuality: Knowledge, awareness and behaviour

Before going to work in Malaysia, documented Indonesian migrant workers undergo pre-departure programmes by their agency. The programme is usually conducted for two days. Almost all female migrant workers do not remember any of the information delivered during the orientation programme as the information is delivered cursorily. Some of them acknowledged that they received information regarding HIV/AIDS, but that they forgot the message. They only remember that HIV is a dangerous disease but they do not know how it is transmitted and do not know about the importance of using condoms.

Side jobs

Aside from female migrants who come to Malaysia to work at entertainment sites, there are also factory workers that have side jobs as entertainers/Guest Relations Officers (GRO). They work in pubs on their days off from their factory jobs. Some of them admitted that they not only kept guests company in the pub but also gave sexual services. The main reason for the side job is economic. The wages from the factory are not enough to support their needs and to send money to their family in Indonesia.

Nia (not her real name) said that her partner never used a condom and that men usually refuse to use it. "Not

comfort" was the common excuse from her customers when she asked them to use a condom. These women get RM100 (about US$38) for each guest if the date is in a pub. They get about five guests in a night. If the date is outside the pub, they will accept extra payment. Mira (not the real name) said that she prefers dating outside the pub because if the date is in the pub, she must drink with the guest. She worries about the health of her womb if she consumes too much alcohol. Sometimes these women also use drugs such as the Ice pill (RM50/US$14 each, for stamina), Butterfly pill (RM13/US$3.70 each, to feel as if they can 'fly'), and Crystal pill (RM150/US$42 each, for increasing sexual capability).

"*Pandai makan, pandai buang* (If one has sex, then one should be prepared to handle the consequences)", is a familiar slogan among them. If they have an unwanted pregnancy, aside from going to a clinic, they can also use black bier to abort the foetus.

Contract/temporary marriage

> "*I am married only as long as I live here (in Kuala Lumpur). I need someone to support my life here. We already plan coming back to Indonesia together. But I will come back to my home in Central Java, and he is going to East Java, for his wife and children.*" (Interview with Daniah – not her real name – an Indonesian who works for a cleaning service in Kuala Lumpur)

Apart from female migrants who meet men during their stay in Malaysia and eventually get married, there are also those who enter contract/temporary marriages. A legal aid organisation based in Kuala Lumpur predicted that there are approximately 3000 Indonesian migrant workers who perform contract marriages. They may marry fellow Indonesians, Indians or Bangladeshi migrants. They call this *nikah agama*. They understand from the beginning that the marriage is not lifelong.

However, some female migrant workers interviewed argued that contract marriages are not a good choice for female migrants because of the following concerns: it is not a real marriage; in marrying a fellow migrant worker they will still be poor; if their spouse (especially if the spouse is from a different country) is deported, this becomes a problem if they have children; the status of nationality; and where to stay if they are not working in Malaysia.

From focus group discussions (FGD) and in-depth interviews, it was found that female Indonesian migrants are not familiar with the concept of a condom. Some comments among them on condom use are: that they have never seen a condom; that the spouse does not enjoy using a condom; that condoms are for western people; that it is a strange thing; and that the problem is already fixed with contraception. Without sufficient knowledge and awareness of safe sex and condom use, even those who perform contract marriages will still be vulnerable to STIs such as HIV/AIDS since they do not know their spouse's lifestyle before they got married. Also, their spouse might be engaging in other high-risk sexual activities during their marriage and thus become a transmitter of the mentioned diseases.

Mode of medication

Female Indonesian workers go to a clinic if they get sick, especially those working in factories because the employers already provide health facilities. However, some of the workers feel reluctant to go to the factory clinic since the staff at the clinic sometimes treat them in an unfriendly manner.

Those working in households or restaurants will go to a clinic if the employer were to pay. If they have to pay themselves, they would rather use traditional or generic medicine. Headache is the common problem for most female Indonesian migrants. Aside from traditional medicines, Panadol (paracetamol) is the common pill used by female Indonesian migrant workers for all types of illnesses. The red Panadol is for menstruation-related discomforts and stomach aches, and the blue Panadol for other complaints like toothaches and headaches. The price of Panadol in Malaysia is RM2.20 (about US$0.70) for 10 pills.

Mandatory testing

Documented migrant workers must undergo medical tests in their home country. Migrant workers, especially those who are working in factories have to undergo the same test again in Malaysia three months after their arrival. If they are considered 'unfit', they will be sent back to Indonesia. Common diseases, pregnancy and STIs including HIV/AIDS are all categorised as 'unfit' conditions. Subsequently, migrant workers have to undergo medical tests annually. Foreign Workers' Medical Examination Monitory Agency (FOMEMA) is the office that has the authority to carry out the testing of migrant workers in Malaysia.

Based on medical examinations conducted by FOMEMA, the Malaysian Immigration Office stated that in 1999, of 271,215 Indonesian migrant workers who underwent medical check ups, 12,446 failed the test (considered 'unfit').[15] In 1999, migrant workers in Malaysia suffered from the following diseases:[16]

- Leprosy 58 per cent
- Tuberculosis 28 per cent
- Malaria 16 per cent
- Cholera 35 per cent
- Typhoid 27 per cent
- HIV 15 per cent

Access to condoms

Condoms can be purchased easily in shops in Malaysia, especially in Kuala Lumpur with prices starting from RM2.50 (around US$0.70) for three pieces. Some pubs also provide condoms for their customers. On each pack of condoms, there is a statement concerning the use of condoms which can prevent the transmission of STIs and HIV/AIDS. Unfortunately, the explanation is in English so it is difficult for migrant workers to understand the language. Even on condoms that are produced by companies in their home country, the explanation is in English.

Factors contributing to vulnerability

Some factors contributing to female migrant workers' vulnerability to HIV/AIDS are:

1. Loneliness. Domestic workers who have no friends get excited once they find someone who cares for them, for example, garbage collectors, drivers and postmen.
2. Boredom, tension, tiredness and stress. An Indonesian woman working in a factory said she feels bored because of her monotonous job. When she needs to feel release from stress, she meets her boyfriend.
3. Homesickness. It is difficult for these workers to see their family since they are far from home. Some of them try to communicate with their family via telephone or mail.

Female migrant workers are also very vulnerable to infection caused by STIs or HIV/AIDS because of such external factors as sexual violence, sex trafficking or getting contaminated blood transfusions.

Unanswered questions/concerns

1. PDOS in the sending country emphasise the ABC (Abstain, Be faithful, and Condom) formula to prevent migrant workers from getting STIs or HIV/AIDS. But the problem is that migrant workers, especially women and girls, contract these sexual diseases not just through sexual relationships based on free choice but also because of other factors beyond their control, such as rape or blood transfusions.

2. Pre-departure/orientation programmes (like in the Philippines and Indonesia) are only for documented migrant workers. The number of undocumented migrant workers is very high and they are vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. How do we deal with this kind of problem?

3. There is a lack of cooperation between sending and receiving countries in preventing and solving the problem of HIV/AIDS. This is a cross-border issue, given that migrant workers could be infected in both the sending and receiving countries.

4. Mandatory testing. All potential migrant workers going through legal agencies have to undergo medical tests. Medical tests are mandatory since most receiving countries require them. If the workers are unfit, they will not be allowed to work abroad. Currently, mandatory testing for migrant workers has become a burning debate: it is considered discriminative and incapable of solving the problem of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. HIV/AIDS testing is carried out without pre- or post-counselling. The receiving countries use the term 'unfit' as the common reason to send migrant workers back. There is no explanation as to why they are sent back. It could be very dangerous if a migrant worker is sent back because of transmitted infections like HIV/AIDS and the worker does not know about it. There is very low awareness among migrant workers and their families concerning the need to have a medical check up. As Suzy (not her real name) explained, she would never have known that she was infected by HIV had she not undergone medical tests while working abroad.[17]

5. The use of condoms is still an unclear issue for our society, especially in Southeast Asia. Even among people who are considered progressive like NGO activists, government officials and training instructors, some are still reluctant or uncomfortable to introduce condoms to migrant workers. In fact, condoms are the most effective way to prevent sexual diseases and HIV/AIDS. This situation could be due to cultural and religious practices as well as the traditional values of the people in this region.

CONCLUSION

1. Female migrant workers are very vulnerable to the HIV/AIDS virus. Their lack of knowledge about HIV/AIDS is alarming. Factors that contribute to female migrant workers' vulnerability to HIV/AIDS are personal problems (e.g. feeling lonely, bored, stressed, and homesick) and external factors (e.g. sexual abuse and contaminated blood transfusion).

2. Lack of information and access to health services increases their vulnerability.

3. Reducing HIV vulnerability of migrant workers is not just a matter of education, but also concerns the issue of migration as a whole.

4. Apart from migrant workers, the governments (both in the sending and receiving countries), NGOs, religious groups, the mass media, health workers, and other groups have a significant role to play in reducing the HIV vulnerability of migrant workers.

Notes

1. Vulnerability in this study is defined as a situation that might put migrant workers at risk.
2. CARAM Asia's brochure.
3. Fast Facts on Filipino Labor Migration, Kanlungan Center Foundation, Inc., 1999.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Effective August 2002, PDOS is not under POEA anymore, but under the coordination of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)).
9. Some issues regulated in Republic Act 8504, year 1998 on HIV/AIDS are: prohibitions on compulsory HIV testing, accreditation of HIV testing, pre-test and post-test counselling. It also specifically regulates HIV/AIDS education for Filipinos going abroad.
10. The length of Thailand-Burma's borderline is about 1800 kilometres. Even though there are only three official gates: Mae Sot, Mae Sai and Ranong, people can pass the border through other unofficial ways.
11. Based on interviews with female migrant workers and NGO activists in Thailand.
12. Some people believe that this is related with the values of Burma's people that put emphasis on modesty of behaviour.
13. Female Labor Migration in South East Asia, Asia Pacific Migration Network, 2001.
14. Laporan Tahunan 1999, Imigresen Malaysia, 1999.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. People living with HIV/AIDS cannot be detected from physical performance. They can look as healthy as other people.

NATURAL RESOURCES

MORAL CONFLICT AND THE CONTEST OF FOREST RESOURCES IN THAILAND AND INDONESIA

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INTRODUCTION

The contest for forest resources in Thailand and Indonesia has led to intractable conflicts between traditional users and those aligned with the economy of the modern nation-state. Using moral conflict as an analytical tool, conflict is seen as a result of the convergence of different economic, political and social systems over the utilisation of the same resources. Conflict arises when the emergence of a new system dominates the utilisation of the resource and threatens the existence of traditional ones that indigenous peoples have depended upon for their survival. Conflagration into open dispute occurs when marginalised groups take action to ensure their survival. The use of this new analytical tool explains why normal methods of conflict management do not lead to the usual resolution, and why alternative methodologies are needed to address these particular types of conflict.

The approach of moral conflict provides a model to assess disputes and to work out innovative mechanisms in partnership with the contending parties in addressing their problems. A new analytical approach that is acceptable to parties in conflict is necessary as most of the contemporary analyses are partisan in nature. For example, non governmental organisations (NGOs) advocating the interests of local communities point out the causes of problems related to local forest destruction and access rights, and recommend solutions that would restore the interest of marginalised communities. Naturally, industry and government institutions that are negatively affected by the recommendations stand opposed to the proposals.

This is understandable as the solution favouring one party cannot be acceptable to the opposing resource user. According to this zero-sum game equation, the dominant side aligned to the modern market economy would have to give way to accommodate the interest of traditional users, or vice-versa. In this polarised condition, when one side wins, the other has to lose, hence the root cause of intractable conflicts. When the dominant party refuses to recognise their interests, marginalised people then struggle to restore their livelihood.

For the same reason, conflicts between local communities arising from competition over scarce resources are also difficult to resolve. Case studies document the reaction of local communities towards this problem, ranging from attempts to drive out the supposedly trespassing party to establishing boundaries where none had existed before. This is another example of the zero-sum game effect that has prevented resolution of disputes.

CONFLICTS IN FORESTRY

Traditionally, the forest provides for many needs of the communities living within or close to the forest environment. Dependent communities use forest resources for food and other material needs, and they sell forest products for cash income. The forest and its environs also provide the bases for the continuity of their culture, beliefs and identity. Their activities impact negligibly on the ecological condition of the forest, which enable it to retain its various functions, such as water catchment and habitat for wildlife.

In a rapidly changing environment, the quest for development driven by monetary gains has increasingly affected the ecological functions of the forest and the traditional utilisation of its resources. The expansion of exploitative and rent-seeking activities into forests, such as logging and land clearance for plantations of cash crops, has affected these traditions. The construction of roads into forest areas has invariably attracted people who have no tradition of sustainable forest use into forest

areas, thereby worsening degradation. In Thailand, the anti-communist campaign and the cultivation of cash crops in highland areas have led to the construction of road networks all over the forests (Hirsch 1993; Pasuk and Baker 1993).

To hold back this environmental degradation, the remaining forests have been declared protected areas in order to conserve biodiversity, maintain wildlife protection and ensure watershed integrity. Where degradation has been severe, reforestation measures have been undertaken to restore watershed functions that are vital for the life of rivers. Unfortunately, these conservation measures have negative consequences as they also inhibit the practice of various traditional activities and worsen the survival prospects of forest-dependent communities.

External forces come to dominate land use at the expense of indigenous peoples because their (indigenous peoples) traditional right to land is not recognised. The state-sanctioned legal and economic systems put indigenous peoples at a disadvantage. That is why groups have had to assist these marginalised groups in asserting such traditional rights (Anan 1997).

In the past, dialogue with government authorities led to naught. Public protest and demonstrations increasingly became the favoured avenues to give voice to frustrations, even though these led to no favourable rulings either. Only with the intervention of the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives in charge of forests are efforts being made to enact new laws that favour the indigenous peoples. It remains to be seen whether the new laws can restore their rights.

In Indonesia, the central government in 1999 granted autonomy to regional administrations at the district level to make decisions on local matters. Local matters included allowing local communities to commercially manage their forest resources for livelihood reasons and collecting revenues for the use of regional governments. Unfortunately, decades of bad governance at all levels of society, made worse by poverty, have resulted in many community leaders taking advantage of the policy for their own interests. Excessive exploitation of fragile forest areas in the headwaters region has caused massive environmental impact on downstream ecosystems.

Instead of improving community livelihood, the opposite has occurred. This has forced the central government to revoke the policy of granting forest concessions to the local communities. New methods are now being devised to enable local people to manage their resources in a sustainable manner.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF MORAL CONFLICT

The following are some characteristics or categories of moral conflicts and ways of addressing such problems:[1]

- ***Incommensurate worldviews – people looking at the same thing but seeing it differently***: This results in the inability to comprehend an issue from the perspective of the opposing side. To overcome this, abnormal discourse is one way to address incompatible arguments and reasoning by having someone who is ignorant of agreed-upon conventions of doing things or who simply sets them aside to create space and to bridge the contrasting worldviews. Opponents need to achieve a paradigm-shift, which is, adopting an ability to see beyond one's own prejudices.
- ***Intractable conflicts – where conflicts have inherent structures that prevent attempts at resolution:*** The problem is addressed by transforming the relationship between parties through a dual process of empowerment and recognition, leading to a better relationship between the opponents.
- ***Inefficient conflicts – where solutions exist but are not discernible to the conflicting parties.***

The reaction of actors in conflict can be assessed in order to determine the types of conflict prevailing so that the appropriate resolution method can be used. The Mathematical Game Theory and Theological Dialogue Theory are two approaches used to analyse the reactions of the opposing parties.

From experiments conducted under the Mathematical Game Theory, the logic of players' choices and the outcomes of those choices are analysed. Three outcomes are possible:

(1) Zero-sum game of pure competition, where whatever one person wins is lost by another.
(2) Non-zero-sum games, where all players can either win or lose together.
(3) Mixed-motive games, where each participant is confronted by the risky choice to either cooperate or compete. Choices made are not made known

to others. In the case of two players, if both cooperate, both win a lot and lose a little. If one player decides to cooperate but the other chooses to be competitive, the cooperative player would end up losing a lot with the other gaining a lot.

Given this mathematical game perspective, the ideal solution is for opposing parties to adopt the non-zero-sum perspective so that mutually beneficial solutions can be found.

Under the Theological Dialogue Theory, the focus is on the relationship between participants in a conflict. How one reacts towards the other, by way of monologue or dialogue, produces a reflexive effect on the relationship of the participants. In monologue, the end justifies the means. In contrast, for dialogue, the ends as well as means are subject to negotiation and evolution. Questions are asked to gain a speaking turn or to make a point in monologue. In comparison, questions are asked to invite an answer in dialogue. In monologue, one speaks to impress or influence others; in dialogue, one speaks to take a turn in an interpersonal process that affects all participants. From this, conflicts involving monologue should be transformed into dialogue to gain an in-depth understanding of the opposing parties.

Further, the concept of rationality within the game needs examination. With rationality, there is a sense of commonality between the opponents as they share a commitment to follow the rules of the game. This gives room to each group to manoeuvre and to negotiate towards an outcome that is favourable to both parties. In contrast, without rationality, as in a debate, the objective is to convince the opponent to accept a predetermined outcome.

ASSESSMENT OF CASE STUDIES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MORAL CONFLICT

The following three case studies, two from Thailand and one from Indonesia, show how moral conflict as a tool of analysis and resolution can be applied. For narrative convenience, the assessment of the conflicts according to the approaches of moral conflict shall be presented immediately after each case study.

Fieldwork in Thailand was carried out among fourteen local communities in the Mae Chaem watershed in Chiang Mai Province to examine local responses towards official policies for forest management and the conflicts that arose from them. The first policy aims at restoring the Mae Chaem watershed by prohibiting communities from inhabiting ecologically sensitive zones in the area. Human activities are thought to negatively affect the area's watershed function. The second policy relates to the establishment of the Mae Tho National Park and the banning of all human activities inside the park. The responses of the communities may be divided into three categories, namely: (1) positive reaction towards the policies, (2) resistance, and (3) inter-community conflicts. This paper focuses on the first two categories, cooperation and resistance.[2]

In Indonesia, fieldwork was carried out in three communities. The findings generally reflect the situation found in each of the three communities and are presented in a single section.

THE KAREN OF BAN YAN SAN

This Karen community living in the Yan San watershed represents the first group that reacted positively to the policy of watershed management, reforming its land and forestry use, and cooperating with neighbouring communities and government agencies in forest management. The Karen live in the highland regions, and make up the majority of the indigenous peoples who are commonly known as hill tribes in Thailand. As opposed to other hill tribes who traditionally practise a form of shifting agriculture based on opium cultivation that has proven to be ecologically destructive, the Karen practise a form of sustainable cyclical shifting cultivation that is ecologically adapted to the sensitive highland environment.

In 1988, a mudslide in South Thailand that prompted the logging ban in 1989 renewed the call for the implementation of the 1985 Cabinet Resolution on National Watershed Classification. Under this regulation, "all highland area considered as the most sensitive part of the watershed and the water source for lowland basin must be cleared of any activity that would affect its forest function (Pinkaew 1999:113)." Campaigns to drive out hill tribes that inhabited such sensitive zones forced the Karen to convert a substantial portion of their agriculture land into community forest and watershed forest areas.

Affected households resisted having to give up cultivated land but the community, faced with the threat of eviction, managed to persuade those households who

had more than enough to share with those who had to be displaced.

Having resolved their internal problems, the Yan San community then decided to protect their forest by putting up boundaries and signs prohibiting outsiders from intruding into their territory. Then, they became bolder and moved the boundaries into areas claimed by neighbouring communities. They rationalised this move by saying that they had to be compensated for the land they gave up by taking back land that had previously been their forefathers but that had been taken from them by expanding lowland communities.[3]

After much discussion and efforts at persuasion, their lowlander neighbours agreed to the idea of a boundary. In exchange, the Karen agreed to move the demarcation line so as not to cover too many plots of land owned by their neighbours.

The lowland communities also agreed to the restrictions on forest use. However, a number of individuals dissented and deliberately set fire to forests to show their discontent. People resented being restricted from further enlarging their farms and from freely taking from the forest products that they needed. When such problems began to spread, the communities within the watershed area had to collectively address the conflicts and to find ways to accept the new form of forest management.

The Chairman of the Yan San Forest Committee launched a personal campaign, meeting village headmen, religious leaders and committee members to discuss the necessity of boundaries and community forest management. It was an extremely difficult and time-consuming effort and he had to devise a way to alleviate their concerns. Using the strategy of Thai boxing, he encouraged his hosts to speak out first, thereby gaining an understanding of their views. He concurred with correct arguments, clarified mistaken notions and gained consensus on the importance of forests in providing water for people's survival. The highland forest, under Karen management, provided the water that irrigated the lowlanders' rice fields. When general agreement on forest management was arrived at, a watershed level network was set up among the affected communities and this was supported by CARE International, an international NGO based in Thailand.

Three-dimensional model maps were developed to provide a clear view of the physical landscape, forest zones and actual land ownership.

This information helped to facilitate discussions with outsiders, especially government officials. With the map indicating the precise location of the settlement and the degree of gradient of their cultivation area, the Royal Forest Department (RFD) and the Land Department declared that Yan San was located outside Class I of the National Watershed Classification, meaning it did not have to be resettled and could remain in the area.

The three-dimensional models were also instrumental in assisting the communities in identifying how an activity could affect other areas. It enabled community members with low levels of literacy to visualise forest management and land use in accordance with the requirements of the actual physical landscape.

Assessment

The Yan San Karen community was able to adopt solutions according to the moral conflict approach. Firstly, the Karen recognised that their worldview was incommensurate with that of the modern political system. This allowed them to reformulate their land and forest use system and incorporate it into the watershed management system of the state. They then adopted a system of communication shaped by the dominant system through three-dimensional modelling and mapping. Presenting their case this way led to their settlement being classified by the RFD outside of the Class 1A Watershed Classification, thus preventing their being uprooted and resettled elsewhere. Understanding the game and playing by its rules allowed the Karen to force their opponents into accommodating them within the system.

Secondly, the Karen managed to win over their other neighbours to the idea of managing a scarce resource by changing the property rights regime from open access to the limited access of common or private property rights. Resistance to this change was overcome by the use of appropriate methods of moral conflict. Opponents were convinced that the change would redound to the common good (ensuring the flow of water of irrigation) rather than favouring one group over others, a shift from the zero-sum to a non-zero-sum game perception. This also conformed to the concept of rationality as all parties realised that keeping to the old ways would ultimately

result in a crisis that would threaten all of them.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE KAREN OF SEDOSA AND THE NATIONAL PARK

The experience of the Karen community of Sedosa represents the other end of the spectrum, providing a celebrated case of resistance against the implementation of the National Parks policy in forests inhabited by hill tribes. The Karen settlement at Sedosa is located close to the top of mountain ranges where only a few hill tribes reside. These hill tribes are endowed with relatively abundant land that enables them to practise sustainable cyclical cultivation, with much land to spare as community forest and watershed conservation areas. These vast tracts of primary forest caused the RFD to declare the area as the Mae Tho National Park in 1998.

The national park was demarcated without consulting the communities in the area, thereby leading to its rejection by the affected groups. Such rejection was precipitated by the negative experience in the creation of the Doi Inthanon National Park in 1972. The common public perception was that the communities' lives would be drastically affected by the severe restrictions placed on human activities. For example, the prohibition on firewood gathering would leave people cold at night.

The issue of who would manage the community and watershed conservation forests complicated the problem. The communities wanted to retain management of such forests, thereby excluding them from the park. However, under the newly drafted Community Forestry Bill, these forests came under the jurisdiction of the Community Forestry Unit of the RFD, rather than the National Park Unit, which refused to deal with their demand. The local communities were not amused by such fine distinctions within the RFD.

The conditions set by the RFD for exclusion are also difficult to comply with. Land claims must be based on intensity and continuity of use according to a cyclical cultivation system of seven years' fallow period, supported by documents and eye witnesses. An additional provision states that the fallow land must be located within the confines of an area designated as community land. Land outside this area had to be turned over to the government but the loss would be compensated with land located within the confines of the community land. Witness testimonies from members of the elected Sub-District Administration Organisation were later accepted in lieu of documents as proof of cultivation,[4] but this only happened when the problems had become too complicated.

Before the RFD could even disseminate these procedures, a further complication worsened the conflict.[5] To stem the tide of timber and rare orchid smuggling over a dirt road that accessed the mountain, the RFD in July 2000 decided to construct a park office along that road. However, the very location of the proposed office became disputed —with the RFD claiming the site to be inside the state forest while the local community thought it was within the boundary of their community forest. Local community members refused to negotiate with the RFD and told officials to instead speak with the Northern Farmers Network (NFN), an influential non governmental organisation.

The NFN challenged the way the RFD had determined what land to include in the park. The NGO demanded that cultivated land and fallow forests be determined by the latest aerial photos (year 2000). It also asked that all secondary forests, regardless of the fallow period, be accepted as community forests. Failing to gain any concession, the NFN brought the matter to the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives (in charge of Forestry) who was known to be sympathetic towards the local people.[6] Subsequently, two committees comprising representatives of all the parties concerned were set up. As of the date of fieldwork (November 2001), the conflict had yet to be resolved.

Assessment

This particular case appears to be one of those intractable disputes identified by the approach of moral conflict. The requirement of document submission as evidence of cultivation was an irresolvable issue as no such document usually exists in these communities. It was unlikely that the hill tribe people, with their low level of formal education, would not have known how to negotiate with the RFD and therefore insisted that an NGO act on their behalf.

From the perspective of the games approach in assessing conflicts, their reluctance to negotiate on their own behalf shows a distrust of the conflict management process. They may have seen the game as a win or lose situation (a zero-sum game), with a wrong move causing them to lose all of their lands to the park. On the other

hand, the conflict would have been intractable had the hill tribes been deprived of their watershed and community forests, even though this matter was to be addressed by the newly drafted community forestry bill. The conflict over the national park was inefficient but not intractable. There existed solutions that would allow for the co-existence of hill tribes and forests managed as national parks. Forest zones could be regarded as biosphere that includes human activities inside protected areas, with only core zones that prohibit all human intervention. In contested areas communities could be allowed to pursue activities that do not threaten the forest, activities that can be determined by the people themselves based on scientific and technical knowledge of forest conservation. By recognizing the people's common and private property rights system, local communities could be enabled to become joint managers of the biosphere with the national park administration.

CASE STUDY IN INDONESIA

Fieldwork was carried out among three communities of the Bahau ethnic group in the upper reaches of the Mahakam River, in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. The Bahau is one of the numerous indigenous peoples in the island of Borneo, the third largest island in the world. Practising traditional forms of shifting cultivation, the Bahau live on flat lands in the headwaters of the Mahakam River, in contrast to the mountainous habitat of the Karen.

In 1999, the government issued one-year concessions to local communities to commercially exploit their community forests. Problems immediately arose. Since information on the concessions was not broadly known, only those who knew could avail themselves of the concessions granted and they exploited such information for their private benefit. Due to a lack of capital, these people then contracted out the concessions they obtained to commercial logging operators who promptly built roads and brought in tractors and other heavy equipment to transport the timber. This was despite the fact that the concessionaires were supposed to only use chainsaws and low impact technology to transport the logs. Boundary disputes also became common as neighbouring communities tended to claim as large a forest area as they dared.

Due to the unprecedented outflow of timber that resulted, the central government eventually revoked this concession scheme. A new form of community forestry is being developed to better manage forest resources.

Assessment

Using the perspective of moral conflict, this case illustrates the convergence of two opposing systems of resource utilisation. The traditional system is based on a subsistence economy, with some commercialisation of forest products as a source of supplemental income. On the other hand, the concession system was a full-blown market economy model that suddenly created a monetary value on trees and forests that were once financially valueless, putting askew the traditional relationship between people and their forests. Individuals were now willing to gain income at the expense of the forest environment and their relationships with other community members. Neighbouring communities began to dispute boundaries that were never clearly demarcated. A zero-sum game perspective had begun to dominate people's view of the world.

In this clash of opposing systems, the modern market economy will surely dominate the traditional system. Individuals who have benefited from the change will not want to relinquish their advantage. For this reason, conflicts in the Mahakam have reached the point that no resolution can be found.

This conflict illustrates a solution that is inefficient. A system of sustainable forest management, which consolidates all the community forests of neighbouring communities into joint-management with an equal distribution of revenue, could have been a better way to resolve the problem. Revenue obtained from the joint-management of the forest is pooled together to develop basic infrastructure, and to implement activities that could generate additional capital.[7]

MULTISTAKEHOLDER COMMITTEE AS THE MECHANISM TO ADDRESS CONFLICT

The lesson learned from these case studies is that the lack of a proper forum of communication between competitors aggravates conflict. To manage or to pre-empt the occurrence of conflict, the mechanism of the Multistakeholder Committee (MSC) is a prerequisite to bringing different groups together to search for means to address their problems (Chan 2002). While the MSC provides the platform for competitors to discuss and to negotiate their interests, the approaches of moral conflict need to be built into the process. Otherwise,

the MSC could become a mere platform for a more powerful group to dominate the process at the expense of the others, especially indigenous peoples who are not familiar with the conventions of official discussions.

For the process of decision-making to become meaningful, preparatory measures of programme awareness for stakeholders and capacity building for members of the MSC need to be carried out so that the processes of the MSC can run smoothly. These should include imparting knowledge on moral conflicts and the processes of addressing them, the different systems of resource utilisation, and the collaborative efforts that have been implemented or developed elsewhere. Failing to do so and putting together stakeholders who care only for their own positions, would cause the MSC process to become inflated, costly and time-consuming, causing fatigue among the participants, and eventually defeating the purpose of the conflict management process.

A suggested framework for the MSC meeting, carried out in the form of a workshop during the early phases of the process, is as follows. Day One should be an introduction to theories of moral conflicts, such as incommensurate worldviews held by opponents, followed by a presentation on the competing systems of resource utilisation. Day Two will be for the presentation of strategies associated with moral conflicts, followed by a discussion among the participants on how to incorporate these strategies into their conflict management process. Hypothetical case studies will help to enhance personal relationships, and provide an understanding of the actual process needed to resolve conflicts. Day Three and beyond should be devoted to the processes of conflict management over the problems that arise. If the issue is complex, it is best to let the matter rest without immediate resolution, and to allow a second series of meetings to further develop ways for resolving the problems.

CONCLUSION

Conflicts in forestry usually arise as the dominant resource utilisation system that is protected by the state's sanctioned institutions marginalises other, usually traditional, forms of resource use. However, in Commonwealth countries, the judiciary has increasingly ruled in favour of indigenous peoples. In Thailand, NGOs are advocating the interests of marginalised peoples. In Indonesia, reform of the political system has led to the recognition of the local communities' right to manage their forest resources.

Regardless of the status of traditional peoples' rights over land, territory and resources, the influence of the modern market economy cannot be avoided. At some level, traditional groups can resist the dominant system as in Thailand or have their rights recognised as in Indonesia. Nevertheless, it is difficult for a subsistence-based economy to escape the clutches of the monetary system. When the external system permeates a society, the community that is not ready to cope with the impact of rapid change will face internal conflicts among its members and even conflicts among communities practising the same system of resource utilisation could occur.

It is inevitable that most forests will come into management systems associated with the wider political, economic and social institutions. As a forest is generally not devoid of human inhabitants, it is necessary to incorporate approaches of moral conflict into forest management that can soften the impact of rapid change upon forest-dependent peoples.

Notes

1. This section is an adaptation of Pearce and Littlejohn (1997). The term 'moral' has little to do with codes of sins and virtues, and is focused on the idea that people's actions are based in what seems good and right (1997:54).
2. On examining conflicts, the 'Rashomon Effect' serves as a guideline when interviewing the informants. The Rashomon Effect tells us that each witness is likely to give a different account of the same event, according to his or her perception over what had occurred (Heider 1988). These accounts could drastically differ and even contradict one another. " . . . the content of each individual source is likely to be influenced by the source's values, focus or underlying agenda. As a result, it is common to find conflicting interpretations of the same events across sources when chronologies are compiled for empirical analysis. This phenomenon has been popularized in social science literature as 'the Rashomon effect' (e.g. Scott 1985:xviii; Mazur 1998)" cited in Davenport and Litras. Acknowledging this effect, the study does not attempt to reconcile the facts — that is, to identify who is telling the truth. Instead, it attempts to identify the underlying causes that led to the conflict, so that conflict resolution or management could address the root causes.
3. The account represents one side of the story, from the view of the Karen. Both the present and the previous lowland

community leaders denied that such problems had arisen between them and the Karen. This probable act of self-denial, I suppose, indicates their desire to erase painful memories of events that had occurred with neighbours who had very friendly relations with them.

4. Few officials would have made visits to the distant settlements due to accessibility problems. Even if they did make visits, the periodic rotation of officials posted in different districts and provinces would make it difficult to locate them. Moreover, illiterate hill tribes would not have considered it proper to ask the names of their visitors, hence, the identity of these officers as witnesses would also be difficult to ascertain.

5. The following mainly represents the argument brought forth by the National Park Warden.

6. During the cabinet reshuffle on 3 October 2002, the Deputy Minister, Praphat Panyachartrak, was promoted to Minister of the new Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment.

7. In a separate paper, a proposal has been developed with the local authorities, the university, NGOs and local community, to seek funding for capacity building to achieve good-governance among the people and the bureaucracy (Chan et al.).

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THE CHANGING OF THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM OF MARINE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OF MALAY AND PATTANI SOCIETY

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INTRODUCTION

This study will show the change in the traditional management of marine resources in Malaysia and South Thailand. It will illustrate the trends in marine resource management and the changes therein. Research was conducted using certain theories on property rights, which connote ownership, access and use (Akimichi 1984). These connotative definitions refer to fishing grounds, fish catching techniques and technology, and marine resources. Meanwhile, property rights theories are a set of rules or management practices for oceanic areas, and all the resources they contain. A more complete discussion of these theories is in Sudo (1984), Akimichi (1984) and Richard Polnac's *Small-Scale Fishery Development: Sociocultural Perspective* (1991).

This study will focus on two issues:

- A description and understanding of the lives of fisher folk societies in the villages of Rusembilae, Thailand, and Tanjung Dahan, Malaysia, circa the 1960s, as well as an appreciation of their environment-friendly technology. In the 1960s, the fishermen were aware of the need to protect the seas.
- Changes in marine resource management arising from over-fishing using modern technology.

This research will also identify problems faced by fishermen in both countries as these relate to the issues confronting regional management because of the changes they have brought about.

The data collection techniques used in this study were observation and interviews with public figures knowledgeable on the topic. The observation techniques included controlled and participatory observations.

In addition, a review of literature was conducted and a qualitative analysis was done to enable the researcher to see the correlation between direct variables and the main issue of this study, namely, marine resource management. I also tried to correlate the general aspects of both societies with their respective provisions on property rights and marine resource management practices.

FINDINGS: THAILAND

Fishery technology and the fishing ground in the 1960s Modern technology does not always bring good fortune to its users, meaning, human beings. If the uses and applications of technology are not properly regulated, they are potentially capable of bringing about disaster. The Thai example shows how modern fishing technology can create a negative impact on the management of marine resources. In contrast, in Malaysia, the use of modern fishing technology has not negatively influence the management of marine resources.

Although located in Thailand, Rusembilae Village is culturally, linguistically and racially a Malay community. It is situated in the Province of Pattani on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula. Muslim Malays constitute about 70 to 80 per cent of Rusembilae's population (Fraser 1968). The climate is tropical, with a well-defined rainy season brought on by the northeast monsoon from the middle of October through the middle of January. Temperatures are normally high, ranging between 30 and 35 degrees Centigrade.

The main job of the Muslim Malay fishermen living in the village of Rusembilae is to catch fish – a job that has been handed down from one generation to the next. These fishermen are very devoted to this occupation despite the difficulties attendant to it. Besides, changing jobs is not easy as the only place where the fishermen can make a living is the sea. In the 1960s, marine resources in the village of Rusembilae were still abundant and

well maintained, so that it was then called *beras cupak*, which means 'rich in a variety of valuable resources', such as crabs, prawns and *kembung*.[1] All these resources could easily be caught because the fishing ground was close to the shore.

Further, in line with tradition, villagers also felt responsible for managing and preserving their fishing ground, because they experienced a sense of ownership. For example, they banned the use of poison to catch fish due to its destructive effects on marine biota. That this was so indicates how villagers had a sense of preserving the environment on which they depended.

The fishing gear used at the time was still friendly to the environment. Each type of fishing gear was exclusively designed to retain certain species in the sea. For instance, there were nets for *udang ako* (large prawn nets) that were also used for *kembung*, just as there were nets for *udang balacan*[2] (small shrimp nets). Villagers used other kinds of nets for crabs and cuttlefish. All these nets were made of cotton thread.

In coastal fisheries, on the other hand, villagers used throw nets for small shrimps. There were also nets for catching crabs and cuttlefish. Fishing operations along coastal waters were normally carried out by a group of people or by only two fishermen.

As for fishing vessels, villagers used traditional boats, known as *kole*, which were commonly 28 *hasta*[3] in length and 8 *hasta* in width. *Kole* boats, which had sharp-edged fronts, did not have any engines to power them. Instead, villagers, usually in groups of 16, rowed and depended on wind power. Frazer (1968) mentioned that only *kole* equipped with oars and sails was actively operated by the villagers of Rusembilae. These groups of fishermen did not go far from the shore into the deep sea. Instead, they confined themselves to their fishing grounds, especially during the season of *kembung*, which usually lasted for six months.

The villagers of Rusembilae acknowledged their fishing territory by calling it Fishing Ground. This Fishing Ground was some 3000 meters from the shoreline, and had a depth ranging from three to ten fathoms. As explained, Rusembilae's fishing grounds consisted of various types of marine resources, particularly prawns, crabs and fish, which could still be caught or retained with ease using traditional equipment.

The fishing grounds of the Rusembilae bordered the villages of Budi and Kuala Air Tawar, at a depth of 2 to 6 fathoms. Rusembilae's villagers normally set up their nets in the evening and picked them up the next morning. During the crab season, which lasted from October until March, villagers managed to earn good money. *Kembung* season was from May through December, when villagers caught plenty of this fish (Frazer 1960). Within an hour of fishing using traditional gear, villagers managed to fully load their boats.

Apparently, in the 1960s, Rusembilae's villagers were not inclined to access fishing grounds other than their own because every marine resource they wanted was available in their own. The protection of Rusembilae's fishing ground before the 1960s was described by Ibrahim, thus: "At that time, from the village of Kuala Air Tawar to Kuala Barat, you certainly saw white sands, decorated by the waves of the oceans. It was just a picturesque view in front of Rusembilae Village. Along the coastlines, various kinds of turtles were able to live freely under the protection of the villagers. Turtles were happily playing around and merrily making holes, laying their eggs. Villagers' attention to the lives of turtles showed their concern for preserving the sustainable richness of marine resources."

He added, "The sea or fishing ground in front of the Village of Rusembilae was a fascinating image of nature to stare at; the sound of the waves always brought prosperity to villagers. Schools of fish juveniles were only for villagers to watch. Villagers, in accordance with their traditions, fully realised that these juveniles were not allowed to be caught until they reached a certain age and size. Various types of marine resources (such as prawns, crabs, and *kembung*) were simply protected because, at that time, marine resources were really the pride and wealth of villagers."

Abundant marine resources were considered a gift from the Creator and were therefore under continuous surveillance and protection then. Hence, the village of Rusembilae was popularly known as *beras cupak*, meaning 'a very prosperous village with abundant natural resources found both on land and in the sea'.

The richness and beauty of the Rusembilae was also captured in the book *Pattani's Spoken Image in Three Petric Language* (Hassan Madmarin 1995), which described it as: "*kampung indah permai damai dengan*

kekayaan sumberdaya alam, disana keluarga bersatu hati, imam, penghulu bukan sembarang, budu[4] *perencah bukan kepalang terujud sudah di daerah ini*." Translated, the description states: "It is a very pretty, beautiful, and prosperous village, enriched with abundant natural resources, both in water and on land; all these resources are easy to collect and to harvest."

Unfortunately, the management and protection of marine resources have been taken for granted in the last 45 years. Abundant marine resources now exist only in the memory of the elderly; they have become history. Furthermore, extant marine resources are fast diminishing, given the presence and use of advanced technology in the region. The beauty of the shores replete with various marine resources, especially turtles, is no more. In his thesis, Hardin said that if marine resources are not well managed, a tragedy which he called The Tragedy of the Common (Hardin 1968) will ensue.

It is very unfortunate that this has occurred in Pattani's fishing ground, especially at Rusembilae Village, because of the use of too much fishing gear and equipment. Intense commercial fishing and the lack of supervision on the use of destructive fishing gear have decreased the income of small-scale fishermen year after year, indicating that this region has been excessively exploited. Consequently, villagers are mad at commercial fishermen who use destructive fishing gear, such as *uwanrum*[5] (push net) in the villagers' fishing grounds.

Marine resource management and the development of fishing technology at Pattani

Since the 1970s, Chinese Siamese commercial fishermen from the north and central Siamese Bay have come to the waters of Pattani because of the decline in marine resources in their area and because of the intense competition among them. They fish anywhere, but mainly in regions containing abundant marine resources. These commercial fishermen come with their 50 to 100 GRT boats, measuring 18 to 25 metres long. The boats are all fully equipped with sophisticated fishing gear and equipment. They also have such modern fishing equipment as radars for detecting fish, radio communication facilities, ice storage equipment and equipment to pull out nets (Raduan 2000). These fishing boats or vessels are navigated and controlled by a group of fishing workers.

Professor Raduan writes that the modern push nets and squid cost nets of these modern vessels are purchased from factories in Bangkok, Mahachai and Samot Parakan. They have the capability of netting not only *domersial*[6] but also *pelagi*[7] fish along the coastal waters. In addition, these modern nets can be operated in any fishing ground, such as coastlines, deep seas and interstate waters. The intensive nature of commercial fishing not only along the coastal waters but also in the deep sea, has endangered marine resources at Pattani Bay. The decline of marine resources along the coastal waters has also made it difficult for small-scale fishermen, mainly villagers living in Rusembilae, to make a living. As a result, the villagers are unable to earn a decent income.

Marine resources at the Fishing Ground of Rusembilae have been depleted through the operation of destructive fishing technology such as push nets (*uwanrum*). Hence, since the 1970s, villagers have no longer been able to maintain the sustainability of their marine resources.

The villagers have been opposing, through demonstrations, for example, the forcible entrance of commercial fishermen operating destructive fishing gear into their fishing grounds. This stance is contrary to the belief of some people that the ocean is common property or belongs to the public, so that everyone ought to have access to it. Based on this contention, every person should be free to enter and leave the sea in order to exploit its natural resources. But as a result of the term 'free right' that emerged from this stance, no one is in effect responsible for maintaining the sustainability of marine resources either.

The above-mentioned situation has prevailed in the village of Rusembilae, where some villagers use the push net, an over-fishing gear, for the simple reason that they find it very difficult to catch fish using traditional fishing gear. Due to their sheer frustration, they are no longer as aware of the need to ensure the sustainability of marine resources as they used to be. To them, a term such as marine resource management is to be ignored; what is of prime importance is survival amidst the extremely tough competition provided by commercial fishermen.

During this research period, commercial fishermen were still actively and intensively catching fish at Pattani Bay, especially at the village of Rusembilae, a practice

that has caused the decline of marine resources because of over-fishing. The lives of Rusembilae's villagers have as Hardin (1968) described them, become the 'tragedy of the common'. Furthermore, common property has created conflicts across all parties involved in the management of marine resources.

One of the main conflicts is that between the commercial and the traditional fishermen (coastal fishermen) who lack capital. Modern fishing technology has convinced the villagers not to bother about preserving and protecting marine resources any longer because of their scarcity and the difficulty villagers encounter in catching fish. All of these make up 'the tragedy' at Pattani Bay, especially the village of Rusembilae, where conflict between the strong party (commercial fishermen) and the weak party (small-scale fishermen living along the coastal territory) has become unavoidable, despite efforts of the Thai Kingdom to resolve it.

This conflict stems from commercial fishermen's entering and exploiting Rusembilae's fishing ground, a conflict that is basically rooted in competition for shrimps or crabs which remain available at Rusembilae's fishing ground. According to some respondents, commercial fishermen go deep into the coastal waters to access Rusembilaes' fishing grounds if they do not get a big enough catch in deep sea.

Conflict arising from the fight for resources

As explained, the fishing ground or catching area of the villagers from Rusembilae, mainly contains two species: crabs and prawns, which are always the main catch of both commercial fishermen and the villagers. The fishing ground is well known for its special mud, unlike other coastal waters that contain sand. Lots of fish, especially crabs and prawns, are found in the mud at a depth of only 3 to 10 fathoms. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, villagers set up their nets to catch the crabs in the evening and harvest the catch the next morning. They put up light and white buoys to mark where they lay their nets. They guard and wait for their nets until morning, unless there are strong winds, in which case they might go home.

This is an unfortunate set-up because all along, while the villagers are waiting at home, commercial fishermen go to the fishing ground and break up the nets. Conflicts resulting from these frequent intrusions need to be resolved by Jabatan Perikanan (Fishery Department) and Prambong (Authorised Officers). Commercial fishermen should compensate the villagers for their losses.

Commercial fishermen with push nets entering the fishing ground at the village of Rusembilae are the main trigger of the prolonged conflict between the two groups. Villagers must perpetually race against them to the fishing grounds, but, because of their inadequate gear, the villagers keep losing out. Villagers strongly oppose the push nets used by commercial fishermen because these overexploit the marine resources. When this research was undertaken, for instance, almost all villagers and fish buyers complained that their total catch had been declining in the last few months.

The Thai Kingdom allows commercial Chinese Siamese fishermen to catch fish in the waters of Pattani Bay. Commercial fishermen have also established modern ports (fishing spots), such as the Pattani Fishing Spot and Provincial Administration Fishing Spot, to land their retained catch. These fishing spots are well able to accommodate small and large fishing boats. To make things worse for the villagers, the commercial fishermen's fishing use of push nets keeps increasing each day. For its part, the Fishery Department has banned the use of push nets because of their destructive effects.

Responses of the Kingdom and Fisheries Society to the use of push nets

The Kingdom, as stated in Article 32 (2) of UD, has long banned the use of any destructive fishing gear, including push nets. In 1974, the Minister for Agriculture and Cooperative banned their use by fishing boats and in Pattani's waters. However, commercial fishermen do not seem to pay attention to the ban and violate it wantonly. Coastal fishermen, for their part, have not remained silent but exhibited their vehement opposition to the use of push nets by conducting meetings between the heads of villages and the fishery department. They have even mounted demonstrations to protest and put an end to the use of the push net.

Finally, the Minister for Agriculture and Cooperative, along with representatives from the villages located along Pattani Bay, signed an agreement to cancel and abandon fishing activities using push nets in Pattani Waters (1997-2001). Moreover, to support their efforts, the Governor of Pattani ordered the Regional Council to send patrol ships to watch and secure the waters. To

strengthen the government's efforts, the fishermen also help the department keep watch over the bay.

The reaction of the village of Rusembilae's fishermen to the decree has been very positive, as can be gleaned in the letters they sent to the Department of Agriculture and Cooperative. The letters contain statements signifying the villagers' full support of the decree for the sake of the development and the richness of marine resources in Pattani Bay. They support the ban on the use of push nets in their fishing ground.

According to the head of Pattani's fishermen, Sukri8, ten years ago, it was sufficient for small-scale fishermen to catch fish from 'behind their houses'. But because of the decline in marine resources and the desire to earn a living, villagers have resorted to using push nets as well. Following the imposition of the ban on their use, however, villagers have resolutely stopped using them, in contrast to commercial fishermen who consistently break the law by entering Pattani Bay and using push nets, to the consternation of the villagers.

The failure of marine resource management practices in Thailand has had two results. The first involves the biological and ecological destruction of marine resources. The second involves a decline in marine resources because of the attendant consequences of the use of unfriendly technology. It is apparent that the destruction of marine resources must immediately be resolved as this has reached a worrisome stage.

FINDINGS: MALAYSIA

Fishing technology and fishing grounds in the 1960s

Meanwhile, in Malaysia, a case worth studying is that of the village of Tanjung Dahan, located approximately 40 km from Melaka. Some of the fishermen living in the village were originally from the Indonesian archipelago, particularly Rupat Island. They came to Malaysia sometime in the 1950s to catch fish. Later, they settled in the area and established a village called Tanjung Dahan.

In the early 1960s, the fishing fleet of fishermen from Tanjung Dahan consisted of traditional sailboats and rowboats. These two types of environment-friendly vessels were the main fishing vessels of nearly all fishermen in the Straits of Malacca, especially those from Tanjung Dahan.

Meanwhile their fishing gear consisted of fishing rods, *lukah* (fish trappers made of bamboo), and throw nets, which they used to catch various kinds of fish like *Pari* (*Trygonidae dasyatidae*), *bawal* (*Stromatidae*), prawns or shrimps, and other kinds of fish. These nets were put into operation according to the fishing territory they were in, and the capacity of the boats used. Another fishing gear, the *rawai*, consists of approximately 200 to 800 hooks. *Rawai* is used for fishing and catching a lot of fish at one time. It remains in use up to now.

There are 108 fishermen living in the village of Tanjung Dahan. As in Rusembilae, the people of Tanjung Dahan have been earning their keep as fishermen since the time of their ancestors. As some of Tanjung Dahan's villagers are of Indonesian descent, they sometimes go back to Rupat Island to buy new boats or to visit their relatives.

The people's fishing ground in the village of Tanjung Dahan in the 1960s was not only located in the waters of the Malacca Strait, but extended to Rupat Island, as mentioned. Then fishermen could freely go anywhere, although they only caught fish in their sailboats and rowboats. The area around the village was their favourite fishing ground, as fish of various kinds could easily be caught. In the 1960s, their total catch was plentiful, but at that time, fish did not cost a lot.

The boats in use now are actually similar to those in the 1950s in terms of shape and size, except that engines with five to fifteen horsepower have been added to them. Despite such minimal modification, the fishermen are able to catch and retain fish without much difficulty, and not too far from their village.

Marine resource management and the development of technology in Malaysia

It was after the 1960s that fishing technology using boats with engines began; the engine capacity was determined by the financial capability of the fishermen. Those with money could afford to purchase thirty-horsepower engines, while some could only afford the five to fifteen-horsepower engines.

The number of fishing vessels started to grow in the 1970s, in accordance with the development of the economy in Malaysia. Since then, each fisherman has come to own more than one boat. Some, especially fishermen of Chinese descent, own up to three boats,

due to their strong capital base. Since then it has become obvious that fishing operations in the Malacca Straits, especially in the village of Tanjung Dahan, have increased.

Some problems have emerged because fishermen started fighting over the marine resources. Daily total catch has begun to decline (Musyawarah Perikanan 1995).

Villagers point to technology developments as the cause of a dilemma. If the ownership of so many boats by one person is continuously allowed, they claim, it will certainly lead to problems. For instance, there will be competition between fishermen with more capital and those with only a small amount of money to invest; or, between boat proprietors and traditional fishermen. Worst of all there will be a significant decline in marine resources due to overfishing.

Generally, traditional fishermen are the first to directly feel the decline in marine resources because their total catch each day becomes consistently smaller. Fortunately though, fish has become expensive, so they still manage to earn a decent income.

The villagers' willingness to form unions manifests their efforts to negotiate and develop certain marine resource management techniques. They admit that this topic is always one of their priorities during discussions. Then, the results of their discussion are forwarded to the Jabatan Perikanan, which usually gives them positive responses.

The villagers have a common ground for promoting marine resource management and preservation: to avoid further conflict as well as unwanted competition among themselves.

As explained, the development of fishing technology has influenced the sustainability of marine resources because it has caused overfishing. It has caused the traditional fishermen's retained catch to become lower each day. Small-scale fishermen with only five-horsepower engines sometimes fail to catch anything at all. A 27-year-old fisherman, daydreaming in front of his empty boat, says, "For the last six months, we have experienced difficulties in catching fish. It is fortunate for us that the price of fish is quite expensive and we are still able to have a decent life with only a small catch. For brave-hearted fishermen having powerful fishing boats, they can always try to enter Indonesian zones, mainly Rupat Island, because, according to the villagers, this region offers more fish to catch and retain."

Since the 1980s, the people of Tanjung Dahan Village have been more aware of the decline in marine resources, so that some efforts to resolve this problem have been executed. The villagers, in association with Jabatan Perikanan and Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia, have formed a union whose main goals are to set rules and create a common agreement to regulate fishing gear, boat ownership for each fisherman, and the use of nets. The rules, they say, are intended to avert overfishing in the waters of the Malacca Straits (especially in the Village of Tanjung Dahan). In addition, they have created and will set some restrictions or a boundary for every village's fishing ground. For that reason, Jabatan Perikanan has issued a vessel licence policy, which was revised in 1985.

As per the policy, fishermen of West Melaka are no longer permitted to own more than one boat. Jabatan Perikanan has also issued a fishing gear licence. The terms and conditions set by these two types of licences are to be collectively established and cannot be separated from the fishermen's lives. Licences are valid until 31 December each year and are to be renewed for the next year; lest they be officially cancelled due to violation of the renewal proviso.

From the results of this study, it can be seen that the observation of property rights, which connotatively means 'to own' (Akimichi 1991), is evident in the fishing grounds of Melaka, especially in the village of Tanjung Dahan. The concept also indicates an effort to manage marine resources. The decline of marine resources makes fishermen aware of holding rights, which means that fishing in Tanjung Dahan has clear borders relative to the neighbouring villages. Villagers also claim that shrimps have exclusive zones, so that other villagers have no right to enter each other's territory.

The fishing ground for Tanjung Dahan's villagers starts from the shoreline and extend to 5000 meters beyond. They are bordered by the neighbouring villages. Coastal waters are the areas for the fish to breed and grow. Realising that marine resources living in these breeding and growing waters must be well preserved, villagers determined a minimum size for fish that should not be

caught. For example, small clams measuring less than 6.4mm should not be caught, while for the bigger ones, they should not measure less than 31.8 mm for them to be caught. The reason behind these policies is to prevent the extinction of the habitat. Jabatan Perikanan fully supports the preservation and management of marine resources in this region that has been divided into four zones.

Pong Lui Yean (1985) states that Malaysia is the first country that has decreed and obeyed the fishing zones set in accordance with the permitted vessel's loads and licensed fishing gear. Commercial equipment capable of seizing a great amount of fish in a single operation, like push nets, and fishing gear that is able to sweep the ocean's floors are banned in Zone A. Through this legal norm, fish resources and coastal ecosystems are well protected. Fishing grounds for both traditional fishermen and commercial fishermen are clearly defined and separated, so that conflicts between these two groups of fishermen can be avoided.

Traditional fishermen in Malaysia using traditional fishing gear (i.e. those other than trawls and purse seines) and with boats less than 10 GT may operate in all zones, especially in Zone 1 (coastal waters). Commercial (medium and large-scale) fishermen using commercial fishing gear, such as trawls and purse seines, follow these regulations:
(a) Those with boats less than 40 GT may operate in Zone 2.
(b) Those with boats from 40 GT to 70 GT may operate in Zone 3.
(c) Those with boats above 70 GT may operate in Zone 4. This regulation is obeyed by all fishermen.

The making of *unjam-unjam* (artificial reefs) for fish by the villagers of Tanjung Dahan inside their traditional fishing ground demonstrates their appreciation for the management and protection of marine resources. These artificial reefs made of old tyres are a substitute for natural coral reefs damaged by modern fishing operations. Villagers understand that the now badly damaged reefs are homes for fish to breed and grow. According to them, damage to coral reefs is a result of the intensity of modern fishing operations.

The villagers' awareness of the need to preserve the reefs is fully supported by Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia. Together, these two parties have decided to work on the basis of cooperation or co-management. Their combined efforts are necessary because the coastal water areas have been overexploited. This effort will hopefully enable fishermen to restore their marine resources.

The protection of marine resources

The development of modern fishing technology worries villagers in that it may cause certain species, like prawns, to become extinct. As a result, besides being aware of the need to preserve and manage marine resources, fisher folk are trying to find a way to avert conflicts arising from the exploitation of marine resources. This is intended not only for fishing grounds but also for marine resources, like prawns. Hence, the villagers claim exclusive areas (fishing spots) in each of their fishing grounds. Being exclusive, these areas are off-limits to fishermen from other places. For example, coastlines are exclusive regions for prawns. This decision is understandable because prawns are an expensive commodity in Malaysia. The price per kilogram is between thirty and fifty ringgit.

Fishermen say that they respect each other and have no intention to violate each other's exclusive zones. Thus far, there have been no conflicts and they live in harmony. Furthermore, they also pay special attention to turtles as several have died while trapped in nets. For this reason, the fishermen have agreed to use nets with 25-square centimetre holes, so that small turtles will not be killed in the nets.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In Thailand, technology advancement began in the 1960s, but it was not until the 1970s that such advances started to bring about a negative impact. After the 1970s, technology advancement began effecting dramatic changes in the management of marine resources and a decline in marine resources. This happened as commercial fishermen from the north and along the Siamese Bay had difficulty catching fish due to a sharp decline in marine resources in their region. As a result, commercial fishermen shifted their attention to the south or to Pattani Bay. In fact, around the bay, especially in Rusembilae village, there are traditional fishermen who really care about and protect their fishing grounds.

The entrance of commercial fishermen to catch and retain fish at the villagers' fishing grounds is deemed

the main cause of the prolonged conflict between commercial fishermen and villagers. The conflict had thus far not been resolved at the time of this study.

Furthermore, commercial fishermen have caused changes in marine resource management and a decline in marine resources. The high number of commercial fishermen with overfishing operations at Pattani Bay and in Rusembilae's fishing ground has placed the decline in marine resources at a critical level. Finally, the competition between traditional fishermen and commercial fishermen always renders the villagers of Rusembilae (traditional fishermen) the weaker party. That they have difficulty catching fish in their fishing grounds has made them poorer.

In contrast, although fishermen in Malaysia also continuously use modern fisheries technology, they fully recognise the importance of marine resource management. Villagers, NGOs, and the Fishery Department administer an integrated preservation programme for marine resources. The various sectors are all fully committed and responsible for the sustainability of marine resources. Hence, they acknowledge what they call fishing borders, regulations on marine resources, and selected fishing gear and equipment, which may or may not be used in the area.

Through rational marine resource management, conflicts and stressful disputes between traditional and commercial fishermen are greatly reduced. Each fisherman can go fishing and retain his catch in a secure and harmonious environment. Violations with regard to vessels and fishing gear can also be avoided. On top of this, the sustainability of marine resources can be maintained. Such is an important lesson we can learn from Malaysia, especially from the village of Tanjung Dahan.

The findings of the study on Thailand must be thoroughly discussed. We must go over the lessons learned from this study, especially in the case of the village of Rusembilae. The Government's failure to manage marine resources from a legal standpoint has been acknowledged by all parties, including the Fisheries Department and the security group, who are unable to execute their duties properly. Their failure has allowed commercial fishermen with their more sophisticated gear and equipment to enter the fishing grounds of the Rusembilae with little regard to the local fishermen. As a result, the villagers no longer seem to trust the government.

Notes

1. A small species of mackerel (*Scomberkarnagurta*). This fish swims in schools of up to thousands in the waters of Thailand, from approximately the first of April to the end of September or the beginning of October (Fraser 1968).
2. *Balacan*, the same given name used in Sumatra, is shrimp paste. In the Indonesian language, it is called *terasi*. Shrimp paste is a kind of spice that is widely used for cooking in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
3. One *hasta* is approximately equivalent to the measure from the tip of an adult's finger up to his elbow.
4. *Budu* is a kind of soy sauce made of shrimp or squid.
5. *Uwanrum* is Thai language for 'push net', one of several destructive fishing gear. The local name of the people of Rusembilae village is *pukat sodok*.
6. *Domersial* fish are schools of fish living in the deep sea under the thermo-cline's line. See Raduan, *Kesan Perkembangan Teknologi Perikanan Moderen Terhadap Komunity Nelayan Artisenal di Kampung Rusembilan Pattani, Thailand*. Hal 205, Majalah Jati.
7. *Pelagi* fish are schools of fish living above the thermo-cline's line, up to near the surface of the sea. See Raduan, *Kesan Perkembangan Teknologi Perikanan Moderen Terhadap Komunity Nelayan Artisenal di Kampung Rusembilan Pattani, Thailand*. Hal 205, Majalah Jati.
8. A key resource person. He was interviewed on 27 March 2002, in the Village of Tanjung Pau. After that, he was also interviewed several other times.

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INSTITUTIONS

LITERATURE AND CRITICAL LITERACY: ENGLISH LANGUAGE WRITING FROM MALAYSIA AND THE PHILIPPINES

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most interesting questions to ask about the currently fashionable word, globalisation, is whether it is a 'new' or 'old' phenomenon, or, whether it is a process capable of containing 'old' elements in new guises. It may contain the legacies of older transnational movements, for example, imperialism and colonialism, but it clearly exhibits new features like the speed with which communications may be effected through information technology (IT). Such technological developments facilitate the quick movement of capital across borders. Contextualizing 'globalisation' within a long duree reveals globalisation's connection to colonialism, and the postcolonial formation of the nation-state.[1]

To take one example in the case of labour, colonial governments gave metropolitan interests a free hand to recruit labour at minimal cost. Today, on the other hand, many governments are coerced or persuaded to discourage unionisation and to abolish laws protecting labour, both male and female, although the strictures operate differently gender-wise.

The second question that is equally engaging is whether globalisation does away with borders and therefore modifies the power of the state. Alternatively, has globalisation in fact reinforced the state's presence in non-Western countries where the state colludes with transnational capital using economic imperatives to reinscribe internal ethnic, class and gender borders? As Francis Loh and Joel Kahn put it, in Malaysia, rapid economic growth, before the crisis, was accompanied by the augmentation of the power of the authoritarian Malaysian state (1992:2).

In the West too, globalisation may strengthen, rather than erode borders. "Whilst capital increasingly disregards traditional borders, the state has generally reinforced the operation of borders and demonstrated its presence as one of the principal agents determining membership in the nation (Kofman and Youngs 1996:5)." Repressive, restrictive policies restraining the number of migrant labourers and the withholding of political rights can result so that it may not be far-fetched to say that, in some instances, there is a kind of global apartheid.

Some of the literary texts from Malaysia and the Philippines that I selected for my project explore the problems of diaspora, migrancy and identity. As Aart Scholte sees it, globalisation may in fact breed a new vigilance since it can 'reinvigorate all the hierarchies and hegemonies'. The liberal concept of globalisation tends to see it as progressive and benign, but as Scholte adds, this liberal discourse 'rules out the possibility that capitalism, industrialism, consumerism, the national principle and rationalism might be the causes rather than the cures of global problems' (in Kofman and Youngs 1996:51). Therefore globalisation can be Janus-faced, leading both to emancipatory practices as well as to disempowerment.

The third aspect of globalisation, which can be open to critical debate, is its ability both to homogenise and produce a variety of local articulations or its vernacularisation. In this sense, globalisation may be analysed from a post-modern perspective and so give room for the articulation of the concerns of subaltern voices. These questions on globalisation frame my exploration of the ways contemporary literary texts from Malaysia and the Philippines (written in English) examine changing identities as the individual, the community, the state and the nation are impacted by global cultural replication.

My project on literature and critical literacy has the

following objectives:

- To encourage students to see literary texts as an important part of the politics of culture, for them to therefore appreciate how literature's ideational aspects are related to events like the formation of the nation-state, rapid industrialisation and modernisation and for them, too, to see the effects of colonialism, nationalism and globalisation on both individuals and groups. In brief, literary themes do not simply mirror wider socio-economic and political issues. Rather, through them, literature and larger events are constantly in dialogue.

- To encourage students to enrich, not jettison, traditional literary analysis (i.e. the I.A. Richards approach of close textual reading) by interfacing this kind of traditional literary analysis (looking at plot, characterisation, metaphor and symbols) with current subaltern cultural theories. Students are introduced in as accessible a way as is possible, to postcolonial, feminist and other subaltern perspectives. To use this approach is necessarily to engage with issues of power and hegemony, and with the problems of discursive contexts and representation. Discussions are invited on 'difference' and homogeneity as students look at the complex human dilemmas literature explores. This approach to literature teaching is more risky than the usual analysis of so-called 'universal aesthetics' and 'human values' (catch-all phrases which ignore cultural specificities and the operations of power). The conventional universalist approach is still prevalent in Malaysian schools and universities (Filipino literature teachers seem more progressive, but this conclusion can only be speculative given my all too brief two-month stay). In teaching a kind of deconstruction, I try to ensure that students are not enchanted by postmodernist theories but are critical and selective. To this end, I employ Freirean pedagogy and selective elements of the New London Group's Pedagogy of Multiliteracies (I shall elaborate on these later).

- To introduce into the selection of texts for the literature classroom sub-genres like the autobiography and the journal, which are often used in history, anthropology and other social sciences but rarely in literature courses (my two-month stint also gave me the opportunity to acquire a variety of Filipino writings not available in Malaysia).

THEORETICAL AND THEMATIC BACKGROUND

In analysing literary themes within the cultural politics of transnational capital, I owe much to the illuminating introduction to the collection of essays *The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital* (Lowe and Lloyd 1997:1-32). In their jointly-authored introduction, Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd discuss the formation of the 'modern' subject in postcolonial nations, a subject modelled after the discourse of modernisation, development and progress, which Western nationalism held to be universal, and which it introduced to colonised subjects. After World War II, the global world system "requires the massive conversion of populations and their cultural forms into conformity with the post-World War II project of universal modernisation." Under this project, the modern subject formed and the contradictions bred are described this way:

> Civil society must be reshaped to produce subjects who might function in terms of modern definitions of social spaces, as the political subject of the state, the economic subject of capitalism, and the cultural subject of the nation, however much the discreteness of these spaces is contradicted by conditions that are lived as racialised and gendered labour stratification, apartheid and poverty (1997:7).

How far is anti-colonial nationalism implicated in forming this basically Western subject of modernity? In many colonised countries, anti-colonial political resistance was a paradoxical phenomenon. While wanting to throw off the yoke of the colonialists, the elites who negotiated for independence also saw the formation of modern subjects and institutions after the Western democratic mould, as necessary for new nations to gain acceptance into the world community. And yet, to mobilise popular dissent against the colonialists in the early phases of anti-colonialism, colonised nations have had to mobilise some concept of 'tradition' and of 'the indigenous'. Hence the moments of anti-colonialism actually gave birth to a variety of nationalist voices, some of these submerged under the weight of state-led historiography.

One of the key themes in my critical literacy and literature class is the recovery of alternative histories,

or as Lily Rose Tope, puts it, the 're-visioning' of history.[2] The anti-colonial struggle gave rise to an elite bourgeois nationalism and to a popular nationalism. In the Philippines, this Great Divide between the illustrados and the masses has left legacies which still have a saliency today. In Malaysia, the struggle for independence is valorised in elite figures like Tunku Abdul Rahman, of aristocratic birth and the head of the UMNO (United Malays National Organisation), and in leaders of other ethnic groups in the multi-ethnic coalition, the Alliance (renamed the National Front or Barisan Nasional). Malaysia, then called British Malaya, did have other more socialist- leaning nationalist voices, such as those of Ahmad Boestaman, Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, Lim Chin Siong, and James Puthucheary but their roles are hardly acknowledged.[3]

Even when these figures emerge from invisibility in certain history books they are usually seen as influenced by nefarious communist agents in the post-World War II scenario of an expanding communist threat. The complexities of their vision of an egalitarian nation are seldom recovered. In Filipino historiography, Reynaldo Ileto's study of millenarian movements recuperates the history of the masses. More than recording the activities and events of the Katipunan and those of its 'successors' like the New Katipunan, the Lapiang Malaya, the Santa Iglesias, etc., such a historiographic approach questions the rationalism and the linearity of Western Enlightenment's construction of the historical subject.

The linear temporality of 'tradition' as anterior to 'modernity' is interrogated when we see that tradition can be continually reconstituted and that the alternative to modernity is not the 'other' outside it, but the 'what-has-been-formed' in 'the conjunction with and in the differentiation from modernity over time' (Lowe and Lloyd 1997:16). In this way, even the word 'indigenous' is problematic as is the idea of originary purity. Literary texts thematise this non-linear temporality in their 'protagonists' lives (examples are Alfred Yuson's Great *Philippine Jungle Energy Café* and Malaysian writers K.S. Maniam's *In a Far Country* and Lloyd Fernando's *Scorpion Orchid*). These texts reveal the past and present as imbricated in each other as, memory colours both anterior and posterior events.

This leads to the second theme, which deals with the hybridity of identity as the postcolonial and global subject negotiates and traverses diverse cultures through a migrant legacy, through education and through other ways. Elsewhere, I had written that in many multi-ethnic and multicultural postcolonial nations, the perimeters of identity "were strained by the dialectic of homogeneity and diversity"; by "the complex overlays of the past; this palimpsest of the past consists of the histories of the migrant, the colonial subject, the citizen of the new nation-state (Maznah and Wong 2001:76)." Both the identities of the citizen subject and the nation are constantly evolving, constantly becoming. The past is imbricated in the present, and both the past and the present transmute each other. Hybridity denies the claim to exclusivity.

In Malaysia, such a claim by the majority ethnic group, the Malays, has been subjected to closer scrutiny by a younger generation of Malay writers writing in English, among them Karim Raslan, Dina Zaman and Che Husna Azhari. Intra-ethnic differences and hybridity within the Malay-Muslim identity engendered by a history of migrancy throughout the Malay Archipelago as well as from the Middle East and Southern India, are boldly addressed. This theme of intra-ethnic hybridity is very rarely taken up by writers using the national language Malay, as though they were afraid of being deemed disloyal to Malay-Muslim ethnic solidarity if they revealed the blendings and blurrings of ethnic identity. As Michael Shapiro puts it, "The identity economy of sameness/otherness which produces claims for exclusivity requires an energetic denial of otherness within (1999:54)."

In the Philippines, hybridity may be engendered by the dynamism of multi-ethnicity too, but very likely, by class and regional differentiations (at this stage, my limited knowledge of Filipino writing in English prevents a more in-depth analysis. I am still in the process of reading creative works from the Philippines acquired during the fellowship).

The theme of identity-in-flux may be further inflected by gender, besides class and ethnicity. It is interesting to compare the ways male and female authors explore gender issues as modernity and globalisation impact Malaysia and the Philippines. Women have often been policed by family, community and state since they are seen as boundary markers of difference and as 'reproducers; both physically and culturally of political collectivities (Deniz Kandiyoti 1994; Yuval Davis and Anthias 1989)'.

In Malaysia's modernising projects, women have been encouraged to enter the workforce of multinational factories. Global capital reorganises the operations of production exploiting women in ways permitted by their subordination under their national patriarchal states (Pettman in Koffman and Youngs 1996:191-208; Lowe and Lloyd 1997:20). The global movement of migrant Filipino women, mainly as domestics, also contributes to the web of diasporic identities globalisation has spawned. Globalisation has thus both heightened the sense of difference, and created opportunities for hybridity. It provides rich material for creative writers to draw upon in order to delineate characters who are at once outsiders and insiders, who reveal in their consciousness the delicately tensioned pulls of separation and reunion, of departure and return.

The last theme is really a mesh of theme and the technique of writing; it deals with the ways English, a legacy of colonialism, has been appropriated and nuanced by postcolonial writers to convey their own values.[4] As Sumit Mandal observes, "English has acquired a culturally viable and hybrid local sensibility of its own in the former British colonies where the language has had a relatively long history (2000:1001)." Lily Tope refers to the ways English can be nativised in Filipino writing in English: through colloquial neologisms, through intersecting English with local ethnographic details, through the use of alternative lects (Tope 1998:83). In African countries too, there is this kind of appropriation of the English language. Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe mobilises local tribal idioms, proverbs and folk tales to write back to the Empire and recuperate the subjugated consciousness of the colonised.

A key deleterious effort of the global use of English to serve economic imperatives has been noted by Sumit Mandal: "Globalisation actively promotes English as a purely functional and even neutral language that is synonymous with economic growth, technological advancement and modernity as a whole (2000:1011)." To resist this kind of hegemony and this claim to neutrality, the English language and literature teacher, both in Malaysia and the Philippines, should help students understand that language carries cultural codes (even in so-called technological English). Students can then be guided to transform English, 'dethrone' it as superior, and appropriate it for their own purposes.

THE PEDAGOGY OF CRITICAL LITERACY IN THE TEACHING OF LITERATURE

Moving into the pedagogy of teaching literature, I discuss here Freirean pedagogy as well as strategies suggested by the New London Group (Harvard Educational Review 1996:60-92). Critical literacy and the teaching of literature may also benefit from selective use of the work of Foucault and Gramsci, as well as of postcolonial and feminist theorists. One must be critical in the use of the New London Group's ideas. My own critique of the New London Group centres on their reluctance to discuss domination and power even though their article mentioned above, which clearly owes a debt to the Freirean and Gramscian deconstruction of hegemonic thinking, as well as to current subaltern theorizing on language and ideology.[5]

In my pedagogical strategies for introducing variants like gender, ethnicity and class into literary analysis I prefer to activate Freire's unhesitating deconstruction of power. Freire's theory of learning is underpinned by his uncompromising assertion that "the whole activity of education is political in nature." Politics is in teacher-pupil relationships, in the syllabus, in pedagogy, even in the architectonics of schools, and not least in "the silences typically surrounding unorthodox questions and issues in the traditional classroom." In traditional classrooms, functional literacy is the main thrust: "students develop authority dependence; they rehearse their future as passive citizens and workers (Shor quoted in McLaren and Leonary 1993:27, 29)."

Against this essentialism Freire postulates a critical transitivity which both learners and teachers develop through a collaborative, democratic and critical pedagogy. He interrogates the homogenizing of education for 'social cohesion' which can absorb or marginalise differences. Similarly, Foucault's concern with social identity and subjectivity, and how language shapes identities exposes the discursive events which seek to mould citizen subjects and, now increasingly, global subjects.

Both Freire's democratisation of pedagogy and Foucault's radical displacement of the unproblematic notion of language as mimetic representation would lead to a defamiliarisation and denaturalisation of what is given or received. This kind of defamiliarisation is central to literature's ability to both refer to a 'reality'

outside the text and to denaturalise it in order to give us new insights on life. Critical Framing and Transformed Knowledge, to use terminology from the New London Group, will result when students first critically unframe and reframe 'nationalism', 'modernity', 'identity' and other abstractions.

Beginning with Situated Knowledge, that is, the students' own daily, lived experiences (what they can most easily comprehend), the teacher guides them to read the literary texts against their own situations. Theories can come much later. These steps may lead to Transformed Knowledge. Both teachers and learners may then learn that hegemony is never stable as it necessitates the presence of subordinate people. The discourses of power which constitute people as social subjects (nationally and transnationally) are never simply reproduced in practice. As Fairclough (1992:58) elaborates: "There is a circular relation. Structures of action or languages are only maintained by being renewed constantly in action/speech," but it is also in action/speech that "they are altered and transformed." Such instabilities therefore allow for contestations and negotiations.

CLASSROOM ENCOUNTERS AND FINDINGS

With regard the theme of historical revisioning, I taught Yuson's *Great Philippine Energy Cafe* in my class at Universiti Sains Malaysia after I returned from the Philippines (one of the benefits of the fellowship was the opportunity it gave me to acquire relevant books and materials not available in Malaysia).[6]

The story of the millenarian-turned-revolutionary, Leon Kilat, did interest Malaysian students after the initial puzzlement with Yuson's mixing of past and present, of real and fictional characters. Students were led to see that the history of the formation of the nation (whether of the Philippines, Malaysia or others) and the history of the postcolonial nation's modernising project can be viewed from various angles: from the perspective of the elites or from below. From the point of view of mainstream historiography, men like Leon Kilat are simply irrational or deviant. From the point of view of the masses, the history of the elites frequently valorises the roles of 'great' men of an elite background eliding their complicity in the oppression of the masses and their collusion with colonialists and neo-colonialists alike.

Some students were uneasy with the 'illogic' of past and present imbricated in each other without chronology (these were mainly students who minored in History); others found this non-linearity exhilarating and liberating. The more perceptive students were even able to connect the novel's use of 'magic realism' with the need for subaltern voices to unseat the rationalism of the novel form of Western Enlightenment. Some students maintained that the novel form, which originated in the West should be transmuted by a sea-change encounter with the colonised to produce a mix of 'realism' and fantasy. One student was even able to connect the mix of fantasy and history in Yuson's novel with the kind of symbolic grasp of 'history' and landscape, transformed into a memoryscape by other non-European writers, as for example, Caribbean writer Wilson Harris (Guyana) and African writer Wole Soyinka (Nigeria).

Yuson's ability in Great Philippine Jungle Energy Café to critique all sides, ilustrados as well as the masses, went down very well with some students, while others felt he was being evasive. Clearly, it is not easy for students to grasp the ideas of the nation as a hybrid of polyphonic voices and that history need not legitimate only a single truth (Tope 1998:138). Malaysian students, in particular, have been so schooled to accept the 'nation' as unproblematic and are so hesitant about questioning Malay dominance (enshrined in the phrase *Ketuanan Melayu*, or Malay Overlordship) that they find polyphony uncomfortable.

There was no time to fully analyse *Great Philippine Energy Café* with my Filipino students (I taught a class for six lecture hours at the University of the Philippines [UP] during the fellowship). It was merely mentioned in passing in speaking of another novel, Malaysian writer K.S. Maniam's In a Far Country. The presence of varying voices in the configuring of a nation did not seem to upset my Filipino class as much perhaps because ethnicity is not quite as enshrined in the Philippines. Therefore the care with which historiography in Malaysia must image the dominant group, the Malay-Muslims, does not apply to any one ethnic group in the Philippines. Class issues may be more pertinent, and may operate more clearly in the Philippines.

The nation as polyphonic, as not fixed but constantly evolving and the individual as hybrid seem to open students to new questions, hopefully not a Pandora's box. Other works, which gave room for meaningful,

non-hierarchical and non-privileging discussions of identity and nation, include the autobiography of diasporic Malaysian writer Shirley Lim (now domiciled in California) and some of the works of young Malay writers like Karim Raslan and Che Husna Azhari.

The issue of gender as a marker of difference elicited varying responses from students in the UP class, male and female alike. Shirley Lim's autobiography, *Among the White Moon Faces*, reveals the dialogic encounter between the evolving female subject and the societal forces that attempt to construct her as a culturally recognisable subject. Autobiographies, whether by men or women, have rarely been included in text lists of literature courses.

The traditional perception of autobiography as unproblematically linked to facticity and documentation, rather than to constructions of identity and subjectivity by the autobiographers, results in autobiographies' being placed under history or social science courses as data for information-building only. In my literature classes, I analyse the autobiographies of women as an effort at sense-making from a woman's vantage point since these autobiographies alert us to the various subject positions women occupy. In this way, I guide students to interrogate the unified female self purveyed by patriarchal discourse.

Shirley Lim consciously re-examines constructed subjectivities by reassessing the ways large collectivities, like Chinese patriarchy, British colonialism and nation, form the female subject. While growing up under the formative influences of different discourses (Confucian, Roman Catholic and British colonialist), she discovered slippages among dominant systems which allow for contestations and choices.

Students also learn from the novel that patriarchy itself is not monolithic. They realise that even men can be silenced as in the case of Shirley Lim's father. He too had to negotiate with systems of domination such as his own Chinese community's laws, the Malay-dominated pre- and post-independence polity, etc. These systems may subjugate men because of their class or ethnicity. *Among the White Moon Faces* usually evokes lively discussion whether among Filipino or Malaysian students (especially female students), perhaps because of the frankness with which the autobiography deals with topics like sexuality and family dysfunctions (issues traditionally muted or silenced in Asian communities). The short story *Ustazah Inayah* by a Malay-Muslim woman writer Che Husna Azhari was taught to the class at UP (Diliman) but Che Husna's examination of the dilemma facing a young, bourgeois, educated Malay-Muslim woman as she negotiates the minefield of religion and politics in post-NEP (New Economic Policy) Malaysia, did not quite excite Filipino students. One key reason could be the number of localised Malaysian socio-religious and political details, which are difficult for non-Malaysian students to interpret.

The literary text which elicited the most animated and vibrant discussion with the class in UP was Malaysian writer Karim Raslan's short story, *Go East*. This story thematises the effects of globalisation and nationalist economic imperatives on the dilemma of identity construction of the individual, in this case, a young Malay-Muslim male by the name of Mahmud. That a kind of internal 'migrancy' can occur within a nation is seen in Mahmud's 'migration' from Peninsular Malaysia to Lahad Datu, a town in Sabah, East Malaysia.

Told as a first-person narrative, Karim's story skilfully exposes the self-deception and the prejudices of his protagonist, Mahmud, whose identity perimeters are shaken by his unease with his ethnic Malay affiliations, his Muslim identity and his sexuality. His struggle to resist his own latent homosexuality, manifested in the unexpressed attraction he feels for his houseboy, Anton, a Filipino-Malay from Zamboanga, exposes the tensions beneath both the discourse of revivalist Islam which mandates heterosexuality, and Malay nationalist discourse which prioritises masculinity. This nationalist discourse takes as its archetype the warrior Hang Tuah. Mahmud's desire to escape the shackles of Malay-Muslim construction of subjectivity is revealed in this manner:

> I liked Sabah. I liked it from the day I arrived. I knew it was going to be different and it was. It was noisy, dirty, rough and un-Malay. There are fewer bloody Protons (God, I hate that car). . .

The reference to hating the national car, the Proton, exposes Mahmud's critique of the burgeoning Malay middle-class and their histrionic need to display a Malay-Muslim refinement to hide crass materialism and consumerism. And yet, as manager of a cocoa plantation (perhaps one that is aided by transnational

capital), he is enmeshed in an elite situation. The fact that he is served by domestics like Suriya from Java and Anton from Zamboanga shows Mahmud as complicit in extracting the services of transborder workers of different ethnicities, while he himself both benefits from and is shackled to global economic imperatives.

The sexual violence, which punctuates this story and is manifested in the brutal treatment of a Filipino prostitute, is not only revealing of the commodification of women. Ironically, Mahmud himself is commodified as he tries to live out the image of the macho womaniser, while all the time denying and fighting his sexual attraction toward men. Like other male 'migrants' from Peninsular Malaysia to Sabah (in East Malaysia) who are mainly bourgeois professionals, Mahmud, in this story, is seduced by the global culture of beer-guzzling, bar-hopping and other consumerist lures in Lahad Datu.

This story elicited vigorous discussion. Students pointed to Mahmud's hypocrisy with regard to his own critique of middle-class politeness and decorum. Many felt that he too was subjugated by the Malay middle-class values of heterosexuality, as well as Islamic injunctions. In the scenario where Mahmud goes to a thirteen-year-old prostitute to prove his manhood, all the while imagining that he is with Anton, the houseboy to whom he is attracted, they felt that it is Mahmud himself who is 'prostituted'. Mahmud himself is moulded by nationalist and global economic imperatives into a manly, aggressive entrepreneur hunting down business opportunities whether in Lahad Datu, Tokyo or New York.

Students, both in Malaysia and the Philippines, were also excited about trying to write creatively in English. They saw the possibilities for nativizing and domesticating the English language as they examined the ways writers do so. Malaysian poets Ee Tiang Hong and Muhammad Hj. Salleh, for example, opted to use the English language rather than be 'used' by it. Ee captures the bygone glory and the subsequent decline of the Peranakan community in Malacca (the Peranakan refers to the earliest Chinese immigrants to Malaya, who adopted Malay dressing, food and language). Muhammad Hj. Salleh evokes a rural Malay ethos. Meanwhile, in braving new frontiers of language, Filipino women poets like Merlie Alunan in *Young Man in a Jeepney* and Marjorie Evasco in *Elemental* knead the English language, giving it the pliability to convey Filipino experiences from a woman's viewpoint.

IMPLICATIONS

Encountering literary texts through the critical literacy approach helps both teacher and learners rethink identity, the nation and the global. Without abandoning the traditional literary analysis of plot, characterisation, point-of-view, etc., this approach opens up the following issues for further thinking:

- That globalisation today may best be linked to colonialism and to the anti-colonialist struggle, to the formation of the modern political-economic subject and to so-called modern institutions. Literary texts explore contradictions in the modern subject as well as in the nation. It may be true that all of us are in some way(s) hybridised. Perhaps, 'nation' is similarly ever evolving, and is never fixed. Both nationalism and globalisation may attempt to homogenise people through various societal processes, but do these paradoxically result in a heightened awareness of heterogeneity?

- That literary texts can therefore be vehicles for teachers-learners to discuss, debate and deliberate what Norman Burbules terms as 'a grammar of difference (1997:102)'. Burbules advises us that teaching 'difference' is not a celebration or reification of difference. Instead students should be guided to analyse the implications of different ways of viewing 'difference'. Simply saying that one supports plurality and diversity may not be sufficient. What is important is how one determines difference. To this end, Burbules (1997:92) notes the following ways of thinking about difference which can stimulate further discussion:
  (a) The *conservative view* of difference, which carries narcissistic assumptions like "we are all the same, really" or "you are like us or should be like us."
  (b) The *liberal view*, which seems tolerant but for which the accommodation of difference is always under what is comprehended and classified in terms of a unitary, dominant standard. Liberal cognizance of diversity can thus be mere exoticism.
  (c) The *radical view*, which recognises and accepts irreducible and untranslatable differences.

  What is significant is Burbules's (1997:10) warning to those who do not 'contextualise difference in

social and political differences' and hence see difference as 'purely voluntaristic or personal'. To do so would be to omit, even deny the operations of power in civil societies. Students may discuss these views on difference in relation to the tone, point-of-view, characterisation, etc., of various literary texts written by Southeast Asian as well as other writers.

- That English should be nativised to serve Asian writers whose native languages can also invigorate English. The flow should be two-way. Mastering English can also help us become self-reflexive about our own languages. Besides analyzing other people's creative works, students may be encouraged to write their own and see how they can appropriate English for expressing their own hybridities.

In guiding students to discuss identity, the nation, and the global, the teacher should be ready to share in the learning process and loosen the grip on her position of authority so that a collaborative and more democratic teaching-learning experience can come about. As Freire puts it: "We want an educational programme which would be an introduction to the democratisation of culture, a programme which itself would be an act of creation, capable of releasing other creative acts, one in which students should develop impatience and vivacity which characterise search and invention (from *Education in Critical Consciousness*, quoted in McLaren and Leonard 1993:26)."

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE ACTIVITIES

Literature and other art forms clearly have a key role to play in the formation of Asian identities in an era of global cultural replication. But we do well to remember the words of two writers, namely Henry James, who reminds us that we cannot dictate to a writer, and Andre Gide, who cautions that to state a problem clearly (and literary works often do so) is not to presume it solvable in advance. Critical literacy in the teaching of literature encourages us to explore the complexities of identity formation in Asia; it foregrounds moral exploration rather than moral prescription. In Asia, literature teachers must listen to each other across national borders so as to address issues honestly. Some of these may be:

(a) The need to link literature teaching to ideology and power so as to see literature and other art forms not as mere aesthetic products, but as part of the politics of culture. Art is neither for art's sake nor for the elites' sake. Literature and other art forms may not even be easily conscripted into 'nation-building'. Whose 'nation' are we building anyway? Are we eliding differences both within a nation and globally?

(b) While noting and respecting differences, how can teachers use literature and other art forms to dialogue with each other across Asia? What constitutes indigenous Asian knowledge?

(c) What is the response of religious fundamentalism to the homogenizing thrust of globalisation in Asia today? How do we define fundamentalism and legitimate political struggles?

Many teachers of Literature in Asia are still teaching, researching and writing in isolation in spite of cross-border texts. Future activities can include:

(a) Workshops to address pedagogy as well as text-selection and curriculum;

(b) Lecturer-exchange schemes;

(c) Joint publications: special issues of journals, monographs, etc., focusing on some of the themes and questions I have raised in this paper; and

(d) Student-exchange schemes.

A critical, empowering pedagogy invites teachers and students in Asia to become change-agents in school and society. Such a pedagogy aims for "critical thought and action, for democracy, equality, ecology and peace against domination, manipulation and the waste of human and natural resources (Shor citing Giroux in McLaren and Leonard 1993:34)."

Notes

1. At an international workshop sponsored by the Sephis Foundation on *Globalisation and its Discontents Revisited* (Kuala Lumpur, 14-16 June 2002). Ulbe Bosma raised interesting questions on globalisation's long duree, on what is old and what is new, in his overview of the papers presented. Kofman and Youngs in *Globalisation: Theory and Practice* (1996:1) are of the opinion that theories of globalisation should not be considered in a vacuum, isolated from the traditions from which they have drawn directly or indirectly. Globalisation, Kofman and Youngs observe, has roots in long-term development in international capital and the inter-state system.

2. In Chapter 4 of her book, *(Un)Framing Southeast Asia: Nationalism and the Postcolonial Text in English in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines*, Tope (1998) compares the ways Alfred Yuson in *Great Philippine Jungle Energy Café* and Lloyd Fernando in *Scorpion Orchid* use revision history. For an incisive, discussion of the relationship between literature and history, see Caroline Hau, *Necessary Fictions: Philippine Literature and the Nation, 1946-1980*, 2000: 94-132 (Chapter 3).

3. New biographical information as well as the writings of such figures have been published recently. See, for example, Lim Chin Siong in Tan Jing Quee and K.S. Jomo, eds. *Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History* (2001); see also James Puthucheary, *No Coward Past: Writings, Poems, Commentaries* edited by K.S. Jomo and Dominic Puthucheary; and Ahmad Boestaman, *Carving the Path to the Summit*, trans. by William R. Roff (1979). For a survey of the trends in writing indigenous Malaysian history, see Cheah Boon Kheng, *Writing Indigenous History in Malaysia: A Survey on Approaches and Problems* (1997).

4. See also Lloyd Fernando, *Cultures in Conflict* (1986). Most of the essays in this book address the issue of intercultural contact and the ways English may be appropriated to write back to the metropolis. It can be nuanced so as to be sensitive to Malaysia's multi-ethnic cultures. English should be used in a self-reflexive manner by all ethnic groups.

5. For a more detailed analysis of my engagement with the ideas of the New London Group, see Wong Soak Koon, *Critical Literacy and Issues of Race, Class-and Gender in the Context of Multiliteracies* (2000).

6. Lily R. Tope's incisive analysis of Yuson's novel helped me frame tutorial questions; see Tope (1998, 117-40).

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LESSONS FROM THE CELLULOID FOREST: CINEMA AND THE CHANGING IDENTITIES OF ASIA

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INTRODUCTION

It was with a clear aim in mind that I embarked on the Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Fellowship. That aim was to know and understand cinema as it has come to define the identities and dominate the collective imaginaries of peoples in Asia. The activities I engaged in, the tasks I accomplished, and the outcomes that resulted from my work were the results of this aim.

Let me begin my report with a personal reflection. As a filmmaker living in the Philippines – a country that belongs to the geographic spread of a continent called Asia, did I ever and do I ever think of myself as Asian when I make films? And when they make films, do my fellow filmmakers living in Asia do so with the thought that they are Asians? As I assume my newfound identity as an emerging scholar, must I conceive myself as an Asian scholar? To what set of meanings does being Asian refer?

Through the years, while concerned mainly with film history and theory, I have often wondered how cinema came to dominate much of our private fantasies and public entertainment. Aware of how cinema started as a western invention and viewing practice that later evolved into a transnational product during Asia's colonial period, I have wondered how cinema became representative of Asia's many identities. I often wonder, is there such a thing indeed as Asian cinema? What is meant by Asia's changing identities and how does cinema affect the process of change? Thus were but some of the thoughts in my mind when I underwent my journey as an API Fellow.

My travel to several countries in Asia may be likened to a virtual journey into a forest. At first, Asian cinema was that forest – draconian, immense and challenging. Its sheer size, diversity and strangeness were enough to frighten the weak of heart. However, like the proverbial journeyman, I took my humble steps and found out that the Asian forest revealed individual nations in the same manner that a forest is composed of individual trees. Those nations were comprised of peoples, their cultures, and their cinemas, after all. So did I learn my first jungle lesson: never mistake the forest for the trees. Thus, did I embark on my travel in Asia: first to Indonesia, then to Malaysia, on to Japan, and lastly to Thailand.

Like the imagined forest with its landscape, Asian cinema has its filmscape – a cinematic terrain I needed to explore. Just as I discovered that there are trees in the forest, I also discovered the fact that there are cinemas in Asia, and not just one either, but many. While these cinemas may all look similar from a distance when one considers Asia as one would a forest, a walk in the woods reveals a cinematic world of the greatest variety of filmic realities and imaginaries.

As I wandered inside the Asian film forest, I also discovered in one thicket a film culture, and in another clearing, another distinct film culture. The multiple identities that cinemas in Asia possessed dazzled me. Their diversity spanned their histories and their practices, their personal visions and state ideologies, local politics and global economics. Overwhelmed by the maddening diversity of film cultures and lost among individual trees and clearings, I soon longed for a sight of the forest. The diversity of cinemas and their relative strangeness to each other ached for something to unify their multiple identities and practices.

Let me now extend my use of the metaphor of a forest to encompass an ecosystem which is essential when I think of Asia as a field of competing film cultures hardly aware of each other's material needs and imaginary pleasures. Asia is not the unified Asia we wish to think

it is when we utter the phrase, 'Asian cinema'. Since colonial times up until nation-states were formed, Asia has remained a fragmented region. Nation-states formed their individual national cinemas to declare each nation's cultural, if not cinematic, individuality. Further, Asia and Asian-ness become problematic terms when one looks at how the formation of nation-states, national cultures and national cinemas are discussed. How do we then reconcile Asia and the independent nation-states, Asian cinema and national cinemas without having the concepts pitted against each other?

Ever since the formation of nation-states, Asia has remained fragmented as a region. When nation-states created their national cinemas, Asia became more divided culturally. To my horror, I see much animosity in Asia's cinemas not only in the imaginaries governing the production of films, but also as reified in the trade and tariff barriers provided for by laws that each nation promulgates to protect a nation's film economy; the censorship and religio-moral laws devised to safeguard social values; and the technological barriers created in order to divide Asia into regional digital markets that isolate one part of Asia from another. Behind the façade of an 'Asian cinema' that posits a united Asia in its terminology and aspirations, Asia has a fragmented cinema and is, in reality, not a united Asia. However, one may likewise ask, why should it be?

This is where I suggest the concept of a forest's ecosystem becomes relevant. As many cinemas are dying or threatened by extinction in the face of rampaging globalisation, and as many film cultures with their distinct film languages are buried in oblivion, it is time to call to mind that the individual trees that we all are, make up a forest. The destruction of one cinema has effects on other cinemas in the region, in the same manner that when trees are cut, the forest becomes disfigured and bald. The cinematic bio-diversity of Asian cinemas must be foremost in our minds as the region embraces globalisation and the future.

This is the second lesson I learned from the jungle: There is no forest if there are no trees. Destroy a tree and you decimate the forest. Cinema has rooted itself not only in collective society but in the individual imaginary as well. That is why it is dangerous to kill one cinema, or to cause it to be killed. In killing cinema, you kill a culture. You also kill personal fantasy.

Cinema is intricately entangled with its self-contained narrative world, with technological materiality, with its economic dependency, its colonial past, its ideology, and its fantastical possibilities. In short, the issues related to studying cinema are as follows: history and colonialism, technology, local and global economics, culture, political systems and ideological persuasions, and the workings of individual and collective imaginaries.

As I moved midway into the forest, I became overwhelmed! My single mission to discover what Asian Cinema is led me to face general issues that have become the defining parameters of my research: cinema, nation, and Asia. In questioning cinema, locating it in a respective country where the nation's patronage allows it to assume the identity of a 'national cinema' became inevitable.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

My first-hand discovery of the cinemas in Asia was a life-changing experience. Face to face with living cultures as I researched the cinemas and lived in the societies that nurtured those cinemas, I gained first-hand knowledge that went far beyond what I could derive from books. I soon realised how impoverished our knowledge is of Asian cinemas.

From Indonesia to Malaysia, from Japan to Thailand, and add to these my experiences in the Philippines and knowledge of cinemas in India, China, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and other Asian countries, I can posit that the cinemas of Asia are individual trees that need to be looked at and studied. The following themes that emerged from my research can be classified under five main headings:

- Colonial Asia: Early Cinemas in Asia
- National Cinema and Its Discontents
- Cinema and Globalisation
- Cinema and the Imaginary
- Colonialism, Nationalism, Globalism: The Changing Identities of Asia and Its Cinemas

COLONIAL ASIA: EARLY CINEMAS IN ASIA

Cinema is not indigenous to Asia. Asians did not invent cinema. So how is it that cinema flourished in such a way that Asian nations began to see in this western invention their identities embodied and projected? Look at what Akira Kurosawa's films have done to our conception of Japan. Consider how Indian Bollywood films have now become the celebrated

promoters of Indian culture. Alternatively, look too, at how kung fu and martial arts movies have conditioned our knowledge of the Chinese. That nations have found their identities in cinema has led to national cinemas becoming carriers of national identities. National film histories are very much a reflection of a nation's socio-cultural and historical evolution.

While the prevailing paradigm that dominates our understanding of cinema is that of the national film culture, my travel in Asian countries made me go beyond the 'national' paradigm. Reflecting on the prevailing national cinemas that served as my entry point in understanding various Asian film cultures, I came upon another avenue of understanding cinema and how it developed in Asia. I went back in time and discovered Asia's early cinemas.

Before the formation of national cinemas, what conditions prevailed in cinema in Asia? The formation of nation-states is a recent invention. In many countries, it was a post-World War II phenomenon. Cinema's arrival and early growth at the turn of the century preceded the birth of many of the nations in Asia. So what was in existence before nations were colonies? Where cinema is concerned, the colonies were the first sites of its growth.

It was a different Asia then. The cinematic landscape of colonial Asia was porous at the time as there were fewer barriers than one now finds dividing Asian nations. The trade tariffs that created economic barriers to the spread of films were not yet in place. Censorship laws that curtail the screening of films from other countries were not yet as arbitrarily devised. In addition, in the case of the digital and electronic spread of films, electronic signals that make DVDs work only in pre-selected geographic regional markets had not yet been invented.

The early cinemas of Asia constituted a far different world from what we know of cinemas in Asia now. The study will doubtless have a serious impact on our understanding of national cinemas as we know them today. As I travelled in Asian countries, for instance, I was dismayed by the lack of serious regard for the origins of cinema. This field of study, being almost terra incognita, was readily dismissed for lack of serious research and investigation. Naturally, this lack could only favour the task of writing about national cinemas. Further, the absence of early cinema history has been superseded by forms of nationalist film writing that deal largely with the time when cinema came into the hands of the so-called Asian 'natives'.

Revealed are film histories that started when cinema came into the hands of Indonesians, Malaysians, Japanese, Thais, Filipinos, and so on. Nationalist writings became the major mode of historical knowledge in many of these nations' cinemas. As such, these nationalist writings consist of events, personages, works, beliefs and practices that favour only those of the film-producing countries. Consequently an Indonesian film history would naturally talk about cinema when it came into the hands of Indonesians, its pioneer filmmakers, canonical works or even when the first kiss was shown in Indonesian movies. Such histories unwittingly became closed narratives feeding only on the history of cinema as it defines the nation at hand. It is conceived to be independent of other Asian nations.

This form of historical writing is completely unlike what I conceive to be the kind of history that will result from a study of cinemas in colonial Asia at a time when there were no closed systems of national boundaries to isolate one Asian country or colony from another. In place of the nations that define the varied film cultures at present, there were colonies that penetrated Asia's countries and settlements.

My study of early Asian cinema history has given me data and instances showing how films, their artists, their filmic practices and their aesthetics were enjoying some degree of mobility and life within the region, less hampered by isolationist laws and practices that are in place today. The identity of those cinemas were complicated and implicated by issues of colonialism in the absence of nationalist identities that gave personality to the films and their practices then.

I hope in the future that the study of early cinemas in Asia may become an academic discipline in itself, taught and learned in schools, and appreciated by the viewing public at large. In the study of early cinema, we may be able to study its origin, its relations with colonialism, its early economic and technological dependency on the West, early audience reception and conceptions of the 'native', and the ideologies and aesthetics engendered by early film forms and practices.

NATIONAL CINEMA AND ITS DISCONTENTS

The emergence of national cinemas came about after the formation of nation-states, attendant to which was the formation of national identities. Cinemas in Asia have been substantially implicated in the creation of national identities. A nation-state seeking to build and propagate such an identity, has sought out cinema as an instrument in nation building. Presently, this is how cinema is regarded in many Asian states. Government regulation of cinema's operations, business behaviour, cultural aspirations, and ideological directions are all obvious signs of how cinema has fallen under the control of the nation-state.

In the process, after starting out as a western invention, cinema has become as national a cultural expression as a people's dances and literature. Very few Indonesians, Filipinos and Malaysians, among others, doubt that their cinemas are native. For many of us Asians, cinemas have been as staple an entertainment fare as the rice we eat.

Nevertheless, how national indeed is cinema? Given the process by which cinema has come to 'nativise' western technology like film through indigenisation, has cinema truly become national if by 'national' we mean representing the totality of a nation's racial, economic, social, religious and ideological composition?

My close reading of the film situation in Asia indicates that the conception of cinema in the national sense has remained greatly unfulfilled. The very notion of a national cinema may thus be questioned for the way it is controlled by an elite few, for its location in a metropolis, for its control of technology and expertise, and its control of capital and therefore of markets. That films have a wide and far-reaching audience does not ensure that cinema is truly 'national'. The consumption of film entertainment is no doubt national, but by no means is cinema 'national' in terms of production and the control of the apparatus and the film's imaginary.

Cinema has remained an elite medium controlled by capitalists, the metropolis and the state. The practice of cinema therefore has remained in the hands of a few: the capitalists, the technocrats, and the powerful. Still, audiences spread across a country may also have power over cinema because of their sheer number. Their potential to impact cinema, however, continues to remain unrealised. Ironically, their number has also been used against them in the sense that as audiences that watch movies swell in number, so too do film capitalists become richer and therefore more powerful.

The existence of national film industries that claim to produce national film products raises crucial questions. For example, in what ways are films national in significance? While there is no doubt that films have helped spread the knowledge and the use of the Bahasa language in Indonesia, or Tagalog in the Philippines, such that these have become the lingua franca of those countries, they only show that the drive to attain a national cinema came at the expense of other equally important elements, like the repression of ethnic and other regional cultures, including the attainment of an Asian cinema.

Marginal ethnic or regional identities (including ethnic and regional languages), are sidelined to favour the hegemonic identity of the dominant culture which is in control of the cinematic apparatus. So in Indonesia we get Javanese cinema; in Malaysia, Malay cinema; and in my country, so proud of its national cinema, I dare to say that we have not yet achieved a national cinema because the cinema that we do have has remained mainly a Tagalog cinema.

In what ways then have these cinemas failed to become national? First, these have remained geographically situated in the city centre whose culture is vastly different from the rest of the country. In the city are found capital, technology, expertise, and a network of relations absent in the rest of the country. Most significantly, it is the imaginary of the city that gives shape to the films produced. Bred in the high culture of the city, this imaginary hardly corresponds to that of the greater nation. In the process, the rest of the nation – the ethnic and regional communities, their realities and imaginations – are all subsumed by the city imagining the nation.

This is the metonymy of imagination, a phenomenon that happens when a part represents the whole. This is when we take the city to represent the nation, which is akin to taking a tree to imagine the forest. While such is often the case, upon closer scrutiny, one senses that so much is repressed when citified sensibilities on film are made to represent the rural realities of the nation.

Yet, despite all the limitations imposed by the fixity

of cinema in the capital, we allow such a condition to persist. Why? The reason is simple: cinema, a novelty a mere hundred years ago, has become a most cherished tradition. By virtue of this position, who dares then question a nation's valued cinema? Cinema in Asia has found its comfort zone in the paradigm of a 'national cinema', but the comforts this offers prove to be deceptive and vulnerable as I shall show in the discussion on a raging issue of our time – globalisation.

CINEMA AND GLOBALISATION

How are national cinemas likely to figure in the new age of globalisation? As global conditions collapse the world into one community, they reveal the effacement and the diminishment of national cinemas. Being less than a hundred years old, efforts to create national boundaries have proven to be so artificial that they already show signs of breaking down.

Notwithstanding the concomitant existence of tariff laws that national governments have decreed to protect native film productions, censorship laws, bigotry and discrimination deeply rooted in religion and social traditions, residual ethnic consciousness and imaginations – all these safeguards of the nation appear to wilt amidst the rampaging march of global forces ushered in by technology, the flow of capital, the speed of communication and the like. We, Asians, must therefore ask ourselves: yes, we are becoming one world, but whose world is it? Can the safeguards of a nation adequately protect local interests in a global world? Who controls the forests?

The national cinemas we all have cherished and protected appear puny and vulnerable in the emerging global film corporation called Hollywood, which enjoys so much money, power, technology and influence. It can buy Asian film talents, the likes of John Woo and Michelle Yeoh. It can even finance the building of multiplexes to showcase their films, create theme parks, and fill up cable channels to secure ancillary markets. There is absolutely no escaping Hollywood's global dominance. Hollywood has become our global government in cinema. Hollywood has become our global film nation.

Looking at the metaphorical forest I was alluding to earlier in my report, I can see how the Asian film forest has evolved over the past century. After its incipience during the age of colonialism, cinema found its local identity in nationalism, and now faces its third identity in globalism. I can also now posit an answer to the question of identity I posed in my API Fellowship research: I find that in the changing identities of Asian countries, media (particularly cinema) functions to change the region's identity, and in the process gets to change its own identity.

What the future holds for cinema in Asia in the age of globalism will put to question many of the safeguards and safety nets that have been conceived and devised to secure our identities as individuals, as nations, and as a region. New challenges lie ahead; and this new age demands that in the age of globalisation, we must pay more attention to matters of the forest. We must continue to be vigilant in watching over the trees.

The third lesson I learned in the jungle is this: as there can be no forest if there are no trees, ergo, every tree is important for a forest to come to be. The law of interdependence and concern for a sense of community must be added to the project of globalisation. In cinema, too, we need to learn and appreciate biodiversity.

The forest is teaching us something; hence we must learn from it. Through the history of cinema in Asia, we learn that from the discontent experienced during the time of colonialism, we were able to forge our identities to favour our present identity as nationals. However, even as we are passionate about our present identities as nation-states, we find that the nation-state has its share of discontents.

The nation-state, so recently formed, cannot fully address the other aspects of our lives and several other paradigms of belonging. Social forces like religion, kinship, communication, sentiments and imagination extend beyond the boundaries of the artificial nation-state and defy the decrees set up by the nation-state. The laws of immigration, as imposed and violated by wars, poverty and terrorism, all point to the vulnerability of national boundaries that cannot be inhumanely imposed when concerns for humanity are raised and provoked. In the end, we are all humans, and the form of bonding – from religion to politics, economy to morality – must find its inspiration from our shared humanity.

In addition, how will cinema shape and be shaped by the global future? Initially, I see signs of decimation of Asian cinemas at the onset of globalisation. In Indonesia, the

production of films has collapsed from a high of 150-300 films a year to an average of only three films annually. In Malaysia, from a high of 100 during the early days, the number has dropped to ten annually. The Philippines, which takes pride in being the fifth largest film producing country in the world with an annual average of 250 films some time back, now manifests a declining industry. Perhaps this year there will only be 80 films – not a cause for rejoicing apparently. In addition, it is not just the numbers that bear looking at but also the quality of the films produced.

But all is not dismal because of globalisation. While many traditional cinemas are losing ground by producing less, there are emerging cinemas in countries whose films were hardly known before. The advance of technology, access to capital, and the far reach of telecommunications now make it possible for works from Penang and Kuching in Malaysia, Iloilo in the Philippines, Kazhakstan, Cambodia and other Asian countries to be seen in several other countries. Globalisation has two faces after all.

On a larger scale, Asian cinema remains in its metonymic stage. The concept of Asian cinema – if we Asians were to make the term useful at all – has to assume importance as a concept and be made to function to favour our cinemas' need to survive. As I speak, the concept of Asian cinema remains unrealised. It is a concept first used by Westerners to describe films from the Far East. After starting out as a term first coined by non-Asians, Asian cinema has slowly been appropriated by Asians themselves. Surprisingly, the term has applied mainly to national film products like those from East Asia.

As it stands, Asian cinema as spoken of in light of film festivals, film conferences and mainstream media, largely projects an Asia that is East Asia: the three Chinas (Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan), Japan and South Korea. India has also fallen within the discourse of Asian cinema. Remaining under represented are larger sections of Asia which remain ignored in international film communities, despite huge numbers in terms of viewer patronage and film production, with film histories that date back to the advent of cinema in the Orient and despite the existence of many film producing capitals in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Arabic Asia, and Central Asia.

Much work is needed for cinematic works in Asia to gain recognition for the term 'Asian cinema' to be of use at all. Admittedly, Asian cinema has yet to attain currency as a useful regional concept signifying a possible convergence of the attributes of the region's varied cinemas, particularly in the emerging new world order – globalisation.

CINEMA AND THE IMAGINARY

I appreciate the struggle among Asian cinemas to survive despite the threat of extinction in the face of menacing globalisation, rising capital costs, the decimation of local cultures, ever-changing technology, and fluid audience demographics. This point brings me to what I consider of significant importance in my research on the cinemas of Asia: my discovery of the imaginary and how it may be of use to issues of cinema and identity.

The subject of the imaginary is something I wish to contribute to the understanding of such complex issues as cinema, nation, and Asia. The imaginary is that which addresses our need to think and symbolise many complex things about ourselves – our realities, our needs, our relations, etc. However, unlike perception that provides us with visible and tangible relations with the physical world around us, the imaginary operates in the principle of absence, or that which we do not see and perceive tangibly. As we are able to perceive the world around us, we can only imagine that which is absent.

The imaginary is thus important in addressing things that many Asians lack: those things that relate to our dreams, aspirations, desires, pleasures and the many things we hope for. But the imaginary may also assume darker forms. It may symbolise our traumas, nightmares, frustrations and greed, our wish for death, and an end to all things. The imaginary can be that which remains unsaid in every word we utter and that which remains unseen in the visible world where we live.

In studying the materiality of the imaginary, let us see how it is generated in cinema. As film is a photographic copy of reality, it lends itself well to the workings of the imaginary. One therefore wonders, what kind of filmic imaginary may account for the multiplicity of cinemas in Asia? In studying films made in the region, it is dismaying to realise that much of this imagination is aimed at stirring animosity and divisiveness among Asian countries.

Look, for example, at films made about World War II and how Asia's national cinemas have made films that were cast by an imaginary born out of trauma and hysteria, suffering and anger. Despite the end of World War II, despite the absence of a real enemy, that which remains as ghosts of the past continues to shape the imaginings we make of our Asian neighbours and ourselves.

Until now, the many countries in Asia that produce films about World War II forever cast the Japanese as brutal enemies. While there is a concrete basis for this screen representation in history, how much of contemporary representation are products of the imagination? I ask that I may know the role of the imagination in shaping much of the films produced today. There is no doubt the war remains as one generative force shaping the film imagination of cinemas in Asia.

However, while the past has lessons to teach us, we continue to live in its shadows so that much of the imaginary governing the making of films is influenced by an absence, meaning, the ghosts of the past. In effect, many of us fail to cope with new and sometimes more challenging tasks because we continue to be haunted by these ghosts of our past, our imaginings.

What I see now is an imaginary that is negatively manifested. As the Asian imaginary is given shape on film, stereotyping gives this imaginary a negative form. Asians very often are represented in negative terms. How many of Asia's national cinemas have made films that cast hatred and division across Asian nations? Even the most contemporary films are not without negative racial stereotyping. The Japanese is often conveniently a yakuza, the Filipina is easily cast as a prostitute, the Indian as a slave labourer, the Muslim as a terrorist, the Chinese as a heartless capitalist, and so on.

Besides the films, a study of how each national cinema has created tariff regulations and censorship laws in order to protect indigenous film industries from the 'corrupting' influences of their neighbouring countries is very informative. But why then are Asian films not circulating as much as they should in Asia if Asia were indeed truly united? On film, Asia is depicted as a divided region. So how can one claim to have a unified Asian cinema? On the other hand, the idea of a pan-Asian cinema remains merely and essentially that – a dream.

It is indeed sad to realise that Asia is imaginary: that force that shapes the filmic imagination of the region is held hostage by larger social forces that generate the production of films. These forces are: capital, technology, power, language, law, religion and morals, all of which restrict rather than liberate the imagination.

How do these forces control the imaginary? From the way we conceive our bodies to the way we shape our nation, from the language that dominates our understanding of the world to the way we conceive our Asian neighbours in the media that feeds us with images – we see the controlling force of our social institutions. The issues of censorship that repeatedly erupt in so many countries inform us of the tension between cinema and society at odds with the role that cinema will play in appealing to the public imagination.

If films are too liberal, if they celebrate sexuality or take a different view of crime or morality, they are sure to be censored. However, the same controlling force – exercised by government or civil society – will have no compunction to blatantly use cinema for propaganda or any capitalist venture in order to profit and secure its own interests.

We may then ask: Who is in control of the imaginary of the cinemas in Asia? In a larger sense, we may ask: is there really an Asian imaginary? I cannot offer immediate answers. I am merely taking my first few steps in the woods. Suffice to say, however, that because of the issues I have raised and the questions that I have asked, you too have grown aware of my lifetime quest for meanings.

For our common good, and in order to make the concept of Asia more useful, let us now start thinking in terms of the forest's ecological balance. Let us see how all of our trees make up the forest. In the age of globalisation, this sense of interdependence becomes an urgent need – if only for our nations, our cinemas, our identities, our Asia, and our world to survive.

COLONIALISM, NATIONALISM, GLOBALISM: THE CHANGING IDENTITIES OF ASIA AND ITS CINEMAS

To sum up, the three identities of Asia that somehow emerged in my research and relate to my study of cinema correspond to the three historical periods that

conditioned the way the region has evolved during the past 100 years, or since the collapse of colonialism, the invention of film, and the birth of nation-states. Born out of colonialism, nationalism and globalism, these identities are colonial, national and global. This does not mean that these are the only identities to be found among the peoples and countries in Asia. One may likewise think of the ethnic, racial, tribal, religious, hybrid, cultural, immigrant, diasporic and other identities. The three mentioned are rather broad strokes to account for how Asia has assumed its identities as it encountered influences from the West.

The first identity, colonialism, was when Asia was designated a geographic region by the West, which pointed to it as the Far East, the Orient, and Asia. Colonialism was therefore a factor in the conception of Asia as a geographic body. However, while the region gained a unifying identity in the name Asia, the reverse seemed to happen in terms of its geographic unity. Invading colonial powers like Spain, Portugal, Holland and Britain cut it up. The convenience conferred by the region's gaining a name only made it easier to turn it into an object of conquest, an easy target and a prized battleground to win and exploit. The period of colonialism endowed Asia with the identity of a colonial subject.

The oppressive condition that lasted for centuries only led to violent reactions from those colonised. Colonial subjects refused to be dominated forever. In the march of history, colonialism – from its forced inception – had already been designed for its own destruction. Oppression could only lead to a violent overthrow of colonialism. The radical liberation of colonies all over Asia gave birth to nations. The notion of the nation came as an inevitable consequence.

The identity that resulted from liberation was nationalism, which came as a repudiation of the former colonial identity and gave way to the transformation from a colonial to a national. Though the path was not easy, it gave those peoples in Asia a feeling of being in control of their own geography, their own islands, their territories, their nations (or as Benedict Anderson has said, their 'imagined communities') and hence, their own identities. This phenomenon of the nation was invented as a consequence of wars, revolutions, treaties and decrees. But as nations sprang from masses of land and strings of islands, the fragmentation of Asia that first came with the earlier colonial invasions have now become legitimised.

The second identity, nationalism, gained its currency from the blood, sweat, and tears shed by millions in order to attain it. Nationalism thus refers to what used to be tribes, communities and colonies.

Now comes the third period, globalism. It argues for a world that has become one global village. Made possible by inventions in technology, the speed of communication, multinational capital, the transnational mobility of people and communities, and many other factors, globalism offers new possibilities in terms of identity. For just as nationalism sought to free itself from the stigma of colonialism, nationalism now will not be spared of the attacks that will doubtless come its way when globalism starts trampling into its territory.

Whatever lessons we learn from colonialism we hope may help us weather globalism. However, if the centuries of colonial power provide no guarantee that we shall withstand the assaults on our nationalist struggle and identity, how certain can we be of the steadfastness of our nations' laws and identities when globalism will have attained its full force even while we speak? As it is, nation-states are already showing signs of vulnerability and weaknesses, even as we also witness strong resistance to protect and insist on nationalism as the defining force behind a nation.

Yet again as we speak, nationalism is undermined day by day by the global flow of capital, advances in technology and communication, the threat of terrorism, the migration of peoples, the melting of cultures, etc. See the signs: countries in Europe, once defined fiercely along their national borders, dropped all pretensions of nationhood and assumed a common currency, the euro, and eased border restrictions by allowing European nationals visa-less travel within the continent's domain. Seemingly, identities are forming differently in the global future. We can name a few of these identities: diasporic, transnational, and global.

Three periods, namely, colonialism, nationalism and globalism, create three identities: colonial, national, global, all of which are likewise reified in cinema. Recall that cinema came at the tail end of the colonial era at a time when much of Asia's colonial powers were

challenged, making cinema, therefore, the child of the late colonial era.

In the Philippines, its arrival came at the most auspicious of times – the fall of the Spanish empire, the start of the American century, and the birth of the Filipino nation. Cinema came at a liminal period when issues of identity were nebulous and porous. Cinema was itself in a nascent state of invention then. Cinema's arrival at the time of the late colonial era also contained and projected an identity that revealed the marks of the colonial.

Many of the cinematic works produced at that time reveal a colonial identity, what with the early films produced by Westerners using devices invented by Westerners and cinematic practices conditioned by Westerners. The natives, no doubt, exercised their incipient participation in the cinematic adventure through their reception. However, the real powers lay in the invention, production, distribution, exhibition and articulation of early cinema in a foreign language. Cinema, at its beginning, was evidently a colonial art and assumed a colonial identity.

When wars and revolutions overthrew the colonial era, the nation filled the void of power and in effect, moulded the resultant identity. Nationalism essentially exercises the power of legitimacy by making a people believe in their ancient origins. They invoke their claim to being natives, a claim that is hard to refute. Nationalism bestows on natives the promise of rootedness to a place, and in their desire to attain nationalism, they have had to spill blood – a sacrifice that deepened the meaning of the word and placed the mantle of legitimacy on the identity evoked.

In the age of globalism, will the fate that met nationalism become the very fate that nationalism will suffer under globalism? I shudder at the mere thought of it. Nevertheless, as I speak, I see how nationalism is challenged, not in a bloody revolution, but in efficient but no less radical, ways. As a child of technology and a form of communication, cinema reflects most clearly the revolution happening around us. It shows how globalism affects our identities.

With the inflow of huge capital from Hollywood, a film studio built in Malaysia stands for the palace of royalty in *The King and I*. A South Korean actor plays a Japanese role in a Chinese film. A Filipina plays a Vietnamese in an American production of a Vietnam War play. All this interchanging of identities has become possible; and to think, we are not yet delving into the synthetic identities a computer is capable of doing, like turning a man into a woman, and then into a dog. Globalism obviously poses major challenges to our notions of nationalism. How we cope will depend largely on how adequately we know and can handle the future.

Let me end with a summary of what the forest and the trees have taught me: never mistake the forest for the trees. There can be no forest without the trees. And as there can be no forest if there are no trees, every tree is rendered important. Having learned all these important lessons, there is a last lesson that the forest can teach us: how to get out of the forest. As the forest has taught me to enter and survive its thick and forbidding jungle, so has it given me a lesson on how to get out of it.

The way out of the forest depends on the knowledge and wisdom from all of the above lessons. The way out depends on how well we can devise our trail from knowing the forest and the trees, being attuned to a forest's configuration and becoming familiar with individual trees. We will see patterns in the seeming chaos of the forest and be guided by our familiarity with individual trees. But it is only when we see the forest and the trees as allies that we will find our way out. Should we turn into their enemies, the forest and its trees have the power to devour us alive.

The Asian cinema constitutes both the forest and the trees in my eyes. The more I know about its history, technology, power and identity, the more I become familiar with Asian cinema and grow confident that I will not be lost in the awesome process of it. In time I hope that I can guide others toward a common future, when we can all look at Asian cinema and determine how it will serve our future.

So far, I am surviving the forest, am I not?

EAST ASIA AND MANGA CULTURE: EXAMINING MANGA-COMIC CULTURE IN EAST ASIA

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INTRODUCTION

It was in the 1980s that Japanese *manga* and *anime* (animation film) were first reported as making major advances into the world stage. Even today (particularly in the current post-bubble era in Japan), some maintain that *manga* and anime, cultural aspects native to Japan, enjoy worldwide popularity. Though *manga* and *anime* have the potential to become global products, the reality is not so simple. In fact, *manga* and its globalisation cannot be fully understood within a framework that is premised on the view that *manga* is a cultural aspect peculiar to Japan. This report discusses the results of investigation conducted on *manga* in East Asia and proposes a new framework for understanding *manga* and comics.

In this report, the following definitions apply: *manga* for Japanese story-telling comics produced after World War II (WWII); comics or BD (*bande dessinee*) for Western story-telling comics; *manga*-comics for works that fit neither of these two definitions nor in cases which include both. These terms are used for convenience to separate the above categories from others such as satirical comic pictures, and one-frame comic drawings and cartoons.

GLOBALISATION OF MANGA

The globalisation trend of *manga* can be broadly divided into two regional areas: Asia, and Europe and the United States.

Asia: Centring on the former colonies of Japan, including Taiwan and Korea (ROK), copies produced without permission called 'pirated editions' or 'imitations' were distributed in the region shortly after World War II. Later in the 1980s, following economic growth and the progress of democratisation in the region, more and more homes began to own television (TV) sets and Japanese-made *anime* and television programmes became popular. In 1991, Star TV (satellite broadcasting for Asian countries) launched programming services and this helped to accelerate an *anime* boom, followed by a *manga* boom. Almost at the same time, copyright-related offices of Japanese publishers were finally put in place and established, and a new age of publication based on formal agreements was realised. In 1997, however, the spread of *manga* temporarily lost steam following the economic crisis in Asia.

Europe and the United States: There had originally been a world market for American-style comics and cartoons.[1] In Europe, BD, which mainly developed in France and Belgium, enjoyed popularity. Japanese *manga* was translated in the US and other locations infrequently and in very limited amounts. In the 1980s, the age of multi-channel satellite broadcasting emerged in Europe (in contrast to Japan and the US, broadcasting stations were owned mainly by the state in most countries). Because these broadcasting stations were facing a shortage of visual media content, they aired large quantities of cheap Japanese *anime* that were not protected by copyright agreements. In or around 1990, the general situation changed greatly as the viewing audience who had watched Japanese *anime* in the 1980s became purchasers of Japanese *manga*. Initially, English versions produced in the US arrived in France via the United Kingdom, but eventually formal agreements came to be concluded directly with publishers. By a curious coincidence, a great quantity of *manga* was exported to the West almost at the same time as they were exported to East Asia.

There are some common features between the above two aspects of globalisation. In terms of market characteristics, *manga* sold on the market is divided into two types: a small number of items with a large volume

of sales and a variety of items with a small volume of sales, without any in-between types.[2] Although it is often reported that Japanese *manga* and *anime* are 'dominating world markets', in actuality only a few – such as Dragon Ball, Sailor Moon, and *Pokemon* – have attained success in world-scale markets.

In turn, many so-called 'maniac' works such as *Evangelion* which has only a limited number of readers even in Japan, have been translated in many different countries. This type of *manga* consists of products classified as 'a variety of items with small volume of sales', and the main purchasers are young otaku (hardcore fans) who wish to buy as many *manga* works as possible. The leader in the world market of comics and cartoons is by far the United States.

Characteristics of the East Asian market compared with the European/US market are as follows:

1. In terms of *manga* types, humorous Japanese works based on everyday life such as *Doraemon* and Crayon *Shin-chan* enjoy tremendous popularity. In addition to manga, the animation film *Ikkyu-san* which has no original *manga* work and the non-*anime* TV drama *Oshin* have enjoyed popularity since the 1980s in many regions.
2. Local *manga* publishers produce Japanese-style *manga* in addition to translated versions of Japanese *manga*, nurture local comic artists, and have gained some market share. In Taiwan and Korea, in particular, *shojo manga* (a genre geared towards young teenage girls) enjoys brisk sales.
3. In the 1990s, supported by a synergy with video games, TV dramas, music and 'fancy goods', *manga* permeated local society at a faster pace and to a wider extent than similar phenomenon observed in the West.

Regarding the first characteristic: *Doraemon* can be termed a classic popular *manga* in East Asia, while the work is almost unknown in the West. Though *Doraemon* was aired in some areas in Europe, it did not enjoy the popularity it had in East Asia. It is not easy to judge how children in a country will respond to *Doraemon*, and it seems that Western TV stations felt there were some risks in broadcasting it. The author assumes that the key factors are whether or not people grow accustomed to the work and whether or not they feel a cultural affinity towards it. Also, the existence of hit dramas such as *Oshin*, a film describing the life of Asian people which invokes a feeling of familiarity from Asians, has produced a synergetic effect among different media – an effect which cannot be expected in the West. Factors commonly seen throughout East Asia – such as a traditional sense of values, the importance of parent-child relationships, family relations, and poverty – have helped to facilitate accessibility to Japanese works, leading to a lower barrier for translation efforts.

Regarding the second characteristic: for many years, pirated editions were published (some East Asians argue that they were not illegal versions because no copyright agreements had existed). There is a history of technology transfer for producing local *manga* works including imitations (in Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong). Japan is idolised as a leading developed nation (reminiscent of Japanese sentiment following WWII in which American culture was idolised), and newly introduced copyright agreements have been made with Japanese publishers.

In Korea, Japanese culture was not officially recognised until 1998 when a ban on cultural imports from Japan was finally eased. In reality, many works from Japanese pop culture had been distributed in the country, but under the label of 'Korean-made'. Boosted by rapid economic growth and the advance of democratisation, a sense of yearning for Japan and things Japanese started to appear among young Koreans. These feelings ran contrary to the general anti-Japanese sentiment in the country.

As there are a considerable number of applications for copyright agreements for *manga* from the former colonies of Japan such as Korea and Taiwan, Japanese publishers made it a condition in concluding agreements that works produced by local artists should appear in local *manga* magazines. In Korea and Taiwan where the market for Japanese *manga* had been developed before the introduction of formal copyright agreements with Japanese publishers, publication of Japanese-style *manga* was already established involving nurtured local artists, with paperbound pocket editions of independent books added to *manga* magazines with several serial works.

The quality of Japanese-style *manga* in East Asia has been relatively high, supported by the fact that local artists have been oriented towards Japanese-style *manga* in their work. In addition, Japanese publishers have encouraged the promotion of local works, and there

are increasingly more opportunities for Korean and Taiwanese works to be published in Japan.

Without a doubt, the globalisation of Japanese *manga* has been backed by the country's relationship with foreign countries based on Japan's industrialised economy.

> Generally, a flow of information and culture is prone to follow a one-way direction from an economically advanced country to a less-advanced nation. . . . The most basic element is the size of the domestic market. . . . In a developed market, high costs can be spent in content production, the costs can be recovered in the domestic market; therefore products are competitive; and incentive toward creative works becomes great. This can be explained in the world market by the example of works produced by Hollywood. At the same time, economic relations between two countries, expressed by such indicators as trade values and the number of tourists, determine the direction of the flow of information and culture. (Ishii 2001) [3]

The flow of Japanese *manga* to East Asia almost nearly corresponds to the gap in economic power and the status of economic relations between the relevant countries, although there are some regional differences in terms of religion, government policies, and national system. As Ishii points out, human resources and cultural background are basic conditions for the production of cultural content. Japanese *manga* and anime have established a domestic market incorporating special expertise and ample human resources.

Supported by the country's economic relations with other nations, Japanese *manga* and *anime* first made their way to East Asia in the 1980s, and then on to Europe and the US. In turn, the advance of Korean and Taiwanese *manga* into Japan, like exports of Hong Kong films, suggests that the economic development of those economies has changed the direction of what was a one-way flow from Japan to East Asia.

Since 1992, translation of overseas *manga* has been prohibited in China, although Japanese *manga* can be observed as having a considerable influence in the country.

The advance of *manga* into other countries is closely related to various complicated conditions including distribution systems, social systems, economical, political and cultural background, human resources, a history peculiar to the cultural field, and the quality and content of work. Therefore, the inroads *manga* has made into other countries cannot be discussed based on the quality of the contents or cultural tradition alone.

FRAMEWORK OF THE CONCEPT THAT MANGA IS A CULTURAL ASPECT NATIVE TO JAPAN

The advance of Japanese *manga* is often understood, both at home and abroad, as an aspect of cultural tradition.

> If comic pictures are defined as a form of popular art, then the history of comic pictures in Korea dates back to the ancient Kokurea era. . . . It is not an exaggeration to say that contemporary Korean comics thoroughly imitate the creative style and the drawing style of Japanese *manga* . . . Korean comics must overcome this tendency to imitate Japanese *manga*-style creative activity and generate a typical style peculiar to Korean comics (Son 2001:45–48).[4]

It is said that anti-Japanese sentiment is stronger and runs deeper in Korea than in Taiwan, which was also a former Japanese colony. This underscores the argument concerning a clash of the indigenous cultures of the two countries. A similar framework for understanding *manga* may also be seen in other regions in East Asia.

In the West, comics are argued as dating back to the wall paintings of ancient peoples. Meanwhile more than a few historians have pointed out that Japanese *manga* originates from various expressions in ancient times, particularly those in *Choju Giga* (scrolls of frolicking animals). In understanding comics within the framework of Korea's own indigenous culture as well as that of other East Asian countries, the argument that comics began with ancient works may be supported by *manga*.

In the West and in Japan, the claim that ancient drawings are the origin of *manga* comics might stem from a desire to appreciate an undervalued field in an indigenous culture, i.e. by seeking out an originator in line with normal tradition. Such an argument is rarely used to attack a culture of foreign origin. In Japan, such circumstances led to the revival of an early-modern word *manga* (comic picture) which has been used in late modern times. Also, on a national level there was a need to adequately appreciate the traditional culture of the country as exemplified by the designation of

national treasures.[5]

The style of Japanese *manga*, which has now come to be globalised, was supported by modern printing technology developed after the Meiji Reformation, specifically the modernisation of newspapers and publishing systems, and was established via influence from American comic strips (serials of story-telling comics with many frames, text balloons and narrations) in the early 20th century. Meanwhile, the framework of *manga* history that directly links contemporary *manga* to pre-*manga* expression before the modern age does not address the issue of discontinuity in the history of *manga*, but places emphasis only on cultural continuity over history.

In fact, in reviewing the developmental process of Japanese comic pictures and *manga*, we find many features connected to Japanese traditional culture, for example, the influence of *kamishibai* (picture-card shows), *kodan* (story-telling), *rakugo* (comic stories), *setsuwa* (narratives), and picture designs associated with the vertical writing of Japanese letters. It is impossible, however, to discuss *manga* within a framework based solely on traditional culture native to Japan because the background factors of *manga* are too complicated.

DUAL STRUCTURE OF MANGA-COMICS IN EAST ASIA

The above issues will be applied to the situation of *manga*-comics in East Asia. It should be noted that the following is based on a summary of the author's research and collected data[6] including several estimates that remain tentative until the study is completed.

In East Asia, a dual structure exists, with Japanese *manga* on one hand and local *manga*-comics on the other. Japanese *manga* first made its way into Hong Kong in the 1960s. In the 1970s, strongly affected by the artistic expression of Japanese *manga*, thin Hong Kong *manga*-comics books (mainly featuring Kung Fu action stories) were sold at street stalls. Subsequently, artists of Japanese-style *manga*-comics set up their own publishing companies and developed a market. Later, these manga-comics publishers came to conclude formal agreements with Japanese publishers. At present, the market for *manga*-comics in Hong Kong is almost equally controlled by Hong Kong-made and Japanese-made works, with the latter holding a slightly larger share.

In Taiwan, *Norakuro* and other Japanese comics were popular when the country was a Japanese colony. Shortly following WWII, Taiwan-made satiric humorous cartoons began to appear (domestic satiric humorous cartoons were published in China and Thailand as early as the first half of the 20th century). In the 1950s, pirated editions and imitation magazines and books of Japanese *manga* emerged[7] and later in the 1980s the publishers of pirated versions developed and expanded into firms that controlled the nation-wide distribution network. Although most of the distributed works were Japanese *manga*, some Taiwanese artists prospered and the market expanded considerably, supported by the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the progress of democratisation. At present, Taiwan is one of the largest importers of Japanese *manga*; at the same time, it is also an exporter of illegal copies of video games and *anime*.

Native to mainland China are *Lianhuanhua* (pictorial prints of serial stories with narratives written above or below the picture) which are said to have originated from novels with illustrations such as *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* during the Sung and Yuan dynasties (see figures 1 and 2 for an example from a series of Chinese *Lianhuanhua*).

Figure 1: An example of *renkanga* (Chinese Linked Drawings). Published in 1990 by Shanghai People's Arts Publisher, originally written by Ya Xun, edited version by Wu Qi Rou, illustrations by Wu Shui Yu, 1990, front cover and pages 48 to 49. Pictures are laid out above text except for some in reverse layout or others in horizontal positions. The front cover is printed in four colours, the inside in a uniform colour.

Lianhuanhua have been published using modern printing technology since the 1920s using the stories of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Journey to the West*. These two comics were very popular and are regarded as the origin of contemporary story-telling comics in China. The author obtained a copy of an illustrated story-type *Lianhuanhua* at a street-side rental library in Guilin. Its

（48）忽然一阵鼾声夹杂着后羿的说话声，"嫦娥，把药放好，明天一起吃。"嫦娥不敢久留，经过蔷薇花丛时，蔷薇花有意拉她一下，她猛力一挣，直向天宫飘去。

（49）镇守南天门的门神，看见嫦娥来了，奇怪地想：天帝明明开除她的神籍，她怎么又能上天呢？便挡住嫦娥的去路，不放她进去。

Figure 2: The basic format is to have the drawing on top and the words at the bottom, but there are cases where the writing is on the top and sides of the drawing. The drawing is classical but elegant. In the case of Japanese rental books, drawings by illustrator-type authors were similarly elegant. An example would be Kojiima Goseki who illustrated 'Kozureookami: 'Lone Wolf and Cub.'

style resembled Japanese illustrated stories and it was a small book containing one frame per page with pictures and text sentences. This type of comics declined in popularity in the mid-1980s,[8] which might be related to the appearance of a considerable number of pirated editions of Japanese *manga*. Distribution of such pirated editions increased while Japanese anime began to be broadcast in the 1980s [A Chinese-version of *Tetsuwan* Atom (Astro Boy) in the same size as *Lianhuanhua* was confirmed]. Currently, many artists and magazines strongly influenced by Japanese *manga* are appearing in China.

If *Lianhuanhua* are regarded as a type of traditional Chinese *manga*-comics, then the emergence of Japanese *manga* in China may possibly have supplanted Chinese tradition. A similar replacement occurred in Japan following WWII, when *Tezuka*-style story-telling *manga* supplanted illustrated stories by Soji Yamakawa and others.

It is assumed that publications similar to *Lianhuanhua* were published and distributed in Taiwan and East Asian countries inhabited by overseas Chinese merchants. Mr. Kuiyi Shen describes *Lianhuanhua* in English as follows:

> [In 1935] every afternoon at two o'clock, publishers brought newly published comics there [the center of comic publishing in Shanghai], and then at about six o'clock, the new comics appeared in the street bookstalls. . . .

During the late 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, besides the World Book Company (which published a popular *Lianhuanhua* book *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in 1927) and a few other big publishers involved in this business for a short time, there were about 20 small publishers which published comic serials and no more than ten professional cartoonist workshops.

> Each cartoonist (a kind of traditional workshop) usually had several apprentices working for him. This master-apprentice system continued until the beginning of the 1950s.[9]

Meanwhile in Hong Kong a system of in-house division of labour was introduced into the territory influenced by the production style of American comics, together with a corporate copyright system. Wong Yuk Long who started the system of division of labour denied the influence of the US (Mr. Wong is the original artist of the Hong Kong comic *The Chinese Boxer*, which appeared in 1971 and is still sold on the market. He currently heads Jade Dynasty Pub. Ltd.).

On the other hand, the influence of Hong Kong films and the production system for *Lianhuanhua* might be the basis for the division of labour. In Hong Kong, newspapers, magazines and comics are displayed at street stalls in the evening, which is the same as Lianhuanhua. A production-publishing-distribution system similar to that of *Lianhuanhua* is seen all over East Asia, not just in Hong Kong. These include circulating libraries, distribution via street stalls, cartoonist workshops and group production under a master-apprentice system. Such a system was also observed in Japan in the past.

In Korea, the emergence of teahouses that sell newly published comics and Internet cafes has made traditional circulating libraries, *man-hwa-bang* (comic shops)

appear small and insignificant in comparison. Today, in addition to publications created by major publishers, *manga*-comics offered at rental libraries are popular in Korea, and are produced and published in factory-like workshops. They are called 'everyday comics' because they are published on a daily basis (Figure 3 and 4).

Figure 3: A Korean rental *manga*-comic, 'Great Killer' volume number seven published by BEST COMICS in 1998. The attitude in the character's expression is reminiscent of the 'Contemporary Japanese Comic Strip,' and the influence of Japanese *manga* can be seen in the drawings. There are nine volumes, each with the same cover design.

Figure 4: A type of secret weapon? Because the pistol is bent, the bullet's trajectory twists and turns. These kinds of outrageous ideas are another interesting aspect of marginal media.

They seem to resemble rental *manga* in Japan that declined in popularity in the 1960s.[10]

Chie Yamanaka describes the situation as follows using a book by Son Sang-Ik as her reference:

> It is said that *manga* in the form of independent volumes appeared in Korea two to three years after the 1945 liberation. . . . In those days, publishers were very small businesses and distribution was limited to only local networks, and no independent *manga* books were displayed on bookstore shelves. Rather, *manga* books were placed at the storefronts of stationery shops or toyshops to attract customers. In the mid-1950s, Chappan appeared, which were street stalls that displayed *manga* in or around the marketplace and payment was received from passersby who read the books at the stalls. . . . A new system was developed under which publishers supplied *manga* to newly established wholesalers who then supplied *manga* to *jwa-pan*. Even today, *jwa-pan* are seen everywhere in town . . . and are being developed into comic shops.[11]

In Indonesia, circulating libraries called *taman bacaan* (reading gardens) existed and rental *manga*-comics were distributed there.[12] Indonesian versions of rental *manga* were strongly affected by American comics, and increased in popularity during the 1960s and 1970s. However, in the 1980s, they were supplanted by new American comics. The distribution network connected publishers of rental books, wholesaler-bookstores in large towns, and *taman bacaan*, and the spine of books contained the address of the wholesaler-bookstore but not that of the publisher. Rental books are usually unicoloured and contain about 50 to 60 B6-sized pages (Figure 5). About ten works from a popular serial, which had appeared in a magazine, are combined into

Figure 5: Rental *manga*-comics at *taman bacaan* in Indonesia. The front cover of Sang Penari Setan is by Shnthy Sheba, details unknown. The sensational and provocative cover gives one an impression of a marginal culture.

an independent book of the same size. However, there existed no royalty system, and all original manuscripts were bought up.

In Thailand, *manga*-comics distributed for sale at street stalls are nearly the same size as rental books in Indonesia but are thinner, containing only 30 to 50 pages. Popular contents include monster stories, with the front cover being multi-coloured and excitingly provocative and the contents unicoloured (Figure 6).[13] In the evenings, these publications are lined up in street stalls in towns and are priced at 5 baht (15 yen). They are cheap when compared with the price of a meal at stands in Thailand that go for 40 baht. In contrast, Japanese *manga* are expensive at 40 to 50 baht (120 to 150 yen). Purchasers of Japanese *manga*, Hong Kong *manga* and translated versions of American comics are limited to the children of the new middle class in Bangkok, while people in the low-income class, as well as farmers and blue-collar workers love 5-baht *manga*-comics.

The obvious dual structure of *manga*-comics can be seen in Thailand: on one hand, there is Japanese *manga* for young people in the new middle class or higher social classes that emerged during the rapid economic development of the country, and on the other, there are local versions of *manga*-comics that are strongly influenced by Japanese *manga*. It is thought that a similar trend of dual structure exists to some extent throughout other regions as well.

In Indonesia, Japanese *manga* are read by people in the upper income bracket and sold at shopping malls comprising stores, amusement halls, restaurants and bookstores. In addition, in such shopping complexes, you can see a large number of pirated versions of Japanese 'cute' goods and other Japanese pop culture products. If one wanted to buy a used book (an old rental book) one has to go to a secondhand bookstore on the so-called black market that is popular but involves a certain amount of risk.

Japanese *manga* (pirated editions or imitation versions) and local works are distributed under the same limited and marginal production-distribution system. However, the market has developed while continuing to transform, owing to industrialisation and the introduction of formal copyright agreements. In Hong Kong, local comics and Japanese *manga* have co-existed, while competing with each other: one comprises American comic-type Hong Kong works in thin and multi-colour volumes containing one work, and the other Japanese-type

Figure 6: Covers of *manga*-comics selling for 5 baht each at a stall in Thailand (titles and publishers unknown). Horror-type monsters and the sensational pictures create a unique provocative nature and remind the author of Japanese rental *manga* in the old days.

magazines containing multiple serials and independent books. In Korea, the market is broadly divided into Japanese-type *manga*, local works of major publishers, and rental books of 'everyday comics'.

In Thailand and Indonesia, the market is clearly divided into two segments according to reader group – one for Japanese-originated *manga*-comics and the other for local comics. The purchasing group consisting of society's middle class has matured, and as a result, the former dual structure either has disappeared or become blurred. Today there remains a difference mainly in the characteristics of distribution and types of media.

MANGA-COMICS AS MARGINAL AND MIXED CULTURE

The dual structure corresponds to the difference in distribution style and the gap in the purchasing power of middle and lower class, thus relating the *manga* to economic power and economic relations. An identical dual structure also existed in Japan in the past, and it remains today in a different sense.

The *manga*-comics sector, including *Lianhuanhua*, which are sold in street stalls, stationery shops and toyshops, resembles the *Akahon manga* and picture book sector in Japan. (*Akahon* originally meant popular fiction with narratives in the Edo period, but in recent years, it has come to mean books sold in marginal publication-distribution systems, in contrast to *manga* that are sold in major publication and distribution systems). Previous studies on Japanese *manga* have placed emphasis on Akahon and rental book media, partly because Osamu Tezuka, originally an artist of *Akahon*, and rental *Gekiga* (Japanese contemporary story comics) contributed greatly to the progress of Japanese *manga*, and partly because fans and researchers of manga generally attach themselves to these marginal cultures.

A history of post-war *manga*, which was established after the 1970s, has duly recognised a revolution in creative works that was brought about by an interface between the lower-grade sub-genre and major genre of *manga* publication and distribution. In a sense, the marginal sector including *Akahon*, rental *manga*, erotic *manga*, and coterie magazines of amateur *manga* artists is revitalizing *manga* published by major central publishers, serving as a driving force for dynamism toward development, and reflecting the vitality of *manga* as popular culture. Therefore, it is considered that even sensual expressions as well as scenes of violence are of significance in that they contribute to popular culture.

Like *Lianhuanhua* and rental *manga*-comics in East Asia, Japanese comic pictures and *Ponchi-E* (combination of letters and pictures) of the past largely deviate from the modern outlook of art, in which genuine art using letters is represented by literature and genuine art using pictures by paintings. Therefore, comic pictures and *Ponchi-E* of the past are positioned as a marginal and mixed type of culture, and for this very reason, they have potential vitality transcending the borders of different media.

Then, how and at what stage in *manga* history did Japanese *manga* gain the competitiveness that enabled its globalisation? One reply may be the time at which *manga* began to include themes particularly geared towards young people who had reached puberty and early adolescence. Although extreme expressions of sex and violence have been condemned the world over, these two factors nevertheless symbolise the growth process of young people, and therefore Japanese *manga* adopted these two factors as its main themes. In this way, the age structure of readers was gradually expanded and at the same time, the market for *manga* was developed with increased diversity in genres and themes for *manga*.

Importantly, as there was no actual norm for *Akahon* and rental *manga*, styles of Osamu Tezuka's works and rental *Gekiga* changed drastically to encompass youth as its readers. In the late 1960s, the *Gekiga* expression in *Shukan Shonen* Magazine, a weekly boys' magazine, became popular and was perceived as a major style, serving as a breakthrough to expand the scope of readers.

The covers of 5-baht books in Thailand and rental books in Indonesia are somewhat sensational and provocative. Their readers are not limited to children but also enjoyed by older readers in their adolescence as well as female readers. Japanese rental books also include adolescents as its readers. In addition, *Lianhuanhua* were not produced solely for children and the same can be said for *Kusazoshi* (picture books) in the Edo period.

Major publishers could have created enlightening and educational content and media based on a modern view that made a distinction between innocent children and mature adults. In contrast, the borderline between

child and adult has seemed ambiguous in the sector of marginal publishers. Such a 'delay' in modernisation, i.e. the fact that contrary to major publishers, marginal publishers have delayed establishing a modern view for children, helped to bridge the gap between the marginal and major sectors and led to the success in involving adolescent readers. In addition, it is the author's impression that people in East Asia have no concept of a generation gap between children and adults while in the West people seem to have a cultural tendency to separate the two as the norm.

If the dual structure of *manga*-comics in East Asia is based on the same cultural background as in Japan, so far Japan alone could trickily utilise the 'delay' in the progress of the unique development of *manga*. Studies of Japanese *manga* have paradoxically attached significance and value to the 'delay'. While the author is not certain whether the same applies to East Asia, he is certain that such a supposition is interesting in clarifying what Japanese *manga* is.

However, if the supposition is applicable only to the framework of culture native to Japan, that would mean that other regions can do nothing more than imitate Japanese *manga*. Also theoretically, a characteristic specific to each region or country and matching each dual structure would have to be discovered. This would then support the theory that the creation of a country's own *manga*-comics has eliminated an invasion by Japanese culture.

Preconditions for globalisation of popular consumption-based cultures are economic and social elements such as industrialisation, provision of an information infrastructure, and a mature middle class. The author does not infer that culture is an upper structure of a particular economy. Today, the globalisation process is advancing in complicated circumstances where a particular culture has a range of consumption behaviour and conversely, particular consumption behaviour is positioned as part of the culture.

Manga-comics are considered part of contemporary popular culture, and they clash or mix with other media and different cultural aspects in the same way that the general consumption market does. Such a situation can be understood if we review the formation and development process of Japanese *manga* and the reality surrounding *manga*-comics in East Asia. In their development, *manga*-comics have clashed with different cultures from the very beginning. For example, Japanese manga were impacted by the West and were affected by American comic strips during their developmental process. In addition, Hong Kong *manga*-comics were established via the influence of Japanese *manga*. A dual structure, with *manga*-comics produced by major publishers on one hand and those as a marginal culture on the other, can be considered as a cultural clash within a country. Such dual structures in East Asia reflect the influence of Japan and the United States.

If this idea is realistic, then *manga*-comics are defined as a cross-cultural phenomenon produced by different cultures. Kazuko Horikoshi describes the globalisation of *manga* and *anime* as follows:

> (The globalisation of Japanese *manga* can be explained) as a global result in which Japanese-made works have encountered local cultural features, generated something like a chemical reaction, and then accumulated individual cases in successive encounters. . . . (Many *anime* works which have made inroads into other countries) have very few features that are peculiar to Japan. In a sense, their lack of indigenous characteristics, and strongly fictitious settings, have helped them to make their way into different countries and facilitated the formation of a preference towards *anime* among local people. . . . While we export *manga* and *anime*, recipients in different countries are simply judging Japanese works excellent as consumers.[14]

Reportedly, works created by Disney Studios featured a reduced amount of 'American characteristics' during the process of its globalisation.[15] In turn, the works produced by Hollywood, the global leader with a well-established industrialised domestic market, continue to incorporate truly American characteristics which have become symbols of Hollywood.

In addition, Japanese *anime* and *manga* may at times contain many Japanese features to a similar extent, rather than being works without nationality. As discussed above, each culture in East Asia has its own unique characteristics but they generally accept foreign culture generously. Foreign consumers do not merely adhere to Japanese *manga* works. Sometimes their brand preference for character goods such as Hello Kitty and Snoopy is strong and sometimes they prefer Japanese brands in general.

The author uses the terms 'Hollywood type' and 'Beatles type' in explaining Japanese *manga* in a foreign country. The Beatles were obviously influenced by American rock 'n' roll and R&B. However, during the process of their globalisation the established Beatles-brand music style was rooted in different regions and then developed into regional pop music everywhere in the world. Today nobody says that the Beatles were part of the invasion of British culture and it may be possible to consider that the globalisation of *manga* has followed an identical process. The popularisation of the Beatles music was a cross-cultural phenomenon, and its globalisation and cultural characteristics cannot be explained according to the specific features of British culture.

The globalisation of *manga* is an interesting phenomenon when such a two-sided perspective is taken into account. Hiroshi Odagiri paid attention to a combination of different cultures: Japanese-origin contents and local culture in different countries. In his words, "An appreciation of *manga* works abroad does not have any significance. Resultant changes brought about by the Japanese contents are the true value." [15]

In East Asia, people are keen on catching up with Japan, and appreciate *manga*-comics with increased motivation. In turn, the concept of a marginal genre involving a sense of 'delay' and a borderless interface of two sectors cannot be accepted easily. However, the viewpoint of the interface may encourage the further development of *manga*-comics in East Asia, and there we can find the possibility of interchanges of different cultures through *manga*-comics and other popular culture.

A framework, which sees a cross-cultural interchange in *manga*, may be a touchstone toward such possibility. The author believes that the globalisation of *manga*-comics should be understood as a phenomenon that occurs between their global nature and the characteristics of indigenous culture.

Notes

1. Comics, represented by *Superman* and *Batman*, are rather serious and realistic in nature and involve story-telling using a lot of frames, whereas cartoons are generally simplified and contain exaggerated drawings including a wide range of types such as one-to-several-frame cartoons, and animation films such as *Mickey Mouse* and *Peanuts*. These words have not been strictly defined.

2. Hirohito Miyamoto, "American Manga, Likely to Become Interesting" in "Manga-no-Ibasho (Whereabouts of Manga)", *Mainichi Shimbun*, 9 Feb. 2001. He reports on the situation of manga in the US. As far as the author knows, a similar situation is happening worldwide.

3. Kenichi Ishii, "Chapter VIII. International Distribution of Culture and Information" in *Popular Japanese Culture in East Asia*, ed. Kenichi Ishii, Soso-sha, 2001, 212-3, 216.

4. Son Sang-Ik, "The Situation of Comics in Korea" in *Pictorial Record – Asia in Comics, Where Are We Heading for?* Ed. Asian Center of the Japan Foundation, 2001: 45-8. The Korean comic picture in ancient days refers to a woman's face painted comically on the wall of burial sites in the fifth century. Son is an exceptional researcher who studies and writes about the Korean manga market from his unique point of view.

5. This paper owes much to the presentation by Hirohito Miyamoto's research group on *manga* history, *History of the Word Manga*, (30 March 2002) as well as its background information. Miyamoto's research will likely be instrumental in completely changing the framework of the view on Japanese *manga*. Miyamoto, "The Origin of Manga; Established as an Impure Genre. 110 Literal Themes from Around the World. Manga and Literature." *Weekly Asahi Encyclopedia*, *Asahi Shimbun* Nov. 2001: 292-5.

6. A survey in 1993 conducted at Hong Kong Comic Publishing Company; trips to Taiwan and Korea in 2000 to gather information on the situations regarding *manga*; the author's book *Manga and Its Global Strategy*, Shogakkan: 2001; research in Thailand and Indonesia in 2001, with fellowship granted by API (Asian Public Intellectuals) sponsored by the Nippon Foundation; refer to Fusanosuke Natsume's "The Situation and Possibility of Comics in East Asia" in *Asia Center News* no. 20, (2002): 10-14, at the Japan Foundation's Asian Center.

7. Please refer to Pictorial Record of the History of Taiwanese comic pictures for "Special Exhibition of the History of Taiwanese comic pictures from 1945-2000" held by the National Museum of History (Taipei, 2000).

8. Wang Yong Sheng, "Developing Chinese Comic pictures" in op. cit. *Pictorial Record for 'Asia in Comics'*: 35.

9. Kuiyi Shen, Lianhuanhua and Manhua – picture books and comics in old Shanghai; John A. Lent, *Illustrating Asia – Comics, Humor Magazines and Picture Book*, University of Hawaii, 2002. 104- 5.

10. op. cit. *Comics and Their Global Strategy* by Natsume (in Note 8), 135–6; op. cit. "The Situation and Potential of Comics in East Asia" by Natsume, 12.

11. Chie Yamanaka "Position of Japan in Korean Manga

– History of Accepting Japanese Manga" in *Annual Report of Human Science* (Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University), Mar., no. 22 (2001): 127.

12. Fusanosuke Natsume, "Taking a Stroll in Asian Comics" in the magazine *Da Vinci*, Nov., (2001): 135.

13. Based on the author's interviews with the following persons conducted from June 26 to July 6, 2001: Staff of Gramedia Editing Dept. at Elex Media, a translation and publishing company of Japanese *manga* in Jakarta; Jonathan L., employee at *Ani-Monster*, an information magazine focusing on *anime* which is based in Bandong; Agus Dejamico, the author's acquaintance residing in Bali and rental book collector.

14. Kazuko Horikoshi, "International Tour for Comic Pictures", in the magazine *Comic Fan* no. 15, Zasso-sha, 2002, 104-5.

15. Tetsuo Arima. *What is Disney?* NTT Publishing, 2001, 37.

16. Hiroshi Odagiri, "Front Line of Internationalisation – Overseas Business of Manga and Anime" in the magazine *Comic Fan* no.16, June 2002 in the special feature: "Manga in the World," 21; other references including Kazue Kawahara *Children's View in Present Days* (Chuko Shinsho, 1998).

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN POLICE INSTITUTION IN THAILAND FROM THE 1930s TO THE 1950s

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INTRODUCTION

Between the 1930s and the 1950s, corresponding to the regime of Field Marshall Phibun, the Thai police played a particularly crucial role in Thai history. In those years, the Thai police made such rapid progress that by 1956, it was strong enough to challenge the military's ascendancy in the country. It was believed that the Thai police then possessed better weaponry than their military rivals and had achieved a rough numerical parity with the army. Police General Phao Siyanon, who was the Director General of the Thai police from 1951 to 1957, enjoyed considerable power in politics through the police's institutional base. US specialists saw Phao as the man most likely to succeed Phibun.

Most academic works that deal with the history of the Thai police have shown great interest in the close relationship between the police and national politics.[1] According to these works, the police and Thai politics are related in at least two ways.

First, political leaders seem to use the police as an instrument to generate and manifest political influence. Political leaders often intervene in the personnel management of the Police Department and control its activities. They use the police force to enhance their political power because the police possess the manpower and weapons. For its part, the military has played an important role in Thai politics as well by relying on the police for support. Furthermore, the military officers in power often intervene in the Police Department by having the people they select appointed to key positions in order to help politicians gain more power.

Second, the police themselves want to be powerful in Thai politics. For example, General Phao built and maintained the power and stability of the Police Department by using the police for political purposes. After Phao was appointed Deputy Director General in 1947, he rapidly made the police a political instrument.

Over time, the Thai police has been seen as a significant political power, having played a key role in Thai politics, a role far more significant than just that of an arm of the state that controls the people. Rather, the police force is one of Thailand's important institutions in the modern nation-state formation, alongside education, conscription and taxation, all of which were institutions reformed in the early years of the 20th century for the sole purpose of controlling people in a more direct manner. The Thai police system is highly important in this respect because the police have a wide variety of tasks, among them the guarding of the borders, immigration control and censorship, in addition to keeping public order.

But how did the Thai police begin to exert such massive influence? This paper seeks to examine the crucial period in Thai history when the Thai police as an institution dramatically expanded and became a dominant force in public life.

SEEKING POLICE OFFICERS FROM HALF A CENTURY AGO

One unique kind of material from which we can gather fragments of the past in Thailand would be cremation volumes or funeral books, which are published in memory of dead people. Of these, there are countless volumes, some of which are available in secondhand bookshops. Some cremation volumes of police officers include their memoirs or autobiographies, or biographies edited by their families and friends. These are useful in the sense that one can read about the officer's thoughts while they were actively engaged in the police force. As these documents show how the police controlled people in

actual situations, this study began by gathering a variety of cremation volumes of police officers from the past.

What were the Thai police officers like just before Phao's rapid climb to the top? A police colonel who graduated from the Police Cadet School and started working at the Metropolitan Police Bureau in 1938 recalls:

> In those days a policeman needed to have *nak leng* (strongman) characteristics and should drink alcohol, smoke opium and marijuana much more than the *nak leng* did. After all, other policemen tended to ridicule any other policeman who did not do so as they were then not seen as true men.[2]

According to the policeman's memoirs, the word *nak leng* refers to a Thai-style strongman who is often the head of gangsters. A *nak leng* must be tough and brave, loyal to his friends, and able to exercise informal power in a community owing to his personal qualities.[3] A police officer, who held the position of Sub-Inspector at the Samranrat Police Station in Bangkok in the early 1940s described one of his superiors as follows:

> He was an inspector who looked like *nak leng* . As soon as a quarrel started, he would strike a blow…all *nak leng* in our precinct were afraid of and look up to him with great respect. They offered to serve voluntarily as his spies…This meant that if there was a robbery in our precinct we could arrest criminals if we had evidence at once...[4]

Another police officer who once served under Police General Phao said that shortly after the Second World War, there were many young police officers at the Patrol Division of the Metropolitan Police Bureau who were hot-blooded. These officers, including himself, often went out to seek fights with gangsters in the name of police patrol.[5]

Provincial police officers also possessed the same characteristics as the metropolitan officers as evinced in the case of Police Major General Khun Phantharakratchadet (Khun Phan), a famous police officer who served from 1929 to 1962. He played an important role in the suppression of banditry in the provincial area. Bravery and *nam cai nak leng* (the kindly feelings of strongman) made his work of suppressing bandits a very successful one.[6] His experiences clearly indicate that these successes were more a result of his personal qualities than of the organisation of the police force by the state. Khun Phan was in the position of Commander of the Phathalung province from 1939 to 1942, after which he was transferred to other provinces because of his expertise in suppression. After he was transferred, Phathalung villagers suffered from banditry again because of his absence.

Heavily distressed by this turn of events, the villagers of Phathalung remembered Khun Phan and discussed how they could get him back.[7] They then petitioned the Police Department for his return and it was done.

Another interesting episode has to do with the suppression of Sua Fai by the police in a district in the Suphanburi province. The word *sua* or *ai sua* (fierce tiger) is used to refer to famous bandits.[8] Sua Fai exercised informal power over those in the community, and was looked up to by them to such an extent that they called him *khru* which means master. In this case, police officers were dispatched to the village, where they eventually developed close ties with the villagers. Shortly hence, the villagers began to rely on the police rather than on Sua Fai. How did this happen?

For one thing, the police officers entertained the villagers by staging *likee* (a Thai traditional dramatic performance and one of the most famous forms of amusement enjoyed by the common people) during some festivals. After winning the villagers' confidence, the head of the police then talked to Sua Fai to persuade him to stop his wrongdoing.[9] That the villagers became attached to the police officers because the latter provided them with entertainment is an indication that these villagers put their confidence in the police officers as individuals rather than as a collective or as members of an institution.

In addition, some officers assumed that their personal qualities were more important than the laws and regulations at hand. A police officer who was Deputy Superintendent of the Sukhothai province in 1939 recounts how he dealt with local *nak leng* :

> Sukhothai province had a lot of *nak leng* . Khun Pho (the Deputy Superintendent) joined and sought quarrels with *nak leng* , and came to blows with them. But he never filed cases against them. Thus, *nak leng* looked up to him as a true man and were willing to be his followers.[10]

By not filing cases against the *nak leng* with the state agencies, the deputy superintendent earned the admiration and loyalty of the *nak leng* .

In summary, the suppression of gangsters in urban areas and of banditry in rural areas appeared to depend largely on police officers' personal qualities. Furthermore, their styles often resembled those of *nak leng* . Some officers apparently preferred these styles to those of the state agency.

These characteristics of the police did not always bring about positive effects, of course. Indeed, in the six years Phao was Director General, the Thai police were criticised for brutality, corruption and the politically-motivated murders they committed. The notoriety of the police culminated in 1957 when the Bangkok press published several articles on their participation in opium smuggling, bribery cases and widespread election pay-offs.[11]

But in the first place, how were these characteristics of the police officers in general related to the state of the police organisation at that time?

THE THAI POLICE IN GENERAL PHAO'S ERA

It is true that the Thai police institution in the 1950s, trained and equipped by agents of the United States such as those belonging to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were well organised and potent enough to challenge the military's ascendancy over the country. The size of the police force had expanded dramatically under Phao. In 1949, the police formed a mounted division, a mechanised division, a tank division, a mobile division and a speedboat division.

After the suppression of the Manhattan Rebellion in 1951 when the navy's attempt to take power was aborted, Phao transferred the navy's coastal patrol duties to his police. In 1953, the Border Patrol Police and the Police Aerial Reconnaissance Unit were established. The Border Patrol Police was one of the major manifestations of US aid during this period, as shown by the following facts: it was better trained and had excellent operation skills compared to any other armed element in Thailand.

While the aforementioned situation was also often attributed to Phao's political ambitions and skills, it remains imperative to go over the factors affecting the Thai police organisation itself.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLICE OFFICERS

Similarities between the police officers of the Phao period and those of the pre-Phao period have been noted to exist. In other words, the policing of people in actual situations continued to rely more heavily on the personal qualities of officers than on the efficiency of the organisation itself. Some diplomatic documents of the United States in the early 1950s complained about the police officers' inefficiencies despite the highly organised Thai police system.[12] However, the development of the organisation was not necessarily accompanied by efficient operations because the traditional management style of the police as an institution was personal rather than institutional.

Above all, Phao himself was the *nak leng* of *nak lengs*[13] as was observable in his personnel management style. After 1948, the year that marked a rapid increase in the size of the Thai police, Phao often manipulated the position of the police to the extent of neglecting its original system of managing personnel issues.

A good illustration of Phao's personnel manipulation is provided by the case of Luan Homronran, who belonged to one of the army's rebel units in 1933. Just after the government successfully quelled a rebellion, Luan sought refuge in Vietnam only to return to Thailand in 1949. A year later, Phao invited him to dinner and asked him to be a police officer, tasked with the handling of Vietnamese refugees in the northeastern provinces.

As per Luan's recollection, Mr. Phao told him, "No one can deal with the matter as well as you, Pi Luan (Luan Homronran), because you know the Vietnamese language and their disposition very well." To this, Luan countered that going into police work would reduce his income. Undaunted, Mr. Phao declared, "You are worried about money, aren't you? Salaries depend on me. Bargain with me, and I'm sure you will be a police."[14]

These last words of Phao's indicated that he had no intention of adhering to the existing salary system. So Luan Homronran started working as a police officer in early 1951, following which he was assigned to deal with the Vietnamese refugees in Thailand.

Meanwhile, Phao himself lured naval officers to the police department soon after the Manhattan Rebellion.

He founded the Marine Police and engaged Chuan Kosonnawi, one of the navy officers Phao knew very well, as the first commander of the Marine Police.[15]

In addition, Phao used the police as a political instrument. He developed patron-client relationships with his own men in the police force and used them to assassinate his enemies.[16] He also became wealthy from opium smuggling and through his support of prostitution, gambling and other shady operations.[17]

A BUREAUCRATIC DISCREPANCY

It is necessary to emphasise that there is a discrepancy between provincial administration and the administrative styles of the central and the special divisions. A look at the Thai police as an organ of the state for controlling the people between the 1930s and the 1950s would likely lead one to say that its function in the provincial arena was not augmented as much as expected. The major job of the provincial police at that time was the suppression of *jon phu rai* (bandits) and its success largely hinged on the individual policeman's personal qualities.[18]

The provincial police was also still consistently short-staffed, while central bureaus experienced several transitions in the organisation of divisions and the regulations relating to them.[19]

In 1946, Luan Sanittulayarak left for his new post in the Songkhla province where he became Commander of the Regional Headquarters 9 (the southern provinces). When he arrived at Songkhla, he noted:

> The official residence was locked and there was no one to receive me despite that I had made known the date of my arrival to them in advance. …No one has any sense of responsibility…even the provincial governor was absent because he was suspended at that time.[20]

He also complained that police officers in the southern provinces in those days did not strictly enforce discipline. They smuggled rice and buffalo to Malaysia at every opportunity, suggesting that the preference for personal management over regulations or discipline easily produced bad results, that is, corruption.

The experience of Luan Sanittulayarak was an extreme case that took place immediately after the end of the Pacific War. However, through the 1940s and the 1950s, the problems of provincial police did not receive much attention and the reinforcement of the police force was concentrated in the central bureaus or new special divisions. The geographic distribution of the police force in 1953 indicated a concentration of the police force in Bangkok and its relatively scant presence in provincial areas.[21]

In contrast to the provincial police, some sections in the Central Bureau expanded steadily and worked very well because of the importance of those sections in terms of generating revenue. Revenue was mostly sourced from fees derived through the granting of alien identity cards and various licences to pawnshops and vehicles, among other activities, about half of which took place in Bangkok.[22]

Meanwhile, the operations of the provincial police to control people, such as those in the immigration division, were overshadowed by their political activities.[23] After Field Marshal Sarit ousted Phibun and Phao via a coup d'état in 1957, the political power of the police force declined because one of Sarit's first actions after the coup was to emasculate the police. However, the police force as a mechanism for controlling the people remained, and was to develop continuously.

CONCLUSION

The findings of the study suggest that between 1930 and 1950, the system of controlling the people by the Thai police relied more on the personal qualities of individual police officers than on the police system itself. It was more flexible in practice than expected. For the most part the Thai police force was an instrument of suppression rather than a force for promoting the welfare and safety of the community. As long as the police officers tried to suppress gangsterism or banditry, the system of personal management compensated for the shortage of police officers in the provincial area – sometimes with positive results.

However, the reliance on the personal styles of social control also had adverse side effects, among them corruption and the abuse of power for political purposes. Moreover, the *nak leng* -like characteristics of the police officers and the traditional employment of personalised management styles made it easy to create patron-client relationships within the organisation.

What is interesting to assess is the continuity and discontinuity of the key characteristics of the Thai

police between the period this study was conducted and the present. Past problems remain visible up till now. The Thai police, for example, is often criticised for its corruption. The police department is believed to harbour syndicates involved in corruption. It is also estimated that well over half of the regular police officers working in police stations are involved in syndicated corruption. Moreover, the money they collect is used for position-buying operations.

The practice of position-buying is facilitated by the systems of promotion and transfer. Senior postings are effectively decided by the police director alone. In the lower levels of the hierarchy, superiors likewise enjoy absolute power. The system contains few checks and balances, and is inevitably subsumed by the vertical corruption of networks in the police department.[24]

Such situations suggest that the characteristics of half a century ago still exist despite reforms and transitions in the organisation of the police institute. Both the social control system of the Thai police and its personnel management style still remain, on the whole, personal rather than institutional. This historical style needs to be confronted during attempts to rationalise this state agency.

Notes

1. Sirivudh Hongspanij, *Tamruat kap Kanmuang* (Police in Thai Politics) (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1976); Chumsai Chaiwat. *Botbat thang Kanmuang khong Phon Tamruat Eek Phao Sriyanonda*, 2490-2500 (The Political Role of Police General Phao Sriyanonda, 1947-1957) (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1995); Police Lieutenant Chitphol Kanchanakit, *Kan San lae Raksa Amnat thang Kanmuang khong Phon Tamruat Eek Phao Sriyanonda* (The Building and Maintaining of Police General Phao Seiyananda's Political Power) (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1996); Phongnakhon Nakhonsantiphap, *Kanmuang kap Krom Tamruat Thai*, 2475-2500 (Politics and Royal Thai Police Department, 1932-1957) (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Thammasat University, 1996).

2. *Anuson nai Ngan Phraratchathan Phroeng Sop Whon Tamruat Tree Prayun Chatrupamai* (Cremation Volume for Police Major General Prayun Chatrupamai) (Bangkok, 1969), 22.

3. Sombat Chantornvong, "Local Godfathers in Thai Politics," in *Money and Power in Provincial Thailand*, ed. by Ruth McVey (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 54-55. Sombat aptly described *nak leng* further: "The principal reason why a *nak leng* becomes 'influential' is therefore cultural in nature, and has nothing to do with economics. An ordinary *nak leng* can therefore be found in just about any setting, rural or urban. Moreover, it is not uncommon for a *nak leng* to break the law in order to protect his group."

4. Chaiyong Patiphimphakom, *Phieng Tamruat Khon Nung Thaonan Eng* (A Policeman, That's All). Bangkok: Rongphim Kromtamruat, n.d.

5. Phut Buranasomphop, *Chaihana lae Khuamphaiphae khong Burut Lek Haeng Asia* (The Victories and Defeats of the Iron Man of Asia) (Bangkok: Sun Ruam Khao Ekalak, n.d.), 23-29.

6. Wira Sengphet, *Phumpanya Kanprappram khong Phon To To Khunphantharakratchadet* (Police Major General Khunpha ntharakratchadet's Wisdom of Suppression) (Bangkok: So Ko Wo, 2001), chapter 5.

7. Samphan Kongsamut, *Khun Phan Mueprap Sip Thit* (Bangkok: Saison Sukhaphapjai, 2001), 319.

8. David Johnston, *Rural Society and the Rice Economy in Thailand, 1880-1930* (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1975), 143.

9. Anuson Ngan, *Praratchatanphloensop Phan Tamruat Ek Phrom Sukmak* (Cremation Volume for Police Colonel Phrom Sukmak) (Bangkok, 1984), 94-96.

10. Anuson Ngan, *Praratchatanphloensop Phon Tamruat Tho Chat NunPhakdi* (Cremation Volume for Police Lieutenant General Chat NunPhakdi) (Bangkok, 1974), no pagination.

11. Daniel Fineman, *A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997) chapters 5-9; Kittisak Sriamphai, *Prachatipatai Samai Phon Tamruat Eek Phao Sriyanon* (Democracy in the era of Phao Siyanon) (Bangkok, n.d.).

12. See Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington: US Government Printing Office).

13. See Thak Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism* (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand & Thai Khadi Institute, Thammasat University, 1979), chapter 2.

14. Anuson nai Ngan, *Phraratchathanphloengsop Phan Tamruat Tho Luan Homronran* (Cremation Volume for Police Lieutenant Colonel Luan Homronran) (Bangkok, 1977), 110-111.

15. Anuson Ngan, *Phraratchatanphloensop Phon Tamruat Tree Jitrasen Akkhanitat* (Cremation Volume for Police Major Colonel Jitrasen Akkhanitat) (Bangkok, 1990), no pagination.

16. See Chit Wiphathawat, *Phao Saraphap* (Phao confesses) (Bangkok: Phrae Phitthaya, 1960).
17. Thomas Lobe, "United States National Security Policy and Aid to the Thailand Police", *Monograph Series on World Affairs*, 14, no. 14, book 2 (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1977), 20.
18. Samphan, *Khun Phan Mueprap Sip Thit*. There was little variety in the methods Khun Phan used to suppress banditry while he was in office from 1929 to1962.
19. Fineman, *A Special Relationship*, 82. The same thing can be said of the army in late 1940. Fineman argues, "The army positioned the bulk of its forces not on the borders to protect against foreign attacks and incursions, but in the Bangkok area to counter navy and police forces. Indeed, until 1950, the military had no plans for the defense of the country."
20. Ayu Khrop, *80 Pi Phon To Tho Luan Sanittulayarak* (80 years old, Police Lieutenant General Luan Sanittulayarak) (Bangkok: Horattanachai kanphim, 1984), 20.
21. Suwan Suwanwecho, *Prawat lae Wiwathanakan khog Tamruat Thai*, vol. 2 (Bangkok: Khurusapha Latphrao, 1989), 176-179.
22. Krom Tamruat, *Raingan Prajam Pi Krom Tamruat Prajam Pi Whuthasakharat 2497* (Annual Report of the Police Department for 1954) (Bangkok, 1955), 62. In 1954, the Police Department collected Thb25 121 104.48 in all.
23. For example, the Report of the Police Department of Thailand for 1954 to 1955 stated that, "The Police Department, in cooperation with the Revenue Department, organised a special unit to check on tax-payers by setting a card index system of all revenue earners in the metropolitan area. By using this system it was easy to locate tax-dodgers." *Division of Educational Techniques, Royal Thai Police Department. Report of the Police Department of Thailand for 1954 to 1955* (in English) (Bangkok: The Police Printing Press, 1956), 15.
24. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, *Corruption & Democracy in Thailand* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1996), 126.

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IDENTITY

THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION: THE CASE OF THE MANDAILING PEOPLE

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The issue of our time, the survival of human beings with individuated consciousness and communal ties, is in peril…. Freedom, then, is the path to this new life. A freedom which begins with the individual, confirms him in his place with his people and his language and his culture, yet by that specific location of his being there, grants him a world perspective to recognise his brothers and sisters elsewhere in their 'differentness' and their challenge (The World Crisis).

INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND AIMS

The Mandailing people inhabit as their homeland the southwestern corner of the province of North Sumatra on the island of Sumatra, Indonesia. For centuries they have migrated throughout the Indonesian archipelago and Peninsular West Malaysia. They have made enormous contributions to politics, society, music, literature and the press both in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Their social and cultural markers include the *markoum sisolkot*, the patrilineal clan-based Mandailing social structure governed by customary law (*adat*)[1]; the *urup tulak-tulak* (Mandailing script); the tradition of consultative governance as embodied in the judicial assembly of *Namora-Natoras* (traditional institution of Mandailing governance); the totem sculpture *Sangkalon*, a symbol of justice; the *Gordang Sambilan* (nine great drums), the ritualistic Mandailing music; the *Abit Godang*, the ceremonial shawl; the *Bindu* gable that represents the Mandailing's philosophy of life; and the *rarangan* (protected areas) in environmentally challenging times.

Yet the Mandailings have been culturally marginalised in Indonesia and Malaysia. Academic works have subsumed them as an appendix of the Angkola, Batak and Malay. In Malaysia, racial politics and state-sponsored social engineering in the name of nation building, backed by the academia, have resulted in the acculturation of the Mandailings into the dominant Malay racial category. In Indonesia, the Mandailings have been lumped into the dominant Batak group since the Dutch colonial era.

Recently, Malaysian politicians from UMNO (United Malay National Organisation) and politician-academics from Gapena (Gabungan Penulis-Penulis Nasional/ Union of National Writers) have been travelling to Indonesia, as well as sponsoring Indonesian scholars to 'Malay World' conferences, to promote the idea of *Melayu inklusif* (inclusive Malay identity) – an idea based on the colonial perception that the native people of the Indonesian archipelago and Malaysia are of the Malay race/stock (*rumpun Melayu*).[2]

The basic human right of the Mandailings – and of other cultural communities and indigenous peoples – to define themselves has been overlooked by most Malaysian and Indonesian intellectuals and the academia who have accepted the state's discourse on ethnicity. Responding to threats of endangered human diversity, indigenous people all over the world are reviving traditional forms of governance, communicating their cultural identity, and using modern information technology for networking and building international alliances. Of late, interest in Mandailing identity and cultural heritage in Malaysia and Indonesia has intensified owing to increased networking and the use of the Internet among concerned Mandailings. Furthermore, Mandailing scholars are part of regional movements to deconstruct mainstream history and state-constructed ethnic categories.

This project represents an effort in the same direction. In the course of the API Fellowship, the author carried out several activities to gain further understanding of the dilemmas facing Mandailing identity, and to engage others in valuing that identity. Several activities were academic: the author presented papers in symposia and colloquia, wrote articles for journals and the popular press, facilitated workshops, prepared cultural heritage guides, and accepted interviews from leading Indonesian dailies.[3]

But a great part of the effort was also non-academic, some of which the author would like to highlight in this paper. These are efforts related to the movement for cultural identity, the promotion of cultural pilgrimage, regional autonomy and the devolution of power, environmental management, cultural performance, the promotion of indigenised 'Mandailing-Islam', the promotion of alternative currencies, the improvement of the Mandailing website, and the holding of a photographic exhibition.

All these tasks must be seen as part of a broader concern to construct a socio-cultural and political identity for the Mandailing people, the purposes of which are: first, to strengthen Mandailing community and civil society through the development of cultural heritage resources and environmental stewardship; and second, to mobilise the Mandailing community towards increased self-determination through public participation, cultural heritage and environmental activism.

METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

The author took a participatory observer approach in addition to doing library and archival research. In Jakarta, he was mainly engaged in library research, and most of the relevant material was obtained from the two libraries of Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI/ Indonesian Institute of Sciences) and Perpustakaan Nasional (National Library) as well as from bookshops (secondhand ones especially) and private collections such as that of Basyral Hamidy Harahap.

He managed to obtain substantial background material on Indonesia's modern history, some of which was used for his paper presentations. There is potentially more material on the Mandailings in Dutch records of the 19th century, but unfortunately the author will have to get assistance in translation as the language is inaccessible to the author.[4] In Jakarta, the author's host was Yayasan Pelestarian Budaya Indonesia (Indonesian Heritage Foundation).

Medan disproved the author's earlier fears that there is a paucity of material written in Bahasa Indonesia and the Mandailing language concerning the Mandailings. For years the author had been led by his fellow Indonesian scholars to believe that there was not much written on the Mandailings. Archival and library research in Medan shows that there is a substantial amount of material on and by the Mandailings. A bibliography of these works should be done to facilitate further studies of the Mandailings.

In Medan, library research was conducted at the various faculty libraries as well as the main library of Universitas Sumatera Utara (USU), the major government university in Medan. The library research at USU proved the most productive. USU has the most Bachelors' theses (*skripsi*), Masters' theses and research reports (*laporan penelitian*) on the Mandailings, albeit mainly on Mandailing literature.

Library research continued at Universitas HKBP Nommensen (private, Protestant Christian-based university), Perpustakaan Daerah Sumatera Utara (North Sumatra Provincial Library), Badan Warisan Sumatra (Sumatra Heritage Trust) and from private collections. The author's host in Medan was Badan Warisan Sumatra (Sumatra Heritage Trust).

The Universitas HKPB Nommensen's Pusat Dokumentasi dan Pengkajian Kebudayaan Batak (Batak Documentation and Cultural Research Centre, previously known as Pusat Batakologi/Batakology Centre) has arguably the best collection on the Batak including some written in Dutch and German. However, the amount of materials in the collection has remained static over the last few years for lack of funding.

While in Jakarta, Medan and in the Mandailing homeland, the author conducted selected interviews to gauge perceptions of history, culture, architecture, identity, etc. Mandailing personalities, academicians, activists and conservationists (both environmental and cultural) were interviewed. These interviews were done formally as well as informally. In the course of his research, the author made two visits to the Mandailing homeland to participate in *adat* (customary) ceremonies as well as in a photographic expedition.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES

Nine key activities were undertaken to promote Mandailing ethnic identity. These were:

Movement for cultural identity

Over the last few years, the author has sought out and nurtured a network of Mandailing scholars and intellectuals from organisations such as the Yayasan Pengkajian Budaya Mandailing (Yapebuma), Ikatan Kebajikan Mandailing Malaysia (IMAN), Himpunan Keluarga Besar Mandailing (HIKMA) and Bindu Matogu, a Mandailing environmental non governmental organisation (NGO). Yapebuma and Bindu Matogu are based in Medan and HIKMA in Jakarta with branches in Medan and Mandailing, whilst IMAN is based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

All the groups mentioned above are directly engaged in activities promoting Mandailing cultural identity. These and other associations such as student bodies with the same objectives, are linked together through the Mandailing website. Internationally, the author maintains a network of friends and supporters, especially amongst academic and activist communities, particularly through the use of the Internet.

Promotion of cultural pilgrimage

In the early 19th century, many Mandailings left their homelands to seek their fortunes in the *rantau* (outside the homeland), especially in Minangkabau (province of West Sumatra today). After the Padri War (1820-1833), many fled to the west coast of the Malay Peninsula (West Malaysia today) via Riau and Jambi. In the late 19th century, Mandailings started to migrate to Medan when the east coast of Sumatra was opened up for plantations by the Dutch. In the early 20th century, Mandailing migrants to the west coast states of Peninsular Malaysia arrived via Medan.[5] Consequently today there are substantial Mandailing communities in Medan and along the east coast of Sumatra.

Many Mandailing sojourners to West Malaysia returned to their Mandailing homeland regularly. For example, the author's family and relations have been visiting their homeland since the 19th century, interrupted only by the Second World War, the Independence Revolution and Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against the formation of the Malaysia. However, many of the present-day Malaysian Mandailings who know only the names of their ancestral settlements, have never set foot in Mandailing itself.

In Malaysia, the focus of Mandailing activities is in the west coast states of Perak and Selangor, where most Mandailing migrants settled. Many well-to-do Mandailings are concentrated in Kuala Lumpur, the federal capital of Malaysia. Malaysian Mandailings do make the trip to the homeland, usually travelling via Medan, a trip that takes 12 hours by coach. The journey can now be shortened as flights are now available from Kuala Lumpur to Padang, the capital of the province of West Sumatra, Indonesia, making it possible to travel to Mandailing via Padang in only 6 hours.

Having explored Mandailing over the years, the author is now of the view that the Mandailing homeland is suitable for the promotion of cultural pilgrimage amongst Malaysian and Indonesian Mandailings. The cultural and natural attractions in Mandailing include pre-Islamic ('animistic', Hindu and Buddhist) sites; traditional sites, such as *sipelebegu* graveyards; Islamic sites, such as the *waqf*; colonial influences (Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese, etc.); sites where there were anti-colonial struggles such as the burial site of Raja Mangkutur; sites significant for the Independence movement such as the birth-place of General Abdul Haris Nasution; scenic terraced paddy fields; cultural performances including *Gordang Sambilan* performances; active volcanic mountains (such as Sorik Marapi and its surrounding hot-springs); hundred-year-old rubber trees, the seeds of which came from 19th century 'British Malaya'[6]; and extensive man-made irrigation systems (*bondar saba*).

In view of Mandailing's cultural tourism potential, a guide book that captures and promotes the cultural and natural attractions should be prepared. Cultural tourism can help build bridges between Malaysian and Indonesian Mandailings to restore and rebuild relationships that were sundered by colonialism, nationalism and regionalism. It is likely that Indonesian Mandailings can benefit from an access to a wider range of resources and expertise, while the Malaysian Mandailings can recover their roots and identity.

Regional autonomy and devolution of power

During the colonial period, Sumatra was carved up by arbitrary and artificial administrative boundaries. There is a need to remap the frontiers of the Mandailing homeland in West Sumatra and Riau along scientific

lines based on commonality of culture, language, geography and a *Volk*.

In the context of Indonesia's decentralisation, administrative units have been restructured all over the archipelago, resulting in the formation of new *Pemda* (local governments) starting in 1999. Regional autonomy is considered potentially more democratic than a centralised system as it favours pluralism and does not subject people to the same standards. It prevents the accumulation of centralist power based on one particular culture, religion, belief or ideology.

The provision of 'village parliaments' as provided in the UU (National Law) No. 22 of 1999, could enable the traditional institution of *Namora-Natoras* (Nobles and Elders) to be revived and revitalised to play a critical role in the management of local affairs. This will help Mandailings recover their tradition of consultative governance, and encourage them to challenge the newly-created district of Mandailing-Natal (abbreviation Madina)[7] to promote participatory planning and decision-making. Although the original purview of the institutions of traditional Mandailing governance covered all aspects of *adat* life, its functions now are circumscribed to marriage and rites of passage.

The call for regional autonomy and devolution of powers within the Indonesian state has stimulated the people to engage with their authorities. In this context, on 19 October 2000, a seminar entitled *Pembangunan Mandailing-Natal* (The Development of Mandailing-Natal) was organised in Panyabungan, Lower Mandailing. Mohammed Dolok Lubis, a young lecturer, organised the seminar, with financial backing from USU and the cooperation of the newly constituted district of Mandailing-Natal. The seminar had the objectives of 'increasing the role of the sons and daughters of the district in its development in order to promote a civil, participatory Mandailing-Natal'. Mandailing scholars and activists from Medan participated in the seminar.

The general consensus of Mandailing people in Jakarta, Medan and Mandailing is that the *Pemda* (the local authority) is ineffective and possibly corrupt, reflecting the general sentiment of Indonesians towards their governments. In May 2002, when Indonesian television aired a half-hour programme on the state of *kabupaten* (district of) Mandailing-Natal, Mandailings from all over Indonesia called in criticizing the district's bureaucracy. This is a case of Mandailing *rakyat* (people) criticizing Mandailing civil authorities. Many vocal Mandailings say that the present line-up should be replaced with a new set of more honest officers.

To foster transparency and local consultation, local-local dialogues could be conducted to explore areas of multi-sectoral collaboration and capacity building as well as making local-global links with experts and resource centres for good governance and environmental management. The objectives would be to strengthen the Mandailing people as stakeholders in national and regional development, allowing them to better realise their options in the post-modern world.

Stewardship of the Mandailing environment

The process of Indonesianisation has resulted in lands, forests and minerals being usurped as national resources to be exploited by the state and its cronies, Mandailings included. The granting of concessions to national and international logging and mining companies is part of Indonesianisation. In this way, *kabupaten* Mandailing-Natal's natural resources were appropriated in the name of national development.

In consequence many urgent issues facing Mandailing today are environment related, in particular illegal logging, the harvesting of bird's nests, and water management. Illegal logging, which has been taking place for over a decade, is the most pressing of these issues. In October 2002, the author, together with Dr. Zulkifli Lubis, an ecologist, held a series of meetings with environmental NGOs, including the North Sumatran branch of Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI, or Indonesian Forum for Environment), the leading Indonesian environmental NGO, to discuss the course of action to be taken to address the issue of illegal logging in Natal. It was decided that a second field trip should be conducted from 26 to 30 October, to verify the seriousness of the situation. The first field trip was organised in March 2002, the result of which was subsequently released to the media.[8]

In contrast to the forestry situation, where there is virtually no organised action at the local level, initiatives have been made in fisheries and water management. For centuries, communities in the district of Mandailing-Natal have managed their own watersheds and river resources under their *adat*. In the 1970s, this was formalised into river protection

(*lubuk larangan*) schemes by local committees. The Mandailing-Natal district with 29 local committees has the largest number of such schemes in the province of North Sumatra.[9] The practice prohibits the harvesting of river resources close to human settlements for 6 to 12 months in a year.

Come 'harvesting' time, a small fee is charged to residents and sojourners[10] alike to catch the fish. The income derived is then used to pay for the development of social facilities such as schools, roads and mosques, and to provide educational scholarships and administrative salaries and grants to orphans, poor families and invalids.

Given the unstable political and economic situation in Indonesia, where remote communities cannot depend on governmental funding for development, this income-generating exercise is beneficial to the community. It instils confidence and financial self-reliance. However, much still needs to be done to overcome over-exploitation of certain species, and to gain the full cooperation of the Dinas Perikanan (Fisheries Authority).

The following are suggested in addressing the problem of environmental management in the Mandailing-Natal district:

- Empowering *adat* or local communities in making equitable 'public policies' which utilise local indigenous knowledge in the management of natural and cultural resources;
- Formulating an ideology of environmental stewardship in keeping with Mandailing *adat* and Islamic principles for customary lands, *waqf* (Islamic endowments) and *harangan* (Mandailing term for prohibited zones);
- Introducing organic farming practices; and
- International marketing of eco-friendly products.

Throughout Mandailing, rivers are treated as 'sewers' for rubbish: in the past this posed no immediate environmental problems in view of the organic nature of the wastes, but with plastic packaging and other inorganic wastes, continued dumping could eventually endanger Mandailing riverine environments.

In order to address this pressing issue, a 'model' project has to be implemented for other settlements to follow suit. Maga has been identified as a possible site for a pilot composting project.

Gordang Sambilan Competition

The performance of the *Gordang Sambilan*, a traditional set of nine drums, has ritualistic functions in *adat* ceremonies such as weddings, installations of nobles (*namora-mora*, plural for raja or chief), receptions of dignitaries, and funerals of rajas. They were also played to mark the death of a tiger, regarded by Mandailings as the king of the forest. The drums are made from old Meranti trees that have hollow centres. Meranti, or Ingol in Mandailing language, refers to a group of hardwood species found in native forests. The conservation of these trees for drum making is another good reason to preserve the diminishing Mandailing forestlands. It takes a skilled craftsman one to two months to make a completely new set of the nine drums.

Formerly, the performance of the *Gordang Sambilan* had to be approved by the huta (settlement) leaders, the *Namora-Natoras*, and a buffalo had to be slaughtered for each occasion on which they were used.

A performance of the drums requires five to seven drummers and usually lasts about half an hour. The performance of the drums is physically quite exhausting for the drummers, some of whom enter into a trance-like state while playing. The cost of the drum performance plus the shortage of buffaloes eventually led to the drums falling silent as ordinary Mandailing families did not have the means to pay for such 'extravagances'.

In order to revive the *Gordang Sambilan*, HIKMA (All Mandailing Clans Assembly) has pushed for the relaxation of customary conditions for their performance. Initially there was resistance from the conservative *namora-mora*, but this was eventually surmounted. Thus since the 1970s, the *Gordang Sambilan* has come to be considered as one of the performing arts of the Mandailing people. *Gordang Sambilan* troupes from the many settlements in Mandailing compete with each other in an annual *Gordang Sambilan* festival.[11]

During the author's last visit he discovered that the *Gordang Sambilan* has resumed its prominent place in Mandailing society. The fact that there are new commissions for the rather expensive sets of *Gordang Sambilan* indicates that this performing art is making a comeback. The settlement of Tamiang in Upper

Mandailing was well known for its *Gordang Sambilan* craftsmanship. Now Manambin and other settlements have their own *Gordang Sambilan* craftsmen. The *Gordang Sambilan* set is displayed prominently in many settlements.

In view of the fact that the *Gordang Sambilan* is unique to Mandailing music, it has become the cultural marker of Mandailing identity. In the state of Selangor, West Malaysia, where there are significant numbers of Mandailings, IMAN has successfully lobbied for the *Gordang Sambilan* to be made the official state musical ensemble albeit compromised by subsuming it under the Malay identity. In 2001, the *Pesta Pulau Pinang* (Penang Fair) in Malaysia was officially opened with a performance of *Gordang Sambilan* by a troupe from Mandailing, Indonesia. The playing of the Gordang Sambilan during the Malaysian Independence Day on 31 August 2002 is perhaps the highest recognition to date for these fantastic drums.

Indigenised Mandailing Islam

The first encounter between Islam and Mandailings in the interior was probably through the port of Natal, on the west coast or by traders coming up the Batang Gadis River from Singkuang (Chinese for New Light) river north of Natal. There are indications that Islam also entered Mandailing from the east coast of Sumatra. More significantly, Mandailing society was historically transformed by a radical brand of Islam – Wahabbite Islam brought by Padris in their white garb from Minangkabau (the province of West Sumatra today).

This brand of Islam, now backed by puritan Arab states and the western intelligence community, is still a menace even today! The Padri episode was one in a series of historical incursions by Minangkabau into the Mandailing homeland, and during this time many Mandailings embraced Islam at the point of the sword.[12] The coming of Islam brought with it many values from this universal religion and its global culture.

In conversations with Dr. Nur Fadhil Lubis, who is also an API Fellow, it was revealed to the author that no one has studied the phenomena of 'Mandailing Islam'. The author then visited tombs/mausoleums of Mandailing religious leaders, *pesantren* (Islamic schools), historic mosques and *waqf* (Islamic endowments). Previously, he had visited cultural heritage sites like tombs/mausoleums of the progenitors of Mandailing clans, *sopo godang* (council house), and *bagas godang* (dwelling of the *raja*).

The author and his travelling companions had the fortune of being treated with a *zikir*[13] session by Raja Syahbudin at his home in Maga, where he and his companions were stationed during their stay in Mandailing. The author also attended a *zikir* session marking a wedding ceremony in Maga in September 2002. This latest visit gave the author a glimpse into the practice of Islam in Mandailing society, a subject that has been largely ignored by Mandailing scholars themselves.

In stark contrast with many Islamic settlements or towns where the mosque takes centre-stage, in traditional Mandailing settlements, the most prominent buildings are the traditional *bagas godang* and *sopo godang* buildings. The indigenous architecture of Mandailing *rajas*' tombs do not conform to the appearance of typical Islamic gravestones found throughout Indonesia and Malaysia. However, the traditional architecture of Mandailing mosques is presently giving way to globalised Islamic architecture, that is, the Moghul-style mosque of domes and minarets. Likewise, the same pattern is observed with gravestones – even the dead are not spared from the imposition of globalised Islamic culture.

The author's preliminary impression is that Islam has been indigenised and harmoniously integrated into Mandailing *adat*, culture and way of life. That is to say, the interpretation and application of Islam in Mandailing is very different from that of the Minangkabau. The Minangs are matrilineal and adopt a position of custom based on Islamic law (*adat basandi syarak*), while the Mandailings are patrilineal and adopt a position of *adat* on par with Islamic law. This is reflected in the maxim *ombar do adat ugamo*, that is, the *adat* is on equal footing with Islamic law.

The latter understanding is closer to the Madinan tradition (*amal* of Madina)[14] than to the Shaf'ie *madhhab* (school of thought) dominant today in Malaysia and the Indonesian archipelago. In the Madinan tradition local custom *urf* is regarded as part of public benefit or public good and is to be encouraged so long as it does not go against Islamic law.

Traditionally, Islam is expressed in Mandailing terms and not in Arabic terms as with Malay-Islam. Of late,

Middle-Eastern, Indonesian and Malaysian brands of Islam appear to be making headway. Thus, there is a need to promote an understanding of an indigenised Islam distinct from globalised Islamic trends promoted through the mass media and through global Islamic publications such as annual calendars. Madinan Islam offers a critique of the present situation in which Muslims find themselves and also a way out of this predicament. The challenge of traditional Mandailing leadership is to retain this unique way of maintaining and reconciling traditional customs with the Islamic religion in the face of globalised revisionist-modernist Wahhabite (Arab)-Islam and regional statist Malay-Islam.

Alternative economic and development models

Concerned citizens, interest groups and communities the world over are looking at alternative models of economics and development. Over the past two decades, there has been a flood of literature about organic farming, natural medicines, back-to-nature lifestyles and so on. Interestingly, the initial four-year development plans for the Mandailing-Natal district prepared by consultants that included academics took 'green' approaches into account in their development module.[15]

In this regard, the author himself has written works particularly on the re-introduction of bi-metallic currency and commodity trading as a means of exchange. The author has been actively promoting this at the regional and international level. In Malaysia, the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, has taken this on and adopted bi-metallic currency as a parallel currency to the US dollar.

Since the translation and publication of the author's *Jerat Utang IMF* (1998) and *Dinar Emas Solusi Krisis Moneter* (2001) in Bahasa Indonesia, the movement to promote these alternative currencies has gained greater momentum. Nusantara Islamic Mint in Bandung and Yayasan Dinar-Dirham (Dinar-Dirham Foundation) in Medan have been set up to promote the minting, and the usage of gold and silver currencies respectively. In fact, *Logam Mulia* (literally Noble Metal), the Indonesian government mint, has already minted gold and silver *dinar* and *dirham* coins.

Recognising that the district of Mandailing-Natal has been a gold-producing region since time immemorial, the author initiated talks with Dr. Helmi Thalib, a founding member of Yayasan Dinar-Dirham on the possibilities of setting up a *Wakala* (clearing house) in the district for the purchase of gold nuggets procured by the local population through *dulang* (panning) washing as well as for putting gold coins into circulation. A proposal is being prepared for sponsorship by Bank Muamalat, to be followed by a field survey in Mandailing-Natal district. The Yayasan will also approach the local government for its support in this project.

The idea is to explore the possibilities of introducing a distinct currency for the Mandailing-Natal district in the light of regional autonomy and of making it a distinctive part of the Mandailing identity.

In order to address the question of poverty in Mandailing-Natal district, the author has been told by Dr. Rizali H. Nasution, a Mandailing and the chairman of Yayasan Pokmas Mandiri (Foundation for Self Reliance of Groups of [Poor] People), a micro-finance institution (MFI), about plans to introduce micro-credit in Mandailing starting in mid-2003.

A Mandailing website / database

Currently the dual-language (Bahasa Indonesia/ Malaysia and English) Mandailing website has around 200 pages of text and pictures, and has on average of 20,000 hits monthly. The Toyota Foundation gave seed funding to set up the site in 1998. The author has been maintaining it at his own expense since then, for it serves as a database of Mandailing studies as well as a gateway for cultural tourism to the Mandailing area. Mike Ionescu, who is currently upgrading and updating the Mandailing website, has suggested that the capacity be increased ten-fold from its current capacity and to host it on another server. At the moment the website is being hosted on a server based in Malaysia.

The benefits of increasing the website's capacity as well as changing its server will be to make it faster, to allow for the posting of photographs suitable for making reports and for general expansion. Mike has also suggested that the contents of the website be converted into Microsoft Word document format and sold as CDs. Arbain Rambey, one of Indonesia's leading photojournalists and national daily Kompas bureau chief for the province of Aceh, North Sumatra, West Sumatra and Riau (Sumbagut), has offered the use of his photographs for the website.

Mandailing photographic exhibition

From 14 to 30 September 2002, the author went with Arbain on a photographic expedition to the district of Mandailing-Natal. In this exercise, he acted as a guide while Arbain captured Mandailing and Natal in pictures. All in all, Arbain took 42 rolls of both colour, and black and white photographs, for the purposes of documentation as well as exhibition. Arbain took pictures of the remains of the pre-Islamic (*sipelebegu* – traditional faith of ancestral reverence, Hinduism and Buddhism), Islamic, Dutch and Japanese as well as post-*Merdeka* periods. One of Arbain's photos of a traditional dentist in Pasar Maga, Mandailing was featured in Kompas.[16]

On 12 October 2002, an exhibition of Arbain Rambey's photographs from this expedition was launched at Gallery One in Medan. Ibrahim Champion, a long time friend of the Mandailings, owns the gallery. The exhibition entitled *Jejak Mandailing* (literally, Mandailing Trails) displayed a total of 53 frames and was to run for one month.[17] In conjunction with the exhibition, a group discussion was held on the question of Mandailing identity, with a panel including Prof. (Emeritus) Dr. M. Solly Lubis, Dr. Zulkifli Lubis and the author himself. The exhibition was very well received by Mandailings as well as non-Mandailings. One of Medan's leading dailies, Analisa,[18] carried full-page exclusive coverage of the exhibition.

The exhibition had a visible impact on those who visited it. Many visitors interviewed at the exhibition showed that they did not know that Mandailing held such cultural treasures. The organisers received many queries on how to get there. For Mandailings who grew up in the homeland, Arbain's pictures gave them fresh insight into the Mandailing world which they previously took for granted. They could now see Mandailing with different eyes and in that sense, the exhibition was very successful.

The organisers, including the author, are now in the midst of trying to interest certain parties to bring the exhibition to Malaysia. The author assumes that the exhibition will be well-received by Malaysian Mandailings, many of whom have never laid eyes on their ancestral homeland, and this hopefully will trigger visits, and in the long run, sustained cultural pilgrimages.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to promote Mandailing studies and cultural identity, research on Mandailing cultural heritage including architecture should be sustained and a strategy developed for an ecological and cultural base development approach/model that is sustainable and environmentally friendly. As such, the author proposes that the following recommendations be considered as a follow-up to the Fellowship:

- Translate selected materials from the Mandailing language (in Mandailing script *tulak-tulak* or Romanised Mandailing) into Bahasa Indonesia. This is critical for the study of Mandailing, simply because many Mandailing, including the author, can no longer speak or write the old Mandailing language. In addition, translate source materials from Dutch into English to make them accessible to a wider range of scholars.

- Compile and publish an annotated bibliography of references regarding matters Mandailing to promote and facilitate research.

- Upgrade, update and maintain the Mandailing website with the objective of it becoming a knowledge networking and resource site to nurture and sustain interest in all things Mandailing as well as to promote Mandailing studies.

- A conference would be desirable and timely to bring together community leaders, activists and scholars from Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere to debate the issues and chart a future direction for Mandailing studies. The conference would act as a catalyst for further initiatives in the following long-term goals:

  1) Enhancing the distinct cultural identity and worldview of the Mandailing people.
  2) Recovering language, culture and indigenous knowledge.
  3) Establishing an educational, cultural and environmental centre in *kabupaten* Mandailing-Natal.
  4) Restoring Mandailing traditions of governance to empower local communities and civil societies to engage in public participation in the context of Indonesia' decentralisation

process.

5) Strengthening the ties between Mandailings in Malaysia and Indonesia through the Internet, cultural pilgrimages, exchange programmes and common projects.

Notes

1. The key concepts are *marga* (patriclan), *kahanggi* (lineage), *mora* (wife-giving clan) and *anak boru* (wife-receiving clan) as well as *tarombo* (genealogy).
2. For a study of this, see Anthony Reid, "Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a source of Diverse Modern Identities," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 32.3 Oct. (2001): 295-313.
3. See Appendix on Academic Activities.
4. Raymond Kennedy, *Bibliography of Indonesian Peoples and Cultures*, Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, second revised edition 1974. First published in 1945.
5. A good summary of this migration is provided by Pande Maradjar, "Perpindahan Orang Mandailing" in the magazine *Mandailing*, No 11, Tahoen ke 2, Chamis 29 Maart (1923): 2-3.
6. According to informants, rubber was introduced into Upper Mandailing in 1918. See Donald Tugby, *Cultural Change and Identity: Mandailing Immigrants in West Malaysia*, University of Queensland Press, 1977.
7. This new district incorporated the Natal area on the west coast of the island of Sumatra and Mandailing, into a new *kabupaten* (district) of Mandailing-Natal. Natal adjacent to Mandailing, was never part of the Mandailing homeland but its relationship with Mandailing spans a few centuries. Through Natal, Islam and other foreign influences was introduced into Mandailing.
8. "WALHI blames destruction of forests in North Sumatra on six firms," *Jakarta Post*, 20 March 2002. See *also <http://www.ecologyasia.com>*.
9. Daftar Lubuk Larangan di Proponsi Daerah Tingkat I Sumatera Utara, 1999.
10. Those who return to the homeland from elsewhere in Indonesia and Malaysia for a short visit.
11. The performance of the Gordang Sambilan troupe from Maga has been featured in the Pulse of the Planet @ NationalGeographic.Com(http://www.pulseplanet.com/current.html) in a write-up by anthropologist Peter Zabielskis from New York University. The author assisted Peter Zabielskis in this venture.
12. Dja Endar Moeda, however, put the date of the spread of Islam in Mandailing as late as 1859. Dja Endar Moeda, *Riwajat Poelau Sumatra*, N. Venn Snelspersdrukkerij "Insulinde," Padang, 1903, 70.
13. Recitation in praise of God and the Prophet, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him.
14. For a critical discussion favouring the Madinan school over the other madhhabs within the Sunni school of thought, see Syakh Abdalqadir al-Murabit, *Root Islamic Education*, Madinah Press, 1993 (2nd ed.). First edition published in 1982. On the Madinan amal, see Yasin Dutton, *The Origins of Islamic Law, The Qur'an, the Muwata and Madinan Amal*, especially the chapter on "The 'Amal of the People of Madina", Curzon, Surrey, 1999. 32-41
15. See Draft Propeda Kabupaten Mandailing Natal 2001-5 and Pola Dasar Kabupaten Mandailing Natal 2001-5 published by Pemerintah Kabupaten Mandailing Natal.
16. *Kompas, Kamis*, 10 Oktober 2002, 11.
17. Gallery One is the exhibition space on the second floor of Restaurant Number One at Jalan KH Wahid Hasyim No. 1, Medan.
18. *Analisa*, Minggu, 13 October 2002, 12. The paper featured seven (7) of Arbain Rambey's photos as well as notes on the author's involvement in the exhibition.

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THE LANDSCAPE OF INTELLECTUALS' THOUGHTS: PATTANI IDENTITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

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"In the western world at least, intellectuals have the power that comes from political liberty, from access to information and freedom of expression. For a privileged minority, western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth hidden behind the veil of distortion, misrepresentation, ideology and class interests through which the events of current history are presented to us. The responsibilities of intellectuals, then, are much deeper than what Dwight MacDonald called, `the responsibility of peoples', given the unique privileges that intellectuals enjoy.... The responsibility of intellectuals is to speak the truth and to expose lies." – Noam Chomsky

INTRODUCTION

The term 'intellectual' is often closely associated with educated people or people who 'deal with ideas as expressed in words' – 'wordsmiths' as Nozick (1986) calls them. However, the current discourse suggests including people not necessarily covered by the term 'wordsmith' but who bring their creativity of thought to re-interpretations of social reality. Such a role places a lot of expectations on intellectuals in terms of where they place their empathy. It is usually believed that intellectuals are deeply involved in seeking new ideas (discovery) and are heavily loaded with new inventions.[1]

Gramsci divided intellectuals into four types, namely: *traditional intellectuals* who spread their ideas and become mediators between their community and the upper class, *organic intellectuals* who attempt to give their reflections on current affairs but to a limited audience, *critical types* who have the ability to be independent from hegemonic power and are able to set up foundations of freedom through alternative civic education, and *universal types* who struggle for humanism and a cultural structure that is conducive to humanity.[2]

As suggested by the opening quotation, Chomsky adds that intellectuals have the responsibility to reflect on meanings and give moral value to society.[3] It seems that intellectuals have the task of reading into a situation and giving it a moral consideration as they reflect on the situation. According to James Peck's terminology, the main job of intellectuals is to make life more 'sane, humane and compassionate'.[4]

In referring to them, Robert Nozick notes that intellectuals need not necessarily have a high level of education nor of intelligence. Intellectuals, according to him, are also defined by their ability to articulate their thoughts and ideas freely. Intellectuals have the will to express their thoughts and arguments, propagate new ideas, and read and discuss social phenomena. These intellectuals significantly contribute to shaping the social construction of society.[5]

Pattani was chosen as a case study because, historically, it used to be one of the centres of Islamic development in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, it has today lost all that glory. The government, for a long period of time, has neglected conflicts of identity, ethnicity and nation-building in Pattani.

Islamic groups in Pattani have experienced massive discrimination, which has affected their sense of identity, their existence and their status of being powerless. To some extent this happened due to the nationalism of the Thais. Being a minority group, Thai Muslims lack bargaining power in relation to the majority Buddhist Thais, resulting in cases of discrimination. These cases emerge as instances of vertical conflict rather than horizontal base conflict, reflecting a collision between

the local identity and the national spirit. As a result, a resistance movement has arisen among the minority Muslims.

Ethnic conflict occurs when minority groups are shunted to underdeveloped areas. Conflict arises when the dominant structural element clashes with local ethnic constructs, spurring the rise of nationalism within that particular ethnic group.[6]

Ethnic conflicts can be examined from a variety of points of view. In analysing the situation of Pattani, the following aspects can be used as tools of analysis:

1) Factor of identity (Berreman 1991; Douglass 1988; Gaasholt 1989; Nagel 1986; Royce 1982).
2) Historical background (Melville and Melville 1971; Smith 1978; Wolf 1982).
3) Combination of other factors, among them: involvement of the military, crisis, unequal economics/politics access, injustice, elite circulation, not ending the process of defining nationalism, etc. (Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985).

This theoretical overview will illuminate a variety of ethnic conflicts, including religio-minority-based conflicts.[7] The discrimination faced by the Islamic minority group in Thailand is the result of an accumulation of many problems. In Gurr's view, these problems include economic injustice, powerlessness or lack of political access, inequality in the distribution of revenues and the struggle to retain an original identity vis-à-vis the creation of a new identity.[8]

In the realm of minority-majority relations, a form of domination is almost always present. This often amounts to the minority group being associated with backwardness, being subjected to subordination, and being rendered powerless.[9]

The relationship between majority and minority groups deteriorates as the subjugated minorities try to assert their political power and interests. In large part, this is in reaction to nationalisation programmes that try to regulate minority life through various laws and regulations. Using the excuse of national interest, the state imposes its prerogative to exploit natural and other resources in the minority groups' traditional domains. Such imposition has naturally been considered an abuse of rights. What is more, the government tends not to compensate these groups for the things taken from them. This has created significant animosity among minority groups.

Minority groups exhibit distinct characteristics as compared to the homogeneous majority. Given such distinctions, minority groups tend to preserve their original identities in the face of new inventions that endanger their ethnicity. Models of resistance movements have been developed to help analyse this behaviour and will be tackled by this study.

To accomplish a comprehensive study, the analysis is divided into four sections as follows: an Introduction to present some background materials; a Preliminary Perspective section to begin the discussion with some basic information on the area of study; an Intellectual Thoughts section that brings together intellectuals' ideas covering historical overviews and the current social and political development as they relate to the Pattani situation; and an End Notes section to conclude the discussion based on an analysis of the intellectuals' thoughts.

This research was done via a combination of methods. The preliminary study was through library research.[10] Insights were obtained through in-depth interviews and discussions with resource persons in Pattani, Yalla, Narathiwat and Bangkok.

PRELIMININARY PERSPECTIVE

Based on the census of 1992, Thais may be broken down by religion as follows: Buddhists (93.47 per cent), Muslim (3.96 per cent), Christians (0.52 per cent), and Hindus and Sikhs (0.01 per cent). The rest were unidentified. Within the Islamic group about 81 per cent were living in the southernmost section of Thailand (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun), while 19 per cent lived in Bangkok. It is mostly the Muslims in the south who use Malay as their lingua franca.

In Pattani, the breakdown of the population based on selected data is in Table 1.

Table 1
Population of Pattani, 2000*

Area	Population	Male	Female	Muslims	Per cent	Mosques	Schools
Muang	112 588	55 671	56 917	76 560	68.00	61	71
Yaring	75 013	37 042	39 970	71 352	95.12	83	76
Panare	42 494	21 074	21 420	29 136	68.56	33	33
Teluban	59 753	29 256	30 497	46 010	77.00	76	80
Mok	10 334	5 038	5 296	7 750	75.00	19	17
Ko Pho	14 549	7 333	7 216	14 454	99.35	26	25
Ku Wiang	18 002	8 884	9 118	17 315	96.18	30	23
Mayo	51 154	25 068	26 086	48 581	94.97	66	73
Yarang	80 045	39 824	40 221	77 075	96.29	97	98
Maikin	14 089	6 830	7 259	8 876	63.00	15	18
Nong Cik	66 739	33 669	33 070	58 095	87.05	71	68
Kokpur	63 516	31 138	32 378	30 514	48.04	59	54
Total	608 276	300 827	307 449	485 718	79.08	636	565

* Data collected by the Islamic Committee of Pattani, 2000

One can get a little confused with this table because it shows a mixture of data types. However, what is important here are the population figures, the number of mosques and schools, and the ratio of Muslims in the population. Table 2 shows that Muslims constitute the majority in the four provinces of Patani, Jala, Narathiwat and Satun. Other religions co-exist with Islam, making these four provinces pluralistic societies.

Table 2 below shows Muslims constituting the dominant group in these four areas of southern Thailand. Most of them are of Malay ancestry and are struggling to preserve their religion and cultural identity. They have stubbornly resisted being acculturated into Thai society and culture, going so far as to distance themselves even from Muslims of Thai origin or those who have chosen to adopt Thai social customs.[11] These Muslims of Malay ancestry are determined to keep their distance from the dominant Thais.[12] This is despite attempts at envisioning a more pluralistic Thai society since Pridi Panomyong's appeal for mutual understanding.

This cultural distance has preserved the notion that Malay Muslims in Thailand are governed by 'foreigners', whose every effort at cultural assimilation is considered a threat to an ancestral identity. This in turn has nurtured resentment from the majority Thais who subject Muslims to many forms of discrimination, such as restricting their access to education, jobs and positions. While the government currently allows private Islamic schools to teach Malay, Arabic, Islamic doctrine, and local history, the long-term policy of secularisation of education seeks to supplant the Islamic schooling system in the Muslim areas.

Table 2
Data of Population and Religion 2000*

No	Area	Population	Muslim	Buddhist	Christian	Others
1.	Patani	608 276	485 718	119 090	1 733	1 735
2.	Jala	358 011	279 705	74 730	2 691	865
3.	Narathiwat	671 649	529 398	89 262	1 380	1 987
4.	Satun	260 265	200 700	59 234	212	119
	Total	1 898 201	1 495 521	342 316	6 016	4 706

* Based on data collected by the Islamic Committee of Pattani, 2000

Table 3
Trends in the Social Structure of Pattani

No	Main issue	Thai-Buddhist*	Thai-Muslim*	Malay-Muslim*
1	Location	Urban	Semi-urban	Rural areas (southern parts)
2	Population spread	Over most areas of the country	Southern areas	Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, Satun
3	Social and economic status	Advanced	Moderate	Low
4	Level of education	High school and upper level	High school	Primary
5	Occupation	Staff and peasant	Sales and peasant	Peasant or jobless

* According to the use of language and religious faith.

Table 4
Muslim Society in Pattani 2001*

	Name of District	District Committees	Area Committees	Mosques	Schools	Teachers	Male Students	Female Students	Total
1	Muang	3	18	61	71	408	3 898	4 359	8 257
2	Jaring	3	18	83	76	348	3 697	4 544	8 241
3	Panare	3	18	33	33	145	1 740	1 980	3 720
4	Teluban	3	18	76	80	324	3 239	3 301	6 540
5	Maikin	2	16	19	17	82	615	712	1 237
6	Kokpho	2	16	26	25	103	1 031	1 072	2 103
7	TYDeng	2	16	30	23	152	1 201	1 261	2 462
8	Mayo	3	18	66	73	407	3 618	4 078	7 696
9	Jarang	3	18	97	98	581	5 149	5 550	10 699
10	Melan	2	16	15	18	73	709	894	1 603
11	Nongcik	3	18	71	68	338	3 294	3 756	7 050
12	Kokpur	3	18	59	54	245	2 338	2 539	4 877
	Total	32	208	636	565	3 206	30 529	30 930	61 459

*From data collected by Pustaka, the Islamic Committee of Pattani, 2001

Table 3 shows the trends in social structure among the three main social groupings.[13]

From data collected by the Islamic Committee of Pattani, Table 4 shows that most Muslims in Pattani attend Islamic schools. Education is a significant component in analysing Muslim life in Pattani.

Conflict between minority groups and the Thai government is also triggered by stringent government regulations. Groups are required to register their organisations and must obtain a permit to conduct an organised meeting in a public place.

Several features of Thai social norms appear to be imposing a uniformity of behaviour in disregard of cultural and religious differences. When the Thai emperor reigned, all Thais were required to profess a formal Thai identity, which comprised proclaiming oneself to be Thai, showing devotion to Buddha, and accepting the authority of the King. Not doing so was considered a form of disloyalty. A Siamization programme is also being pursued to standardise certain Thai practices. This seems to be an attempt to suppress all forms of regionalism.

One can conclude that the Thai government is seeking to terminate the separate identity of the Islamic minority group even though it currently allows Islamic regulation of marriage and divorce processes. Muslims consider the standardisation of Thai cultural practices as ultimately forcing on them devotion to Buddha.[14] This is simply unacceptable and has inflamed resentment of the government.

Evidence of the requirement to show devotion to Buddha can be seen in The Anthem of His Majesty the King. Muslims not only have to pay respect and show obedience to the King, they must also 'confess' that they are 'servants of Buddha' as in the following:

.....

Announcement of the Office of the Prime Minister on Stateism (No. 8)
Re: The anthem of His Majesty the King

Since it was decreed that the name of the country is 'Thailand', the Government deems it proper to revise the anthem of His Majesty the King to exclude the word 'Siam' and to abbreviate the text and the tune to make the song more compact and appropriate. Hence the Council of Ministers unanimously voted to proclaim as the State Preference, the revision of the anthem of His Majesty the King to contain the following text:

We the servants of Virtuous Buddha Lord.
Prostrate ourselves in front of you with our hearts to salute the Lord of the land, the Great Thai King
May whatever Your Majesty wish, flourish to the fullest of your virtuous heart. Be you blessed with victory. Victoriously!
The shortened tune is to remain the same.
Given on 26th. April, Buddhist Era 2483.

Phibunsongkhram

.....

An advantageous aspect is the geographical location of the Muslim minority in the four provinces. To some extent, the geographical distance is an advantage because the distance from the central government provides seclusion.[15]

The Rattaniyom is the basic regulation in the uniformity policy. Rattaniyom No.11 can be seen as a model for total uniformity, as in the following citation:[16]

Ratthaniyom No. 11, dealing with the 'Daily activities of the Thais', proclaimed that:

1. Thais should divide each day into three parts, that is, the time to carry out occupational tasks, the time to handle personal matters, and the time to rest. This should be conducted regularly as a habit.
2. Thais should carry out their daily activities as follows:
   a. to punctually eat their meals not more than four times
   b. to sleep for six to eight hours
3. Thais should attend to their respective tasks without becoming discouraged or evasive. And they should stop to rest and have lunch for a period of not over an hour. After the working hours in the evening, they should exercise by playing outdoor games for at least an hour, or engage in other tasks such as growing vegetables, raising animals or plants. After cleansing their bodies, they should have their meals.
4. Thais should use their spare time at night to finish off their work, converse with members of their families or friends, educate themselves by listening to the radio, read, or go for entertainment or art exhibitions.
5. Thais should spend their holidays in manners useful for their bodies or mind such as religious activities, listen to a sermon, make merit, study, travel, play games or rest.

This call to uniformity can raise issues of discrimination. However, it is less likely to affect other groups as they tend to be more flexible in handling religious differences, but it is different for Muslims because the government has also imposed other edicts on using the Thai language, on adopting Thai names and on embracing Thai culture. [17]

Nationalism, according to Anderson, is, "Nothing worse than a person's faith in the moral duties incumbent on citizenship become a substitute religion."[18] The Thai brand of nationalism, Siamization, is an attempt at homogenizing those who are different from the majority. This compulsory process and the idea of uniformity are factors that have strongly influenced the change in the education system, local language used and the social construction in the South. It is a major factor in the rise of the resistance movement among the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE INTELLECTUALS' THOUGHTS

The intellectual sees Pattani as an emergent problem that involves a complex set of factors. Therefore, it runs true to Gurr's theory, i.e. that this situation occurs because of complicated factors.

There are two different interpretations of what is happening in Pattani: the traditional views and non-traditional views. Traditional views represent those

of intellectuals whose sole source of interpretation is his or her own perspective. On the other hand, non-traditional views represent broader points of views, and are sometimes enriched with citations of 'so and so's experience and arguments'.

HISTORY OF PATTANI

A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt wrote in Hikayat Pattani[19] about the meaning of Pattani,[20] exposing its old glory and airing its grievances after its conquest by Siam. From a traditional point of view, this history is the perfect reason to retain the spirit of Pattani. History inspires them to recreate the glory of old Pattani.[21] The resistance is a struggle against conquest by a foreign power.[22] The non-traditional view sees the history of Pattani as a thing of the past, a memory to reminisce about, whereas what ought to drive those in Pattani is the future.

ETHNICS AND ETHNICITY

The people of Pattani have no doubt that their ancestry is Malay, from whence their distinctive characteristics derive – religion (Islam), language (Malay-Jawi), and custom-tradition (Islam-Malay). Sometimes, there is no clear distinction between being Malay and Muslim, no difference between practising Islamic traditions with a Malay touch or Malay traditions that have been Islamised.[23] To traditionalists, the ethnic origin of Pattani provides it with a distinct character compared to the rest of Thailand. The government should acknowledge this distinctive character, and denying it should be a cause for resistance. The non-traditionalist view recognises this ethnic origin and considers it a contributing factor to the development of a pluralistic Thai society. Any feature that is offensive to the government should be revised.

LANGUAGE

Malay is the local language of Pattani. The language forms as much a part of the identity of the people as their religion. In fact books on Islamic teachings are written mostly in Jawi script.[24] Banning the Malay language, the traditionalists believe, threatens the identity of the people.[25] The non-traditionalist view, on the other hand, accepts a multi-lingual society as the preferred situation.

SYSTEM OF EDUCATION

The state effort to fully transform traditional schools is seen by some Muslims as a way of alienating them from their Malay ancestry and religion.[26] The traditional system, adopted from the education system in the *ponok*, is considered by traditionalists as most suitable for teaching Muslim values. The new education system (the *kindom* system of education) supposedly distorts the delivery of Muslim values. On the other hand, non-traditionalists believe that a dual system of education should be applied – a combination of the traditional and the new. According to them, such a combination should ease the suspicions of people about the aims of modern education.

SYMBOL AND MEMORIES

People's collective memory of their history clearly identifies their Malay origins. This memory and Islam had previously inspired them to call for special treatment and even independence from the rest of Thailand. These two things are the major symbols of every resistance movement in the South. To the traditionalists, local symbols have to be maintained in order to maintain the spirit of Pattani as a Muslim-dominated area. People are enjoined to maintain traditional sites, tombs and other historic buildings as reminders of their distinctiveness and their struggle against assimilation. The other point of view is that local symbols should nurture memories but not provoke unconstructive actions. Symbols should not be exploited as tools for anti-government agitation.

NATION AND NATIONALISM

A form of nationalism is explicitly stated in the *Rattaniyom*, a policy to create Thai nationalism symbolised by one flag. In the *Rattaniyom*, Thais are governed by a trinity: the confession of one nation (which is Thai), the confession of religion (which mostly refers to Buddha), and obedience to the King. This *Rattaniyom* was applied forcefully in earlier times.

In the traditionalist point of view, the assertion of one Thai nation in a formal document denies the Malay origin of Pattani. Non-traditionalists, however, reject this argument, saying that the aim of nationalism is to create pride in the country. Also, the sense of all groups bound together in one nation should ease the sensitivity of being a minority group as it emphasises equal relations among different groups.

MOVEMENTS

It is commonly understood that resistance movements are created because of frustrations regarding particular

programmes of the government. Three distinct forms of resistance movements can be identified: the existing but largely unheard of underground;[27] those who have abandoned the underground;[28] and new vision groups seeking more peaceful solutions.

Traditionalists believe that discrimination against the Pattani Muslims is the cause of the rise of resistance movements such as the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani (BRN) and others. The non-traditionalists, however, believe that government has stopped such discrimination and urge people to take a more positive attitude as this can only bring better conditions in the future.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Traditionalists see current changes in government policy toward Muslims as an attempt to right historical wrongs. However, this is no guarantee that new policies will no longer discriminate against Muslims. On the other hand, the non-traditionalists believe that changes have actually occurred and that these should allay people's suspicions.

CONCLUSION

Being aware of the influence of globalisation, modernisation, the dynamics of economics and the political environment sheds light on Pattani's identity and the emergence of resistance movements. This is crucial to understanding the problems in Southern Thailand. The key points are summarised as follows:

1. The case of Muslims in southern Thailand reminds us of the problems faced by certain societies, which we may or may not be aware of. Some problems may be obvious and some others may not be as obvious. Details will be important in gaining more knowledge, seeking the truth and exposing lies.

2. The case suggests that any insights by people, regardless of their formal positions and education, are important in analysing the situation. Therefore, any thoughts will contribute to uncovering problems. In turn, this will call the attention of others to these problems and they can help make life more human, sane and compassionate.

3. Equal attention should be given to all three timeframes: past, present and future. Experiences in the past that are recorded in every history of any nation; their spirit, local memories and other distinctive characteristics that are maintained, should be treated as local assets rather than liabilities. The present conditions should be seen as the good intentions of the government. The government has tried to accommodate demands by changing its policies. This should be seen as an indication that people will be able to participate in determining the future of Thailand. The resistance movement, however, should be seen as the people's right to express their reaction toward anything that is deemed 'iniquitous' (rights, treatment, access, etc.). The movement is part of the dynamics of popular government. It can be used to enhance the speed of development for a better future. In setting up the agenda for the future, what Dr. Surin called 'seized mentality' (fear of something new) has to be avoided in order to create a better and more prosperous life for all.

Notes

1. Karl Mannheim, *Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge*, London: Routledge, Kegan Paul.
2. Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, New York: International Publishers, 1971 which has been quoted by Ron Eyerman, *Cendekiawan: Antara Budaya dan Politik dalam Masyarakat Modern*, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1996. Discussion on Gramsci's theory also found at <http://www.upress.umn.edu>, or <http://www.bu.edu>.
3. See Noam Chomsky, *The Responsibility of Intellectuals in the Age of Crack*, at <http://www.baylor.edu>.
4. James Peck, the editor of *The Responsibility of Intellectuals*, reprinted in The Chomsky Reader (Serpent Tail, 1987), at <http://www.pridi.or.th>.
5. See Robert Nozick , "Why Do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism?" in *The Future of Private Enterprise*, ed. Craig Aronoff et.al (Georgia University Business Press, 1986) and reprinted in Robert Nozick, Socratic Puzzles (Harvard University Press, 1997), at <http://www.cato.org>.
6. David Carment and Patrick James (eds.) *Wars in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
7. See Kevin M. Ellsworth, *1999 International Studies Association Conference*, 19 Feb. 1999, at <http://www.public.asu.edu/~ellswork/research.htm>.
8. Ted Robert Gurr, *Minority at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1993, 38-40.
9. D. Stanley Eitzen and Maxine Baca Zinn in *Conflict and*

Order: Understanding Society, 5th ed., Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1991, 266-80.

10. The preliminary study was conducted by a team in Research Center for Politics (P2P-LIPI), 2000. I was one of the authors who wrote about Pattani. See Riza Sihbudi et.al., *Problematika Minoritas Muslim Asia Tenggara*, Jakarta: P2P-LIPI, 2000.

11. Luis Golomb, *An Anthropology of Curing in Multiethnic Thailand*, Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 1985.

12. *Ibid*

13. John Knodel at <http://demog.berkeley-edu/>.

14. Busakom Suriyasarn, *Ethnic Relations in Thailand*, 1993.

15. Peter G. Gowing: Moros and Khaek, "The Position of Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and Thailand" in Ahmad Ibrahim et al, *Reading on Islam in Southeast Asia*, ISEAS, 1985, 181.

16. Omar Faruk, "The Origins and Evolution of Malay-Muslim, Ethnic Nationalism" in *Southern Thailand in Islam and Society in Southeast Asia*, 254-5.

17. See Masdar Hilmy, "Minoritas Muslim di Asia Tenggara di Tengah Pergumulan Identitas dan Dilema Integrasi," paper presented at *Workshop on Minoritas Muslim Asia Tenggara*, IAIN Sunana Ampel, Surabaya, 6 July 2000.

18. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the origin and spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1983 which has been excerpted by Gerd Baumann, *The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identity*, New York and London: Routledge, 1999.

19. See A. Teeuw and D.K Wyatt, *Hikayat Pattani*, KITLV: The Hague-Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

20. See for example the excerpt of Tashilu Nailil Amani, quoted by Hj. Wan Mohd. Saghir Abdullah, *Al 'allamah Syeikh Ahmad Al Fathani, Ahli Fikir Islam dan Dunia Melayu*, Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Fathaniyah, 1992, 57.

21. Interviews with the traditional ordinary Muslim villagers indicate that they will support the movement for Pattani's independence. This analyses is based on some unrecorded interviews with various classified respondents in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat during field research, September-October 2001.

22. Respondents mentioned that some people still could not accept the destiny of old Pattani after conquest by Siam. Therefore, there is no doubt that some people still strongly support every mechanism to bring back the glory of Pattani. This is based on interviews with formally educated intellectuals in Pattani and Yala, September-October 2001.

23. Respondents see clearly that some traditions and customs performed by the Pattani are more Malay than Islam. Based on discussion with colleagues in Pattani, October 2001.

24. Hooker gives a comprehensive detail on the use of Kitab Jawi in Pattani and the other three provinces in the Southern Thailand. See, V.M Hooker in *Jawi Literature in Patani: The Maintenance of an Islamic Tradition*, paper, n.d.

25. Some respondents in Pattani underlined their fear of their children's losing the ability to understand and practise Islamic teachings. Based on some informal discussions in Pattani, September-October 2001.

26. Interviews with local Muslims underlined their fear of being converted to Buddhism. Interviews were conducted in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat from 2 August to 30 September 2001.

27. According to some respondents, the underground movement's ultimate end is to bring back the independence of Pattani. Therefore, they will keep struggling until that is achieved. Based on some respondents' views during field research in Pattani, Yala, September-October 2001.

28. Respondents regarded these people to be mentally unstable because they could be bribed by material or other rewards such as being promised positions, being given funds to do something, etc. Informal talk with some respondents in Pattani, September-October 2001.

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IDENTITY CRISIS AND INDONESIA'S PROSPECTS FOR NATIONAL UNITY: THE CASE OF ACEH

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INTRODUCTION

In a corner of the provincial museum in Banda Aceh hangs a small painting of a plane flying over an undulating landscape of paddy fields. There is nothing artistically significant about the exhibit. No explanation is provided, and an outsider might wonder at the reason for its place there.

But those who are born and raised in the conflict-torn province of Aceh need no explanation. They know the story by heart. It was the first plane owned by Indonesia after gaining its independence from the Dutch – bought from the money donated by the people of Aceh and given as a gift to Jakarta.

While this tiny part of history is fading from the memory of many Indonesians, the Acehnese hold on to it with pride. For them the painting is not kept there simply to record the past – it is a symbol of Aceh's stake in the birth of the Indonesian nation.

Today, when separatist sentiment dominates the province, such historical memory emerges as a potent political statement. The Acehnese no longer use this piece of history to mark their share in a nation-state. Instead, they use it to emphasise the rejection of a dominant power alienated from them. The story of the plane has been narrated through the years, employing different interpretations. This time it is to fuel Aceh's aspiration for self-determination. The story is told time and again to show the injustice that has been done to Aceh by the 'ungrateful' Javanese.[1]

The sudden change that came during the time of post-Suharto Indonesia has brought along many critical challenges; among them being several conflicts that pose a threat to national stability. These conflicts have raised the question of how the country can survive without first breaking apart. The answer, perhaps, lies in Indonesia's ability, or inability, to maintain its unity through its people's perception of a common identity as citizens of one nation.

The departure of East Timor was concrete evidence of such a threat. At the forefront of provinces following East Timor's lead, is Aceh where secessionist struggles have gained momentum.

Jakarta sees Aceh's secessionist sentiment as the most threatening challenge. But while a big part of the Acehnese community clearly distinguishes its traditional identity from that of the rest of Indonesia, the answer to the question of whether identity difference is the root of the Aceh conflict remains arguable. From my observation, the Acehnese traditional identity *per se* was not a part of the problem in the beginning. Its role, however, has become significant as the situation continues to develop since it helps to justify Aceh's rejection of becoming part of another identity – that of Indonesia's.

Contributions by a multitude of ethnic groups to Indonesia during its early state of nation-building are recorded in history. Benedict Anderson wrote that among the different ethnolinguistic groups that gathered under the guidance of nationalism in the early state of nation-building, only one had separatist ambitions.[2] The fact that all the rest were competitive under the single political system showed the ability of ethnic identity to function under the concept of nation-state without the element of conflict.

That differences have now emerged, and often manifested themselves in an orgy of violence, is worth exploring. If the nature of identity is not fixed but instead changes according to the situation, as Tung Ju-lan

wrote,[3] it follows that identity can adopt different faces at different times. The case of Aceh also suggests that a local identity can emerge with a new interpretation as a response to political changes, and become a major factor in the conflict itself. In this process, the product of such an identity can also be reproduced and thereafter used selectively by groups in conflict to serve a particular goal. Despite its strong local identity, the case of Aceh shows that it takes more than identity difference to make people take a stand against their official state.

The conflict in Aceh started when people began to question their relations with Indonesia. While Anderson defined 'nation' as an imagined political community possessing the concept of sovereignty and existing within limited boundaries,[4] Chaiwat Satha-anand pointed out an obstacle to its existence, which he called an 'imagination deficit'.

According to Satha-anand, the imagination deficit occurs when members of that community can no longer imagine themselves as a meaningful part of the whole of the nation.[5] It happened, he wrote, where there were gross injustices such as in the case of East Timor and Aceh, which suffered from a long history of betrayal.

Another important factor that has put Indonesia's national unity in trouble since the beginning is the weakness of its state-built national identity. Indonesian expert Max Lane pointed out that the reason was the absence of the fundamental factors needed for a true sense of nation-ness. The factors he meant are a national culture that goes beyond that of different traditions, and common national institutions that give people a sense of belonging. "Indonesia was, and therefore is, the product of a conscious struggle for democracy and not a manifestation of cultural, ethnic or religious unity," he wrote.[6] Moreover, he viewed Suharto's repressive regime as a serious interruption of Indonesia's nation-building process within a true democratic atmosphere. This, he wrote, resulted in the beginning of localism in the country.[7]

To deal with the Aceh challenge, Indonesia perhaps needs a change in its fundamental perception of national unity. Decades of war between Aceh and Indonesia are evidence that the established concept of unity imposed on people by force did not yield a good result. A solid national identity, which is the foundation of national unity, can only be built through a real democratic approach.

This paper is a result of my ten-month research in Indonesia. It is based on interviews with different groups in Indonesian society especially those in conflict areas. The interviews focused specifically on their interpretations of the current situation of the country, the ongoing conflicts, their perceptions of national identity, and their hopes for the future.

As each conflict has its own depth and complexity that requires space to elaborate, the focus of this paper will be on the Aceh conflict as it is one of the most obvious challenges to Indonesia's territorial integrity.

ACEH: THE HISTORY OF CONFLICT

Prior to Indonesia's 57th anniversary of independence on 17 August 2002, citizens of Aceh – the resource-rich province on the northern tip of Sumatra – received a message from the rebel group Free Aceh Movement, popularly known as GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). It called for a general strike to coincide with the anniversary, urging The Acehnese to halt all business activities and remain at home unless absolutely necessary.[8]

The open challenge from Aceh has long posed the most dangerous threat to Indonesia's national unity. There is no sign of an end to the 50-year-old conflict that is littered with human rights abuses comprising over 7,000 deaths during the ten years of a special military operation initiated under the Suharto regime. And despite the fall of the New Order, pervasive killings in Aceh continue. Last year alone, the International Red Cross reported over 1,000 deaths in the province. From January to August 2002, the death toll was over 800. The violence has severely disrupted the lives of citizens. Indeed, Aceh today is effectively a war zone.

The Aceh conflict has its root in the history of Indonesia's nation-building. Rizal Panggabean elaborated that among the factors contributing to this conflict are people's participation in decision-making, the distribution of resources, legitimacy and identity, that is, people's self-definition and allegiance to the nation.[9]

Nevertheless, the nature of conflict between Aceh and Indonesia in the beginning was far from being centred on the issue of secessionism. The first disagreement emerged in 1948 when Aceh was included as a sub-province of North Sumatra. The Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA, or Association of All-Aceh Islamic Scholars), which was established in 1939 by Muslim leaders opposed to Dutch colonialism, demanded Aceh's own provincial status. PUSA leaders cited the differences between Aceh and the rest of North Sumatra in terms of economy, religion, education and law as reasons for their demand, given that Aceh then was the poorest area. PUSA's demand, however, fell within Indonesia's principle of sovereignty.

According to Tung, nationality is a modern concept that "demands that all groups within its officially announced boundaries submit themselves to the unified, homogenizing values of newly established nationhood."[10] The rejection of localism clearly showed in the early stage of the Acehnese conflict with Indonesia. In his response to PUSA's demand, S.M. Amin, the governor of North Sumatra, stated that the creation of North Sumatra was based on a new premise concerned with economic and political unity, not on old and narrow foundations such as ethnicity and religion. According to him, Indonesia is founded on Indonesian nationalism, and therefore there was no place for ethnic particularism.[11]

The establishment of an ideology of nationalism at the beginning of Indonesian statehood formed a rigid framework of state policy toward Aceh. Consequently, the province responded by joining the Darul Islam rebellion in 1953, which ended in 1962.

In the midst of the 1956 rebellion, autonomous status was granted for the first time to Aceh with the hope that it would help ease the conflict. But before Aceh enjoyed its fruits, policy change in Jakarta, which led to the era of Guided Democracy under President Sukarno in 1959, brought about a centralist system that ended the region's dream of autonomy. This continued in the 32 years that followed under this regime.

The repressive regime under Suharto became fertile soil for the growth of the seeds of the movement against Jakarta. Human rights abuses by the military, extreme poverty among the people and exploitation from both the government and multinational corporations led to the establishment of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in 1976.

GAM was established with a political objective that is significantly more radical than that demanded by past Acehnese leaders. GAM leaders, with silent support from a big part of the Acehnese population, insisted on the province's independence from Indonesia. The military regime in Jakarta responded by turning the province into a military operation zone (Daearah Operasi Militer: DOM), a condition that lasted for ten years (1989-1998). That period saw a drastic increase in human rights violations.

A sign of change emerged after the end of the Suharto era. Later, the pro-independence referendum in East Timor under the brief period of President B.J. Habibie inspired the Acehnese. It also encouraged the open involvement of Acehnese civil society in conflict resolution after decades of silence. Positive gestures from Jakarta continued during the period of President Abdurrahman Wahid, when several positive policies were initiated. However, no concrete step was taken to solve the problem because of his quick decline and the increasing power of the military.

It is clear that after the independence of East Timor, the Jakarta ruling elite was in no mood for another provincial breakaway. Nevertheless, Jakarta did come up with some interesting initiatives that were at least different from the hard-nosed military approach of the past. During the time of the Wahid government, the policy to apply Syaria'h, or Islamic law, in Aceh was made with the hope that it could go some way towards placating the demands of the Acehnese – the majority of whom are devout Muslims – by recognition of their religious identity.[12] The Wahid government also started a dialogue with GAM brokered by the Swiss-based organisation Henry Dunant Center (HDC).

But the most significant move came under the Megawati government in 2001 with a law known as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) that gave special autonomy status for Aceh. The law covers greater dimensions of Aceh autonomy compared to earlier laws, including the identity dimension by incorporating a lot of terms from the Acehnese language.[13] The law gives more economic autonomy as the province will receive 15 per cent of oil and 30 per cent of gas revenues in addition to the earlier share of 55 per cent of oil and 40 per cent

of gas revenues for a period of five years. Politically, the law guarantees direct election for governors and lower-ranking local administrative posts instead of leaders being directly appointed by Jakarta.

But the situation in Aceh remains severe despite this new development. GAM and several human rights groups accuse Jakarta of having a two-faced policy that obstructs the progress of peace. Indeed, along with the implementation of the new policies, more security forces were deployed in the province. In early 2001, the Megawati government re-established a military unit in Aceh, a move that led to more clashes between the military and the rebels, resulting in more deaths among civilians caught in the conflict.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IDENTITY IN THE ACEH CONFLICT

Over the years, the separatist movement in Aceh has forged a rather unique identity. The ethnic Acehnese have their own cultural heritage, including their own spoken and written language and history. Aceh was once a great Islamic kingdom that served as a centre of trade between the region and other continents, especially for traders from the Arab peninsula. Thus, while Hinduism and Buddhism have largely influenced Javanese culture, what distinguishes Acehnese culture from that of Java is the fact that the tradition of the former, especially Islam, has a much closer connection to the Arab world.

Such an identity, however, did not emerge as a problem during the formation of Indonesia in the early years. On the contrary, Aceh was among the many provinces that gave strong support to the independent movement. The Acehnese still take pride in the fact that they were the last group to hold out against the forces of the Netherlands East Indies.

The strength of Acehnese cultural identity, which later acted as a political motivation for its people, manifested itself in the form of a poem. *Hikayat Perang Sabi* (Legend of the Holy War), called *Perang Sabi* in short by the Acehnese, was written in 1881 in the Acehnese language by Islamic scholar Chick Pantee Kulu (1836-1894) who returned to his hometown of Piedie after studying in Mecca. In his poem, the poet urged his fellow countrymen to 'fight in the name of Allah' and be rewarded in paradise.

Perang Sabi became popular soon after it was written and became an important factor in the war against the Dutch. The following is a part of the poem as translated by S. Jaafar Husin:

> Thus written in the Holy Book,
> The words of my Lord,
> Listen to the words and understand the meaning,
> The Holy War is most pious of duties.
> When then your soul to God returns,
> The highest of paradise its throne guaranteed,
> Be thus convinced my dear fellow men,
> For those with faith, eternal happiness is sure waiting.
>
> Be ready to sacrifice your soul and possessions,
> As expenses for the Holy War,
> Allah will pay and price so high,
> The paradise above the return is promised.

In this case, Acehnese religious identity was given life in an artistic form through the Acehnese language to become a source of inspiration. This inspiration called for the Acehnese to sacrifice themselves in the struggle for independence, and later for the birth of a new nation called Indonesia.

Regardless of the vague meaning of nationalism in the context of their own traditional culture, the fact that the Acehnese were willing to die for what they had not traditionally known and lived with proves an important fact. It shows that the existence of a traditional identity does not have to go against the idea of nationalism despite the fact that by accepting such a concept, this identity allows itself to be reduced to a less important part of a new community.

In the context of the nationalist revolution in the 1940s, Indonesian leaders were able to gather strength from many traditional societies that existed together under the Dutch, in order to serve one absolute goal – Indonesian nationalism. Aceh was one of these traditional societies. The spirit of *Perang Sabi* is still a powerful inspiration for most Acehnese today. Different people reproduced the message of the poem in many different forms. For example, A.D. Pirous, an Acehnese who is internationally known for his calligraphy, has one of his masterpieces displayed in his gallery in Bandung, a drawing of Teunghu Umar, the Acehnese hero during The Dutch War. Pirous used a line from

Perang Sabi to serve as the background, "I would rather die in the battlefield than in the bed of my wife; I would rather die on the ground than at home surrounded by my family."[16]

But today, *Perang Sabi* finds its place in a completely different situation. In November 1999, the poem was read in front of a mass gathering in front of the central mosque in Banda Aceh. The gathering, with participants numbering close to a million, was to demand a referendum for the independence of Aceh.

This time, ironically, it was Jakarta that replaced the Dutch. The independence the poem inspired now is Aceh's independence from Indonesia – the nation the Acehnese were urged to die for decades ago.

While Acehnese local identity has a significant role in the dispute, it alone can hardly be taken as an answer to the conflict. When the Wahid government legalised Islamic law in the province, saying that it was a way to solve the conflict as it answered the Acehnese's demand for their religious identity to be accepted, many groups, including civil society and GAM, came out in protest. According to them, the problem of Aceh lay in other courses rather than religion. Despite its significant meaning for Acehnese spiritual life, Islamic law was not an answer to the problem.

SOURCES OF THE ACEH PROBLEM

While no one denies the uniqueness and strength of the Acehnese local identity, it is known that the lesson for the on-going conflict lies in other things. The following are the most important sources of the conflict that I found:

The nation-building process

The state of Indonesia since its establishment has made clear that maintaining national unity is an absolute task for all sections of the society. Different mechanisms have been made to ensure that national stability remains untouched. However, the emergence of the separatist movement in Aceh and other conflicts indicate the failure of the project. An important question to ask is what went wrong with the country's nation-building process that it still failed to guarantee stability despite the time and energy the country has invested in it.

From the time before Independence in 1945, influential secular nationalist leaders have employed as the philosophical basis of the newly-born Indonesia the invented state ideology Panca Sila. Panca Sila, which refers to five principles consisting of belief in God, humanity, unity, democracy and social justice, has been used alongside the state motto 'Unity in Diversity' to urge all ethnic groups to assimilate under one nation. Governments, acting as the fundamental state apparatus have since taken this as state ideology.

But questions remain on the justification of the ideology, and therefore, a lot has been said regarding its weaknesses. Firstly, the ideology is centralistic as it was created under a political atmosphere dominated by a political elite based in Java while the presence of the outer provinces was lacking. The absence of local participation in a crucial part of the nation-building process makes the ideology fail to justify itself before those seeking to reject the presence of Indonesian nationality. On top of that is what critics call Java-centric imperialist behaviour reflected in the unjustified annexation of some outer territories such as West Papua in 1963 and East Timor in 1974. The result is the rise of localism among the outer territories.[17]

Secondly, critics view the concept of national identity based on the state ideology as being ill-defined. As Tung wrote, the problem came earlier from a reluctance among the then ruling elite to clarify the boundaries of a national culture supposedly constructed out of the country's multi-ethnic traditions.[18] Thus, for Tung, the concept of 'Unity in Diversity' was nothing but a reflection of such vagueness.

The Suharto regime was able to hide such weaknesses behind its repressive policy. Instead of giving the identity space for mature development by providing for open debate that involved the society at large, the regime chose to maintain unity by rules and force. For example, rules to prohibit discussion on ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group differences were created on the grounds that they would help guard national unity. Consequently, ideologies which differed from the ones propounded by the state were considered as threats to unification.

From its beginnings, the Indonesian state has never been able to bridge the gap between its ideals and the aspirations of the local community. The state's obsession for nationalism and unity has done nothing but drive the people away from its grip. The Aceh conflict is an

example of the people's alienation from, and rejection of, such an approach.

Multinational investments

As with many developing countries, globalisation manifested itself in Indonesia in the form of multinational corporate investments. What makes a difference is that their presence in Indonesia has also fuelled the conflict between Jakarta and its troubled regions. The investments of the US transnational ExxonMobil in the Arun natural gas field in Aceh, which started in 1968 and generate approximately US$1 billion annually for Indonesia, is one of the most obvious examples.

A big proportion of the Acehnese sees ExxonMobil as a loyal counterpart of the central government. The Acehnese have pointed at the investments not only as a threat to the people's traditional way of life, but also as a contributor to the propagation of violence against them.

According to several studies by human rights groups both in and outside Indonesia, ExxonMobil's investment in Aceh strongly relates to the financial interests of Indonesian security forces. The obvious cases involve soldiers and police hired by the company to provide security for the investment sites. Such security service is a major financial source for Indonesian security personnel both in Aceh and in other places with multinational investments. Over the years, there have been several cases of murder, torture, kidnapping, and rape of the locals by security forces in Aceh. Last year, International Labour Rights acted on behalf of 11 Acehnese villagers who were victims of human rights abuses in suing ExxonMobil in a United States federal court. The group mentioned that ExxonMobil provided barracks where the military tortured and detained villagers, and lent the military equipment such as excavators to dig mass graves.

Worse still, the investment of ExxonMobil failed to bring about economic development to Aceh. The transmigration policy that brought workers from Java and other islands to work with the company has discontented the Acehnese majority who still suffer from poverty and unemployment.

For many Acehnese, the presence of ExxonMobil is a symbol of injustices perpetrated by the state. One of the consequences was the 2001 attack on ExxonMobil's operations in Arun by GAM, which led to operations closing doors for three months.

The security policy

Military solutions to the Aceh conflicts are still Jakarta's most favoured approach. Although the departure of the Suharto regime helped end the ten-year special military operation that claimed thousands of lives, Jakarta continued with Operation Rencong I, II and III, a series of coordinated Indonesian police and military operations.

Since the beginning of the Megawati government, more troops have been deployed in the troubled province for 'security reasons'. The presence of security forces has generated more violence in the province as more clashes with GAM occur. The idea of imposing martial law in Aceh as intended by Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Political Security Lt. General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in July 2002, clearly shows the government's tendency towards a security-based solution.

The emphasis on the military solution inadvertently impedes other solutions from emerging. It does not only prevent political solutions from developing, but also creates doubts among the Acehnese on both the efficiency of the talks and the sincerity of the government in solving the problem. In the end, such a solution has not yielded Jakarta any fruitful results. On the contrary, it has alienated the central government from the provinces, and Indonesia from many of its people.

Injustice

There are many reasons for the unpopularity of the special autonomy law in Aceh. One of them is its failure to answer one of the most important questions posed by the province – the question concerning economic and political injustice.

There is still no answer from Indonesia regarding the demand for an investigation of those responsible for the 7,000 civilian deaths during the DOM period. Despite apologies from the government and the military for violence committed by the state apparatus during that time, violence continues in the same manner. An attempt by the Wahid government to ease the separatist sentiment by setting up a trial for the 1999 killing of Muslim Acehnese Tengku Bantaqiah and his supporters

turned out to be a disappointment. The shaky political position of President Wahid made him unable to send soldiers suspected of abuses to the human rights tribunal as demanded by the Acehnese community. Instead, pressure from the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) led to a trial by a joint civilian-military court.

Pervasive violence in the troubled provinces widely believed to be committed by Indonesian security personnel has alienated people from the centre. The failure of the following governments to bring about justice after the end of the Suharto regime has increased the locals' distrust of Jakarta even more. Out of distrust came a rejection: the Acehnese's negative response to the special autonomy laws is a part of this rejection.

Injustice also came in the form of imbalanced economic opportunities for the people of the provinces compared to those at the centre. Aceh accounts for 30 to 40 per cent of all oil and natural gas export production in Indonesia, which is the world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas. But most of the income from that investment went to the centre while much development is still needed for the locals.

Violence and economic discrimination, which are seen by the Acehnese as injustices done to them by Jakarta, naturally led to an 'imagination deficit' among the people of the province. Unless the people feel a fairer treatment coming from Indonesia, there will be no end to the war in Aceh.

CONCLUDING REFLECTION

Two fundamental questions struck me at the end of my ten months in post-Suharto Indonesia. Is the country ready for change? And if it is, in which direction will it go? The answers to these questions remain elusive.

Coming from Thailand, I see some similarities between the two countries. Both nations, for most of their modern history, have flirted with military rule. While Suharto and his junta reigned for 32 years in Indonesia, Thai generals took turns seizing political power in the past few decades. The concept of 'the military as the nation's guardian' has been applied in almost the same manner in Indonesia and Thailand.

But there are significant differences between the two – Indonesia's ethnic and cultural differences are much more diverse, and the two countries have different historical backgrounds especially concerning their respective processes of nation-building, thus providing different grounds for conflict management.

Until recently, Thailand's 'unity' was challenged by the Pattani separatist movement, which operated in the country's key southern provinces. But the government was able to contain the conflict by changing the core of the problem from one of secession to one that is negotiable within its national borders. The military solution is thus replaced by political solutions, creating space for political negotiations.

In 1988, the Thai government announced the New Hope policy for the rebellious southern provinces, where there had been violent clashes between the Thai military and the Muslim separatist movement PULO. The policy was to promote political freedom and recognised the people's rights to participate in democratic development and national administration. This policy followed an earlier government policy in dealing with the communist insurgency which mooted a special law in 1983 giving amnesty to members of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). As a result, thousands of students and intellectuals who fled military violence to join the CPT in the jungles since 1976 returned home, and the armed insurgency was quickly put to an end. Likewise, New Hope saw the laying down of arms by a majority of PULO's members and the weakening of the movement in the early 1990s.

Although the government continued to apply security measures in both cases, these were minimised under the new policies. Curiously, the state institution assigned to carry out the policy was the Thai Army itself.

To return to Aceh: a good sign was shown with the beginning of the peace talks in 2000. Despite the ongoing violence and chaos, the fact that both sides at least officially recognise an alternative to the security approach helps many to sustain hope for a peaceful end to the conflict.

While there is a long way to go before Aceh and Indonesia reach the point Thailand is at right now, the latter today is still far from being conflict-free. On the contrary, while old conflicts between the people and the state are put to rest, new conflicts emerge, be they environmental, economic or social. Perhaps the lesson from Thailand's and Indonesia's quests for peace and

territorial integrity is that a rigid solution, especially a military approach, may not be the best answer to the question of conflict resolution.

Notes

1. This story was mentioned in several interviews with separate groups of Acehnese. For example, a businessman based in Banda Aceh expressed his feelings: "The Javanese never said 'thank you'." In this context, Indonesians of other ethnic groups, especially those in conflict areas, often use the term 'Javanese' to refer to the government or the ruling elite. In many cases the term also means the ethnic Javanese in general whom Indonesians believe receive more favour from the powers-that-be.
2. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1983.
3. Tung Ju-lan, *Identity Influx: Young Chinese in Jakarta*, Ph.D. thesis, School of Sociology, Politics and Anthropology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Australia, 1998.
4. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.
5. Chiwat Satha-anand, *The Paramnesia of Southeast Asia: Looking at Indonesia's & Malaysia's Presents from Thailand's Past*, Thailand, Australia & the Region: Strategic Development in Southeast Asia, National Thai Studies Center, Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian University, 2002.
6. Max Lane, "Aug 17 and New Order: National-building Problem," *The Jakarta Post*, 13 August 2002.
7. Ibid, 2002. Max Lane noted, "Even in Java, people are demanding provinces of their own, such as Cirebon."
8. *The Jakarta Post*, August 13, 2002.
9. Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Separatism, Autonomy, and Democracy: The Case of Aceh*, unpublished paper for the project on Separatism, Autonomy and Democracy in Asia, The United States Institute of Peace and the Asia Foundation, 2002, Jakarta.
10. Tung Ju-lan, *Identity Influx*: Young Chinese in Jakarta.
11. Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Separatism, Autonomy, and Democracy: The Case of Aceh*.
12. Despite the fact that Islam is the religion of the majority of Indonesians, Islam has never been a major factor in Indonesian politics since the concept of national unity ignored all identity differences including those of religions.
13. Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Separatism, Autonomy, and Democracy: The Case of Aceh*.
14. *In words in Colors, Poetry and Paintings*, Yayasan Ananda, first edition 1995.
15. *Ibid*.
16. Translated by an Acehnese during the interview with A.D. Pirous in Bandung in May 2002.
17. Gabriel Dovert, *Indonesia from an Empire to a Nation: The Crossroad of the National Construction*, unpublished paper for International Symposium on Management of Social Transformation, Indonesian Institute of Science, 2000, Jakarta.
18. Tung Ju-lan, *Identity Influx: Young Chinese in Jakarta*.

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IDENTITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE AMONG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE CORDILLERA OF NORTHERN LUZON, THE PHILIPPINES

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INTRODUCTION

This project is about the 'encounter of other-ness' and is a self-reflection about the indigenous peoples of Cordillera in Northern Luzon of the Philippines who face processes of development in that nation. The author, who is neither a Filipino nor an indigenous person, tried to understand the problems of the indigenous peoples of Cordillera. The methods used in trying to understand this group of people were a combination of conventional research methods such as a review of literature, field research (interviews and observations) and drawing from the author's own experiences.

The last was done when the author immersed himself with the people and their problems, through the delivery of lectures and obtaining feedback, working with the community, and getting actively involved in the issues of the indigenous people through networking with governmental and non governmental organisations (NGOs).

'Self-reflection' means the comparison of the author's imagination concerning the indigenous peoples of Cordillera at the time when he wrote the proposal in Indonesia and the reality of the indigenous peoples' struggle for their self-identity. In October 2000 in Indonesia, I proposed the following research questions: (1) What historical milestones are related to the indigenous peoples and their position in the Philippines? (2) What actions are involved in the indigenous peoples' issues and for what position? and, (3) What do the indigenous peoples need in facing development and how do they fulfil their needs?

However, I have a hidden 'ambitious agenda' in this public intellectual activity, which is to understand the problem of the identity of the indigenous peoples in the Cordillera region of the Philippines, from their everyday lives (through a case study in one village) to a wider perspective, like national issues.

The problem of the indigenous peoples in the Cordillera lies in a contestation between the State and the indigenous peoples regarding the position of the latter in Philippine society. The State has, through the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, placed indigenous peoples under the state's power. On the contrary, indigenous peoples have their own identity that is to be self-determined.

From Jakarta the author went to the Philippines where he visited Manila, Baguio City, Sagada, Ifugao and Abra, and resided in a village in the province of Kalinga, named Balbalasang. He conducted interviews, made observations, read printed material, gave lectures, worked with the community, attended seminars and conferences from the municipality level to the national and international level, and attended Cordillera Day festivities.

Getting involved with the community for several months gave the author firsthand experiences with the people. He attended several life circles rituals, community meetings, conflict settlements, engaged with military personnel, attended the *vochong* (peace pact) celebration, worked on a documentary, joined in the dancing and singing, followed the people preparing for tribal war, and attended mass in church.

What did the author achieve? What do the objectives mean? The author believes that the ethnographer's own racial, national, political, financial and professional position was inextricably at play in the processes of recording and interpreting the field (Gardner 1999:47).

DEFINING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: FROM IDEOLOGY TO TERRITORIAL BASES

The Philippine's Indigenous Peoples Right Act (IPRA), Republic Act 8371, 1997 defined an indigenous people/ indigenous cultural community (IP/ICC) as:

> A group of people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organised community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilised such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonisation, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos.

This definition on the one hand, gives a new label to the indigenous peoples of the Philippines from that of the Colonial to post-Colonial periods. In tracing history, one can see that old labels were given by the colonial state, such as tribal *independiente* (Spanish Occupation, 1575-1898), 'Non-Christian Tribe' (American occupation, 1899-1942), 'National Minority' (President Ferdinand Marcos's regime, until 1984) and 'Cultural Communities' (President Corazon Aquino's regime, 1986-1992). The Spaniards also used other labels, such as 'savage' and 'barbaric'.

The new definition also gives power to the state through the NCIP to interplay the authenticity of the indigenous peoples with the notion of 'ascription by other' through the certification of their ancestral domain. There are some necessary requirements in claiming the ancestral domain, such as written historical documents, mapping of the ancestral domain and written documents about customary law.

Sociologically, however, the definition has loopholes, particularly involving the notion of 'homogeneous society.' This is based on the fact that with prevailing circumstances there is no homogeneous society; every society is heterogeneous in terms of gender, economic status, religion and the like. If a society is not homogeneous, the IPRA is not going to recognise it as an indigenous group of people in the Philippines. As such, there are no indigenous peoples in the Philippines following the term 'homogeneous society'.

However, both the colonial state and the nation-state of the Philippines are two agencies with the authority to give definitions, labels and 'ascription by other' for indigenous peoples. The Spaniards employed the term *indio* for a dark-skinned person wearing pants that attended mass, paid taxes, obeyed Spanish Law and only went to war when the government told him to.

On the contrary, the mountain peoples of Northern Luzon obviously did not conform to this pattern, be they the Igorots, Tingguians or Zambals, so they were collectively referred to as *tribus independientes* (Scott 1998:3). Then, when the United States replaced the Spaniards in occupying the Philippines, a new Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT) was formed. Label ideology was apparent during the American period. This bureau was formed not to improve the overall life of the indigenous peoples, but to control their natural resources. However, the BCNT was abolished in 1938 and no agency took care of the national minorities, until 1941 when a Commissioner for Mindanao was established.

In the post-colonial era after 1946, the new Philippine government had the task of pacifying Muslims and other national minorities and thus set up the CNI in 1957 which functioned in almost the same way as the previous BCNT. The government looked at the indigenous peoples of the Philippines in a similar manner as the American government did. The Philippine government called for the 'Non-Christian Filipino or National Cultural Communities', as stated in their objective, ". . . to effect in a more rapid and complete manner, the economic, social and moral and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or National Cultural Communities, and to render real, complete and permanent, the integration of all said national cultural communities into the body politic (Reyes 1986:160)." In the eyes of the government, the 'non-Christian Filipino' needed to be integrated in the nation-building of the Philippines.

When Marcos was in power, the CNI was transferred to the president who acted as the Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The label employed was still the same, but he used the PANAMIN to subordinate indigenous peoples under his control. Later on, some cases proved to the public that the PANAMIN was there to serve the president's needs and not the needs of the indigenous peoples themselves.

After the first EDSA in 1986 that put Corazon Aquino in power, a new vision for the indigenous peoples in the Philippines came about: from the Spaniards with their label *tribus independientes* or *tribus salvajes*, to the American colonialists with their non-Christian Tribes, to the CNI with its non-Christian Filipinos, the PANAMIN with its National Minorities, to Aquino's regime which called them Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICC). During the formation of the new Constitution in 1987, the term ICC was present in the Constitution: "State shall recognise, respect and promote Indigenous Cultural Communities." By definition, there was a shift from an 'ideological' perspective (*tribus independiente, tribus salvajes,* non-Christian Tribe, Non-Christian Filipino, and National Minority) to issues of 'ancestral domain'. It was the first time that the Philippine Constitution mentioned indigenous peoples. However, it is important to note that a global movement on indigenous peoples was on the rise during that period and this influenced the Philippines' decisions.

Cory's successor, Fidel Ramos with his Social Reform Agenda (SRA), recognised indigenous peoples as a marginal sector that needed to achieve a higher status. In October 1997, he signed Republic Act 8371 into law. The Act was "an act to recognise, protect and promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities/ indigenous peoples, creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, establishing implementing mechanism, appropriating funds thereof and for other purposes…(IPRA, 1997)." It seemed a comprehensive law for indigenous peoples and made promises of a better life for them.

However, during his time, Ramos also signed into law Republic Act No 7492, popularly known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Some provisions of the law threatened the concept of ancestral domain as stated in the Constitution of 1987, and later in IPRA 1997. It was not surprising why many NGOs were not in favour of the IPRA. Indeed, shortly after IPRA was signed into law, a civilian took the IPRA to the Supreme Court and questioned some of its provisions, stating that they were unconstitutional.

When Joseph Estrada came to power in 1998, and after learning of the case of the IPRA in the Supreme Court, he decided to freeze the budget for the NCIP. All IPRA activities for indigenous peoples came to a standstill. The promises of the Constitution and IPRA to 'promote' the rights of indigenous peoples lapsed during the Estrada administration. Estrada concerned himself with the problems in Mindanao and promoted himself among the urban poor.

Then, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became President during the 'street oath-taking' of EDSA 2001. She looked into the Indigenous Peoples' issues in her first Executive Order (EO 1) which provided for the formation of the Office of the President for Indigenous Peoples' Affairs (OPAIPA). She served as the temporary Presidential Adviser and oversaw matters such as renewing and revitalizing the NCIP, forming new commissions, strengthening legal frameworks and the like. The Arroyo administration seems to have brought about a new wind of change concerning indigenous peoples' rights in the Philippines.

At the national level, the author discovered interesting facts in his encounter with indigenous peoples of the Philippines and their issues, which date back from the Spanish era and have persisted until the present time period. I found the workings of an 'ascription by other' when the colonial state as well as the Philippine state and government placed labels of identity on the indigenous people. The labels of identities shifted from 'ideological' bases, like what the Spaniards, Americans, CNI and PANAMIN employed, to a more 'territorial' one during Cory Aquino's regime i.e. related to the notion of ancestral domain, similar to that of the 1987 Constitution and Ramos's IPRA 1997.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF CORDILLERA: HISTORY OF RESISTANCE

Presently, the term 'Cordillera' refers to an administrative region in Northern Luzon in the Philippines which is composed of six provinces, Benguet, Mountain Province, Kalinga, Ifugao, Apayao and Abra. This administrative region is supposed to be an autonomous region emanating from certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

Two Republic Acts (RA) came about for the purpose of autonomy. First, all provinces, except Ifugao in its plebiscite of 1990, rejected RA No. 6766, otherwise known as the Organic Act of Cordillera. Then, RA 8433 came about as an amendment to the Organic Act. The people, except in the province of Apayao, in the 1997 plebiscite, rejected it again. Those who

rejected autonomy were ignorant of their past history of resistance from the Spanish colonial era up to the present time. While many dreamt about autonomy and self-governance, the Cordillerans rejected those initiatives from government.

The late William Henry Scott, an American historian, (Scott 1998) wrote about the motives of the conquerors to occupy the Cordillera area during the Spanish era (1575-1898) and how the natives resisted this occupation. The whole thing started with Spanish expeditions searching for gold, but most of them failed or found the operation was not viable. However, the natives, resisting through ambushes, tortured and killed members of the expeditions. These groups were composed of Spaniards and native lowlanders. Because of the forceful resistance of the natives, the Spaniards placed negative labels on these people, calling them 'barbaric', 'killer savages' and the like. The people also resisted the tobacco monopoly.

When the author interviewed an elder from Balbalan of Kalinga, the elder said, "The Spaniard was a colonialist, but America was not; the Americans were friends!" However, the late William Henry Scott, himself an Anglican missionary, had a different point of view: the American government, the Protestant missionaries and the Roman Catholic missionaries had the same goal: to make the Filipinos more like the Americans and less like the Filipino (Scott in Reyes 1986:5). Further, Scott told a story about Bishop Brent, the first Anglican Bishop of the Philippines, who was advised by some American Presidents not to allow Filipinos to gain independence, because they were not competent to govern themselves.

From 1898 to 1946, the Americans were perceived as colonialists who labelled the indigenous peoples in Cordillera, part of the grouping called 'non-Christian Tribes'. The Americans then tried to immerse themselves with the Cordillera peoples when they appointed some *pangat* (tribal leaders) for local government positions to build schools and introduce English as a medium of instruction, to introduce American history, to build a hospital, and to open a road in Kennon. It was understandable why the old man from Balbalan said that the Americans were their friends.

However, a documentary entitled *Bontoc Eulogy* told the story of a Festival in Saint Louis, Missouri, U.S.A. in 1904, which featured the *Igorots* and labelled them as 'headhunters' and 'dog-eaters'. Similar to the Spaniards, but using different approaches, the Americans finally occupied the gold area in the Cordillera and Christianised the people.

In Cordillera, the American colonial government appointed some *pangat* for government positions, who acted as the presidents of municipalities, in order to attract the people. The appointments of these local leaders were not because the Colonialists appreciated their existence, but it made it easier for the Americans to approach them.

THE COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND COLLECTIVE REMEMBRANCE OF CORDILLERA

When the author attended a discussion about the *Cordillera Image* at the University of the Philippines campus in Baguio, a lady questioned the speaker on the use of the terminology 'Cordillera', since she preferred the term *Igorot*. Her question was one of never-ending debate about the 'Cordillera identity' among the middle class, the activists and indigenous peoples' political movements in the region. *Igorot* literally means 'people from mountain'. However, for some lowland groups, the meaning of the word took on a derogatory slant when stereotyping and ethnocentrism among certain people associated the word with backwardness.

Among activists and political movements, the term *Igorot* became the basis for a collective identity indicating the value of resistance, since the *Igorots* believed the Spaniards were not able to occupy their land. Nevertheless, the term *Igorot* was rejected by some of groups in the Cordillera itself, such as people from Kalinga and Ifugao. They preferred the term 'Kalinga' and 'Ifugao' or 'Cordilleran'. According to these people, the term *Igorot* refers only to people from Benguet and the Mountain Province areas. The word *Igorot* came to denote a political identity and Cordillera, a territorial identity.

Presently, the image of Cordillera as a united political movement resisting state domination is pre-eminent among advocacy groups such as non governmental organisations and other 'middle-class' organisations: youth associations, political parties, women's groups and the like. It was different during the Marcos period, when the issue of the marginalisation of the peoples of the Cordillera was prominent. The protests against

the Chico dam at Kalinga-Mountain Province and Cellophil at Abra united most groups in the Cordillera area.

One effort to strengthen the identity of Cordillera is strengthening the 'collective remembrance' through annual events such as Cordillera Day on 24 April. The annual event commemorates Mangli-ng Dulac, a chieftain from Kalinga who was killed by the military. This was the price of his struggle against the development of the Chico Dam. The anti-Chico dam movement united many tribal groups, including those not living along the Chico River. At the time, they used a traditional mechanism called *vochong* as part of their struggle. In addition, New People's Army (NPA) was also involved in the movement to oust the Marcos regime.

IDENTITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE: THE BANAO OF BALBALASANG KALINGA

The Banao in the Balbalasang village of Balbalan, Province of Kalinga, has been classified as a sub-group of Tinggian, as most of its population inhabits the province of Abra (Peralta); others (Saboy 1995; Puyao 1999) classified them as a sub-group of Kinalinga of Kalinga. Both classifications are valid, since the Balbalasang village is located in the border area of Kalinga and Abra, and migration between the two different groups are frequent.

The Banao was always associated with the name of a lake in Pantikian, adjacent to a village of Balbalasang. The area around the lake was first inhabited by these people before they migrated to other places, including Balbalasang and Talalang in the present Balbalan Municipality of Kalinga, and in the municipalities of Daguioman and Malibcong of the present province of Abra. Balbalasang was named after sacred trees in that area and related to a story of womanhood. In Ilocano, the word *balbalasang* means woman.

During the Spanish period, few writings mentioned the Banao of Balbalasang. However, Alexander Schadenberg, a German chemist who passed by Balbalasang in 1886 in his trip to the interior of Cordillera published some information about the area. The publication gave some important firsthand information about (1) the existence of the Spaniard's military post in the area and the fact that the relationship between the military and the people were close; (2) the inhabitants were scattered in 13 *rancherias*; (3) the practice of animism; (4) the agricultural system, housing construction and clothes; (5) the practice of tattooing; and (6) food habits. His information, although biased towards the West and inaccurate in terms of naming traditions, is important because it shows that even at this late date, Spain and Christianity had not yet influenced the area.

Contact with western culture became intensive during the American period, especially from 1907 to 1925. In 1907 an American government official reported that a situation in Balbalasang caused many people to migrate to other areas because of diseases and calamities.

However, contact with Anglican missionaries was the most significant factor for the changing traditions of the Banao. The Anglican missionaries not only provided churches, but schools and dispensaries. The church served as the centre of religious activities and was successful in changing the original religion of Balbalasang from a strong belief in Kabunian (supreme God) to a Christian ideology, and at the same time replaced the *mandadawak* (traditional priest) with a Christian priest. In the same manner, the role of education using the American system gave the people a chance to learn to read, write and absorb information. A new *lingua franca* between Banao and the English language was invented.

In the era after independence was granted in 1946, the Banao underwent a nation- building project centred on the identity of being Filipino. They introduced political, educational, market and developmental systems.

DE-TRADITIONALISATION OF BANAO

In a travel book about the Cordillera, the author wrote about Kalinga as a 'scenic place' and made a mention of 'headhunting', followed by a picture of a man wearing a G-string. That image can influence one's impression about Kalinga and Banao. Afterwards, when the author was staying in Baguio City, a colleague, an NGO activist, said, "be careful there," and when the author was waiting for public transportation to the Banao area, a friend from Mindanao said, "I don't want to go there, many communist rebels." That information shaped the author's first impression of Kalinga and Banao: that although the environment is nice, the people are strange.

However, the author's findings were contrary to what he had heard. Banao people are completely alike to his neighbours in Baguio City. Imagining people with G-strings, tattoos, wielding bolo (big knife), who are headhunters, and threatening foreigners is a complete misinterpretation, and such images were true only in books published before the 1950s.

Influenced by the education system, Christianity, intermarriage and development projects, the Banao at present are experiencing a condition of de-traditionalisation. Tradition is not disappearing, but the people have more choices. For example, *pagtong* and *gangsa*, both traditional dances of Cordillera are exhibited only for fiesta or school events, but during Christmas night, they perform them as part of the entertainment. In the same manner, *bodong* (peace pact) is still practised, but people also use national laws to solve the problems. All traditions are created, not natural. There is no pure traditional society; there are reasons for the creation of traditions and customs, and one of them is power (Giddens 2001).

Balbalasang is presently composed of around 900 people with 250 households. They inhabit three *sitios* (hamlets), namely Balbalasang proper, Ibong and Saltan. The dominant religion is Anglicanism (77%). It was the only dominant religion after tribal elders in 1925 declared a ban on religions in Balbalasang other than Anglicanism. However, there are now some other religions, such as the Charismatic movement, Spritista, Roman Catholicism, United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP), Islam, and other denominations.

In terms of their livelihood, the Banao of Balbalasang combine agriculture, services and gold mining. Agriculture is for subsistence needs, with an emphasis on producing rice for daily consumption from wet-rice fields and dry-fields (*kaingin*). The Banao also plant vegetables, but only for family consumption. The Balbalasang was well-known as a producer of *Kalinga Orange* during the 1970s; however a virus attack damaged all the orange trees.

Now, gold mining has become an important livelihood. They have their own mining areas in Gaang, and recognise them as part of their ancestral domain. Under the management of Banao Bodong Federation (BBF), all those with blood and marriage relationships with Banao are free to mine the gold. However, they also allow people from other villages within the municipality of Balbalasang to mine but only within a certain quota. On the other hand, adjacent tribes from different municipalities are not allowed, based on reasons of peace and order. The Balbalasang people also use the forest for hunting animals, finding wood and non-forest products. However, the forest area is declared as part of the Balbalasang National Park.

Several problems related to the environment were raised in a community workshop including (1) forest fires, (2) illegal logging, (3) unregulated hunting, (4) forest-product gathering, (5) illegal fishing, and (6) the encroachment of mining corporations. Behind those environmental problems, there are some economic, cultural and political problems as well, such as the deterioration of cultural practices, the lack of employment opportunities, low incomes, boundary disputes, encroachment of territorial jurisdiction, unprocessed Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADT), the lack of land tenure titles, the lack of environmental awareness, the lack of knowledge of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act (IPRA) and the non-functioning of the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB).

WHO ARE THE BANAO: IDENTITY AND AUTHENTICITY

As the author mentioned earlier, the Anglican Church is an agency that significantly changed the everyday life of the Banao people. The dogma and the practices of the church are changing the worldview of the people over time. Religion, education and health changed the people. They now enjoy new institutions, such as the Sunday mass, a fiesta every second week of January, Christmas, a church choir, weddings, Holy Communion and the like. The people recognise a new leadership of the priest and his clergy.

In the past, the *pangat* (chieftain), *mengol* (tribal elder), and *mandadawak* (traditional priest) were the mediators in charge of connecting with the *Kabunian* (Almighty); now the people look upon religion and its elements, such as the *padi* (priest), the clergy, the Episcopal Women's Church and *Ayalak* (Youth organisation) as the agencies answering their needs. However, there came a time when other denominations came into the scene, and the people became divided based on denomination.

Education also significantly changed the life of the Balbalasang people. An elementary school owned by the government and a high school run by the Anglican Church have been built in the area. Having a private high school became an advantage for the Balbalasang people towards obtaining a higher education beyond that offered at the villages in Kalinga. The nation-building project sponsored by the government at the elementary school and the American-style education at Saint Paul Memorial High School are transforming the identity of the Balbalasang people. The educational system has opened a wider window for the Balbalasang people and connected them with the world beyond their own. Many of them now can finish college or at least can experience studying in a college. It is not surprising that the percentage of people graduating from college is higher than those finishing high school.

Another factor changing the identity of Balbalasang is intermarriage with other tribes in Cordillera and with the lowlander Ilocanos. Most of the prominent people in Balbalasang are of mixed parentage belonging to the Balbalasang and lowlanders from the Ilocos region. The geographical location of Balbalasang makes it more accessible for the people from the Abra and Ilocos area, than from the Cagayan region, therefore influencing marriage patterns.

What Giddens has noted about de-traditionalisation is happening in Balbalasang. Tradition is not truly lost, but society now has the choice. For instance, the Balbalasang still practice *vochong* (peace pact) which is the traditional way to solve boundary conflicts, they still exhibit traditional art for fiestas and they practice *waksi* for the death rituals.

GOVERNMENT, SHADOW GOVERNMENT AND NON GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS

Three agencies are significantly involved in the local politics of Banao: the Local Government Unit (LGU), the New People's Army (NPA) and NGOs.

Balbalasang is a political unit known as *barangay* (village), which is under the management of the municipality of Balbalan and the Province of Tabuk. As a political unit of an LGU, Balbalasang is also dependent on the political dynamics of the political system. During elections – national, provincial, municipality and barangay – the people of Balbalasang experience a division due to political factionalism, supporting one candidate and criticizing others. In that situation, kinship line, power and wealth are the important elements for getting support from constituents. During the *barangay* election of 2002, the people were divided by kinship factions in supporting their candidates for *barangay captain* and *kagawad* (village representative).

During the 1980s, the rest of the municipality of Balbalasang, including Balbalasang proper was a well-known stronghold of a 'shadow government'. This term is used in reference to the area as a stronghold of the NPA, the armed element of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The NPA played a vital role in the Balbalasang community during 1980s. They were not involved with political matters, e.g. the campaigning against the government and the execution of government leaders who were corrupt. However, they were involved in the everyday life of the people and in important events, such as *vochong*, conflict settlements and even the private lives of the people. Nonetheless, when the power of the government became stronger, people who were members or supporters of the NPA were labelled as belonging to 'the other side'.

Currently, the NPA is still trying to get involved with community concerns. They actively participate in some occasions in the community, such as fiestas, *vochong* celebrations, death rituals, wedding parties and conflict settlements. Due to their conflicts with the government, the armed forces and the police, they hide in the mountains and forests during daytime, and visit the community at night. A slight difference here compared to other NPA areas is that the NPA's 'revolutionary tax' is not issued in Balbalasang.

Another institution involved in Balbalasang is the NGO. NGOs are trying to give an alternative model of development, which is different from that of the government. Two types of NGOs are involved in Balbalasang. The first type is the advocacy NGO with its focus on political movements and human rights issues, and the second type is the development NGO who works for the welfare of the community.

The Cordillera People Alliance (CPA) through the Kalinga chapter is an alliance of various NGOs, people's organisations, and professional groups that emphasise political movement for indigenous peoples. Their two main goals are self-determination and the defence of the ancestral domain of indigenous peoples. However, they

rejected the idea of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) and Indigenous Peoples Right Act (IPRA), the reason being that both ideas come from the government and are not genuinely from the indigenous peoples.

Through their chapter in Kalinga, the CPA comes to the village with their campaigns for their own versions of self-determination and indigenous peoples' rights, which is the opposite of the government's ideas. Some informants in Balbalasang said they do not like NGOs who just talk and criticise the government without giving any practical solutions. The people need something practical and related to their welfare, such as programmes relating to agriculture and income-generating activities.

The second type of NGO is one whose work is related to the development of mini-hydroelectric power. This NGO does not provide technological expertise, but organises people to gain knowledge on how to maintain and manage electricity. Under the supervision of Anglican priests, the people of Balbalasang are self-maintaining their electrical production. Most of the people have accepted the presence of the NGO simply because electricity is necessary to light their lamps, to run their electronic appliances and for other purposes, such as fiestas and *vochong* celebrations.

CONCLUSION: IDENTITY AND SELF-REFLECTION

The indigenous peoples in the Cordillera region experience in their everyday life the conflict between 'self-identity' and 'identity by other'. On the one hand, the people have their own names, territories, aspirations and ways; on the other hand, the state applied 'identity by other', through the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and government policy, and the authentication of indigenous peoples as reflected in the document entitled Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim.

To benefit from development projects, the indigenous peoples need birth certificates and authorisation from the NCIP. However, identity is something fluid, and the indigenous people's community uses the system for their pragmatic concerns. They agree to be certified, but they also practise their traditions, which is contrary to the government's rules and regulations.

Like other indigenous groups in the world, the Banao and the Cordillerans are experiencing de-traditionalisation. Their tradition is not disappearing, but they maintain the authority to use tradition for pragmatic matters.

Living with the Banao and getting involved with the Cordillera's middle class movement showed the author that his original research plans were too simple and too romantic. The problem of indigenous peoples does not only involve civil society and the state, but also other agencies like non-indigenous groups, communist rebels and other pressure groups. However, the author firmly believes getting actively involved in the everyday life of the people is the best way to understand their problems.

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COMPROMISING INDIGENOUS LEADERSHIP: LOSING ROOTS IN TRIBAL COMMUNITIES

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INTRODUCTION

The Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Fellowship enabled me to examine the marginalisation of indigenous communities and the role that indigenous leaders play in the gradual decline of traditional or indigenous social and political systems.

This follows the work I had done on the situation of the *Orang Asli* (Original Peoples) of Peninsular Malaysia. I had previously demonstrated (Nicholas 2000; 2002) that the various *Orang Asli* groups, in discovering that they faced very much the same problems and that these originated from the same sources, began to forge a common political consciousness. Concomitant with this consciousness was a sense of 'indigenousness' that in turn developed into an *Orang Asli* identity (which was to become a powerful unifying factor in the struggle to affirm and regain their rights).

However, because of the varying backgrounds and motivations of the individual *Orang Asli* leaders, collective *Orang Asli* interests were compromised while those of the individual were advanced. Equally significant was the fact that the state was also an actor in the process insofar as it determined which *Orang Asli* leaders were to be accorded recognition. In the process, the state was able to co-opt *Orang Asli* leaders so as to ensure that dominant or mainstream interests were protected. The initial research question was whether this experience and process of marginalisation was also true among other indigenous peoples in the region.

DATA-GATHERING PROCESS

The main subject of the fieldwork during my four-month fellowship was the Hill Tribes of Northern Thailand where I chose to spend the larger part of my time. I spent the first month at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, where I did secondary research on the topic, and in Hokkaido where I briefly visited *Ainu* centres.

My stay in Thailand was spread out over an in-residence period totalling three months from November 2001 to April 2002. My indigenous non governmental organisation (NGO) host institution, IMPECT (Inter-Mountain People Education and Culture Association in Thailand), provided excellent opportunities to interact, observe and learn from individuals through meetings at IMPECT and in the communities and through home-stays in a number of Hill Tribe communities. My status as a 'friend-observer-photographer' gave me access to and, more importantly, acceptability at the month-long Assembly of the Poor. It was a protest of Tribal Peoples and lowland farmers, who at any one time numbered 3,000 to 5,000, who camped on the grounds of the Governor's office in Chiangmai to press for their rights.

During the tenure of my fellowship, I also attended a meeting between indigenous leaders of the *Inuit* (Eskimo) communities of Sweden, Finland and Alaska, and those of some of the Northeast Indian states (e.g. Nagaland and Mizoram) that are struggling for self-government. I also participated in a workshop of the Burma Reconciliation Programme that involved leaders from the various ethnic communities of Burma who are seeking autonomy or independence from the Rangoon administration.

When I was housed in the premises of the Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) in Chiangmai, I was also able to meet various indigenous leaders who were passing through or who had programmes in Thailand. A seminar at the Rajabhat Institute in Chiangrai, Thailand enabled me to meet, visit, and live with young tribal leaders, activist-researchers and others who were

not within IMPECT's circle of involvement. The experience I gained was immense and valuable.

THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT

Before we look at how indigenous leaders carry out their roles today, it is necessary to set the context. The structure and content of traditional indigenous society determined the role and function of indigenous leaders. However, traditional indigenous society was changed by various interests and, consequently, so too was the nature of indigenous leadership.

TRADITIONAL INDIGENOUS SOCIETY

The general perception is that traditional indigenous society was relatively static, but not entirely stagnant, as far as customs and ways of living were concerned. It is also assumed that the individual uncritically accepted what was transmitted in oral tradition and practice, and did not commit himself or herself emotionally to the pursuit of greater intellectual advancement.

Frequently, for example, when asked why a particular ritual was done, or what the origin of a social taboo was, the elders and especially the younger members I approached could not give a passable answer. Several could relate myths and legends but few could link it to some aspect of their social code. It was as if someone in the distant past failed to explain the purpose of the ritual or the meaning of the myth and, over time, that knowledge got lost. Their descendants today comply with the perceptible elements of the tradition simply because that is what their elders tell them or show them, or because they know it to be the way things have always been done – that is, "We do it because it is the *adat* (tradition)."

Once, from my vantage point on the first floor of the CSEAS library in Kyoto, I watched a group of Japanese Sumo student-wrestlers train. Before each bout they would alternately lift and slap their thighs hard. I later found out that it was a ritual whose function and purpose have been forgotten. Many rituals in mainstream traditional belief systems suffer a similar fate.

Clearly, belief in the indigenous religion is crucial in ensuring that a particular culture is accepted and practised. As long as the community believes, the culture is likely to prevail. Destroying it inevitably leads to the culture's demise.

Similarly, because the culture of indigenous peoples is intricately linked with a highly localised spirituality, one would expect the culture to collapse if either element – the specific ecological niche that the community refers to as their ancestral land or the indigenous religion itself – is appropriated, degraded or denigrated.

Many researchers have also demonstrated that traditional methods for working the land are environmentally superior to those employed by the non-indigenous. However, these ways of doing things are sustainable only under conditions of low population density, abundant land and limited involvement with a market economy. Again, change the social context and you are likely to see a change in behaviour that may not be in line with the traditional culture.

TRADITIONAL INDIGENOUS LEADERSHIP AND INTELLECTUALISM

In most indigenous societies, traditional leadership is loosely structured along the lines of a council or body of elders (such as the *Lembaga Adat* among the *Temuan-Orang Asli*). Membership in such a council is usually assigned by consensus. Decisions are also arrived at by consensus among the informed and knowledgeable, and not on the basis of an arithmetical majority.

In non-structured egalitarian societies, little importance is given to leadership positions except on a temporary basis such as when leading a hunting team. Nevertheless, responsibilities (such as those pertaining to the maintenance of harmony in the community) are invariably delegated to elders who are held in high esteem for their wealth of experience as well as for their patience, courage, fairness and generosity – in radical contrast to the power-wielding model of modern society, which encourages the pursuit of self-interest and the acquisition of resources to secure a strategic advantage over others.

In fact, nowhere is the contrast between indigenous and (dominant) western traditions sharper than in their philosophical approaches to the fundamental issues of power and nature and the natural order. In the dominant Western philosophy, power derives from coercion and craftiness – and its alienation from nature (Alfred 1999:60). In the indigenous context, respect and influence is accorded to those able to maintain harmony among community members, and between the community and nature.

Russel Barsh (cited in Alfred 1999:90) suggests that those who occupy positions of leadership and are held in high esteem within indigenous communities share four general traits:

- *They draw on their own personal resources as sources of power*. They do not give other people's money away to gain support. They are productive, they are generous, and their values are not materialistic.
- *They set the example*. They assume the responsibility of taking the lead and assuming the greatest risk for the good of the community.
- *They are modest and funny*. They minimise personality conflicts and use humour to deflect anger.
- *They are role models*. They take responsibility for teaching children, and they realise the educative and empowering role of government in the community.

Thus, traditional indigenous leaders are responsive and accountable to the other members; they consult thoroughly and extensively, and base all decisions on the principle of general consensus. Traditional indigenous leadership also honours the autonomy of individual conscience, practises non-coercive authority, and upholds the deep interconnection between human beings and nature. This set of values directly challenges the destructive and homogenizing force of western liberalism and free-market capitalism.

However, for indigenous societies to remain healthy and to survive, more than mere leadership is required. The leaders must constitute a functioning intellectual group that is able to define the indigenous response to new values and paradigms that seek to obliterate unique traditional cultures.

Indigenous intellectualism requires that leaders be rooted in the community and be answerable to it. Such leaders must be knowledgeable and respectful of indigenous knowledge and spirituality, and be able to find solutions to problems from within the indigenous tradition. Invariably, indigenous intellectuals are expected to play an important role in transmitting the community's knowledge, in promoting justice and in ensuring that future generations will not be deprived of their birthright. To be in short supply of such intellectuals is to lack leadership in determining goals and directions, and in finding solutions.

Sadly, many indigenous communities today tend to be led by wizened elders, guided by the experiences of a lifetime but employing little or no intellectual exertion in their leadership of the community. Thus, when confronted with emerging paradigms and influences in the eras of colonialism, capitalism and now globalisation, they do not fare well. Without intellectual strength, these elders are unable to secure or regain autonomy for themselves. The fact is that some contemporary indigenous leaders are so divorced from their tradition, spirituality and place that they are unable to think for themselves. Some may even have embraced new values that reflect those of the dominant group rather than that of indigenous tradition. Such leaders have no qualms in allowing non-indigenous individuals or institutions to reconstruct their religion, culture and traditions, or even to represent them. This has far-reaching implications for the indigenous community.

ABSENCE OF AN ECONOMIC/MATERIALIST MOTIVE?

It is often assumed that indigenous peoples have a long tradition of unique systems for the maintenance of social and environmental wellbeing. Indeed, it is often argued that traditional indigenous communities have always lived in harmony with the environment, never taking more than was needed for their subsistence. To a large extent, this is true. However, it is incorrect to assert that all significant activities in traditional indigenous societies were directed at community subsistence untainted by economic motives.

The *Ainu*, for example, hunted eagle feathers to trade with the Japanese. Hill rice is sold or bartered by native farmers in the interior areas of Sabah and Sarawak. Forest products such as *gaharu* (eaglewood), resins, camphor, rattan, animal parts and even timber have been staple trade goods in forest communities since early times. Hill Tribe communities in the Golden Triangle grow opium poppy in order to earn cash income. Countless examples also make it clear that indigenous peoples can be forced, seduced or tempted into accepting new methods, new crops and new technologies. No better example exists than the near-universal adoption of firearms for hunting. Shotguns or rifles, often combined with the use of flashlights and motorcycles or four-wheel-drive vehicles, have changed completely the interaction between human hunters and their prey.

Yet, accumulation *per se* in traditional indigenous

societies is generally absent. Traditional peoples have behaved in the same way over time: they do whatever is necessary to feed themselves and their families.

CONDITIONS FOR COMPROMISING LEADERSHIP

Recognising that the latent objective of individuals is the maintenance and expansion of economic interests for their livelihoods, certain external interests have capitalised on this in order to alter indigenous society. They accorded certain individuals, or groups of individuals, representative (leadership) functions and, by sidestepping the community's traditions and spirituality, created a pool of leaders (or rather, representatives) for whom the survival of their people was only secondary to their individual economic gain.

At the risk of being simplistic and succumbing to generalisations, we can attribute external interest in indigenous peoples to the following broad reasons:

- *Land* – the traditional territories of the indigenous peoples are no longer considered a 'frontier' resource; rather, such territories are now a much sought-after factor of production, especially if they can be obtained cheaply.
- *Resources* – similarly, the resources found in traditional territories are potential sources of profit and their extraction is vigorously sought by others, with or without the collaboration of the indigenous community.
- *Political compliance* – having seemingly autonomous indigenous societies within its midst threaten the sovereignty and political dominance of the centre. As such, assimilationist and integrationist policies are invariably foisted on indigenous peoples to smother any attempts at seeking self-styled autonomy.
- *Market* – indigenous peoples are also increasingly becoming a lucrative target for consumer and other externally produced goods, causing them to become more enmeshed in the cash economy. This, in turn, requires the further pursuit of cash income.
- *Knowledge* – indigenous knowledge, especially of the medicinal and utilitarian potentials of biological resources is now sought by bio-prospectors for the super profits to be derived.
- *Souls* – being perceived as 'last lost souls' to be 'saved', makes indigenous peoples the target of missionary groups, whose proselytising clearly have no regard for indigenous beliefs and spirituality.
- *Self-actualisation* – a host of people (e.g. researchers and social activists) work among indigenous peoples ostensibly for professional or altruistic reasons but in reality serve, to a large extent, to benefit themselves.

The ultimate effect of all these external interests imposing their wills on indigenous communities is the de-culturalisation of indigenous peoples. For example, given that their traditional lands provide indigenous peoples with both the content and form of their culture, the physical appropriation and environmental destruction of these geographical and ecological spaces – an integral consequence of modern development – destroy the fabric of indigenous societies. The predictable conclusion of development is the gradual separation of indigenous peoples from their cultural and spiritual foundation.

New religions, new consumerist values, new education systems, and the very orientations of funding agencies, among others, also contribute to the de-culturalisation of indigenous peoples in an equally effective manner. In the wake of these changes are new indigenous leaders created, co-opted and consigned to new roles and responsibilities. Ironically, despite being far removed from their traditional cultures and beliefs, these new leaders become vocal advocates in reclaiming their lost or forgotten cultures in a bid to claim representation of their people and to benefit from position.

EXPERIENCES WITH INDIGENOUS LEADERS

During my fellowship, I had the opportunity to witness or hear about instances when indigenous leaders compromised themselves. For example, in a discussion with an Inuit (Eskimo) leader from Alaska, I learned that there was a deal to transfer ownership of traditional lands to corporations with the full consent of the so-called community leaders.

People in towns (i.e. nonresidents) were making decisions for the people in the native governments. The group of native peoples who were lobbying in Congress for the Alaskan Native Claims Act (ANSCA), for example, were not indigenous to the areas concerned but were nevertheless in control of the process. In fact, many in the villages did not hear of the Act until the decisions were all made. These lobbyists were not indigenous leaders yet they immediately became

managers of the corporation established by the Act, earning up to US$500 000 per year in salaries.

Another indigenous leader, from Sweden, also revealed how the *Saami* Council was established in 1993 because the Swedish government was anxious to have a *Saami* Parliament set up "so as to look good in the International Year of the Indigenous Peoples that year." She said, "The *Saamis* were not given a chance to decide for themselves the nature and content of their own decision-making body. They never had the chance to form the *Saami* Parliament the way they would like; no chance to introduce indigenous systems, or indigenous politicians." Yet an appointed member of the *Saami* Parliament who was at the same forum, asserted that, with this institution, the *Saamis* had in fact achieved their long-aspired goal of self-government, though they did not control crucial functions such as finance.

The *Inuit* situation seems to square well with that of the *Orang Asli* in Peninsular Malaysia that I am familiar with. This is primarily because the conditions are rather similar: some recognition having been accorded to the indigenous community, and this in turn requiring some form of benefit being shown to be given to the community (although this usually monetarily benefits a few individuals or a co-opted representative body). That is to say, in an environment where some amount of indigenous rights is recognised, there is always something to gain in asserting one's indigenous identity.

On the other hand, in a situation where such an indigenous identity is not politically recognised, the claim to being culturally different can only be for reciprocal political gains. The *Nagas*, for example, in their decades-long war against India to reclaim sovereignty over Nagaland, justify their claim by asserting their cultural differentiation from the Indian mainstream. This despite the fact that almost the entire *Naga* population has converted to Christianity, and that the main *Naga* freedom movement has as its motto: 'Nagaland for Christ'. When pressed for elements of indigenous content in their proposed constitution, one *Naga* leader merely asserted the presence of such elements. In reality, the proposed *Naga* constitution and the methods of administration they wish to adopt mirrors those of the very powers they are trying to displace.

The case is similar in Burma – or Myanmar, as the ruling military junta has renamed the country. Here the various ethnic groups are not recognised and, due in part to changing alliances and political-economic re-orientations, the region is a complex matrix of violent conflicts between ethnic nations, the junta and drug warlords. One interesting result of the conflict, however, is that more and more women now get to hold the office of village-head. This is especially true among the *Karen* tribes. Because male village-heads have been systematically brutalised or killed for failure to supply forced labour or for their suspect loyalties to the junta, women leaders have to take on the responsibility of leading their communities. Clearly there is no economic or self-serving motivation here. The women leaders are reported to be doing a better job than their male counterparts in part due to their noted qualities of patience, tactfulness and far-sightedness.

This brings to mind an exchange I had with a woman leader of the minority *Pa-O* community in Burma. We had just listened to deliberations by the predominantly male leaders of the major ethnic groups of Burma as to how the country was to be partitioned into autonomous regions once democracy was restored in that country. It was clear to both of us that many of the smaller ethnic communities were being completely subsumed by the main ethnic groupings. I asked if she agreed to this nation-carving exercise that would reduce her people to an invisible community. It was difficult putting my question across and it must have been more difficult for her to give an honest answer since our interpreter was a member of the majority group.

But her answer, through another interpreter, struck me despite its soft tone: "For now, we must hold each other's hands." In that one sentence, she displayed tact, vision, strategy and concern – showing her to be the indigenous intellectual and leader that she was. She had taken up the leadership role at a time when there was nothing to be gained personally. This said, it is perhaps a moot point to ask if women would still be given leadership roles in times of peace.

EXPERIENCES WITH THAI TRIBES

From my limited exposure to the Hill Tribes of Northeast Thailand, I am of the impression that their situation is dissimilar to that of the *Orang Asli* in Peninsular Malaysia or to the situation in Burma or Nagaland, and is certainly distant from that of the *Inuit* people in the arctic areas. For one, some of the tribal groups

are recognised as indigenous or Thai in nationality, but others are considered suspect by the government. As such, the issuance of valid identity documents remains a major issue for many tribal communities. Arising from this lack-of-citizenship dilemma, comes a multitude of related issues such as denied access to education for 'alien' children, the question of the right of domicile in areas claimed as traditional territories, as well as freedom of movement within the country.

Further, because of the problems of deforestation in watershed areas, and the contest for land and timber resources between hill tribe communities and lowlanders and other vested interests, there is much pressure to relocate the tribes to smaller, less fertile areas on grounds that their practice of shifting cultivation is destructive to the environment.

In response to this, Hayami (2000:125–6) notes that among the *Karen* communities in particular, there have been attempts to reconstruct and reproduce traditional culture. She argues that the *Karen* have reformulated a 'tradition' and ethnic image that is aimed at outwardly encouraging the recognition of their rights to forest and land while at the same time inwardly strengthening the community in its claims. Also, by combining an environmental conservationist view with their indigenous knowledge and values, they are able to ally with lowland environmental activists. Their aim is ostensibly to emphasise their ethnicity while asserting their right to Thai citizenship by appealing to aspects of the dominant culture pertaining to environmental conservation.

I witnessed two such conservation-related events during my fellowship. The first was a *Lisu* forest-sanctification ceremony where a wooded part of the community's forest was ritually sanctified, complete with sacrificial offerings and placement of taboo symbols on trees to indicate that this area was totally out of bounds to any kind of human intrusion. The second was a *Karen* community work schedule to clear the undergrowth in the firebreak area between the community's totally protected watershed forest and the community's use-forest. Both activities were well-attended by community members and both had an official opening ceremony where local government officials and politicians were invited to attend and were given the honours. Both activities were also co-organised with social organisations from outside the community.

Clearly it does seem that the indigenous communities were using a part of their culture to educate others on their worldview especially with regard to the conservation of forests, and in the process stake their claim to their traditional territories. For me, it was particularly interesting to note how the NGO organisers were able to mobilise the indigenous communities in a sensitive and patient way. Being indigenous themselves certainly made a big difference – not just in terms of getting acceptability from the village elders and leaders but also in their understanding of local customs, traditional processes and, more importantly, being able to empathise closely with the target group.

These traits were again admirably displayed in the month-long Assembly of the Poor 'camp-in protest' in front of the Governor's offices in Chiangmai from March to April 2002, coordinated by the Assembly of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Thailand (AITT) and the Northern Farmers Alliance. Certainly, in the functioning of AITT and the various NGOs (such as IMPECT, CONTO and the various ethnic associations) that constitute it, there was evidence of individuals displaying leadership traits that weighed more towards fulfilling self-serving (but not purely economic) aspirations.

However, because the AITT leadership responsibilities were seen as 'hot' work – as in having to deal/confront/negotiate with the government – there was no open clamour for these positions. Furthermore, at the 'cooler' local NGO or community level it was recognised that putting all expectations on a single leader was an unreasonable burden on him or her. As such, leadership responsibilities were, as a rule, shared by two or three grassroots leaders, thereby coming somewhat close to what it would have been in the traditional indigenous context.

What is of concern, however, is the trend to relegate the functions of elders in these representative groupings to mere ritualistic responsibilities (as in performing the opening and closing ceremonies at the more important meetings). This leaves the other (new-generation) leaders – who are invariably younger and more worldly-wizened – to organise the community in the way they understand it should be.

This is where a complication frequently crops in: these indigenous NGO leaders get so taken up by the

intentions and objectives of their non-indigenous counterparts (some have even been 'trained' by them), or have been conditioned by well-intentioned funders with specific agenda in mind, that they themselves take on a way of doing things that reflect the NGO's – not the community's – orientation and philosophy. In the process they often unwittingly re-define indigenous systems accordingly to suit the external expectation. In this regard, I still vividly remember the genuinely humble comments of a 23-year-old Caucasian volunteer who introduced himself as the 'special advisor' for the indigenous NGO coalition, CONTO. Among his responsibilities, he told me, were that of negotiating with the military and advising tribal communities about development programmes.

While leadership in the Thai indigenous NGOs was largely genuine and altruistic, I did come across some personalities in the communities whose self-serving motives were more evident. These were usually harmless individuals but from experience in my own context, they had the potential of collaborating with outsiders to wring every ounce of profit from the people or to jeopardise community objectives.

As an illustration, I relate an interaction I had with one such character, whom I had referred to in my field notes as the 'groveller-opportunist'. I had come back from the school field where the Hmong's New Year festivities were going on to get fresh batteries for my camera. The groveller was waiting outside my sleeping area with an instamatic camera in his hand. He communicated that he wanted something. I thought it was film for his camera and proceeded to give him a roll. But it was batteries that he needed and so I gave him a pair. However, later in the day, he came back and, sure enough, asked for film! But he also invited me to his house ('to take picture').

At the house, an eating-and-drinking session was in progress with four persons at the table. It turned out that three of them were Thais working as forest rangers in the area. The fourth person was his brother. There were other adults and children in the same hall but no one seemed to be bothered by the guests; rather I could sense some resentment towards their presence there.

But the groveller-opportunist was unperturbed by all this and went on entertaining his Thai forest ranger friends and myself. The next day he was grovelling again and I thought he wanted a new roll of film. But he had apparently obtained a new roll from somewhere or someone. Later, while I was having dinner that night, he came over to my host's house and asked for a picture to be taken, with his camera, of the both of us. I obliged and after that never saw him again. I later learned that the picture was requested by the forest rangers as they were curious as to why I would want to stay in the village for a stretch, and especially since my host was the local NGO organiser. Uncannily, I had experienced the same thing in my involvement with the *Orang Asli*.

I am not suggesting that my experience and observation of the Thai indigenous experience should be generalised as I have narrated here. My time with them was very brief and severely constrained by language difficulties. But I did get more insight into the institution of indigenous leadership that has been of interest to me.

LESSONS LEARNED

Unfortunately, indigenous peoples today are working within the framework of modern assimilated states. As such, they are bound to face the same fate as the moderns today simply because they are subjecting themselves to the same influences and wants that we have allowed ourselves to be conditioned by.

Indigenous leaders are what they are because of what we, the outsiders, set them out to be, or require them to be. Funding agencies, community organisers, NGOs, missionaries, and international networking, all play a role in making indigenous leaders become like us. Having to deal with international norms and being trained in those paradigms further set indigenous leaders away from the principles and practices of their own traditions.

To counter this trend, the popular recourse is to resort to efforts and programmes that can be categorised as 'recovery of tradition' activities. However, what is needed now is not a simple matter of going back to traditional practices but rather to those spiritual values and living philosophies that kept indigenous communities intact, equitable and sustainable. The question, for example, is not which traditional practices are sustainable and practicable, but rather which conditions encouraged these. To be able to see the difference, one needs more than just leadership. One needs sound intellectual pursuit that is firmly rooted in the community.

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FROM MARGINAL TRADERS TO CAPITALISTS: CHINESE-FILIPINOS JOIN THE MAINSTREAM

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INTRODUCTION: THE LEGACY OF SPANISH COLONIALISM

Until the 1950s, the identity of the Chinese community in the Philippines was characterised by their legal uncertainty, political alienation and economic marginality. As a migrant minority, the Chinese in the Philippines were legally very insecure owing to their alien status that prevented them from going into certain business activities or becoming professionals. It was very difficult and costly for them to obtain Filipino citizenship. Consequently, they had a difficult time articulating their political interests and aspirations. Trading was the only opportunity apparently open to them. But they were merely marginal traders, a far cry from successful capitalists that their fellow Chinese were in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.

In order to understand the marginality of the Chinese community in the Philippines, it is necessary to look at the history of Spanish colonial policy toward the Chinese. Unlike Dutch and British colonialism in Indonesia and Malaysia, the nature of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines was, from the very beginning, as much a religious mission as it was a commercial venture. The Spaniards had a strong religious-cultural missionary zeal to Catholicize and Hispanicize the Philippines and its inhabitants.

The Chinese had been considerably involved in the economic and social affairs of pre-Spanish Philippines. During the early days of Spanish colonialism, Chinese sojourners were single males, with or without a family in China. Soon they entered several unions, either legal or informal, with Filipinas. Their offspring partly comprised the *mestizo* Catholics, the first generation of which categorically differed from their fathers who were still categorised as *sangley*, which literally meant trader.[1]

Chinese *mestizos* in the Philippines differed from *peranakan* Chinese in Indonesia or *baba* Chinese in Malaysia since these groups were no longer considered Chinese. Unlike the *peranakan* or the *baba*, the Chinese *mestizos* in the Philippines were not a special kind of local Chinese. Instead, they were a special kind of Filipino.[2] Under Spanish rule, the law identified them as such and thus did they regard themselves. The legal identification with the Philippines was automatic upon birth such that it required special effort on the part of the *mestizos* to identify themselves with China, an effort the majority did not wish to make.

The Chinese *mestizo* was therefore a by-product of Spanish colonial policy. From the very beginning, the Spaniards treated the Catholic Chinese and their *mestizo* descendants as part of the domestic sector. The Spanish colonial authority allowed them access to economic opportunities, such as the acquisition of huge parcels of land that enabled them to become members of the landed class. More importantly, after the British occupied Manila (1762-1764) and after the subsequent massacre of Chinese who supported the British, the Spanish colonial ruler barred new Chinese immigrants from entering the Philippines. For about 85 years, thereafter, or until the 1850s, the absence of new Chinese immigrants enabled the Chinese *mestizos* not only to be absorbed into Philippine society, but to merge with the Indio, the Spanish and the Spanish *mestizo*, and help shape the identity of modern Filipino society.

Once the Spanish rulers allowed new Chinese immigrants to re-enter the Philippines after 1850, Chinese *mestizos* began to see themselves as people of Chinese descent already settled in the Philippines. They considered the new immigrants as sojourners. But the huge influx of new Chinese immigrants during the last

two decades of the Spanish colonial period (1880-1898) forced many Chinese *mestizos* to shift their economic base from trading to landholding and commercial agriculture of export crops. They moved from the urban areas, in particular Manila, to Central Luzon and other frontier areas where they later became part of the landed capitalist class.[3] Greater educational opportunities in the Philippines and Spain in the second-half of the 19th century, coupled with the abolition of the legal distinction between Chinese *mestizos* and *Indios* in the 1880s enabled some Chinese *mestizos* to pursue higher education. The arrival of a significant number of new Chinese immigrants also compelled Chinese *mestizos* to distinguish themselves from these Chinese immigrants.

The Chinese in the Philippines continued to be political outsiders and marginalised both under American rule and the Republic of the Philippines; however their outsider status arose because they were neither American subjects nor Filipino citizens. But while the Chinese in the Philippines were able to prosper more under American rule than during the Spanish era in terms of capital accumulation, they lagged far behind their counterparts in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, notwithstanding the fact that most lucrative business sectors in the Philippines then were already controlled by either Chinese *mestizos* or Spanish *mestizos*.

This research project will look at the transformation process of the Chinese in the Philippines, from being outsiders and economically marginalised to becoming part of mainstream Filipino society and playing a substantial role in the country's economic development. Undoubtedly, the growing business network of Chinese in Southeast Asia and the economic growth in mainland China since the 1990s have been important factors in the formation of a Chinese identity in the Philippines. To date, although the Chinese have been part of mainstream Philippine society, they are still regarded as 'strangers' because they do not fit into the established Filipino framework. In addition, the strong tendency to identify the Chinese with money further compounds their political fragility.

FROM THE GHETTO TO THE MAINSTREAM

When the Americans annexed the Philippine islands, they introduced a slogan 'the Philippines for Filipinos', thereby suggesting that the Chinese were outsiders in the American project. Soon afterwards, the American ruler imposed the Exclusion Law,[4] which prohibited Chinese immigrants from entering the Philippines. The enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Law originated from the fear of American colonial officers that Chinese immigrants would use the Philippines as a stepping stone to enter the United States.

Another American policy toward the Chinese was the abolition of tax farming which had been one of the most lucrative businesses run by the Chinese during the Spanish era. Undoubtedly, the abolition was a systematic effort of the new colonial ruler to marginalise the role of the Chinese in the economy. The abolition of tax farming forced the Chinese to enter the retail business. Between 1910 and 1930, the Philippines witnessed the phenomenal growth of foreign trade in nominal value terms, with the Chinese playing the important roles of collectors and distributors of export commodities such as abaca, sugar and copra. They were thus among the main beneficiaries of the sustained economic growth.[5]

However, the Chinese could not transcend their role as middlemen traders linking producers and consumers in the exchange of goods. In addition, the Americans imposed the 1921 Bookkeeping Act, which required Chinese businessmen to record their accounts in English, Spanish or any native language.[6] Clearly, the 1921 Bookkeeping Act reflected the suspicion of the colonial administrators toward the Chinese.

But the period of American rule – which also saw the introduction of modern transportation, communications and institutions – was momentous in shaping the Chinese identity in the Philippines. In addition, radical political change in China from 1895 to 1911 created a new political consciousness among the Chinese all over the world.

The Chinese set up three strategic modern institutions during the American period: Chinese language newspaper publications, Chinese schools and Chinese organisations. Although the first Chinese newspapers were already established during the last decade of Spanish rule, they lasted for a very short period and never became politically significant and influential. From 1910, Chinese newspapers were needed by different groups of Chinese in the Philippines.

Until the end of Spanish rule almost none of the Chinese could afford to send their children to good quality schools such as San Juan de Letran and the

Ateneo de Manila. The only way to educate their children at that time was through tutorials where elders taught the young how to read and write in Chinese. In the light of the awakening spirit of modern Chinese reformists in China, the Chinese community in the Philippines realised that setting up Chinese schools was indispensable to maintaining their identity. From 1899 to 1935, various Chinese-based organisations founded as many as 58 Chinese schools, where Chinese was the medium of instruction, to cater to Chinese children and at the same time, strengthen the Chinese identity.

The American rulers allowed the Chinese to enjoy the freedom to organise their economic, social, and political interests anywhere in the archipelago. In 1904, in response to the invitation of Secretary William Taft, some prominent Chinese-Filipino businessmen established the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. As a modern organisation, the Chamber aimed to create a closer relationship between Chinese businessmen in the Philippines and their counterparts overseas, China included. The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce later played a substantial role in representing the entire Chinese community.[7] Statements from the President of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce were always deemed to voice the political stance and interests of the Chinese in the Philippines. Furthermore, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce became a forum for solidifying the identity of the Chinese in the country.

Some Chinese made their wealth under American rule (1898-1941) and never experienced any political persecution. Nonetheless, most of them remained marginal traders under a period of sustained export economic growth. In comparison to the Chinese in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand who controlled the sugar industry, tax/opium farming, rubber, tin and rice exports, the Chinese in the Philippines experienced stagnation in their role as commodity collectors and exporters. The disadvantaged economic conditions of the Chinese in the country mainly stemmed from their inability to compete with the strong *mestizo* groups, whether Chinese or Spanish, who, being landed oligarchs, have enjoyed control of the Filipino economy since the Spanish era.

A study by George Weightman in the early 1950s showed that when the Philippines gained independence in 1946, the Chinese controlled 75 per cent of retail business.[8] Although the Chinese were still economically marginal then, the fact was that most proprietors catering to Filipinos' daily consumption needs, from small sari-sari stores all the way up to big wholesale traders, were Chinese. As a result, the Filipino economic nationalism sentiment was stirred in the 1950s. Economic nationalism is an elusive but pervasive concept that seeks to promote economic growth in ways conceived to be in the national interest.[9] In pursuing economic nationalism, the Filipinos were determined to 'Filipinize' their then existing legacy of a colonial economy, characterised by progressive alienisation. Through 'Filipinisation', Filipinos had to conduct de-alienisation process of productive assets. The process consisted of restricting further growth in alien ownership, and transferring alien assets to Filipinos.

The strong sentiment of promoting economic nationalism and 'Filipinizing' domestic retail trade gained momentum during the incumbency of President Ramon Magsaysay. By early 1954, the proponents of economic nationalism had been successful in articulating the resentment of Filipinos against 'alien' Chinese domination, in all sectors of retail trade. The Philippine Congress and Senate were dominated by those who were considered nationalist-leaning. In addition, President Magsaysay who was dubbed a 'man of action' appeared to be different from his predecessors who were all lawyers and appreciated equal protection of the law as well as the sanctity of international obligations.[10]

Inevitably, throughout his term, Congressional sessions in 1954 introduced a number of retail trade nationalisation bills, among which were six bills that prohibited alien participation in the retail business. On 19 June 1954, President Magsaysay approved Republic Act No. 1180, which became widely known as the Retail Trade Nationalisation Act, despite vociferous protests from the Chinese business community and certain foreign groups.

The passage of the Retail Trade Nationalisation Act was a political blow for the Chinese, who in effect became factually and legally 'alien' in the country where they had been living for some time. In addition, the Act systematically excluded them from participation in the retail business, a field where they had gained some prominence. In short, the Chinese saw the Act as politically discriminatory and economically ruinous.

Eventually, a significant decline in their share of new investments followed. But the Chinese managed to survive through legal and illegal means. Interestingly, too, the Retail Trade Nationalisation Act was seen as a 'blessing in disguise' by the Chinese, since it forced them to move either to wholesale trading or the manufacturing industry. In the ten to fifteen years after the law was passed, the number of Chinese who controlled small-scale retail trading grew fewer and fewer. More became active in wholesale trading and embarked on various manufacturing ventures. Ironically the wave of Philippines economic nationalism created better business opportunities for the Chinese.

The economic nationalist sentiments of the 1950s also produced another economic legislation, one which prohibited the Chinese-Filipinos from controlling the wholesale trading of rice and corn. The proponents of the law believed that the Chinese-Filipinos controlled about 70 percent of this business, not only in the sense of wholesale distribution, but also the operation of rice and corn mills.

During the incumbency of President Carlos Garcia, the government enunciated the Filipino First policy, which aimed to prioritise Filipinos in terms of business opportunities. Almost simultaneously, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) passed a resolution restricting loans to Filipinos who "by deed as well as in spirit had embraced and practised the Filipino way of life, assimilated and imbibed the Filipino culture, traits, customs, and tradition, as distinguished from those who utilised such citizenship merely for convenience."[11] It was obvious that such policies strongly expressed suspicion and distrust toward the Chinese despite their being Filipino citizens.

In retrospect, the Retail Trade Nationalisation Act was not successful at empowering the Filipino business community because from the Chinese's point of view, their experience in dealing with the Act made them more politically cohesive. In the same year the Act was passed, 1954, the Chinese community transformed the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce into the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (better known as the 'Federation'). The Federation became an umbrella organisation with a nationwide network, which dealt not only with commerce and trade interests of the Chinese community, but represented the interests and political stance of the entire Chinese community, particularly in its dealings with the government.[12]

As stated, the Act was also an avenue for the Chinese to switch from trading to manufacturing. Since the late 1940s, the Philippine government had been promoting an import substitution industrialisation (ISI) programme by offering powerful incentives to 'new and necessary' industries. These incentives included tax exemptions, liberal credit facilities, and windfall profits from an overvalued Philippine peso,[13] making the Philippine ISI programme very attractive to both foreign and domestic investors.

A study reveals that 158 out of 169 Filipino investors in ISI came from the politically dominant and landed capitalist class,[14] but their domination of the manufacturing industry did not prove conducive to building the landed group's capacity as a manufacturing industrial class under the ISI programme. "As the dominant segment of the ISI bourgeoisie, the landed capitalists confronted an inherently self-contradictory set of interests forced upon them in their situation as both landlords and capitalists."[15]

The internal class contradictions among Filipino investors strengthened the position of the Chinese in the ISI programme. More importantly, the incentives offered by the government through the ISI programme attracted more Chinese businessmen to enter the manufacturing sector.

Access to the manufacturing industry under the ISI programme became the initial step for the Chinese to rise from their status as marginal traders. More significant changes took place in the 1970s when President Marcos showed that he favoured the Chinese more than his predecessors did.[16] From the start, Marcos veered away from the oligarchic mentality, and showed his belief in wealth's serving power. Understandably, having consolidated his power, Marcos sought to dismantle the business empire owned by the old landed oligarchs who posed a potential political threat and economic barriers to his ambitions as well as his cronies' interests.

Marcos knew the Chinese businessmen were 'apolitical' and willing to work with his authoritarian government as long as they could continue running their businesses. He also believed that the Chinese were less prone to conspire politically against him. In addition, he

was convinced that dealing with the Chinese was more practical, more efficient, and politically non-threatening, compared to dealing with the old landed oligarchs who had strong political leverage and were also inclined to look down on him.

Very few Chinese directly benefited from their relationship with Marcos. However, Chinese-Filipinos in general believed that Marcos liberated them from the Philippines' anti-Chinese attitudes and policies. During the first 10 years of Marcos' presidency (1966-1976), Chinese-Filipinos experienced a process of transformation from marginal traders to diversified industrialists or middle-class professionals. Thus, while many Filipinos saw the declaration of Martial Law as a catastrophic political event, most Chinese-Filipinos appeared to respond enthusiastically to the declaration of Martial Law in September 1972. In fact, the Chinese saw the declaration of Martial Law as a good political decision for six reasons.

First, Martial Law guaranteed political and economic stability that sustained their business interests. Second, the declaration of Martial Law and the dissolution of Congress were seen as an appropriate political measure, since Congress, while it existed, produced numerous anti-Chinese legislations. Third, the dissolution of Congress implied the end of extortion by aspiring congressmen. Fourth, under Martial Law, corruption was centralised in the hands of Marcos and his close confidants, making it easier and more efficient for the Chinese to deal with these individuals. Fifth, during the first few years of Martial Law, the crime rate significantly declined and government was able to restore law and order. Sixth, the sustained Gross National Product (GNP) per capita growth between 1972 and 1982 benefited the Chinese-Filipinos in general.[17]

Nonetheless, a large number of Chinese in the Philippines retained their 'alien' status because the naturalisation process was very costly and tedious. In light of improving diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), President Marcos had to solve the 'alien' Chinese status. For this reason he issued Letter of Instruction No. 270 in 1975, creating a special committee with the Solicitor General as chairman, and the Under-secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligent Security Administration as members. Through the special committee, aliens permanently residing in the Philippines could apply and were eligible for naturalisation.

From the Chinese point of view, the mass naturalisation policy was a strategic avenue for them to become legally accepted in the Philippines. More importantly, it increased their business capabilities as a group. Until today, most Chinese remain grateful to Marcos for his mass naturalisation policy[18] since it successfully wiped out the legal impediment that made discriminatory policies against them possible.[19] Although most Chinese businessmen were naturalised before 1975, mass naturalisation was still important in creating a wider base for Chinese business and social activities.

The mass naturalisation policy considerably changed not only the legal status of Chinese-Filipinos, but their mental attitudes as well. Before being naturalised, most Chinese-Filipinos still had the *huaqiau* (sojourner) mentality, and were uncertain about their future in the Philippines. But as soon as they became Filipino citizens, they were convinced that they could continue staying and doing business in the Philippines. No longer were they *huaqiau*; instead they were now *huayi* who considered themselves citizens of the Philippines, the place where they were born and where they lived – an important watershed in their state of mind.

Previously, some wealthy Chinese-Filipinos chose to invest their capital in Taiwan and Hong Kong. But from the mid-1970s, more Chinese-Filipinos chose to invest in the Philippines in diversified businesses such as manufacturing and financial industries, retail trading chains and real estate. To a certain extent, all these were a consequence of Marcos' deliberate effort to weaken the political and economic leverage of the old landed oligarchy. It was not surprising then that close to the end of Marcos' regime and during the wave of a military-led coup d'états after the fall of Marcos, some Chinese companies continued to expand their business, while most of Marcos' cronies were in trouble and simply fled the country.

The Chinese had successfully moved from petty marginal traders to capitalists. Until the early 1970s, a substantial number of Chinese still ran *panciterias* or modest noodles restaurants, all over the archipelago. Nowadays, the number of *panciterias* has significantly declined. In the 1980s, Filipinos witnessed the rise of both local and international fast-food chains, all of which were mainly either owned or controlled by

Chinese. Among the local fast-food chains, Jollibee, Chowking and Goto King are Chinese-owned.

Meanwhile, international fast-food chains with Chinese franchisees include Chili's, Italianni, Kenny Roger's, McDonald's, Outback, Popeye's, Seattle's Best Coffee, Super Bowl, and TGIF. Jollibee, owned and run by Tony Tan Caktiong, has surpassed even McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken in terms of total sales in the Philippines. It is the only Southeast Asian burger franchiser that has successfully penetrated the fast-food markets of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Guam, Hong Kong and the Middle East. In 1997, Jollibee Foods Corporation ranked fifteenth among the 50 most competitive companies owned by the Chinese of Southeast Asia, with total sales of US$193 million and a profit margin of 13.8 per cent.[20] Chowking, which serves modified Chinese food, is another giant fast-food chain, with annual sales of P2.45 billion in 2000.[21]

In the banking industry, nine out of 26 private banks in the Philippines are owned and run by Chinese-Filipinos, who control about 39 percent of the banking industry's total assets.[22] The Chinese have been in this industry since the 1920s. However, Chinese-owned banks such as China Bank and the Mercantile Bank of China never became big due to the Great Depression and their inability to compete with the more established American-owned banks.

Among the Chinese bankers, George Ty's Metrobank experienced considerable growth in the late 1970s and became the biggest private commercial bank in terms of assets. Metrobank surpassed Bank of the Philippine Islands, which was owned by the Ayalas, who symbolised the old Spanish *mestizo* patrician oligarchs. In 1977, Metrobank moved its head office from Binondo to Makati, signalling the Chinese's detachment from their ghetto mentality and their attachment to the old, established Spanish *mestizo* business community.

The transformation of the Chinese in the Philippines was not limited to their ability to accumulate capital, as the transformation also reduced cultural biases against them, such as the pejorative *Intsik beho tulo laway*[23] monicker and the stereotype signifying the Chinese's being money lenders or sari-sari store keepers. The tremendous success of modern Chinese retail businesses and fast-food chains has created different relationships between the Chinese producers and Filipino consumers. In the past, when the Chinese were still known as sari-sari storekeepers and *panciteria* owners, Filipino consumers interacted directly with them as individuals and small traders. Today, hundreds of thousands of Filipinos go shopping at SM or dine at Jolibee, but neither see nor interact with the Chinese as producers, since almost all the store managers and attendants are Filipinos.

Above and beyond the rise of Chinese big businesses in the last two decades, the 1980s also witnessed the birth of a new hybrid of Chinese-Filipinos. The appearances of most Chinese in the 1950s and 1960s represented the stereotypical 'Chinaman': hard-working, thrifty, modest in attire, someone who spoke mainly Chinese and some Tagalog and/or English with a strong Chinese accent, he was Chinese-schooled, resided in Chinese quarters and suffered from a ghetto mentality. Such stereotypes virtually disappeared among the young Chinese-Filipinos in the 1980s and 1990s, though a few old Chinese men and women might still represent such impressions.

JOINING THE MAINSTREAM, BUT STILL A 'STRANGER'

Apart from the mass naturalisation policy in 1975, President Marcos also 'Filipinized' Chinese schools in terms of ownership, administration, and curricula. All Chinese schools in the Philippines had to follow the Filipino curricula and use Filipino as the medium of instruction. The Chinese language continued to be treated as a foreign language.[24] Given these developments, within ten years, more and more young Chinese spoke better Filipino or English than any Chinese language, or at least, they no longer spoke Filipino with a strong Chinese accent. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of newly naturalised Chinese were legally eligible to own property. Therefore, more Chinese families moved out of their Chinese quarters in Binondo to new subdivisions in Metro Manila in the late 1970s.[25]

The Jesuits apparently contributed to the making of a new Chinese hybrid. In the early 1950s, some Western Jesuits who were expelled from China came to the Philippines and set up the Jesuit China Province in the Philippines as a transitory base for themselves. Having realised that the chance of going back to China was virtually impossible, they started establishing schools, from the grade school to the high school level, to

cater to Chinese-Filipinos who wanted to send their children to good Catholic schools. These schools also offered Chinese language classes. The Jesuits' Chinese language skills appeared to have been an important asset for them in opening Chinese schools and catering to Chinese parishioners as well.

In the mid-1950s, Fr. Jean Desantral, S.J., a French-Canadian Jesuit who was expelled from China, set up Xavier School in Echague, Quiapo, after members of the Chinese-Catholic community in Manila City expressed their need to the Jesuits for Chinese-Catholic schools. Later, in the mid 1960s, the Jesuits moved Xavier School to Greenhills in San Juan. At that time, Greenhills and its immediate surroundings stood in the middle of nowhere, and the now famous Ortigas Avenue was but an idle dirt road. Nevertheless, Xavier School managed to attract students who resided far away. More surprisingly, the reputation of Xavier School did not only serve as a magnet for Chinese parents to send their children to, but also succeeded in motivating the Chinese community to move to Greenhills.

As the Chinese are widely known for being obsessed with good education, they were apparently willing to move from their old residential area for the sake of their children's education. In addition, the neighbourhood in Greenhills was much nicer and healthier than the one in Chinatown. At that time, too, the price of property in Greenhills was still very reasonable and affordable. Over time, Greenhills grew more attractive especially when the Immaculate Conception Academy, an elite school for girls run by the nuns, moved next to Xavier School. For many of the newly naturalised Chinese-Filipinos, the Greenhills subdivision became a natural choice to settle into because it was the site of the two elite schools.[26]

The main reason the Chinese sent their children to Xavier school was not only the school's academic excellence, but also the social and business network that Xavier School graduates tended to gain. Numerous graduates of Xavier School were the children of politicians, Chinese tycoons, successful businessmen and professionals occupying strategic positions in various businesses. To sum up, the Jesuits, consciously or unconsciously, found a promising terrain in the Philippines for 'manufacturing' a new breed of Chinese-Filipinos. The Jesuits equipped the Chinese with excellent academic training and, at the same time, altered their appearances and idioms.[27] They geared them with access to strategic businesses, and social and political networks.

Aside from catering to the Chinese community through an elite education system, the Jesuits 'furnished' the Chinese community with Chinese parishes attached to Xavier School in San Juan, Santa Maria school in Iloilo, and the Sacred Heart School in Cebu. These three parishes enabled the Chinese to convert to Catholicism, the main religion of Filipinos, while at the same time maintaining the traditions of their Chinese religion. Most Chinese in the Philippines are nominal Catholics or, as a Jesuit who serves the Chinese community put it, they are baptised but not evangelised.[28]

To a certain extent, the making of a new Chinese hybrid appeared to parallel the Chinese *mestizos* in the early nineteenth century in that while no longer alien, they maintained their Chinese traditions. In the 1980s, the Chinese imitated the Northern American hyphenated version of identity. They identified themselves as Chinese-Filipino or *tsino-pinoy* (*tsinoy*). The term *tsinoy* expresses their basic social-political commitment, while the term 'Chinese' is the adjective for 'Filipino', their main identity.

Through a long process, the Chinese in the Philippines managed to transform themselves from marginal traders to become captains of manufacturing and financial industries. This remarkable transformation was due to the political and legal access offered by Marcos, who saw the Chinese as his tactical ally. In addition, prior to the 1970s, the Chinese never had the necessary 'social capital' that could enable them to participate in strategic, modern networking. The wave of migration from Chinatown following the mass naturalisation in 1975 was very important for the Chinese to eradicate their ghetto mentality and to link up with mainstream Filipinos.

Anti-Chinese sentiments still exist among some Filipinos. Occasionally Chinese-Filipinos become the scapegoat of any government's policy failure. Nonetheless, Chinese-Filipinos have successfully experienced the process of integration into Filipino society.

The condition is totally different from what started to happen in Indonesia in 1966. In the aftermath of

the September 1965 coup attempt, the military and right wing Chinese-Indonesian politicians forced the implementation of the assimilation policy. The logic of the assimilation policy required all Chinese-Indonesians to abandon their 'Chinese-ness' and to be absorbed without a trace of it into the wider Indonesian population.[29] For this reason, government issued various discriminatory policies to guarantee the process of assimilation, forcing the Chinese to change their names into Indonesian sounding ones; and banning Chinese schools, Chinese-based organisations, and the circulation of any printed material in Chinese. The policies also prohibited the display of Chinese tradition and religion in public.

It is obvious that the Suharto regime's policy toward the Chinese was contradictory: on the one hand the government wanted the Chinese to assimilate, but on the other hand, it imposed discriminatory policies that 'ghetto-ized' the Chinese. While the discrimination against the Chinese in the Philippines in the 1950s was based on citizenship, Chinese-Indonesians, already Indonesian citizens, still remained targets of such discriminatory policies. Meanwhile, the 1975 mass naturalisation policy enabled Chinese-Filipinos to fully integrate into the Filipino community without abandoning their 'Chinese-ness' at all.

The Chinese-Filipinos' transformation from marginal traders and sojourners to capitalists and Filipino citizens took place almost at the same time as the globalisation process among the diasporic Chinese. In the pre-globalisation era, an individual was always defined and fixed in space by his/her gender, age, occupation, education, religion, kinship ties, ethnicity, language group, region and citizenship. The globalisation process, in contrast, seduces with its more inclusive definition of 'self' as 'global citizen'. [30] This suggests that Chinese-Filipinos have the option either to identify themselves as Filipinos or as Southeast Asian Chinese.

The 1990s witnessed mainland China's emergence as an economic power and the emergence of enormously important diasporic Chinese business networks (guanxi network). This development implied that most Chinese directly or indirectly experienced the process of global capitalism, which now links them to a new representation of 'Chinese-ness' in the context of transnational Asian capitalism. Inevitably, the Chinese in mainland China and in Southeast Asia will become linked in a circuit of production, trade and finance. Meanwhile, some Chinese-Filipinos have transformed themselves into tycoons of diversified business empires. Such changes have carried the Chinese identity through capital's global mobility, which recasts class, gender, race and nationality differences in new ways.[31]

When the Chinese became socially 'Filipinized', left the ghetto, and felt more secure legally, they ironically became the main targets of rampant organised kidnapping-for-ransom syndicates. This predicament might be related to the fact that the Chinese are no longer 'alien.' However, they are still considered 'strangers', not in the sense of 'wanderers' or as persons who come today and go tomorrow, but rather, as persons who come today and stay till tomorrow.[32] Being 'strangers', the Chinese do not fit into the established social framework, or at most, fit only into certain social frameworks. As such, the Chinese are seen as the 'perfect targets'.

Many of them think that their money will solve everything; hence they willing to pay ransom and are very much reluctant to report kidnappings to the law enforcers whom they believe are part of crime syndicates. A new phase in the Chinese-Filipino intersection has possibly started.

Notes

1. Edgar Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850-1898*, Manila: Ateneo de Manila, University Press, 1999, 9.
2. Ibid., 31.
3. Wong Kwok-Chu, *The Chinese in the Philippine Economy 1898-1941*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999, 21-2.
4. The Chinese Exclusion Law was an American law to prevent the influx of Chinese immigrants from entering the United States.
5. Wong Kwok-Chu, 53.
6. Antonio S. Tan, *The Chinese in the Philippines 1898-1935: A Study of their National Awakening*, Quezon City: R. P. Garcia, 1972, 185.
7. Ibid., 177.
8. George Weightman, *The Chinese Community in the Philippines*, M.A. Thesis, University of the Philippines, 1952, 71.
9. Frank H. Golay, *The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development*, Ithaca: Cornell University

Press, 1960, 312.

10. Remigio E. Agpalo, *The Political Process of Nationalisation of Retail Trade in the Philippines*, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Office of Coordinator of Research, 1962, 93.

11. Quoted from Yoshihara Kunio, *Philippine Industrialisation: Foreign and Domestic Capital*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1985, 87.

12. Theresa Chong Cariño, *Chinese Big Business in the Philippines: Political Leadership and Change*, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998, 2-3.

13. Amando Doronila, *The State, Economic Transformation, and Political Change in the Philippines*, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992, 54.

14. Temario C. Rivera, *Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family, and State in the Philippine Manufacturing*, Quezon City: Center for Integrative and Development Studies University of the Philippines and Philippine Center for Policy Studies, 1994, 51.

15. Ibid.

16. Unlike most Filipino political elite, Marcos did not come from a wealthy clan. He came from a middle-class family with a bureaucratic and political background. However, those who belonged to the old landed oligarchy never considered him one of them. See Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams", *New Left Review*, 169, May-June 1988, 20.

17. Yoshihara Kunio, *The Nation and Economic Growth*: The Philippines and Thailand, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1994, 6-8.

18. According to Rigoberto Tiglao, based on documents seized by US authorities in Hawaii, Marcos received US$12 million for providing mass naturalisation. A letter marked 'personal and confidential' from Ralph Nubla who was then the President of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce, contained 850 Chinese names who paid for assistance in obtaining their Filipino citizenship.

19. As soon as a Chinese obtains Filipino citizenship he ceases to be the target of any legal discriminatory policies. The situation is totally different in Indonesia and Malaysia where, although he may legally be an Indonesian or Malaysian citizen, he still continues to be discriminated against as policies are based on ethnic origins rather than on citizenship.

20. Edmund Terrence Gomez and H.M. Michael Hsiao, *Ethnic Chinese Business in Southeast Asia*, Taipei: PROSEA Occasional Paper no. 25, 1999, 28.

21. "Chowking: Takes off under New Management", *Philippine Graphic* 25 March (2002): 35.

22. Go Bon Juan, "Ethnic Chinese in Philippine Banking", *China Currents* 4.4, Oct.-Dec. (1993): 21-4.

23. The expression depicts an old, unpleasant Chinese man. Aileen Baviera and Caroline Hau, "Individual, Ethic and National Identity in the Age of Globalisation: the Case of Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia" in Armando Malay Jr., ed., *Going Global: the Asian Society on the Cusp of Change*, Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines, 2001.

24. Antonio Tan, "Chinese-Filipinos Changing Identities, 1946-1984" in Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu, eds., *Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988.

25. Previously, without Filipino citizenship, they were not entitled to own property. In the first few years after the 1975 mass naturalisation, the price of property in Manila shot up due to high demand from the Chinese community who had just obtained their citizenships. This created resentment among the Filipinos who felt disadvantaged by the Chinese.

26. Rex Aguado, "Greenhills Goes Up", Manila Chronicle, 16 November 1991.

27. They are no longer considered *baduy* (exhibiting awkward and bad manners), but cosmopolitan and Westernised.

28. Interview with Aristotle Dy, S.J., Quezon City, 12 December 2001.

29. Charles Coppel, *Studying Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia*, Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies, 2002, 27.

30. See, Aileen Baviera and Caroline Hau, "Individual, Ethnic and National Identity in the Age of Globalisation: the Case of Ethic Chinese in Southeast Asia", in Armando Malay Jr., ed., *Going Global: the Asian Society on the Cusp of Chang*,e Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines, 2001, 22.

31. Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, "Toward a Cultural Politics of Diaspora and Transnationalism" in Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, eds., *Ungrounded Empire: the Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*, London: Routledge, 1997, 326.

32. The concept of 'stranger' refers to Georg Simmel and Kurt H. Wolff, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, New York: Free Press, 1950, 402-3.

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THE FORMATION OF ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: A CASE STUDY OF THE LAHU IN THAILAND

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INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The theoretical concern of this report is two-fold. One is the flexibility of ethnic identity, and the other is the possibility of an 'alternative nationalism from the bottom' in Asia. Although both issues, based on the case of the hill tribes of Thailand, are related to each other, ethnic-level identification and alternative nationalism are parts of a macro-level struggle in constructing national identity.

Some issues raised from the discussions of changing ethnic identities of the hill tribes in Thailand

Since Leach published Political Systems of Highland Burma, the flexible nature of ethnic identification in mainland Southeast Asia (hill societies in particular) has been discussed. Based on the Kachin case, Leach (1964:285-6) argues that the difference between the Kachin and the Shan is a matter of political modelling rather than the cultural or racial matter that anthropologists expect. He also maintains that the Kachin and Shan themselves "recognise that these differences are not absolute – individuals may change from one category into another."

This issue of flexibility in complex ethnic relations in mainland Southeast Asia was raised again in the 1980s and 1990s when Kammerer (1990) and Tooker (1992), specialists on Akha culture, submitted a model of ethnic identification that was determined by custom rather than by birth based on their observations from their Akha field sites. The essence of their argument is that, in the Akha worldview, each ethnic group has its own custom (*zan*) and ethnic identification is determined by the custom practised ('carried' in the Akha sense). This means that an identity shift is expected to occur whenever somebody changes a custom to 'carry'. Although sometimes referred to as religion, the Akha traditional system of custom or *zan* is not limited to the strictly religious but is rather of the holistic kind, one that encompasses almost all aspects of social life (Alting von Geusau 1983).

As for Akha Christians and Han Chinese who have assimilated into the Akha community, Tooker (1992:800) explains this in the following way: "(To) be an Akha, ethnically, is to practice the Akha 'religion' (and vice-versa). All three identities mentioned above (Akha, Christian, Chinese) are *adje tshoha*, 'types of people'. …The switch from Akha to Christian is seen by the Akha as equivalent to the switch from Chinese to Akha (or vice-versa). …Identity switches are seen as switches of behaviour or *zan* whereby one 'becomes' (*pjeq-e*), one of another 'type of people' (*adje tshoha*)." She also says that such identity changes as 'Akha becoming Christian' and 'Chinese becoming Akha' 'violate common sense Western notions of identity' (Ibid).

Arguments on 'identity systems of highland Southeast Asia' persuade us to reconsider or revise conventional notions of ethnic identity. However, some theoretical questions arise at this point. If ethnic identity can be changed by changing customs, it is impossible for an Akha to claim multiple identities (i.e. Akha and Christian, Akha and Chinese, etc.). The reason is that one cannot follow two customs simultaneously given its holistic nature. When a villager of Chinese origin decides to follow the Akha custom, or when an Akha converts to Christianity, it must be supposed that his custom is no longer Chinese in the former case, or Akha in the latter case. This contradicts the well-known fact of multiplicity of ethnic identities that is commonly seen in complex ethnic relations in Southeast Asia. One of the purposes of this project is to examine this Akha model of identity change that is supposed to be determined by custom.

The place of the hill tribes in the quest for 'nationalism from the bottom'

Another theoretical concern of this project is on the emergence of 'nationalism from the bottom' in Asia that supposedly stems from the 'alternative knowledge of the peasants'. Such a notion has been gaining popularity in contemporary Thailand, especially since the 1980s when the problems of capitalist-oriented development policy came to be questioned by a wider public.

This paper intends to examine two aspects of the issue. First, I will take the Thai intellectuals' arguments on the 'local wisdom of the hill tribes' into account. Then I will consider different views of 'alternative knowledge' as shown by the hill tribes themselves in the process of socio-cultural change.

It is widely argued that the promotion of 'local wisdom' inherited from ancestors is of vital necessity for sustainable development. This local wisdom is an alternative, bottom-up concept of knowledge that challenges the existing elitist view of the 'ignorant peasant'. The hill tribes of Thailand are supposed to 'have knowledge or wisdom to manage natural resources sustainably'. The typical proof cited of the value of such knowledge is, apart from the agricultural technology itself, the traditional worldview of the existence of guardian spirits of the forest who are propitiated by annual rites.

However, from an anthropological viewpoint, such arguments leave questions unanswered. First, advocating traditional spirit worship as local wisdom may result in a too uniform image of 'traditional religion of a community' to reflect socio-religious changes and the religio-cultural diversities coming from such changes. The second question is that advocacy of local wisdom itself is essentially an initiative by urban-based intellectuals, and concepts of alternative knowledge as expressed by the villagers themselves 'from the native's viewpoint' tend to be disregarded. One of the main goals of my research is to investigate these questions by field research in the villages of the Lahu, one of the hill tribes that have been heavily influenced by both Christian evangelism and Chinese religious tradition.

Secondly, I will compare the place of the culture of the hill tribes, who are slash-and-burn cultivators, in academic debates in Thailand, with a similar case in Japan in order to explore the question of 'nationalism from the bottom in Asia' in a comparative perspective. Through recent debates over local wisdom as mentioned, the Thai intellectuals present it as alternative knowledge to replace the existing top-down view of national culture stressed by modernizing (Westernizing) elites.

Here is a parallelism between this school and the Japanese folklore movement in terms of the construction of national culture with multi-ethnic origins. Both challenge existing elitist views on national culture by presenting alternative, peasant-based, pluralistic views. In both cases, the location of the culture of slash-and-burn farmers as ethnic minorities becomes crucial. The last part of this project focuses on parallelisms and differences in the location of such minority culture in both countries in the quest for an 'alternative national culture from the bottom'.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The concept of 'custom' and ethnic identification among the Lahu in the process of social change

The focus here is on the relationship between 'custom' and 'Lahu-ness' in the process of religious change. Materials used here are collected from my field research in two Lahu villages, namely village M and village R. Both are located in Chiang Rai province. All 48 households of village M have a long history in the Christian faith (American Baptist), whereas 70 out of 100 households of R village practice Chinese religious tradition.

In Lahu, an equivalent of the Akha *zan* or 'custom' is called *aw li*. *Aw* is a prefix to a noun while *li* comes from a Chinese word which originally means 'etiquette'. Although *aw li* can denote 'religion' in a particular context, the connotation of this concept is, like the Akha *zan*, broader than religion in the Western sense, for *aw li* includes concepts of courtesy, culture, or customary law as well as religion. It can be said that *aw li* is traditionally a holistic system of regulation to control both inter-human relationships and relationships between people and supernatural beings. It is natural to expect that an identity switch, as stressed in the Akha model of identity system mentioned by Kammerer and Tooker, can occur among the Lahu whenever one changes custom by marriage, migration, or religious conversion.

Most of the villagers of R regard themselves as Lahu even though they practice *Heh pa aw li* or Chinese

customs. The villagers raise such examples of *Heh pa aw li* in terms of annual rites as follows:

- Chinese New Year (*Xin nian/ Chun jie*);
- Repairing a grave (*Qing ming*);
- Burning pine (*Er shi si/ Huo ba jie*);
- Midsummer festival of ancestor worship (*Qi yue ban/ Zhong yuan jie*); and
- Harvest moon (*Ba yue shi wu/ Zhong qiu jie*).

Apart from these annual rites practiced according to the Chinese lunar calendar, people offer joss sticks to honour their ancestors in altars built in each house each first and 15th day of the month following Chinese tradition.

The villagers explain the history of R village in the following way: "Some generations ago, when we were in Burma, many Chinese *Kuomintang* soldiers came to the Lahu village to take Lahu wives and live there. At that time, these *Kuomintang* soldiers were on hostile terms with the Burmese government and they disguised themselves as Lahu so that they could escape government suppression of the Chinese. By living with the Lahu and using their language, later generations have become Lahu."

It is noteworthy that these Chinese 'have become Lahu' while maintaining their traditional customs. Their Lahu spouses replace their traditional Lahu *aw li* with a Chinese one while maintaining their ethnic Lahu identity. The villagers are fluent in both Lahu and Yunnanese Chinese. All of them are listed as Lahu in government statistics but they are Yunnanese Chinese in the list of the Taiwanese aid project.

This example of village R assumes that ethnic identification is flexible. However, ethnic identification has not been 'switched' from Chinese to Lahu (or vice-versa) but one has been 'added' on top of another. Such complex ethnic identity indicates that it is not determined by custom alone. One can be Lahu by birth and Chinese in terms of custom. Ethnic identification can be additive without the switching of customs, and sometimes it can remain the same even when customs are switched.

In this light, it can be said that some scholars' emphasis on the flexibility of identity among the hill tribes of mainland Southeast Asia, for example, simply by switching off their 'Lahu-ness', seems to result in an over-simplified image of the 'non-essential' nature of ethnic identification.

Let us consider the other case, that of the Christians of village M. What has to be noted is that, for the Christians, *Lahu aw li* never means religion. Regulations on marriage, ritual exchanges during New Year celebrations, and traditional customary laws, all examples of *Lahu aw li*, are not considered religious matters. The word for religion is *bon li shin li*, which forms a sub-category of *aw li*. *Bon li shin li* literally means 'customs of blessing'. Another sub-category of *aw li* referring to 'non-religious custom or culture' is *chaw li va li* or, literally, 'customs of human beings'. In this sense, praying to God during annual rituals (New Year and harvest time) is not a Lahu custom but a religious practice. On the other hand, the New Year dance, the ritual exchange of rice cakes, and the ritual washing of elders' hands are Lahu customs with no religious meaning.

This indicates that newly introduced Christianity is, contrary to what some scholars have proposed, not regarded as equivalent to traditional Lahu custom. After the Christian conversion, the concept of *aw li* has been divided into the 'sacred' and the 'secular', between 'religion that controls the relationship between man and god' and 'customs that control human relations'.

There are some non-Lahu members of village M: Chinese, Wa, Akha, Akheu and Kachin who migrated into the Lahu village after marriage. They are sometimes referred to as 'having become Lahu'. They themselves claim that they no longer practise their old customs and have become Christian (i.e. *Nga Hui Heh pa aw li ma te, Bon ya te ve*). In this context it is quite plausible to conclude that for the hill tribe Christians, some scholars claim (cf. Keyes 1996; Tapp 1989; Kammerer 1990), 'being Christian' means 'being Lahu', and 'Christianity functions to maintain the ethnic boundary.' In this sense, it is supposed that Christianity is equivalent to traditional concepts of customs that function to define ethnic boundaries.

However, close observation leads us to another conclusion when we recall the separation of religion from secular custom among the hill Christians. The statement, "I no longer practice Chinese customs and now I am a Christian," literally means that they have abandoned *Heh pa aw li*. However, the idea that

this replaces only the religious aspects of traditional customs tells us nothing about their secular life after conversion. If they have abandoned Chinese customs totally in order to be assimilated into the Lahu, we expect the religious part of Chinese customs to be replaced by Christianity and the secular part by *Lahu aw li*. Therefore, when they say, "We are not Chinese but Christian," there is a hidden meaning: "We have accepted the Lahu custom after conversion." In reality, it is this unspoken statement that determines whether somebody is Lahu or not, and so determines 'Lahu-ness'. The function of boundary maintenance by Christianity is rather limited.

In some cases Chinese migrants and their children, who are mixed Lahu and Chinese, are called 'Chinese' as well as Lahu. In this context, it is clear that custom is not the reference point to determine ethnic identification. They are Chinese only because their ancestors were Chinese. More interestingly, Lahu spouses of these Chinese immigrants are also called 'Chinese' in some instances. The Lahu wife of a Chinese migrant becomes *Heh ma* or 'Chinese woman' as well as *La hu ma* (Lahu woman), and her Chinese husband can be called *La hu pa* or 'Lahu man'.

These examples from village M tell us that conversion from *Lahu aw li* to Christianity does not result in the replacement of the traditional holistic custom system as an ethnic boundary, but in the separation of traditional custom into religion and secular custom. After conversion, the Lahu Christians remain Lahu not because Christianity functions as the ethnic boundary in spite of its foreign origin, but because secular custom continues to define 'Lahu-ness' regardless of religious faith. Close observation of the migrants' case further demonstrates some unique aspects of Lahu-ness ethnic identification is not only determined by custom as some scholars would expect, but also by birth and spouses' attributes.

Theodicy and 'alternative knowledge'

Among the Lahu, both traditionalist and Christian, the theme of knowledge is closely related to the question of Theodicy. The term 'Theodicy' employed here follows Weberian usage: a question concerning the contradiction between the existence of the Almighty and imperfection of this world.

It has already been pointed out that the hill tribes of mainland Southeast Asia construct their identity *vis-à-vis* their lowland neighbours, namely the Han Chinese, Shan, Burmese, or Thai, by 'negative identification (cf. Tapp 1989)'. This means that they identify themselves in negative forms of questioning: "Why do they have a state (king, book) and we do not?" Among the Lahu, who are unique among the hill tribes in that their belief in the Supreme Creator, *g'ui sha*, is prominent, this kind of negative identification manifests itself a seriousness of Theodicy: "If God is almighty and we have faith in Him, why are we poor, suppressed, and illiterate while 'they' have everything?"

This question of Theodicy is reflected in the narratives of the 'loss and return of the book' in Lahu mythology. The story is about the creator-god (*g'ui sha*) who once appointed the Lahu as the rulers of the world and gave them a book of life written on rice cakes. However, the Lahu were careless and ate the rice cakes. In anger, the god struck the Lahu from their ruling position and made them suffer illiteracy and suppression by other groups. However, when the book is returned, god will appear again to restore their sovereignty.

The Lahu themselves recognise their own illiteracy and ignorance. The story of the 'loss and return of the book' is an expression of their feeling of inferiority as well as of their desire for 'alternative knowledge' to counter the lowlanders in power.

Among the Christians, the church officially claims that the book mentioned in the myth is the Bible and it was returned by way of the missionaries. A Japanese anthropologist Nishimoto (2000:104-5) comments that the Lahu Christians, as an effect of 'the civilizing project' of the church, "value 'knowledge' from modern education" and that "a concept of 'wisdom' in non-written form cannot find its place in the mainstream of Christian Lahu (ibid:107-8) discourses." On the other hand, he stresses that "the Lahu are also proud of their good skills in working in the 'forest'," for "they regard the 'forest' as their territory."

His comments might support activists' intention to construct a counter-ideology of 'alternative knowledge' as wisdom based on villagers' forest life as opposed to the existing 'scientific' or 'developmentalist' concepts of knowledge. However, I have never met such expressions as 'praising the forest as their territory' in the field. On the contrary, the villagers always regard the forest (*heh*

pui hk'aw) as 'the place for exploitation given to human beings by His will at the Creation' or 'the residence of demons that are to be driven away'. The forest is clearly categorised as opposed to the 'human world' by the binary code of 'culture-human-village/ nature-non-human-forest'.

However, villagers often show their pride in their 'ignorance' when they criticise the religious establishment, government officials and Chinese merchants. A typical expression of such 'criticism' is the following: "They have knowledge of the book and are rich in this world while we have nothing. But books are human products and knowledge based on it is valid only in this world. We cannot read books but our hearts are always seeking God. No matter how poor, suppressed and ignorant we are in this world, the Divine Kingdom is our place, not theirs." In this context, 'ignorance' as well as 'poverty' function as synonyms of 'piety' and 'ignorance' as a condition for 'grace'.

The extreme example of such a concept of 'salvation by ignorance' is expressed by Ca nu Hpa ya, who claims to be a 'man-god' and was once a leader of the non-Christians before he 'met Jesus Christ'. After conversion he claimed to have 'the power of the Holy Spirit' to cure the sick. He explains his power in the following manner: "It is mentioned in the Bible that the Holy Spirit is working in the world. Pastors know a book but they do not know God in their hearts. I am His vehicle and the Holy Spirit works through me, not through them. The conditions to be used by Him have nothing to do with knowledge of the Bible. He chooses His vehicles only by His wish."

Here we see an essential similarity between Ca nu Hpa ya's concept of 'power' (*kan pa*) and ordinary villagers' affirmation of their ignorance. They commonly stress that ignorant piety is the ultimate condition of power that has its origins in God's will. Literacy is the fruit of human effort but 'power' is the perfect knowledge of God. 'Alternative knowledge' as expressed in this context is a 'gift from the God' or charisma in the Weberian sense, rather than inherited skills of forest life.

Unlike the Christians, for the 'Sinified' Lahu, the teachings of the creator-god have declined and his position has been replaced by the Chinese lesser deity *shan shen*, a guardian spirit responsible for village affairs. In village R, the creator-god is mentioned only in the context of the origin myth and he is never worshipped in ritual occasions, although the villagers affirm that their ancestors once participated in a messianic movement that promised the return of the god and the book. The 'Sinified' religion of village R can be categorised as 'traditional' in the Weberian concept whereas Christianity is a 'rationalised' one.

Religious questions of theodicy also seem to have disappeared among the villagers. For traditionalists the imperfection of the world cannot betray their deities because these deities respond only to ritual offerings, not to piety or belief in doctrine. The occurrence of problems does not reflect on the righteousness and power of the god; it simply means that the deities need extra offerings or that rituals were performed incorrectly. These 'traditionalised' aspects of religion point to the lack of 'alternative' religious narratives of the concepts of knowledge.

The place of 'hill culture' in Japan and Thailand

There are a few parallelisms between Japan and Thailand in terms of the academic debates on the place of the culture of shifting cultivators in society. Such culture is the focal point of current peasant-based pluralistic models of national culture.

Suzuki (1991) states that Kunio Yanagita, a founder of Japanese folklore studies, tried to establish the nation's new subjectivity in Modern Japan. His focus on the religious belief of *jomin* or 'common man' is the struggle to construct 'nationalism from the bottom' to counter existing 'official nationalism' or 'nationalism from the top' as represented in state Shintoism (Suzuki 1972). Indeed, in his early manifesto of folklore as a new science, Yanagita (1939:7) says that the object of folklore studies is the construction of a way of life and a way of thinking for the common people. In this sense, Yanagita and his folklore studies pursued an anti-elitist 'alternative knowledge'. Morse's (1990:86-87) comments on this point constitute a challenge to both Eurocentric enlightenment thoughts and Westernizing bureaucratic elites.

Yanagita's (1976) focus was partly on *sanjin*, or, literally, 'peoples of the hills', who were indeed the most distant from the educated intellectuals. He thought that the multi-ethnic origin of the Japanese nation consisted of the *sanjin*, the indigenous hill folk, and the lowlanders,

relatively new immigrants. According to him, the *sanjin*, after being conquered by lowland wet rice cultivators, tried to escape the lowlanders' political control by fleeing to the hills and were able to maintain their cultural distinctiveness until quite recently.

He was later inclined to present more conventional view on the homogeneity of Japanese culture based exclusively on wet rice cultivation, and so the *sanjin* were gradually eliminated from the category of *jomin* or the would-be Japanese nation. However, in the postwar period, when open discussions on Japanese history were permitted, Yanagita's early model of *sanjin* was rediscovered and the multi-ethnic origin of Japanese culture was once again revived.

Among them, Miyamoto (1968) assumed Yanagita's early hypothesis that the hill peoples were once engaged in hunting and slash-and-burn agriculture until they were culturally assimilated into the mainstream in recent times. Tsuboi (1979) noted that the *sanjin* celebrated the New Year with taro instead of rice cakes, the most important item of the Japanese New Year feast. He showed that the culture of wet rice cultivation was a relatively new *sanjin* practice, and that customs based on taro and cereals cultivation in slash-and-burn style preceded it. Sasaki (1971), employing Nakao's concept of 'the culture of Lucidophyllus forest' (1966), further demonstrated that this type of cultural complex not only forms an important part of the basic Japanese culture especially on the hillsides but was also widespread throughout the East Asian hills.

One of its implications is that the Japanese *sanjin* culture, that was discovered in postwar folklore and anthropology, shares common features with those of the hill tribes of northern mainland Southeast Asia and Yunnan, China. With the *sanjin* way of life slowly disappearing after a long process of assimilation into the mainstream culture, Japanese folklorists and anthropologists have turned to Southeast Asia and Southern China to supplement the 'missing link' as they try to re-construct the history of the multi-ethnic formation of the Japanese nation.

The 'local wisdom' school shares a common orientation toward national culture with the Japanese folklore movement. First, the Thai intellectuals of this school generally reject the Western type of scientific knowledge and the modern capitalism that is behind it. Rather, they value the specificity of the peasant way of thinking in an unwritten form to counter the 'universality' of Western knowledge, just as Yanagita did.

Second, their emphasis is on *chat* or nation, rather than *rat* or state (cf. Chatthip and Siriphon 2000:43). It has been argued in Thailand that the category of 'nation' independent of 'state' has been 'stunted' (Anderson 1979). Now they want to challenge the top-down style of 'official nationalism' by presenting an 'alternative knowledge' of the nation that consists of people of multi-ethnic origin. They consider the hill tribes, labelled 'ignorant outsiders' by the bureaucratic elites, as part of the nation with their own special knowledge system.

This seems similar to Yanagita's project to construct a new bottom-up concept of a modern nation of multi-ethnic origin. In terms of the emergence of a national consciousness, the hill tribes of Thailand and the *sanjin* of Japan share similar functions, although the Japanese concept of *sanjin* is a rather retrospective one while the Thai intellectuals' arguments on the knowledge of the hill tribes clearly target present-day political issues.

IMPLICATIONS

The findings of this project have some implications for contemporary discussions of the construction and change of ethnic, or national, and cultural identity in Asia.

On the flexibility of ethnic identification

We have examined two propositions: one on ethnic identity switching through changes in customs, and, two, that Christianity functions as an ethnic boundary in spite of its foreign origin. These models clearly demonstrate that ethnic identification is flexible and has nothing to do with inherited traditional culture. In this sense, these models 'violate' the commonsensical conceptualisation of ethnic identity.

However, it seems that some anthropologists' stress on 'anti-essential' aspects of ethnic identification is too exaggerated to reflect social reality. I have demonstrated that attributes by birth as well as customary practices still function as important factors in determining ethnic identification among the Lahu Christians and the followers of the Chinese tradition alike. On occasions of inter-ethnic marriages or the replacement of customs, the factors that define ethnic identity are layered

one on top of the other rather 'switched' from one to the other. It can be concluded that a more nuanced understanding of ethnic identification is needed so that we can approach these studies from the 'natives' point of view'.

On the 'alternative knowledge' of the hill tribes

The same applies for arguments regarding the 'alternative knowledge' of the hill tribes. As far as my field data are concerned, the villagers rarely express their 'wisdom of forest life' in the manner that activists might come to expect. Expressions of 'alternative knowledge' among the villagers studied consist of answers to the question of Theodicy concerning salvation and have nothing to do with their ability to safeguard the forest. Intellectuals' efforts to promote local concepts of 'knowledge' may find no counterpart in the hills.

On 'nationalism from the bottom'

The arguments of the 'local wisdom' school have some implications for Asian nationals. Comparisons between Japan and Thailand demonstrate that common aspects among Asian nations in terms of present pluralistic bottom-up images of the nation emerge when taking hill tribes into account. It is noteworthy that in the present context, the hill tribes of Thailand provide information that may well revise existing uniform views of national culture in Japan as well as in Thailand.

Findings from this paper show that, at the present time, the hypotheses presented by some scholars regarding the formation of ethnic identities and alternative knowledge do not conform to the experiences of the hill tribes examined. Nevertheless, this should not deter the quest for 'alternative knowledge' and an 'alternative nationalism' that presents a more pluralistic bottom-up concept of national culture that may be used to improve the lives of the marginalised.

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IMAGINING NATIONS AND COMMUNITIES THROUGH MUSEUMS: THE POLITICS AND AESTHETICS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES

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INTRODUCTION: PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES

This discourse examines the museum practice that deals with displays of 'everyday life' in view of the politics of public culture, in the context of the modern condition. In an era where 'globality' is encroaching on a nation's political, economic, social and cultural agenda, the presence of a significant variety of museums dealing with traditional ways of life (peasants) and folk objects, presents a problematic issue of representation and identity construction of Asian societies such as Japan and the Philippines, who are grappling with modernity and its effects on everyday life.

Recognising the dangers of museums' presenting an exotic gaze on 'othered' ethnicities and communities for urban consumption, we can ask, what kind of aesthetics are being constructed and for what purpose? How is the issue of identity being addressed in such a museum and for whom?

Keeping in mind the importance of differences in the mode of production and reception of displayed objects, people as individuals and as a collective construct offer meaningful significance to what a museum represents in civil society. Museums are spaces where the discourse of an authentic culture through exhibits of 'everyday life' is transformed into 'displayed life.' In the midst of criticism of the prevalent 'self-orientalisation' or 'nativism' in ethnographic and folk museums, or even national museums, there is a need to re-evaluate the role of such public institutions so that they can address the politics of identity construction and a nation's imagination of itself.

It is this paper's premise that the museum is a negotiated and contested space concerned about the issue of ethnicity, wherein different people are able to locate a nation's sense identity or identities. A comparative study of the particular contexts of the museum practice in Japan and the Philippines will therefore be fruitful and strategic: Japan's history having been marked by a strong state, economic success with rapid modernisation, and narratives of homogeneity; and the Philippines having experienced colonisation, economic mismanagement, and political instability within an archipelago of cultural diversity.

Therefore, the paper aims to accomplish the following: 1) assess and evaluate museums in Japan and the Philippines that deal with 'everyday life' as sites of 'identity construction' in the context of the modern condition; 2) problematise the concept of ethnographic museums and folk art museums as products of Western rationalisation but appropriated by two Asian nations with their own particular needs and social condition; 3) provide a comparative analysis in the study of aspects of Asian culture and historical experience as an alternative body of knowledge to Western exoticism; and 4) recognise the role of museums in their various forms as powerful instruments of identity construction, aesthetic valuation and political signification.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE MUSEUM GAZE AND PUBLIC CULTURE

Working on the premise that culture is a social construct, a contested and negotiated field of knowledge and articulation, then a critique of the museum gaze is timely in Asian societies immersed in questions of identity within the context of encroaching globality. In more ways that one, museums communicate to a disparate audience or communities, forging an artifactual or artificial experience of homogeneity, being as they are spaces where social tensions are ironed out and made sensible. With the intention to reveal the politics of collection and to display to an enlightened viewer the

call of the times is to be more sensitive to people's lives that are sometimes exploited in the name of culture. The themes of 'politics of representation', 'identity construction', 'art dichotomies' and 'orientalisation' will be problematised in this paper as a contribution to the debates on modernity, civil society and globalisation.

A main concern of the paper is the museum's role in creating a public culture as part of civil society. Economic activities, social life and cultural affairs are all constructed within civil society and the strength and resilience of a social order reside in the capacity of civil society to aid in shaping the direction of change. As Ivan Karp aptly puts it, "Civil society is the crucible in which citizenship is forged .. more than a mosaic of communities and institutions, civil society is a stage, an arena in which values are asserted and attempts at legitimation made and contested (Karp 1992)."

As an important element in civil society, museums articulate social ideas. They define relations with communities, whether they intend to or not. They construct central and peripheral identities because of particular narrations, aesthetic privileging and political-economic interests. Museums, when considered as integral parts of civil society, often justify their existence on the grounds that they play a major role in expressing, understanding, developing and preserving the objects, values and knowledge that civil society values.

However, the following questions remain: Who decides what items are representative of people's lives and experience, and should therefore be collected? How are social relations forged in the politics and aesthetics constructed in the museum practice? What values are silenced by the museum practice and what are advanced as true and authentic? As Karp has observed, the traditional roles of museum – collecting, preserving, studying, interpreting and exhibiting – are now under scrutiny by communities marginalised by the museum gaze. The realisation that the museum audience does not passively accept what they are made to see is to point to the complex and changing nature of public culture. For better or for worse, there is a wide acceptance in civil society that museums are spaces for defining who people are and how they should act, and for challenging outdated and oppressive representations.

The second issue that the paper deals with is the concept of representation that arises from imagining selves, nations and communities in the museum gaze. Using Benedict Anderson's notion of 'imagined communities' and Hobsbawm's and Gennels's 'invented tradition', we can examine nations such as Japan and the Philippines as cultural constructs created by the intellectual elite and appropriated in the political and economic policies of the state. As Hobsbawm has suggested, it is a mistake to think of a 'nation' as an unchanging social entity. It is rather of a 'particular and historically recent entity, relating to a certain kind of modern state (Hobsbawm 1990)'. When we think of nation as a project, we can imagine it as an artifact, an invention and as a product of social engineering that enters into the making of nations. With this point of view, the concept of a nation is not a static one, but an active engagement with people's imagination that partakes in this 'nation-building'.

METHODOLOGY

The paper intends to analyse the space of the museum in its totality so that its collection and curatorship, as well as its architectural features will be seen as meaningful signification of a negotiated representation of culture. The following methods were used to achieve its objectives: 1) field observation in museums in Japan and the Philippines where a multi-disciplinal approach of art criticism and cultural studies was used; 2) archival research in the history and culture of both countries; and 3) interviews with museum professionals, cultural officers and the museum audience.

Almost all major National Museums in Japan and the Philippines were visited, significant folk art museums studied and a sampling of special interest museums included. I made it a point to visit the museum first as a regular visitor so that I could experience the museum collection afresh, following the established or suggested curatorial flow of the display that is akin to a narrative or story being presented.

From the perspective of museum studies, a visitor's experience inside and outside a museum, and the rules that he or she must abide by will affect the way that visitor will construe his/her personal valuation of the display. The architectural style, height, dimension of the exhibit halls, as well as material texture, light, sound and sometimes, smell (or the lack of it) affect the viewing of an exhibit. In some ways, viewing an exhibit is akin to the experience of religious spaces because of the implied importance and sacredness of the space, and

to the experience of a theatre performance, where the viewer is a member of an audience passively receiving information, albeit in a traditional museum set-up. Keeping in mind the political dimension of the manner of display – whether this be the cabinet of curiosity, a glass showcase, an installation, dioramas, multimedia technology and/or an interactive mode – I share these thoughts as an observer of culture, as well as of myself embroiled in a constructed world of meanings.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: THE DISPLAY OF EVERYDAY LIFE AND CULTURAL APPROPRIATIONS

Museums dealing with things used in everyday life assume that there are specific ways of seeing and valuing that can be taught to urban culture, which is marked by its 'stranger mentality' – the absence of community solidarity. We do not actually 'know' our neighbour because there is nothing that ties us beyond the family: except for a network of friends and professional colleagues.

Therefore the modern city has to create cultural symbols so that people can have a sense of commonality and communality that will bind people together, imagining, feeling and acquiring the same things. As state apparatus and as arbiter of what is acceptable or not, museums contribute to the notion of a homogenous culture. They engage in the production of knowledge that vie for space in the modern Japanese consciousness, especially in urban areas such as Tokyo, where a museum boom from the 1970s until the 1990s was observed together with rapid urban development.

In the Philippines, a boom in museum structures and practice has been slow in coming as it is only now that museum professionals are being trained. Moreover, there is an absence of a cohesive cultural agenda on the part of the state at both the national and the local levels.

Based on the observation of a rising number of museums in industrialised counties in Asia, I note that the elements needed to cultivate an interest in museums are following: a strong state policy that engages in 'global and local' realities, financial patronage of the business sector, a professional sector or advocates interested in museum work, and communities that feel the need for preserving an ideal life overtaken by a rapidly changing social environment. On the last point, one might say that an ethnic community would not see the importance of displaying its community for itself if that culture were still being lived and experienced. However, an urban audience has more need for appropriated life experiences to create a sense of a nation authenticated by ethnicity.

National museums and the culture of collecting

We can say that the idea of nations is intimately intertwined with the idea of national museums as markers of its achievements over the passage of time. We remember the story of Noah in the Bible, who saved as many living things as he could in his famous ark, and felt the need to classify and organise God's creations for a promised future (Elsner and Cardinal 1994). The birth of national museums follows the same pattern: first is the felt need to collect so that the past is brought to the present; second is the impetus to organise and classify so that collections become meaningful; and last is the language of display: for how does one exhibit collections that would be cohesive and representational of interests of the state and its people for a diverse public? Objects from everyday life are imagined to be saved from the deluge of time, natural catastrophes and social upheavals to serve as a stable repository of the past for a continuously changing present.

We can also observe that the chosen sites of national museums are symbolic of the cultural claims of the economic and political centres of a nation. Significantly, the concept of a national museum is a claim to civilisation, so that more than the objects, the context of viewing and its attendant atmosphere are as important. For example, architectural massiveness is always present and in tune with the vastness of the collection that characterises museums in Tokyo, Kyoto, Nara and Osaka, where national representations of 'Japanese-ness' are constructed. As historical are the buildings that depict western-inspired Meiji architecture, these museums are distinctly Japan's, organised on the discourse of 'inheritors of East Asian art', formed through a nationalism shaped by past imperial dreams.

A national identity that is founded on East Asian art through the prominence of Buddhist art as national treasures clearly places Japan as the inheritor of the great tradition of China (interestingly, not of India), dramatically lit in darkened interiors. Museums imagine themselves in terms of history and projection so that Kyoto still sees itself as the centre of Japan, while

the vast collection at Minpaku (National Museum of Ethnology) in Osaka might be viewed as an attempt to organise and classify the cultures of the world through thousands of everyday objects, in a dizzying array of displays. Minpaku best exemplifies the conflation of time and space – display rooms assume worlds that are comprehensible and knowable, free from global tensions and ruptures.

Since an empire can only be worth its name through its colonies, the Ainus and Okinawan are relegated to curiosities for an urban audience. Displayed in the traditional manner of cabinet curiosities and hands-off curatorial style, the textile and implements of these cultures are seen from a distance and out of context. For an urban audience introduced to these objects, the tendency to exoticize is great. Since no interactive display is available, one cannot lay claim to it because no sensory stimulation was permitted. In a sense, one cannot touch and feel the minority's identity, if seen only from a distance. Japan's attempt to develop a 'culturally-oriented nation' as espoused by the Agency of Cultural Affairs, is therefore undermined by the museum practice of centre-periphery relations that mirror the social inequity and attitudinal bias for the unstated centre.

The concept and collection of the Philippine National Museum started in the latter end of the 19th century under Spanish colonialism, experienced a tumultuous history during the American rule and the World War II bombings, and the loss of important artifacts to influential museums abroad. In the last decade, the museum was rehabilitated upon its transfer to the Finance Building originally constructed during the American occupation. Claiming to be 'The Museum of the Filipino People', the National Museum's method of display has been modernised to include interactive programmes side by side with archeological, ethnographic and thematic displays.

It promotes a strong awareness of the diversity of ethnicities that form the nation, although it is mostly silent on the Muslim identity and its sense of history. The main problem with the national museum is financial (despite the name of the building which houses it) as evinced in the policy not to light and turn on interactive displays if only a few visitors are around, for example, and in the absence of handouts for elucidation. In a world of meaningful relations, the exhibit rooms are named after banking institutions!

In Japan, on the other hand, people include museums as a likely place to visit in their leisure time again and again, according to the seasonal changes of the exhibits. A similar consciousness has yet to be instilled into the Filipino audience because sans the benefit of an organised group tour, it is difficult to persuade Filipinos to visit a museum. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the absence of a felt need to view a displayed version of the life that continues to be played out daily. It could be that the Philippines urban culture has not rapidly changed the everyday landscape, where traditions persist alongside social change. Yet, whether there is an interest in them or not, as part of civil society, museums in the Philippines appropriates various ethnic emblems and objects as the bases of the Philippine nation.

Folk craft museums in the urban context

Since the Meiji period, the constructed boundaries of the 'nation' of Japan have used folk crafts symbolically and economically, in relation to the West and to unify the nation radiating from the urban centres. Museums and cultural centres have been created in their name, civic associations have been formed, and craft communities engineered for their preservation. They have come to signify Japanese culture, here and abroad.

In the Japanese discourse, the idea of 'folk craft' has taken on varied permutations as *kogei* (craft), *bijitsu kogei* (art craft), *ryosan kogei* (mass-produced craft), *dento kogei* (traditional craft), *mingei* (people's craft), *mingu* (folk tools) or simply as *getemono* (common things). As a human creation and as a cultural construct, the category of craft has always struggled between 'art' and 'industry', culture and commerce, design and mass production. The ambiguity of craft as a man-made creation must also be contextualised in the dichotomy born out of the dividing spheres of knowledge constructed in the Period of Enlightenment in the West.

With the privileging position of *bijitsu* (fine art) and the individual genius in the cultural discourse, crafts for utilitarian use were relegated to the status of 'minor arts'.[1] Nations that developed under the tutelage of the West have struggled with this dichotomy, and in the course of cultural nationalism have reclaimed the right to call their 'crafts' as their rightful 'art', claiming a privileged position in the cultural representation, as has happened

in the Philippine. Being a product of colonial rule and social inequity, the privileging of art over craft is also tied with social, political and economic interests.

An interesting aspect of Japanese craft that is widely known in western discourse is the theory of *mingei* or *minshuteki kogei*, literally meaning 'popular craft' or 'people's art', coined by philosopher and writer Soetsu Yanagi in the 1920s. Per this theory, *mingei* works are the objects used in our daily life, made by the 'unknown craftsman' – a metaphor that means a craftsman is working within the traditional methods and ethos of a craft community, and has no desire for individuality which is the mark of a self-conscious artist in the fine arts tradition.

That the work should speak for itself and not the name of the craftsman was a powerful enough message that captured the imagination of so many intellectuals at that time so as to create a *Mingei* Movement. It finally resulted to the setting up of the Japan Folk Crafts Museum in 1936 with the help of businessman Ohara Magosaburo, indicating the role of Japan's powerful business sector in influencing public culture.

It also produced a nationwide membership consisting of crafts people, intellectuals, collectors and connoisseurs; a magazine; broad acceptance in the international scene; and a substantial network at that time. So did it bring forth a *mingei* boom well up to 1975, when demand for craftwork was so great that craftspeople experienced wealth never imagined before (Moeran 1997).

Built as a traditional roof-tiled Japanese house, the uniqueness of the museum's outside appearance is evident when compared to its surroundings and to the architectural design of most modern museums. One enters by manually opening a wooden door, in marked contrast to the modern-day experience of automatic doors. Once inside, one is asked to leave one's shoes in the front and to wear slippers from a pile in a big basket.

These unique features of the museum, based on the Japanese traditional custom of leaving one's shoes before going inside, serves two purposes – first, to retain the cleanliness inside while walking along the wooden corridors and exhibit rooms and second, to signify a practice or metaphor to leave the outside world at the doorstep and be transported into the *mingei* experience. Most visitors feel surprised at this novelty. It is in this sense that visitors are made to experience the idea of a 'traditional home'. No extraneous sound is evident, apart from people's footsteps treading on creaking wooden floors, inviting contemplation of the object as an aesthetic experience. There is not much of an attempt to explain the individual objects, as their objective is aesthetic contemplation, not the accumulation of data and scientific know-how.

Notice that the emphasis of the *mingei* philosophy is on the process of doing and using – the mode of production (communal) and the mode of reception (utility) – resulting in the so-called aesthetics of use. The theory is certainly reacting to the mechanisation of production due to industrialisation, the use of synthetic materials, and too much individualism in an industrialised-westernised society. But let us examine the imagery of the so-called 'unknown craftsman' – he is toiling at his work, as his father and ancestors before him, creating the same craft, economically poor, earning just enough for his daily needs, unschooled and with no desire to change – a much romanticised imagery of innocence and nostalgia of what Japan was in the Edo Period.

We can say that to buy *mingei* is to consume this wealth of meanings and imagery – perhaps to symbolise a *furusato* or old hometown that is fast disappearing in Japan's march as leader to an industrialised and urbanised world. To consume and partake of *mingei* objects in the home or restaurant where pottery is part of the aesthetics of Japanese food presentation, are all attempts to bring ethnicity into everyday life and to homes in the city. One is always in contact with his or her Japanese-ness through the material and visual environment of a situated ethnicity.

In the Philippines, the terms 'art' and 'craft' would be problematic to traditional communities where spheres of knowledge are intimately intertwined despite modern encroachment. In the academe, there are attempts at a discourse on folk art called *sining bayan* or *katutubong sining* with aesthetics based on an environmental and a social context. Since the fine arts come from a western tradition, the traditional folk crafts shaped by the diverse Philippine landscape are seen as bastions of ethnicity, honesty and purity. It was in the 1970s that folk art gained ground as a valid inspiration for the creation of a national culture.

Two reasons may be cited: the first was the cultural agenda of the Marcos conjugal dictatorship to use folk cultural emblems for tourism showcases and for the export industry, as well as a visual language of the notorious and invented 'Filipino ideology'; while the second was the nationalist movement in the academe that turned away from Western paradigms and looked at indigenous ethnic communities and their knowledge as liberating models and directions in a post-colonial society.

Given Imelda Marcos' claim to be a cultural messiah, many structures were built in the 1970s in which the divide between the elitist fine arts and the folk arts was created. One such structure was the Museum of Philippine Ethnography in the Nayong Pilipino Park, where displays of everyday life and objects such as textiles, mainly from the indigenous groups of Northern Luzon and Southern Mindanao, were exhibited. The display underscored the cultural context of the textiles but the orientation was mainly visual and discouraged interaction.

In addition, the touted representations of the Philippine village as an open-air museum looses much of its credibility when the attitudinal concerns of the staff cum guides are economic, i.e. to make you buy the array of souvenir folk art items or tourist art. The staff of each 'regional' house openly welcome visitors, especially those with flashy cameras which they seem to regard as a signifier of buying power (To test, I hid my camera during my next visit, and I instantly became unimportant in the scheme of things).

One thematic exhibit on the Filipino way of life is that entitled *Diwa: Buhay, Ritwal at Sining* at the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), which also houses the *Museo ng Kalinangang Pilipino*, in a small gallery. The main problem of both is accessibility to the public and the symbolic meaning still associated with the CCP, however misplaced, as a Marcosian creation. In both, in situ (context) displays are attempted using mannequins that give approximations of how people lived in the past and how they live today. But the resulting display is one of exoticism – of faraway static communities untouched by modernity (except for the Converse brand of shoes worn by a male mannequin in the *araquio* tableaux).

The contemporariness of culture and its possible emergence are subsumed as unchanging, coming from the past, a 'narrative of loss' – loss of innocence, of purity, of meaning – all for the benefit of tourists and an urban-based audience. Yet in our own history, indigenous communities have experienced many encroachments and exploitation from the outside world in the name of imperial dreams and display. For one, they were exploited in an international exposition at the turn of the 20th century, when they were shipped to the United States to perform like displayed objects in the middle of winter. Many died during that journey, forgotten and lost in historical memory.

Nowadays, there are attempts to correct the sins of the past through the conferment of such awards from the state as Gawad Manlilikha ng Bayan (National Living Human Treasures) to traditional artists who are into weaving, pottery, basketry, music and the performing arts, in order to promote the traditional as high art (De Leon 1998). Alongside the award comes the responsibility on the part of the awardees to create 'Centres for Living Tradition' where indigenous knowledge can be taught and transmitted. Funded by the government over the last five years, the awards' effects on these communities and on social relations within and beyond them, have yet to be seen. What is significant about the concept of the centre is that it replaces the traditional museum where it is clearly not needed.

There are current thoughts that the whole idea of ethnographical museums should be destroyed or at least re-framed to avoid the dangers of exoticism and self-exoticism now prevalent in public culture, as seen in – street parades/dancing by 'natives' during town festivals or when foreign tourists arrive. Since this type of museum is a product of Western imperialist dreams that patronise people rather than elucidate social realities, what should take its place in the project of imaging the nation?

There are suggestions of 'climate museums' or 'region museums' (Hudson 1991) that will encourage the use of all five sensory perceptions – sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell – to simulate reality and avoid the sterile, safe, controlled and tension-free environment of the ethnographic museum. Certainly, this suggestion is almost akin to the theme park where 'reality' is created in the presence of thrill rides and danger, or to open-air museums requiring tracks of land and strong financial support. In the Philippines, this would be difficult in the light of financial difficulties confronting cultural

work. However, a more engaging museum programme, one with interactive displays that address all the senses, is not an impossible undertaking given the Filipinos' capacity to think creatively during difficult times.

Community museums and civil society

Imagine in urban Tokyo a museum dedicated to capturing life during the Edo Period, both in terms of size and atmosphere.[2] Imagine, too, the same concern for atmosphere in a museum in Osaka so that day and night activities are simulated in a span of 30 minutes through special effects created via multimedia.[3] Imagine, as well, the same concern in Tokyo and Sapporo where they have transformed hectares of land into an entire village, complete with everyday conversations and the concerns of a bygone age.[4]

Clearly, nostalgia for traditional lifestyles is alive and well in Japanese museums these days. In these eco-museums where the concern is for context rather than connoisseurship, one does not only see displays but touches and interacts with things, objects and space. It is in this sense that Japanese museums are it much more akin to the language of theme parks, being as they are – a conflated narrative of society with an element of surprise and discovery.

The Ainu museums in Hokkaido are also interactive and rely on informative guides to the traditional house and performances.[5] Traditional clothing and musical instruments constitute an impressive show of the admirable cultural traits of the Ainus. However, a prolonged observation in one museum resulted in a reality check: the Ainus only put on their costume when visitors arrived and promptly took them off when the visitors left. The practice is a metaphor of sorts – a situational ethnicity – such that when one is observed, clothing serves as armour that lays claim to authenticity, which the majority culture denies. Following the long struggle of the Ainus for acceptance in Japan's imagination of itself, it might be said that Ainu museums represent the cultural sphere of the struggle alongside the political and social concerns.

In the Philippines, we have begun to re-assess the museum practice in the light of local realities, coming face to face with political and economic marginalisation, as well as globalisation in the form of diasporic communities comprised of millions of Filipinos working abroad. And recently, a widening interest in the institution of local museums has been springing up in the regions as local communities grapple with their own sense of identity, as well as with the political symbolism of having a museum in a small town.

In Mauban, Quezon for example, there is a concerted effort on the part of the local government to start a local museum based on the felt need for it 'to be a destination' as this community struggles with uneven development (it plays host to a multinational power plant, just as it does to insurgents belonging to the New People's Army). Poverty and the lack of opportunities have pushed generations of its people to migrate to the United States where from a position of economic affluence, they have supported the cultural initiatives of the town such as a theatre group, street dancing during festivals and maybe, soon, the local museum. Hopefully the resulting display of Mauban culture will not fall prey to 'exoticisation' or 'orientalisation', but will face the changing social-scape and environment leading to an empowered representation of its people.

It is also noteworthy to cite the case of the Museo Ilocos Norte where traditional life is represented through farming implements and manifestations of Spanish influence on everyday life. The narrative on a historical tobacco factory-turned-museum tells of how the patronage of the elite can hasten the establishment of a local museum. However, a conversation with one of the guides reveals this interesting feedback: non-Ilocano visitors appreciate the display more than do the Ilocano people themselves. The reason is that Ilocano visitors expect in museums displays of fine art objects alone and certainly not of everyday life that is easily found outside the museum's walls. While the intention of the museum is to promote the Ilocano heritage among its people, the museum has begun to establish a wider arena for the definition of art. Nowadays, the money for maintenance comes from the earnings made by the souvenir shops, from solicitation and fundraising activities.

The process of reification of folk art objects happens when everyday things become acquirable possessions, as happened in the Cabanatuan City Museum in 1992. It being my hometown, I helped the local government at that time to start a historical and thematic exhibit on this fast-changing city. To build up the largely on-loan temporary collection at the museum, we borrowed from the rural barangays a huge *kawa* or *talyasi* that this village used for cooking during collective celebrations

and events. Come opening day, the decontextualised *talyasi* was transformed: the everyday object became art by virtue of the museum space it occupied. It drew the interest of antique collectors.

Museums appropriating everyday folk materials also contributed to the idea of acquirable art mostly for urban consumers of culture, pointing to a democratisation of symbolic and material culture. Yet a revaluation of folk art is in order to widen its definition enough such that it would incorporate notions of 'cultural justice', and face the fact that the objects we admire so much also connote meanings of unequal relations, of urban and regional development, and of marginalisation in the national imaginary. We only need to be reminded of the T'boli culture's exploited people whose land was encroached upon by a multinational corporation that grows pineapples for the global market. T'boli textiles and brassware are now so popular and widely accepted as national treasures in our country, even as the province of South Cotabato from where they hail has time and again become a site of recurring and unresolved violence in Philippine society.

IMPLICATIONS: TURNING MUSEUMS INTO SPACES OF ENGAGEMENT

What we construe as 'Japanese culture' or 'Filipino culture' is always mediated by invented concepts and agencies of modernity: nation-state, schools, media and museums. As Stuart Hall has suggested, "The nation-state was never simply a political entity. It was also a symbolic formation – 'a system of representation', which produced an 'idea of the nation as an imagined community', with whose meanings we can identify and which through this imaginary identification, constituted its citizen as 'subjects' (Hall 1999)."

Yet, just as we are citizens shaped by our particular society and culture, so must it also be recognised that people are active social actors with the capacity to re-create or re-invent themselves in every context and milieu. Museums then can be an instrument of both suppression and empowerment by addressing the issue of perspective on what constitute the everyday: For whom is the representation? Who benefits from the discourse of authenticity? Why is the discourse of an everyday life that is rooted in an idyllic past important to a modern audience?

In the agenda of imagining a nation, a lived experience by its indigenous communities becomes the carrier of ethnicity, perhaps as a reminder of what was before modernity. Consider again the problematics of displaying *mingei* or folk craft in a museum: First is the contradiction of its advocacy when we remember that the ultimate criteria of *mingei* is that it be used, for utility, yet the unspoken message of the museum is one of display and status. Second, the soaring prices of the once inexpensive objects are the result of *getemonos* being declared as *mingei*. Like it or not, museums as purveyors of cultural value push the prices of inexpensive things to exorbitant levels. Urban craft shops compete for a limited number of crafts that comes from craft communities. A *mingei* boom has resulted in a change of lifestyles, social organisation and the social relations of a community in post-war Japan.

One such example is the village of Sarayama in the south, where ten families collectively worked for hundreds of years producing Onta pottery ware before its discovery in 1931 by *mingei* connoisseurs. According to a recent ethnography, with the *mingei* boom and rising demand for crafts, the residents ceased to work on their fields, focusing on orders, and building their own kiln instead of using the communal one (Moeran 1997). Thousands of tourists have trouped to Sarayama in search of the true *mingei*.

And of course, tour operators catering to tourists, mostly women, affected the works produced. Rarely is the large pot made now, given the low demand for it. What is in demand, instead, are small pottery outputs that tourists buy, that are more suited to the tastes and needs of modern-day client-consumers. *Mingei* craft has become acquirable art, with status and an ethnicity that can be consumed and brought to one's home and enjoyed in 'ethnic' Japanese restaurants.

Ten families benefited from this *mingei* boom, which raised their standard of living and allowed them to improve houses, buy land, and build their own climbing kiln. And with government recognition of the Onta tradition as an Intangible Cultural Property, the families in the village were conferred the title National Living Treasures. Accompanied by an annual stipend[6] and national distinction, these awards generally confer status to an individual or group, attendant to which are bestowed duties and the responsibility to continue and teach the tradition.

It is in this regard that we can see the state's effort to control the dynamics of culture so that the politics of 'authentic-ness' would be preserved and maintained. Nothing is left to chance and hopefully, nothing will change. To paraphrase what one official I interviewed said, craftsmen are discouraged to indulge in experimentation with other designs, or to adopt other traditions into their work, as this would constitute a 'dilution' of the tradition.[7]

Whereas before, artists were social agents who interacted with the realities of their social environment for their work, the active role of the state has created the traditional craft as representations of the nation-state appropriating the local tradition for a national audience and economically affluent cosmopolitan citizens. Craft has become heritage in Japan, which operates on the 'narrative of loss' (Clifford 1988).[8] And with state intervention to create a 'culturally oriented nation', the effort to construct an unchanging and controllable cultural environment is legitimised – a craftsman's individuality is not encouraged to emerge, not because of the effect of social relations, but because of an disembodied control system – much like Foucault's panopticon.

In the case of Tono, a small city in the Iwate prefecture, regional development came hand in hand with the idea of 'discovering Japan and Japanese-ness', through its re-invention of itself as a 'pastoral museum-park city' (Yamashita 1995). Aiming to be a typical 'rural city' and using the catch phrase 'homeland of folklore' (*minwano furusato*), KunioYanagita's famous book *Tonomonogatari* or *The Tales of Tono*, written in 1910 with rich folk imagination, was appropriated to become the basis of the Tono City Museum built in 1980, to represent the traditional village of Tono.

For such rural cities that depict the invisible Japan which modernisation has marginalised, tourism is promoted as the core of regional development, emphasizing 'old, traditional Japan'. The desire of local communities to create an identity of their own – in other words, to be a destination – is the context which folk craft now inhabits. Folk craft has been appropriated for purposes of regional and local identities, to counteract their perceived marginalisation vis-à-vis the favoured large urban centres.

Mingei has had, and still continues to have, great impact abroad and in Japan, probably because it has fulfilled the psychological vacuum experienced by people living in urban industrialised environments, and has met Western expectations of oriental exoticism (Kikuchi 1994). It has created a space for acquirable art for urban consumers of culture, pointing to a democratisation of symbolic and material culture. Yet a revaluation of folk craft is called for in order to widen its definition to incorporate notions of 'cultural justice', amidst the fact that the objects we admire also connote meanings of unequal relations of urban and regional development, and of marginalisation in the national imagination.

How then do we turn museums into live, cultural spaces of engagement thereby freeing them from the confines of being mere 'narratives of loss'? As a component of public culture, the museum's role must be defined beyond 'collection and display', and the notion of the museum audience turned into one of an actual community with stakes in its representation. It must rather be of people and communities having the power to reclaim historical memories and create meaning for themselves, rather than having this meaning given to them didactically.

The role of nation-states and their relation to museum must be reviewed to be more engaging with the public, to become more people-oriented rather than object-oriented. Such transformation necessitates more programmes of dialogue and museum education, in the hope of encouraging multiple perspectives on issues concerning a changing society, of communities having social connections with other communities.

We hope for museums that will develop an audience not primarily of connoisseurs, but of socially aware individuals. Collaborative curatorship must be encouraged as this is a terrain of hybrid meanings involving multidisciplinary approaches and knowledge, of working with the community of people themselves. Only then will the display of everyday life be valid – if it articulates unspoken hopes and tensions in civil society – the past and present clearly connected, the problems of centre and periphery also actively resolved.

Notes

1. From the socialist and Marxist perspectives of art, this was truly an elitist view so that when William Morris and John Ruskin founded the British Arts and Crafts Movement

at the start of 20th century, it became a direct challenge to the formalist and academic understanding of art, or of art for art's sake. People create objects not for their own sake but in the context of the needs and values of a community of people. For them, humanity can only be regained from the industrialised world if people create their own craft. In the West, the golden age of folk art was the medieval period when craft guilds built cathedrals anonymously and collectively. But the Art and Craft Movement soon succumbed to its own contradictions, overtaken by the events of the 20th century.

2. Tokyo Metropolitan Edo-Tokyo Museum.

3. Osaka Museum of Housing and Living.

4. Edo-Tokyo Open Air Architectural Museum and Historical Village of Hokkaido.

5. The Nibutani Ainu Cultural Museum in Sara-gun, and the Ainu Museum in Shiraoi-cho.

6. ¥3 to 5 million for a group per year and ¥2 million for individual/annum/for whole lifetime. For individuals, it is noteworthy to mention that many of Yanagi's artist craftsman friends (Shoji Hamada, Serisawa, Tomimoto who later on parted ways with Yanagi, among others) were conferred the award and the prices of their work are 'unimaginable'. However, one exception is Kawai Kanjiro who refused the award, rightly recognizing that he could not claim the right to say that his works are *mingei* if he acknowledges his individuality as an artist.

7. Mr. Sasaki of the Agency for Cultural Affairs, 13 Sept. 2001.

8. James Clifford said "Modern ethnographic histories are condemned to oscillate between two meta-narratives: one of homogenisation, the other of emergence; one of loss, the other of invention."

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ADVOCACY AND EDUCATION IN HERITAGE CONSERVATION

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INTRODUCTION

Our Architectural Heritage from Consciousness to Conservation is the title of a book published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1986. The second half of the title 'from consciousness to conservation' aptly represents and lays out the pathway Asian countries have to traverse along the worldwide movement to conserve and protect the valuable inheritance (tangible and intangible) of diverse cultures at every level – international, regional, national or local.

While heritage conservation has a long history, tracing back to more than a hundred years in countries like England and Japan, the impetus for the movement's becoming worldwide and popular happened only after the devastating effects of World War II in cities and villages in Europe and Asia. Today some heritage conservation advocates warn that the phenomenon of an increasingly globalised world, with its open market and free flow of cultural ideals and expressions, is as threatening as war is to heritage, if not more. Globalisation, it is feared, will lead to cultural homogenisation.

OBJECTIVES

The objective of this fellowship was to understand the shape, present state and possible future of heritage conservation as a popular movement (hence, 'advocacy') in four countries in Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Japan. Because of the project's populist aim, research centred on the work of privately organised and initiated heritage conservation groups (HCG) in contrast to public or government-initiated efforts. The project was especially keen to discover problems, especially those arising from globalisation, and learn about the creative solutions to these problems generated by HCGs. Such a discovery could lead to a viable exchange between Philippine HCGs and their Asian counterparts, resulting in the development of stronger regional networks. The project's activities included site visits, guided tours, interviews with conservation advocates, common activities, and video camera documentation.

A recurring key factor in advocacy is the need for education – not just as information, but also to change the public's mindset (hence, the second theme of this paper). This educative task is as varied in its objectives and strategies as there are countries, towns and villages: ranging from basic programmes like raising public awareness to more sophisticated ones like professional degrees in conservation.

CONSERVING HERITAGE: ACTORS AND STAKEHOLDERS

Not surprisingly, Asian countries are at different stages in heritage conservation. Some are just awakening to their rich heritage; others are vigorously conserving it and projecting it to the world. Much depends on the resources of a country, financial or otherwise, for aside from financial stability (conservation costs money), three other resources shape the heritage conservation movement, namely social institutions, stakeholders, and a grasp of the developing theoretical framework supporting the heritage conservation movement.

In countries with strong institutions, like a monarchy or organised religion, the tradition of maintaining key sites and monuments has existed for decades or even centuries. These sites were maintained for religious reasons or due to 'tradition', seen less as a time-based reality and more as an enduring foundation for existing institutions or practices.

Monarchy and religion, the most crucial social institutions, fostered the growth and development of important arts and crafts needed by these institutions

for their iconic buildings or ceremonies in and around them. In turn, artisan groups around the court and religion became the core that evolved into modern institutions such as Thailand's Fine Arts Department under the Ministry of Education, Culture and Religion, and the royal schools of traditional art and dance.

But not all Asian countries, cities, towns or communities have a strong sense of heritage conservation. This is especially true among migrants and in the busy entrepôts of Southeast Asia. These peoples and centres are always the first to experience new international trends. Thus, we see the rapid change in the urban landscape of Jakarta, Semarang and Surabaya (entrepôts) relative to the more traditional Yogyakarta.

The process of heritage conservation occurs on the level of social practice, where organised groups, tightly or loosely run, influence conservation. These stakeholders are not limited to government, the monarchy, religion or HCGs; but encompass a great array of interest groups such as individuals and entities in the industries of tourism, hotels and restaurants, culture and heritage, airlines and transportation, city planners and developers, artists and artisans, academics, architects, entrepreneurs, and the people who live in heritage sites and houses. Conflicts and problems arise because stakeholders, who are involved directly or indirectly in heritage, have different agendas and attitudes toward conservation.

Tourism has become a key player since the 1980s, which saw the full development of mass tourism. With the financial crisis of 1997, Southeast Asian countries began to rely more on tourism as a fast way of creating foreign reserves. The Tourism Authority of Thailand has been cited as a successful model in promoting Thailand as an 'amazing' place to visit. Tourism's interests mesh with those of the hotel, restaurant, airline and transportation industries.

With the promotion of 'cultural and environmental tourism' as an alternative to the standard Southeast Asian 'beach and golf tourism', a whole culture and heritage industry has developed. This industry ranges from tour guides (licenced or otherwise) and festival organisers in specific heritage sites, to manufacturers and sellers of souvenirs (like stone replicas of the Borobodur Buddha), to performers of traditional dances and drama, to museums and galleries, and to operators of cultural villages that give a taste of 'Bali in 40 minutes' or of Lanna culture in a programme consisting of dinner and a performance. With the obligatory street market selling souvenirs thrown in, Nusa Dua in Bali is a spruced up example of this lucrative culture and heritage industry. The impact of mass tourism on culture and heritage is one of UNESCO's on-going concerns.

Academics, architects and city planners also play a role. Couching their interventions in carefully phrased language, they develop plans and schemes for conservation. Many advocates of heritage conservation come from this group.

Although real estate developers and entrepreneurs are often pictured as the opponents of heritage conservation, they actually represent the force of growth and development that has characterised human settlements. They are often seen as unsympathetic to the heritage movement, yet some developers have successfully integrated heritage conservation with urban renewal schemes producing satisfying aesthetic and financial results.

Finally, the very people who live in heritage sites and houses are important stakeholders. Some heritage sites like Ayutthaya in Thailand and Intramuros in Manila have squatter problems which go back several decades. Other inhabitants, though, have legitimate rights to live on heritage sites. They may be the owners of these places or tenants like those of the century-old shophouses of Penang and Malacca.

Admittedly, the initial impetus for conserving monuments and sites of the past is often a sense of loss, a sentiment. HCGs are often criticised for being sentimentalists who block the path of development. As HCGs go about their tasks they discover that conservation is more than just preserving one or two isolated buildings, which the Australian heritage advocate Ken Taylor calls 'distinct dots in a map' (lecture at Yogyakarta, 19 February 2002), but involves far more complex social processes.

They cannot but agree with the perceptive remark of heritage advocate Khoo Salma Nasution of the Penang Heritage Trust: "Heritage conservation is about the management of change." This is no easy task because of the stakeholders involved. What advocates find themselves fighting for is often a fair playing field where the 'management of change' is not determined by

market forces alone, expedited by the global movement of capital, resulting in the razing of traditional neighbourhoods because land values have skyrocketed.

THE THEORY OF HERITAGE CONSERVATION: INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS

The theoretical framework of heritage conservation, enunciated in a series of international declarations, charters, and policy statements by international conferences, is clear. In the early part of the 20th century, heritage conservation focused on buildings, and architects were understandably at the forefront. The Sixth International Congress of Architects expressed this focus in the *Recommendations of the Madrid Conference* (1904). By the end of the century, the concept of heritage conservation had developed from a focus on iconic buildings to 'cultural landscapes', a term popularised by the Burra Charter (1981), International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) Australia.

Iconic buildings are usually monumental and associated with a particular culture like the Taj Mahal with northern India, the Great Wall with China, Borodobur and Prambanam with Indonesia and the Emerald Buddha temple with Thailand. The context in which buildings are understood and appreciated is ever widening; buildings are no longer regarded as mummified structures or ossified artifacts but the setting (landscape) where a people's life (culture) occurs.

The declarations also recognise that there is more to heritage than the material or the tangible; there are the intangibles expressed in song, dance and movement.[1] That cultures are diverse and no one culture can be the norm are also recognised. As heritage is not limited to the artifacts and actuations of the socially dominant, but is contributed to by everyone in society, its diversity must hence be protected (Kyoto declaration, 2000).

COUNTRY SNAPSHOTS: POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN HERITAGE CONSERVATION

This section discusses what the HCGs are doing in Japan, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Because popular participation is in part fostered or hindered by powerful social institutions, especially government, brief references to public policies will be made.

Japan: Japan is a pioneer in heritage conservation. During the Meiji period, the establishment of museums was a priority and Asia's earliest conservation laws were forged at that time. Among them were Japan's Antiquities and Relics Protection Order of 1871 and the Old Temples and Shrines Protection Act of 1897. These laws formed the basis of subsequent legislation, whose implementation is under the Agency for Cultural Affairs of the Department of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT).

Japan's legal framework has a clear system, beginning with guidelines on the classification of heritage in Article 2 of the 1950 Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties. It recognises five types of cultural properties, namely: 1) tangible properties: buildings and fine arts; 2) intangible properties: performance and music; 3) folk cultural properties (tangible and intangible: Japanese manners and customs, and performing arts); 4) monuments: places of scenic beauty, historical sites, natural monuments; and 5) groups of historic buildings.

Aside from its laws, Japan maintains an extensive network of public museums (complemented by many small private ones), making it fair to say that Japan is a country of museums – from the national, prefectural, municipal, city, town, all the way to the village and neighbourhood levels. Themes span fine arts, crafts, science, history – all the way to popular expressions like toys and *manga*. Japan even has corporate and industry museums on sake production, paper, and so forth. Its museums, especially the historical ones, are geared towards education. Using three-dimensional scale models for demolished structures, neighbourhoods, or vanished scenes; interactive electronic displays; and actual objects and hand-on experiences, the museums evoke a vanished era while preserving heritage. They have the dual function of preservation and education.

Besides the government's commitment to the conservation of Japanese culture and heritage, it has an active programme in the region. Japan has assisted Southeast Asian governments directly or indirectly through organisations and institutions established in Japan.

For example, the Asia/ Pacific Cultural Center for UNESCO (ACCU), a private NGO, is funded in part by UNESCO and the Japanese government, with the government providing a bigger share. The organisation promotes the conservation of heritage through

various transnational projects like book development, documentation, publications and the organisation of symposia and conferences. Even private schools, like Sophia University, receive financial support from the government through its funding programmes. Sophia's Institute for Asian Culture runs an excavation and documentation project in Angkor Wat, and also trains Cambodian archaeologists on-site at Angkor and takes them to Tokyo for more advanced training.

Because of the government's active role, people's movements appear superfluous; but this is not necessarily so in Japan where there are many HCGs. Prof. Chester Liebs of Tokyo Gedai (University of Fine Arts and Music) notes that there still exists much room for growth in public recognition that heritage extends not only to temples and palaces, but also to the frequently ignored vernacular architecture, like the *machiya* (literally *machi* [street] *ya* [shop]) or shophouses, and to buildings representative of the industrial phase of Japan, like the navy docks at Yokohama (interview, 10 June 2002).

Examples of conserved *machiya* are found in the Naramachi section of Nara, south of the Kokufugi Temple and the Sarusawaike Pond. In Naramachi is the *Koshi-no-ie*, a replica of a traditional merchant house, part museum and part meeting place. Also active in Nara is the Nara Machizukuri Center, which preserves the traditional storefront houses of Japan that are fast disappearing because they are made of perishable wood, and have been replaced by modern structures.

Public involvement is due in part to Japan's being a leisure and aging society, noted for various clubs composed of senior citizens who want to do something. One such seniors' club is The Sketching Club of Tokyo, established a decade ago by Prof. Masaru Maeno, professor emeritus of Tokyo Gedai. Prof. Maeno, an active voice in the conservation movement, was responsible for establishing the conservation major at Tokyo Gedai and building its documentation and restoration laboratories, specialising in materials like wood, stone, and metal. He also spearheaded the preservation of the wooden music hall of Tokyo Gedai and of the Meiji-era Tokyo Station, and the restoration of Frank Lloyd Wright-designed school building, the Mynonichikan Jiko Gakuin.

Prof. Maeno drew inspiration for the sketching club from a conversation among journalists about such a club in France, whose objective was to raise public awareness of historic sites. Every month, the club organises a sketching party at a historical or cultural site, which has not yet been gazetted. Often these sketching sessions are subtle ways of finding out more about the cultural and heritage sites in far-flung villages where residents are suspicious of researchers documenting sites. Villagers generally associate documentation with redevelopment, an option not always welcomed by them.

While the Japanese government has put its act together, NGOs continue to assist it through a more thorough cataloguing of heritage, often proposing sites that have not yet been gazetted. NGOs are also pushing the national imaginary, by focusing on aspects of heritage that 'fall through the cracks' like making room for vernacular architecture, cultural landscapes, and the minority voice, like the Ainu and Okinawan (Jiro NRICP 2002:103-8).[2]

Thailand: Like Japan, Thailand has a monarchy, whose stabilising role has been instrumental in the country's survival for half a century, notwithstanding numerous coups and changes in the Constitution. The extent of the Thai government's involvement in heritage conservation cannot be compared with Japan's, as Thailand lacks the resources to protect its vast heritage. It has some heritage institutions in place, notably the Department of Fine Arts under the Ministry of Education, Culture and Religion, and the many cultural institutions patronised, managed or maintained by the monarchy, like schools for traditional art, the Bang Pain Crafts Center, and the Siam Society.

Established in the 1930s, the Department of Fine Arts grew out of the institution of court artists and craftspeople. It assumes the following functions directly related to heritage conservation: 1) architectural conservation; 2) archaeology; 3) the restoration of paintings and artwork; 4) the registration of monuments and sites; 5) research and documentation; and 6) licensing for the export of antiquities and sacred images.

The Department is mandated to protect ruins like the World Heritage Sites of Sukkothai and Ayutthaya, and the Khmer temples of Phimai, as well as 'living monuments' or 'living spaces' (buildings in active use). Thus far it has registered 2,056 monuments and sites, while 300 more await registration. The Department oversees museums, both national and provincial, of

which 35 are considered world-class. It is also mandated with controlling the sale and movement of antiquities and is the sole agency that grants licences to export Buddha images.

The Department follows a different set of norms when protecting ruins versus 'living monuments'. With ruins, its main tasks are archaeological research, preservation and consolidation, and partial reconstruction and landscaping. Interventions are controlled in order that they be as traditional as possible. For the conservation of Ayutthaya for instance, the Department sourced hand-made clay bricks fired in open pits using rice husks.

As for living monuments, it is the Department's task to maintain them. Because many of the living monuments are Buddhist *wat* or temples and the active involvement of followers is an important element in the temple's total cultural significance, the department notes that it cannot and does not maintain the buildings as museum artifacts. Hence, Buddhists give donations to keep the buildings in the best state possible, to the extent of adding more gilding to them as part of 'merit-making'. For these living monuments, the Department maintains standards for acceptable intervention. It identifies contractors who are competent at doing traditional work, approves suppliers who provide tiles, glass teserrae, cast bronze images and the like for construction projects. It also maintains contact with local artisans well versed in traditional crafts and buildings, like the artisans of Phetburi who are experts in stucco.

Thailand's category of living monuments raises the issue of authenticity. While the European tendency is to keep buildings as similar as possible to those of a particular historic period, certainly, the *wat* in Thailand is not treated thus. Consequently, simple whitewashed stucco walls might be covered with a white marble veneer. Because marble is precious, the change is seen as meritorious act. How then to balance the desire to keep buildings as they were and the equally legitimate cultural perception of what a *wat* should be? How then to balance the intervention of the conservator and the legitimate need and right of people to express religious beliefs through their participation in temple maintenance and enhancing works?

Besides the department, Thailand has institutions that keep alive the traditional arts, for instance, schools for traditional dance sponsored by the monarch. Silpakorn University in Bangkok, established by an Italian artist and responsible for introducing Western art to Thailand, runs a programme in traditional art as does the Faculty of Fine Arts of Chiang Mai University. Graduates of traditional painting find employment in the restoration projects of the Department of Fine Arts, or in some cases earn a reputation as independent artists in Thailand or abroad.

In Thailand, for whatever the reasons – the Buddhist temperament of maintaining harmony or the general feeling that a benevolent monarchy can fiscalise the actuations of government – heritage groups and advocates are few, and generally not very local. Thus when they do speak out, what they say becomes grist for media.

The prestigious and almost century-old organisation, the Siam Society, was founded in 1904 under the royal patronage of the future Rama VI. In 1932, it built its first office in Soi Asoke, which remains the site of its present office. In the property are a library, meeting, exhibition and lecture areas, and a bookshop. Also within the property is the Kamthieng House from the Nimmanahaeminda family of Chiang Mai. The 150-year-old teak house is also an ethnological museum.

Aside from the scholarly Siam Journal which the Siam Society publishes regularly, the Society occasionally publishes books related to Thailand. For its members, and on a limited basis for non-members, it has docent tours conducted by experts. Others are allowed to participate on a limited basis. Membership in the society is not limited to Thais at all; in fact, many expatriates are active in the society.[3]

Like the Siam Society, the Jim Thompson Foundation, which preserves a cluster of teak houses in Ayutthaya and Bangkok began as private enterprise, but is presently under royal patronage. The houses are museum pieces in themselves.

An article in The Nation (12 November 2001) noted the growing concern of residents of Chiang Mai over the unabated construction of high-rise buildings near temples and in the historic district of the city, despite zoning laws. The same article mentioned the work of Thanet Chaoernmuang, a faculty member of the Department of Political Science in Chiang Mai University. Ajarn Thanet established the Centre

for Urban Studies, and created a website to alert the citizenry about proposed developments in Chiang Mai. Many of these developments were in line with the desire to meet the needs of foreign tourists: elevated highways and a subway were being proposed for Chiang Mai and a cable car or rope way system was being contemplated for Doi Suthep, the mountain west of the historic district where the Royal Doi Suthep temple and the Phuping or winter palace are located.

Ajarn Thanet's website reasons that such interventions are unnecessary and will radically change the character of the city and its immediate environs. As it is, the professor pointed out, Chiang Mai's traffic is not horrendous like Bangkok's. The public transportation of *song tows* and *tuk tuk* work quite well, and the leisurely pace of Chiang Mai, versus the frenetic pace of Bangkok, is its very charm.

Another action that has drawn media attention came as a response to the Ratannakosin Island Waterfront Reclamation project.[4] Spearheaded by the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA), the project proposes to make Rattanakosin Island look 'more authentic', and thus more appealing to foreign tourists. The 16-year-old project worth 15 billion baht, will develop a greenway along the banks of the Chao Phraya River. The greenway will have lawns, walkways and roads along the river bank. The project also involves demolishing post-1910 structures (buildings constructed after Rama V) such as the National Theater, the Thai Dance School, some buildings of Tamassat University, plus many riverfront stores and dwellings. The plan also calls for a reduction in the resident population from 200,000 to 90,000.

The plan has so far not been implemented, although the refurbished park built near Phra Sameru is a foretaste of what might be done. Critics say the Rattanakosin project would alter the riverine character of Thai culture. Prof. Suwattana of Chulalongkorn University, Faculty of Architecture, is especially wary about such moves as it changes the historic character of Thailand and the people's relation to water. She notes that in Europe the river is often set apart from the buildings by spacious plazas or roads. People do not live on or near the river but simply use it as a convenient waterway. In contrast, the Thai are riverine people whose livelihood and social transactions occur on the river, the mighty Chao Phraya in the case of Bangkok.

At present, because of public outcry and the lack of funds, the aforementioned ambitious plan has not been fully implemented. BMA's present policy is to ask residents and shop owners to repair and maintain their places. Only when a structure is dilapidated and poses danger will the BMA initiate steps to have it demolished. Similarly, talk about reducing the population has ceased. Redevelopment has taken on a slower pace, one that is hopefully more sensitive to the needs and sensibilities of the people living in the area.

Another facet of heritage conservation that also needs to be systematically addressed at this point involves Thailand's ethnic minorities, who mostly live along the borders of Myannmar, Cambodia and the southern border which Thailand shares with Malaysia. For the minorities, the monarchy is quite active in livelihood projects centring on agriculture and crafts. Several NGOs, a number of which, under the aegis of religious groups, specifically Christians and Buddhists, focus on ethnic minorities, specifically on ethnic rights and livelihood.

Indonesia: Indonesia has many HCGs. In Yogyakarta, the cultural capital of Java, there are some 30 heritage groups, organised under an umbrella organisation known as the Yogyakarta Forum for Heritage Conservation. Dr. Laretna Adhisakti, better known as Sita, and a faculty member of the Gadjah Mada University, was instrumental in setting up the organisation. She strongly believes that heritage conservation should be a movement rather than a centralised organisation so that she prefers the existence of small local groups to having just one central group controlling the process.

Heritage conservation falls directly under the antiquities department of the Ministry of Culture. Until 1998, culture and education were in one ministry, but with the reorganisation and decentralisation of government, the Ministry of Culture has been merged with the Ministry of Tourism. This merger probably represents the official mindset regarding culture, that it is a part of the tourism industry and is a commodity.

We find the strongest critics of the commodification of culture in Bali, which for almost a century now has been the greenhouse of 'cultural tourism' (marred only recently by the October bombings). Degung Santikarma, an anthropologist and one of Bali's organic intellectuals, laments the reduction of culture and

heritage to the aesthetic – to song and dance, if you will. Balinese intellectuals have used the anatomy of a tree to create an analogy explaining their culture: the root of Bali culture is religion, the trunk is its tradition, which includes organisations and customs, while the fruit represents the arts. Santikarma and others are quick to point out that traditional village organisations and customs revolve around the perpetuation of rituals and crafts, and the interpersonal relations within the community.

However, when it comes to policy setting and determining the wider issues of Bali's future, that is, issues of national import, the Balinese are disenfranchised. Decisions regarding such crucial matters are made in Jakarta despite the decentralisation begun in the post-Sukarno era, and whose effects have yet to be seen. The Balinese have declared that, "Bali does not need Java; it is Java that needs Bali." For this other reasons, heritage groups and advocates perceive their roles to be those of fiscalising government, often on the local level, and developing initiatives that creatively address heritage.

Dr. Sita belongs to two other organisations: an academic one based in Gadjah Mada University, and the other, more popular, Yogyakarta Heritage Society established in 1991 to address the weak public appreciation of heritage. The heritage society is one of the pillars of the Yogyakarta Forum which organised a successful heritage festival in August 2001 and is presently spearheading Jogya Heritage Year 2002,[5] leading to the Indonesian year of heritage 2003 being organised in cooperation with the Indonesian Network for Heritage Conservation (INHC).

A successful offspring of the heritage society is the community-based tourism organisation, Kanthil, based in Kota Gede, the *kampung* in Yogya noted for silversmiths. These smithies trace their origin to artisans who provided silverware for the sultan of Yogyakarta, but eventually branched into crafting jewellery and other ornaments for others. With the 1997 Asian crisis, the silversmiths who relied on visitors and tourists experienced a decline in business. The heritage society, on its part, noted that livelihood, more than the conservation of historic buildings, was a priority among the residents. So with these residents, the Kota Gede arts festival was organised, which drew a large crowd and highlighted the charms of this special *kampung*.

From the festival Kanthil was born, a group dedicated to conducting guided walking tours through the village. With guides and members drawn from among the residents of the village, Kanthil has become a response to the perception that mass tourism, which is hurriedly undertaken, does not paint a fair picture of a locale. It also points to the fact that native residents are the best guides to any place.

Malaysia: In Malaysia, heritage conservation falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture. Two years ago, the ministry also oversaw religion, but since then, Malaysia has twinned culture with tourism, just like Indonesia.

A critique of Malaysia's heritage programme lies not in the absence of a law pertaining to it, but on the law's uneven implementation. Moreover, some laws such as the gazetting of historical buildings go back to the British colonial era. For example, the Penang Heritage Trust laments that after 15 years of negotiating with the municipal government about the historic Suffolk House, nothing much has been done, leading to the further deterioration of this late-18th-century colonial residence. Redevelopment permits in historic areas are apparently issued based on a superficial inspection of old buildings, without the benefit of thorough historical and archival research.

Malaysia has three leading heritage NGOs namely: Badan Warisan Malaysia (established 1983), Penang Heritage Trust (1986) and the Melaka Heritage Trust (1999). I will focus on Penang Heritage Trust (PHT) as representative of the three because it is recognised in the region as a model heritage trust organisation. Patterned after the British trust organisation, it is a privately initiated and maintained body that conducts its own activities: research, education, publication, advocacy and conservation. Just like the British trusts, PHT is incorporated. The funds it raises goes towards maintaining historic structures, so much so that PHT even has titles to some of them. The Trust builds networks with local and national governments, and with similar organisations on a national and international scale.

PHT maintains an active membership of more than 200 people, collects membership fees and holds an office in a historic shop house, the Fukinese Sailors Guild on Lorong Steward, a cross street of Penang's famous

Love Lane. PHT runs regular guided walking tours (on Tuesdays and Wednesdays), and with the assistance of American Express, has marked out a heritage trail with educational signboards in Malay and English. It has printed brochures for its tours, which include the following: the Little India Spice Trade Tour, the Historical District Tour, the Five Clans Tour, and the Waterfront Tour. Aside from these regular tours, it conducts special ones for groups like students, teachers, and convention participants.

The well-planned walking tours are led by well-informed local guides, who maintain the pace of the tour by combining a guided walk with moments for rest and refreshment often ending in a local restaurant for the tourists to savour the distinct cuisines of Penang as follows: Hakka and Hokkien Chinese, Baba-Nyonya, Malay, Muslim, South and North Indian. An average tour lasts for about three hours, so that a morning and an afternoon tour can be conducted within a day.

PHT has forged a working relationship with the local Ministry of Education office and conducts special tours for teachers and students. It works hand in hand with a recently organised NGO staffed by young volunteers, the Kota Anak-anak (Children of the City), which seeks to familiarise young people, especially elementary school children, with their heritage. For instance, PHT conducts walking tours for children, after which Kota assists the children in reflecting on the tour and expressing themselves through art.

PHT maintains a small library, and distributes and sells books on Penang, to generate income for the organisation. The first printing of the book on the filming of *Anna and the King* (starring Jodie Foster and Chow Yuen Fat) in Penang's heritage sites was sold out.

PHT is behind the restoration of historic buildings and is currently fixing the Carpenter's Guild Temple. After campaigning to save Suffolk House, the garden bungalow built by Francis Light who was the British founder of Penang, it began the arduous task of restoration. But the Suffolk project has a long way to go. In fact PHT calls it an example of a monumental failure because it took more than 15 years to obtain government's support for the project.

PHT's biggest campaign thus far has been to place Penang, specifically Georgetown, the capital, on the UNESCO World Heritage List. To this end, three public conferences on the Malay, Chinese and Indian heritage of Penang culminated in an international conference, The Penang Story, that was held at the City Bayview Hotel from 17 to 20 April 2002.

PHT's campaign to save the historic district of Georgetown from deterioration gained urgency with the repeal of Malaysia's Rent Control Act in 2000. As PHT predicted, the repeal created social dislocations and endangered some 7,000 shop houses (many of them dating back to the 19th century), eventually leading to their material destruction. PHT also then warned that the social dislocation would lead to the destruction of traditional trades, and has been proven right. With the repeal of rent control, landlords have raised rent by as high as 1000 per cent, resulting in many tenants moving out of Georgetown. Where a tenant is an artisan or craftsman, the crafts also move out to newer neighbourhoods where rent is cheaper. A streetscape formerly home to a string of artisans has been abandoned, a 'cultural landscape' lost.

CONTESTED CONCEPTS

HCGs have the dual tasks of: (a) generating public support and awareness so that heritage conservation becomes a public rather than a 'middle class, middle aged' concern and (b) widening the conceptual understanding of Asia's heritage. Heritage cannot be defined deductively but is discovered through familiarity with actual artifacts, monuments, sites, customs, arts, crafts and expressions that make up a cultural landscape.

Consequently, HCGs face formidable challenges. The first is quite physical: for whereas Japan has had a long history of conservation and documentation, Asia with its vast heritage that is largely under-documented and Southeast Asia, in particular, have hardly made many strides in heritage documentation. Part of the reason for this neglect of proper documentation goes back to the colonial era, when the interests of the ruling and educated elite were co-opted by the colonisers. The elite then were either more interested in the culture of the 'mother country' rather than their own indigenous culture; or if the elite then did exhibit interest in local culture, they focused on its exoticism.

The seemingly daunting challenge posed by

documentation might be better appreciated by looking at the Indonesian example. Take the World Heritage Site of Borobodur. Is Borobodur a temple? Mandala? Or sacred mountain? Where are the living quarters of the monks who presumably maintained Borobodur? Although some answers are being formulated, the questions are far from being answered. And what about Indonesia's Dutch colonial heritage, a concern of advocates like Fr. Adolf Heuken, the author of *Historical Sites of Jakarta*, an authoritative guide to Old Batavia, and of the Bandung Heritage Trust, which wants to preserve the Art Deco character of this planned city in the hills?

The second challenge is interpretative. Aside from the basic task of listing, cataloguing, and documenting, Asia faces a conceptual problem when defining and delimiting heritage. What qualifies as Thai, Malaysian, Indonesian, or Japanese heritage? I suggest that what a nation projects itself to be, what it imagines itself to be, and what is fashionably called the 'national or social imaginary' play a pivotal role in defining heritage.

Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, declared not too long ago that Malaysia is a Muslim state but fundamentalist groups contend otherwise, pointing out that Malaysia's laws do not conform to Islamic *shariyah* laws. Academics also make distinctions between Muslim and Islamic states.[6]

Nonetheless, Dr. Mahathir's statement has accentuated one of the formative realities of Malaysia as a nation, which from its inception has adopted Islam as the state religion. The repercussions of this constitutional fiat on built heritage are being experienced as Islam undergoes a revitalisation in Southeast Asia. Thus when historic mosques in Malaysia are renovated or expanded to address present needs, architects and planners look to the Middle East for models.

For although Southeast Asia has developed a unique form of the mosque built on the pattern of a dwelling with a hip or pyramidal roof and open sides [7], and with minarets resembling Chinese pagodas (examples are the Kampung Kling mosque in Malacca or the minaret of the Acehnese mosque in Penang), these architectural forms are seen as less than 'pure', purity being equated with Middle Eastern forms. *Waqf* (private trust groups) and other groups who oversee these traditional buildings are changing them as they build more permanent ones to replace wooden vernacular mosques in the *kampung* (villages) or when they renew important mosques.

Kuala Lumpur's signature modern buildings deliberately quote something Middle Eastern. The quotation can be quite literal as seen in the *muqarnas* or stalactite vaults of the KL Towers, which artisans from Isfahan built; or in the ubiquitous onion domes sprouting in government offices, in Putrajaya or the Islamic Arts Centre, completed in 1998 at the cost of US$26.3 million and described in a Time magazine article as "an Arabian gem replete with white marble, rippling fountains and sky blue onion-shaped domes in the middle of Malaysia's tropical capital (24 June 2002:17)."[8] While there is no government policy to quote from Middle Eastern architecture, Islamic revitalisation is recreating Malaysian-built heritage.

Asian nations define heritage from a national perspective. But nations in Southeast Asia are relatively new, being products of the last century, and therefore partly colonial. Furthermore, the physical boundaries of nations were set either directly by colonial policy or indirectly by colonial experience. With national boundaries set in the post-War era, newly independent nations therefore faced the task of identifying national cultures. National identity was defined by a discourse about differences rather than similarities. For instance, the Philippines prided itself as the 'only Christian country in Asia', using religion as a tool of differentiation. Indonesia, on the other hand, enshrined in its national seal the motto 'unity in diversity' and the Pancasila. Malaysia, meanwhile, recognised that the British left it as a nation of three distinct racial groups – Malay, Chinese and Indian – but emphasised its Malay roots.

Some recent government-sponsored tourism campaigns presuppose these social definitions. Indonesia's current ad campaign, which is aired internationally on cable television, emphasises the existence of 345 ethnic groups that make up the archipelago, yet names all these varieties 'Indonesian'. The blurb 'Malaysia, truly Asia' promotes the country as a bargain destination because for the price of one trip one gets a sampling of all of Asia: the Malays, the Chinese, the Indians, tribal groups, and so forth.

In countries with a history of colonial rule, this self-definition took a further step to search for indigenous roots, while rejecting colonialism. Such was the tenor

of the 1970s' postcolonial discourse. The discourse did not remain on the level of theory but fuelled a 'nativistic' architectural trend. This development is noted in *The Malay House* by Lim Jee Yuan (1987:132), where the author laments the "vulgarisation of the Malay house". He writes, "The use of traditional Malay houseforms as mere decorative 'cultural symbols' in modern architecture is another retrogressive stage in the development of the Malay house." While the nativistic trend was another example of the discourse of differentiation, (native not foreign) when turned into an architectural programme, it produced buildings which ran contrary to a tenet of heritage conservation, espoused in the 1964 Venice charter and refined by the 1994 Narra document – AUTHENTICITY.

THE FUTURE OF ASIAN HABITATS

A nation's boundaries, whether physical or cultural, are negotiable. Recently, East Timor declared independence from Indonesia.

HCGs are among many social aggrupations defining and redefining the cultural boundaries of the national and social imaginary. When PHT, for example, seeks to preserve Suffolk House, it also preserves Malaysia's British heritage, which links the country to the Strait Settlements and the ancient British Empire. When PHT campaigns against the lifting of rent control, it is creating space for the voices of the residents and not those of the landlords, entrepreneurs and technocrats in Kuala Lumpur. More concretely, what is at stake in PHT's campaign to save Georgetown is the careful management of urban change.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Undoubtedly, HCGs have their work cut out for them. They face the educative task of expanding public understanding of heritage conservation and their active participation in the preservation of heritage not for sentimentality's sake, but more so for its future.

Following are recommendations to the API Fellowships that can play a vital role in enhancing the work and effectiveness of HCGs:

- *Networking*. The most important feature of the API Fellowship is the opportunity for face-to-face encounters. The Fellowship created the opportunity for me, for example, 'to see the face behind the website'. Notwithstanding the rapid development of communication technology, seeing how one's colleagues work, including the physical conditions in which they operate, is instructional. It is vital that face-to-face encounters be encouraged. Perhaps more ongoing encounters with professionals in similar fields or areas of interest can result in the development of programmes of co-operative research and work. API might consider accepting proposals only in a specific field, i.e. during a particular year, all Fellows should be working on only one field of interest. The synergy of such a meeting can be vigorous.

- *Maximising technology*. Although the Internet is already being used by heritage conservation groups and institutions, the proliferation of sites makes the construction of a dedicated index or portal for heritage conservation an important time-saving measure. Another technological advance that I experimented with was the use of digital video for documentation. The advantages of the digital system are noteworthy; these include the capturing of 'cultural landscapes', and portability and ease in editing with a dedicated computer. Video productions can serve as effective tools for dissemination of information.

- *Working with academia*. Heritage groups and advocates have worked closely with academics. Many of them come from academic institutions to begin with. With the exception of Japan, other Asian countries have to develop academic programmes for heritage conservation. The establishment of such programmes in Asian universities can strengthen the movement. Another area of academic work would involve developing programmes for children and young people in order to create heritage conservation consciousness in them. Teachers can be trained on how to capitalise on heritage to make their classes in history or social studies come alive. The UNESCO office in Bangkok has drawn up models of such programmes, which schools can easily adapt.

- *Educating the public* is a theme that runs across countries and heritage groups. Vital to the survival of heritage is raising public consciousness regarding conservation. This involves informal programmes

and the assistance of academic institutions.

To conclude, the continued vitality of Asia's heritage depends on an awakened citizenry aware and proud of what makes Asia, Asia. But for this to happen much more has to be done and those who care about heritage have a long way to go.

Notes

1. Japan introduced the concept of intangible heritage to conservation discourse.
2. Sasamura Jiro, "2002 revival and transmission of Ainu culture" in NRICP: 103-8.
3. The Siam Society was founded with the objective of researching and gathering information on the arts and sciences of Thailand and its neighbouring countries. In 1922, having been in existence for 18 years, the Society was able to move into its own offices for the first time. In 1932, the first building on the current property at Soi Asoke was opened, at which time the Society was able to provide a more complete library service. In 1962, the Society's library and office building were opened, with two kings and three queens of Thailand and Denmark, graciously participating in its dedication. In 1963, the Society was presented by the Nimmanahaeminda family of Chiang Mai with the Kamthieng House, an outstanding example of northern Thai architecture that is well over 150 years old. The house, located on the grounds of the Society's offices, is utilised as an ethnological museum and is open to the public (from the Siam Society fact sheet).
4. Rattanakosin is an area in Bangkok beside the Chao Phraya River, where the Royal Palace and the Wat Mahatat (Temple of the Emerald Buddha) are located. When a new capital for Siam was established, the monarch replicated the layout of Ayutthaya, which is surrounded by three rivers. A bow bend of the Chao Phraya was chosen as the site, and a canal was dug to connect the bow bend, thus creating an artificial island. This effectively isolated the royal palace by surrounding it with a moat. Hence, the name 'island'.
5. See <http://www.jogjaheritage.iwrap.com>.
6. Muslim states are culturally Muslim, but Islamic states follow the *shariyah* laws. This is the distinction academics wish to make.
7. As in Malaysia, Islam is a strong force in Indonesia; however, Indonesia has not adopted Islam as a state religion, preferring to be known as a secular Muslim state. This decision has resulted in restiveness in some islands, where fundamentalist groups are campaigning for the establishment of an Islamic state. How these developments impact the conservation of heritage bears watching.

   In Indonesia, since the time of Sukarno and throughout Suharto's regime, the Southeast Asian-type mosque has been promoted as the official form of the mosque. Except for a small onion-shaped metal finial topped by a crescent and moon or by calligraphy, the building is similar in outline to the meeting houses called *joglo* in Java. But these Southeast Asian forms are fast being replaced by Middle Eastern ones in Aceh where a strong fundamentalist movement exists.
8. The Aga Kahn Award for Architecture, begun in 1977 and considered one of the most prestigious awards for Islamic Architecture, has given its top awards to buildings that are not clearly or literally Arabic or Middle Eastern in outward appearance. Charles Correa (1994) in "Vistas," an article in the book entitled *Architecture for Islamic Societies Today* (London: Academy Editions, 1994), wrote that The Aga Kahn Award for Architecture maintains that when architects design they should go beyond the level of 'compulsory imagery' to the level of 'deep structure', the wellspring of architecture. This means going beyond the images of onion-shaped domes and minaret towers to address the holistic needs of people.

MAIN TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO GLOBALISATION

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INTRODUCTION

Globalisation is a new discourse of development incepted in the late 20th century by Western countries or the Group of Seven (G7) in order to intimidate people in non-G7 countries. It followed the terms 'development', 'progress', 'modernisation', and 'liberal democracy' that were much touted as the development discourse of capitalism in the middle of the 20th century. The imposition of capitalism mechanisms, namely free market mechanisms, free competition, the liberalisation of financial markets and liberalism in media has led to the extensive exploitation of land, natural resources and people who have simply become cheap labour. Through stock market investments and the free flow of money, a few individuals have amassed capital. Socialism, which Third World countries used to counter Western imperialism and capitalism, has come to a halt.

Before it did, though, massive subjugation of Third World countries was made possible by the expansion of mercantilism, evangelisation and the domination of indigenous cultures through the use of military power. For centuries, many countries were under foreign rule. As a result of colonisation, the ways of life and cultures of indigenous peoples were distorted, while natural resources were plundered and processed. The postcolonial years did not fare any better. Today, people in the Third World face a new kind of colonisation in the guise of globalisation.

The categorisation of countries into First World or Third World, G7 or non-G7, North or South, rich or poor, and developed or developing, has created the impression that globalisation is a process waged by people belonging to a particular group versus individuals belonging to another group within the same nation. In fact, even in countries accused of initiating globalisation, some citizens have exploited many of their own people. This statement is confirmed by the existence of active and strong anti-globalisation movements in the countries that are themselves proponents of globalisation. Movements that have set up ways to collaborate with similar groups in the countries being exploited by globalisation have spread worldwide.

In every country, the poor and middle class constitute up to 80 per cent of the population versus the political and economic elite, which account for the remaining 20 per cent. In these countries, the 20 per cent oppresses and exploits the majority through the process of globalisation. In effect, the anti-globalisation trend has become a struggle between the 'oppressors' and the 'oppressed' and has evolved from being nonviolent to becoming more violent and from conventional warfare to guerilla warfare, particularly after the Cold War. In the meantime, the United States of America, the leading proponent of globalisation, increasingly behaves like an imperialist in the tradition of the Roman Empire.

As globalisation has replaced the old discourse, new political mechanisms, laws, economic and cultural mechanisms, and a new consciousness have emerged to reinforce the invasion of Western countries and the G7, which amass massive capital, advanced technologies, modern arms and troops, and the global media – the same way the Romans ruled the world and overshadowed the monarchy.

The ineffective but representative democratic systems have used globalisation to inflict domination in non-G7 countries and socialist countries, a feat made possible by the liberalisation of financial and market systems, an undertaking led by multilateral organisations including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations, which have been more or less controlled by

the G7. They are simply interested in dumping their products produced using cheap labour and without consideration for environmental costs, into the huge market constituted by Third World countries.

Meanwhile, the West has also initiated representative democracy to replace the monarchy and authoritarian systems in Third World countries. Democracy has been well utilised to pave the way for the expansion of development and progress set out by the West. But candidates elected by the people to form the ruling coalition merely represent the interests of national capitalists, conventional technocrats, local mafias and the underground business people, all of whom directly benefit from globalisation. Very few independent representatives of the middle class and the grassroots succeed in penetrating parliament. The claim that checks and balances in democracy are ensured by the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government is also unfounded, as all three powers are known to collude to support capitalism and suppress the people, such that checks and balances cannot be instituted.

In some countries, a fourth power has been established via the creation of independent organisations (as per the 1997 Thai Constitution). In all eventualities, these so-called independent organisations continue to be influenced by the powers that be within the representative democracy. Similarly, the role of opposition parties, which are constitutionally supposed to monitor the government's performance, has been rendered inutile in many instances (such as those in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and possibly Thailand in the near future). The mass media, founded on the principle of freedom of expression, which is the main element of democracy, is supposed to be there for the people to be able to voice out their opinions and to monitor the government's use of power; but they have also been controlled by capitalism and state power like in Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia.

Since the middle of the last century, modern social and political discourse, as well as representative democracy, have replaced traditional discourse in Third World countries. The mobilisation of the middle class and the grassroots people aims to harness elected representatives to set up policies to tackle poverty, to address human rights violations and the curtailment of freedom of expression, and to stop social injustice that is attendant to the new development discourse, the progress discourse, the modernisation discourse and Westernisation.

Some problems have indeed been solved through this process, and a new kind of middle class situated between the elitists and the grassroots people has emerged. The new middle class has been able to gain more wealth and comfort as guaranteed by the said discourse. However, the new discourse has also been used to suppress movements of people at the grassroots level, as well as progressive middle class movements, which have been protesting new Western-initiated development and progress. These progressive movements have likewise been accused by the elitists and politicians of posing a hindrance to progress and modernisation.

Through representative democracy, a fraction of the people at the grassroots have been able to evolve as the middle class, just as some who belong to the traditional middle class have become better off relative to their situation under monarchial or dictatorial rule. The rest of the grassroots people, however, have had to continue to struggle, and have become more impoverished, after being victimised by political, judiciary and capitalist systems. Their local resources have been plundered, forcing them to desert their land and to offer their services cheaply at the regional and national levels.

Similarly, the grassroots people, the new rising middle class, have been victimised and threatened by capitalism but are unaware of it because of the extensive manipulation and domination of Western development discourse. Moreover, their increasing comforts have discouraged them from questioning the new kind of colonisation led by the imperialistic US, and from recognising unjust structures imposed on their countries and the world over.

Still, most grassroots people and the new progressive middle class are opposed to traditional politics – the representative democracy that represents the interests of the capitalists (The cabinet reshuffle of the Thaksin administration in Thailand starkly reflected the kind of representative democracy extensively controlled by capitalists at the national and international levels. Six families, in particular, have almost absolute control of this administration). They have thus attempted to create a new kind of society and politics to serve new political movements.

New political and social movements have been an emerging phenomenon since the 1970s and are expected to merge eventually. They perform differently from the traditional movements which tend to separate social from the political realm. They have no intention to assume political power, but intend to pressure the government to allow alternative development, one which is free from mainstream globalisation controlled by G7 countries and local capitalists, and one that is free from centralised and technocratic systems so as to make local government and a self-determined way of life at the community and family levels possible.

These new social movements are composed of ordinary citizens. They do not function for the interests of particular classes of people, but the common good. They tackle collective problems relating to education, the environment, children's rights, women's rights problems and community rights. Their mobilisation tends to serve the public in general rather than particular political parties or political factions. Harnessing public consensus, they pressure the government to change policies accordingly. If domestic mobilisation fails to deliver, the movements tend to bring the issues to the international level, to effect pressure of a wider scope so that the government would make internal change, among them being legal amendments. What remains most clear is that they have no intention to take over power, or to become the government.

The mobilisations have led to a participatory democratic process, or an open democratic space, a public space, or what is called 'public politics' at the national and international levels. This process aims to stimulate widespread debate in society, as a result of which public consensus can be reached on issues that will be implemented by traditional politicians or the conventional political systems. Appropriate policy and amendments in legislation are expected to result from this process.

The crux in the new manner of gaining public space is the manoeuvre of new political and social discourse through the media in order to reach a wider public. This process is known as 'politics of space' aimed at the acquisition of 'space of politics'. Through this process, grassroots people and the middle class can eventually bring forth new politics.

The new social movements have replaced the conventional representative democratic system, and have opened space for public debate beyond the House of Representatives, which tends to be too exclusive. This public space can grow and eventually give way to a new kind of politics, thereby changing representative democracy to participatory democracy or direct democracy, and bringing back political space from the politicians to the people. This kind of people's politics is taking place in Thailand.

The strategy of these new social movements and political movements reflects an objection to capitalistic development dominated and led by the G7 countries. Through the tide of globalisation, it reaches every government in the world. It does not just simply present opposing views, but offers new alternatives in terms of culture, religion, gender, race, human rights, freedom of expression, the environment, natural resources, education, and civil disobedience rights, all of which are based on diversity in development and self-determined livelihood for families and communities.

My work under the Asian Public Intellectuals Program on 'Reinventing Politics in Thailand' (with reference to other Southeast Asian countries and Japan) focuses on investigating selected social movements of the middle class and grassroots people in three countries – Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia – and then comparing them with Thailand in order to understand the emerging social and political movements in the country.

All the new movements considered in this study opt for alternatives to mainstream development imposed by governments and multinational capital movements. They have no intention to wrest power away from the state. In essence, they aim instead for changes in the policies of political parties and the government. In addition, movements of the progressive middle class and grassroots people are studied.

The emphasis on the movements that do not seek political power springs from the fact that the term 'politics' is usually viewed as involving attempts to struggle for power and benefits in national politics and local government offices. For this reason, new social movement activists tend not to declare their involvement with politics although they have shifted to a new discourse. It also makes these movements unpopular with the general public, despite their working for the common good. The general public still looks

at these new movements suspiciously, accusing them of being backed by conventional political parties and politicians. Some conventional politicians are known to use media controlled by the state and capitalists to give distorted images of the new social movements to the general public, as in the case of Malaysia and Thailand. For example, people's politics is sometimes maliciously portrayed as being acts of violent protestors.

The new movements that I studied include the following:

Alternative education movements

The term 'alternative education' is used to distinguish the new kind of education from 'formal education' and 'informal education' both of which are controlled and organised by the state. The state education's curriculum and objectives are geared toward creating a unified system to subjugate students under the power of the state. It creates problems for children in the sense that it does not correspond with their natural and emotional development. This learning process also aims to make students blindly believe in Western development and a Western way of life.

To resist globalisation and state-controlled domination, middle class parents should start looking at education as the first and foremost factor that impacts their children. Among the people at the grassroots level who work to protect their localities from the impact of capitalistic development, an increasing awareness has emerged on the importance of alternative education that can provide a learning process free from the domination of Western development vis-à-vis globalisation.

The case of the struggle of the Assembly of the Poor sets a good example of the learning process through its many years of fighting various administrations. The more the movement evolved, the more it was able to give importance to alternative education for both children and adults.

Eventually, the Assembly asked for help from the Children's Village School under the Foundation for Children to set up an alternative school. This school was first situated at the site of the protest: the pavement in front of the Governmental House in Bangkok. Later it moved to the Pak Moon dam site in Khongcheam District, Ubon Ratchadhani Province, where communities have been set up. As for adult education, a 'Politics School' was established in both places in order to explore new alternatives in politics. It subsequently developed into an alternative university. All these efforts are noted to have led to the widespread expansion of alternative education all over the country.

Thus far, of the four countries I studied, I saw the most distinctive trends of alternative education in Japan and Thailand.

In Japan, alternative education originated about ten years ago in the capital city at Tokyo Shure, as a result of the tension wreaked by an inappropriate learning process imposed on students, who were also exposed to the increasing violence in school and the psychological pressure borne out of a highly competitive atmosphere.

For this reason, progressive middle class parents collectively set up a new school system that embraced a new pedagogy and learning process different from state schools and informal education, and called it 'Free Space', 'Global School', or 'Alternative *Juku*'. While some 20 alternative schools exist in Japan today, there are more than 300,000 children who refuse to go to school (according to the National Institution of Education Policy Research, Tokyo, Japan), indicative of a lack of alternative systems to serve dropouts. Possibly, this disparateness also explains the rise of school violence in Japan.

At the university level, alternative education has taken root in some areas such as Tokyo Shure in Tokyo and University City in Shizuoka. Besides cooperating with governmental offices at the policy level, movements also have collaborations with other centres of alternative education. For example, they have been able to propose a peace curriculum to the United Nations in an effort to find solutions to the conflict-ridden globalisation campaign in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist event.

The expansion of the people's sector in Japan is evident across movements involving parents, public school teachers, local politicians, and NGOs, all of which mobilise their strengths to form an alliance for alternative education. They also strive to work for the endorsement of international conventions that guarantee rights to education, namely the International Convention on Children's Rights, the International Declaration on Human Rights, and the International Convention on Women's Rights.

In Thailand, alternative education started in Kanchanaburi in 1979 in the form of a conventional day school. Later on, the "homeschool" movement evolved along with other kinds of alternative schools that sprang from the community level upwards and has served students from the preschool level to the university level. Their foundational pedagogy is based on the belief in natural development and child psychology. It also attempts to find a way out of capitalistic development and the domination of globalisation – a search that differentiates the new education movements from state education, which tends to impose belief in capitalistic development.

Alternative education movements in Thailand are thus part of the new social and political movements that opt for alternatives to globalisation and operate at both the national and the community levels. Currently, there are more than 400 such alternative educational set-ups in Thailand.

Ultimately, alternative education movements in both Japan and Thailand have led to the reform of the whole education system. They represent a critique to existing educational systems dominated and centrally organised by the state. They help point out the government systems' mistakes and failures – how state education makes children less happy and impedes their intellectual and emotional growth, and how schools serve only the state in imposing beliefs in Western social and political development. The curricula also do not help children develop intellectually and creatively. As a result, the schools themselves have increasingly become a dangerous zone for students.

For example, Thai schools are plagued with problems involving drugs and violence. Rights violations in schools are also widespread, but have been neglected by human rights activists in general. It has also been observed that patron-client relationships, feudalism and militarism are much more enshrined in Thai schools than in schools in other countries.

Over time, state education in Japan has bred a narrow attitude and competition for success. The environment is set to increase violence and hopelessness, reduce empathy between teachers and students, and bring about isolation and irresponsibility. It likewise creates a moral and spiritual crisis as it lacks connection with sacred truths.

The critique against state education has to continue until people start to realise that they need to take education management away from the state and give this to the people at the grassroots level. In this way, alternative education movements can free children from domination by the state and Western development.

Natural farming, organic farming and integrated farming movements

Natural farming and organic farming, which rely on non-chemical and composted fertilisers, have been practised for centuries by human beings. As we entered the industrial age and food demand rose, plantations and monoculture supported by the Green Revolution discourse of capitalistic countries replaced traditional farming in Asia. From then on, chemicals and chemical fertilizers became essential inputs of farming and increased production costs, while the prices of produce were kept low so that Asian countries were able to compete in European and US markets. Many farmers have died from these chemicals, however, and the deteriorating health of consumers has become more obvious, possibly because land is contaminated by at least 20 chemicals. The farmers have also become poorer.

Shortly after the inception of natural farming in Japan, alternative agriculture movements or self-reliant agriculture movements emerged. A farmer in Shikoku Island, Mr. Masanobu Fukuoka, first practised natural farming when he started to grow rice and oranges using natural methods about 60 years ago, thereby influencing the birth of alternative agriculture movements in Thailand. His book *One Straw Revolution* (also available in Thai) started the 'back to nature' trend and has led to a variety of nature-friendly farming methods including *Kuse Yore* farming and organic farming.

In particular, the making of fertilisers from the excrement of earthworms became highly popular, and many earthworm farms sprang up in many villages and earned the owners a substantial income. They even offer training in earthworm cultivation. Nowadays, non-chemical farming is widely adopted in both Japan and Thailand, and outlets for the produce have become more readily available.

Non-chemical farming movements as well as non-toxic food movements are new efforts against consumerism that come with modern development. Activists belonging to these movements hold that the creation of

a new culture and the production of food are fundamental to fighting capitalism and globalisation, which offer the 'fast food and soft drinks' culture imported from the United States.

In Thailand, the movements for natural farming, self-reliant farming, natural foods, herbs, traditional medicines and consumer protection have worked together as a new social movement and are linked with movements of people at the grassroots level that work on poverty, land problems and community economies. Some of them have created their own local currency (which exists in Japan as well, but in the case of Thailand, the attempt was blocked by the Bank of Thailand and the Ministry of Finance).

All these movements aim to create a livelihood free from the domination of capitalism, emphasising local production, and reviving traditional medicine in order to be less dependent on Western medicine and medical services. By using local currency, they also reduce the outflow of money from communities and give rise to bigger local markets. Movements are strong at the community and family levels.

Alternative community movements

The movements against globalisation led by progressive people, who do not want to be dominated by capitalism, but at the same time have no intention to challenge state power, usually opt for the creation of alternative communities to free themselves from the impact of globalisation. The concept of these alternative communities includes a new way of life, a new mode of production, new health practices, new foods and a new kind of education for children in new families and communities. They have their own interpretation of religious teachings, new rituals and new worldviews, which combine traditional values and modern values.

The number of alternative communities in both Japan and Thailand is on the rise. Both single families and groups of families such as those in Kamogawa, Hibiki and Fukushima have started alternative communities in Japan. Similarly, large alternative communities in Thailand have emerged, including the Ashoka community, which has branches throughout the country. They choose to differentiate themselves from conventional communities controlled by the state. Their attempts are made possible by decentralisation mechanisms stipulated in the present Constitution. These alternative communities were not affected by the economic crisis in 1997.

Alternative communities have come out to campaign for new politics and for peace. Some of them voice opposition to the amendment of laws that pave the way for the country to become directly involved in any war. Some campaign for alternative education and alternative agriculture. In principle, these communities embrace the self-reliance concept, and therefore attempt to generate sufficient basic necessities along with living a modest life, which is well spelled out in many religions. In the United States, which is the centre of globalisation, the Amish communities in Philadelphia and elsewhere set excellent examples of ways to effectively resist capitalism.

The main challenge lies in how to campaign for social conditions where these alternative communities can flourish on a large scale. More activities on other key issues are needed to ensure the successful emergence of these communities. These include land reform, decentralisation, human rights protection, community rights protection and local natural resource management as well as freedom from government control. A good example in this regard has been set by the Amish community, which won its case in the US Supreme Court to obtain the right to manage its own education.

Alternative movements for local banking

One of the increasingly obvious challenges imposed by capitalism is our dependence on financial resources from mainstream banking systems. The point is how to set ourselves free from being dependent on capital from the mainstream system. Most banks concern themselves with amassing capital for capitalistic ventures and big industries. Coupled with the free flow of financial transactions across countries, industrialised nations are able to use financial flow as a weapon to attack non-industrialised countries, similar to what gun-ships did during the colonial times.

People at the grassroots level have no access to the capital in a conventional banking system. They may be allowed to have it, but are required to use the capital to solely serve capitalism and industrialism. It has therefore led to a situation in which the poor get even poorer and even more indebted, while capitalism grows. As a result, many of the farmers have banded together to push for debt cancellation.

New banking and local credit unions are an increasing phenomenon in Malaysia and Thailand. They allow grassroots people to gain access to capital needed for their local businesses and for daily use, while allowing the capital to grow and revolve for the benefit of the community. The more capital amassed, the less they become dependent on capitalistic development.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of alternatives out of globalisation or the capitalistic world is a new kind of social movement after the decline of Marxism. It began with a small group of non-sectarians who cooperated with people who subscribed to a certain ideology but then became disillusioned. The way of life promoted in a capitalistic and consumer-driven society has simply led to increasing greed and environmental degradation. It has made human beings become slaves to materialism and technology, increasing the gap between human beings and nature, and between each one of us.

Democracy does not seem to offer an effective solution to these problems. Increasingly, the representative democratic system has worked for the interest of national and international capitalists and has enslaved the nation and its people to serve capitalism and consumerism. Traditional feudalism culture has been turned into consumer culture and has impeded democratisation.

The emergence of new social and political movements is necessary to pave the way for participatory democracy and the democracy of public spaces – both of which have been threatened by globalisation. Radical democracy along with active nonviolence is vital to the emergence of new social visions. Many a time, civil disobedience has become an important tool to gain political public spaces. Through this mobilisation, a new opportunity exists to present a new social and political discourse to replace capitalistic political and social discourse. It is hoped that traditional politics will be made more open to the participation of grassroots people, so they can protect themselves from the harsh impacts of globalisation.

Members of these new social movements believe in living with diversity, similar to the diversity found in nature, plants and animals. The offer of new social alternatives is therefore consistent with natural processes. These alternatives shall free the people from a globalisation process that creates a uniform world and promotes reckless consumption, despite apparent limits to growth.

The crux of the struggle of people's movements is the transformation of politician's politics, capitalist's politics and businessmen's politics to people's politics or civil politics. If new social and political movements through intense democratisation and active nonviolence fail to open up political spaces to address poverty and inequality at the structural level, and if they are attacked by representative political systems through unjust laws and judiciary systems, then the eruption of violence in the world such as the September 11 event becomes unavoidable. Further, this violence may spread worldwide.

THE ROLES OF NGO PRINTED MEDIA ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

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INTRODUCTION

Under current conditions of capitalism-dominated development and the turbulent globalisation process, the mass media have been inevitably forced to reduce their critical role in advocating social and environmental justice. The same situation has also forced non governmental organisations (NGO) to produce their own alternative media. The existence of an increasing number of alternative media among NGOs is now an interesting event.

This project chose to study and investigate four alternative publications in two countries: the Philippines and Malaysia. Three publications are by Filipino NGOs, namely, Suhay, by Magsasaka at Sayantipiko Para sa Ikauunlad ng Agham Pang-agrikultura (MASIPAG), an alternative agricultural and environmental NGO based in the town of Los Baños; Feedback, by the Center of Environmental Concerns (CEC) in Quezon City; and Indigenous Perspectives, by The Tebtebba Foundation, an NGO working on indigenous issues in Baguio. One publication is by a Malaysian NGO: Utusan Konsumer, by the Consumers Association of Penang (CAP) in Penang, Malaysia.

The study focused on each publication's objectives, roles and positions, working and production processes, and problems and obstacles. It also critiqued the NGO publications in view of enhancing their impact on the general public.

The study used several methods to better understand the nature and impact of alternative printed media. It observed working processes of the staff of NGO; interviewed them and some of the publications' audience; and analysed the publication's content, format, presentation and feedback generated. The earlier plan to attend and participate in the internal working process of each medium was modified because the publications did not have fixed work schedules, making it difficult to become involved in them.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Introduction to the four publications

Suhay: Suhay is a quarterly magazine of MASIPAG, an environmental NGO located in Los Baños in the Philippines. It was started with the objective of providing a variety of information to the NGO's networks. It lives up to its role as an alternative medium by conveying all kinds of information, and by reporting on and educating network members who are mainly farmers. It also helps connect them to other farmer members across the country. Suhay's contents focus mostly on sustainable development.

Feedback: Feedback is a publication of the Center of Environmental Concerns (CEC). Its first issue was launched in 1990, a year after CEC was founded. It aims to educate its target audience through environmental news, movements, data, knowledge, opinions and perspectives. Its main objectives are to raise awareness, educate, as well as challenge the general public's ways of thinking about the environment. It serves as a voice for people who have been affected by environmental problems and hazards, especially large-scale development projects and related investments. Feedback is distributed free of charge to interested groups and individuals.

Indigenous Perspectives: Although Tebtebba and Indigenous Perspectives are in the early stages of development, they play an important role in the indigenous people's cause both in the Philippines and abroad. The main objective of Indigenous Perspectives is to launch an information campaign on issues affecting indigenous people. It is distributed freely and widely to all concerned organisations and individuals in the

Philippines and abroad. Though the publication focuses mainly on indigenous issues, every issue features an environmental concern.

Utusan Konsumer: This tabloid-sized, monthly newspaper is regularly produced by the most well-known consumer protection group in Malaysia – the Consumer Association of Penang. Since its launch in 1971, the newspaper has become increasingly popular. At the very start, it had two editions: Malay and English. It now publishes in two other languages, namely Chinese and Tamil. The English version is its base of production while the most popular is the Malay version.

Its title, Utusan Konsumer, translated to English, means 'The Consumer Forum'. It contains a variety of critical news, reports, articles, comments and analyses of matters related to consumer rights, basic human rights and needs, advertisements, the ethical practices of private companies and manufacturers, and so on. In addition, it reports on general issues concerning different aspects of development which do more harm than good to the environment, society, community livelihood, people's lifestyles and others.

Utusan Konsumer is a successful alternative medium and has a monthly circulation of more than 60,000 copies.

Similarities and differences

All four publications differ vastly from each other in terms of format and style. Utusan Konsumer, for example, is a tabloid-sized newspaper, whereas the thirty-two-paged Feedback is a magazine without a cover, the size of a standard newsletter. Suhay, which measures 10 inches wide and 12 inches long, has a full-colour cover similar to Indigenous Perspectives: but the latter is the size of about half a magazine.

The content structures, page layouts, and story details of all four publications are distinct. Their objectives and audiences are also dissimilar. Suhay specifically serves its own network members, while the other three target the general public. Among them, only CAP's publication has been able to gain the interest of the general public in Malaysia and some other countries. Indigenous Perspectives and Feedback, on the other hand, are popular in a limited setting, especially among social activists who are interested and concerned about environmental and indigenous people, both at the national and international levels.

Still, the four publications are one in not seeking business benefits or profits from their target groups. This intention poses a challenge to their survival and differentiates them from other mainstream mass media, that confine themselves to reporting, educating or entertaining. The NGO publications' specific goals ultimately aim to bring about a 'better and fairer society'. They all question the direction of government's development, and promote alternative development approaches and policies.

The hardcore environment

Except for Feedback, the other publications are not solely environmental publications. All, however, give importance to environmental issues. Their definition and coverage on the environment go beyond articles concerning natural resources, science and technology, and the state of the environment like air and water quality, in that they also tackle the social and development dimensions of these issues, that is, the 'structural and political environment.' Articles presented in these publications often reflect the fundamental causes of environmental problems related to development policies, politics, legislation, economic systems and mechanisms, interest groups, classes of people and discrimination, culture, development direction, and cultural and social lifestyles.

Considering these characteristics, environmental dimensions as presented in the four publications are more detailed than environmental stories generally presented in mainstream media. They are not entertaining by nature and readers on the contrary, may fret, feel burdened, or frustrated after reading an assessment of a current situation, particularly when they find that their contributions are too small to effect change for the better.

Tasks and challenges

The biggest among the many different problems and challenges faced by each publication, is the question of how long each can survive. Both Suhay and Feedback are still around despite tough economic conditions. Under the organisations' present policies, both can continue to exist for the next few years but their survival beyond these years depends on whether they can obtain further funding support. The survival of the organisations parallels that of the publications.

As for Indigenous Perspectives, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, director of Tebtebba, said finances pose no problem as funding agencies have committed to give further support to the organisation and the publication. Therefore, Tebtebba is financially secure at this time. It even has plans to launch a marketing campaign to promote the publication.

Utusan Konsumer is also surviving very well and realising good profits from the large number of copies sold. It likewise earns a considerable amount from selling booklets and mini manuals reproduced from its comprehensive database. This value-added feature is beneficial to CAP and its publication.

However, all NGOs admit that the production of printed media exacts a high price, especially since paper costs have escalated. Further, the production process is time-consuming and requires sufficient manpower to deal with production details.

The three Filipino publications appear less frequently than their Malaysian counterpart: Suhay is a quarterly, and Feedback and Indigenous Perspective come out bi-annually. Despite these similar dissimilar production schedules, however, all require full-time staff to handle them. The few involved presently are overloaded with work.

MASIPAG's publication staff, for instance, does not only handle all the work for the printed medium, but also the uploading of information for the NGO's website. The same staff also coordinate all the outside mass media needs, including the setting up of media training programmes for its members.

Utusan Konsumer is different in terms of its human resource and publication management since it appears more frequently and prints more copies. Its set-up entails more work so that at CAP, the editorial team does not devote time to other activities. Instead, the NGO has a publication section, a media section and four editorial desks, or one per edition – English, Malay, Mandarin and Tamil. At the English editorial desk which was chosen for this study, three news reporters and two artwork staff members comprise the team, which has its own research section to support the editorial team.

Except for Utusan Konsumer and Suhay, the biggest challenge facing the other two publications is how to increase sales and subscriptions. To persuade a person to spend money on a copy instead of getting a free one is a difficult task but is crucial to the publication's sustainability. Otherwise, finding funds to ensure the publications' survival would have to done.

Though Utusan Konsumer is more stable, it also has to work ceaselessly to expand it target audience and increase sales. Meanwhile, the biggest challenge confronting Suhay is finding sufficient funding to support its existence. Providing free copies to the NGO's members, however, is important since the majority of them are poor farmers who cannot afford to buy printed matter. During the conduct of this study, out of MASIPAG's 20,000 members across the country, only 2000 received copies of Suhay. This indicates that finding more financing in order to increase its production capacity is essential and a challenge for MASIPAG.

Specialised role and position

Apart from Utusan Konsumer, which is well known, the other three publications lack variety in terms of content and coverage of events in their respective societies. At the same time, 'communicating with the general public' is not their priority. These characteristics reflect, to some extent, the perceived role and position of each individual organisation.

Given their very specific and narrow roles and positions (in terms of form and style, frequency of publication, content, audience and printing processes), the impact of the publications on the general public is limited. The publications cannot push the NGO's agenda forward to create awareness among all members of society. Still this very limitation has somehow turned out to be a strong point in the sense that the specificity of the campaign issues and the special content of the publications somehow increase their credibility among the general public. CAP, for example, is branded as a strong consumer protection group, and is automatically recognized for supporting consumers. What its publication reports and presents is after all, sourced from studies and investigation conducted by experts, thereby conferring on it greater credibility relative to traditional mass media.

The other three publications have also received praise for their specialisation. Indigenous Perspectives is viewed as focusing on indigenous people's issues, Suhay on agriculture, and Feedback on environmental concerns.

CEC and Tebtebba have research projects to support their campaigns, which in fact, generates greater trust among their audience. Some people, however, feel that their publications' messages tend to be biased. Though this is true in some respects, the publications argue that they are not biased, and that their publications are best read as reflecting their viewpoints and their media objectives.

In a broader sense, the four publications can be classified as 'development communication' because they exist to promote developmental ideas and push particular campaign strategies. Among the four, only Utusan Konsumer and Suhay do well in this role. Utusan Konsumer, in particular, has a large group of readers who are able to pay for copies of the publication. It also has a distinct public reputation.

Although no studies have been carried out in this area, indirect surveys show that Utusan Konsumer is perceived as a publication that alerts the general public about consumer protection issues, including health care alternatives based on self-treatment approaches. The newspaper has also brought about some concrete changes in governmental policies and made active claims for consumer rights. It has served as a useful informational source for mainstream media in these fields.

Suhay has a narrower audience. Its publication is the only activity which MASIPAG carries out using the same staff. It is a communication tool geared to campaign for development, connect networks, create regular activities among networks, and inform and educate target groups with social stories as well as ways of thinking.

Evidently Suhay is an effective medium that helps MASIPAG members connect and communicate, and allows them to share and discuss views and issues beyond the scope of the farmer's daily lives. These issues include the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), intellectual property rights, genetic engineering, BT-corn, bio-piracy, patenting, and the like. Furthermore, of the four, Suhay is the only medium that has identified its exact audience. That it has achieved this points to its profound role in influencing its audience, despite being a small and simple print medium.

Feedback and Indigenous Perspectives have no substantial audience, although they have their own networks of environmentalists and groups interested in indigenous people. They play a less prominent role in connecting and supporting their networks compared to informing and influencing their audiences' way of thinking. While they have no concrete role in campaigning for development changes, they do provide a channel or forum for exchanging experiences and opinions, a practice not too often seen in mainstream media.

Feedback and Indigenous Perspectives, but more particularly, the latter, have done very well in voicing disadvantaged people's concerns. CEC cannot identify exactly who comprises its audience, but its publication is an effective tool for the disadvantaged and powerless.

The following are some of the other noteworthy roles of these publications:

- Except for Utusan Konsumer, the other publications do not give priority to raising the awareness of the public on general areas.
- Priority is given to coverage of specific aspects of environmental concepts. For example, even an issue like ecology generates public interest.
- As they are considered environmental and development thinking leaders, the publications should be firm about the nature of their existence (except Utusan Konsumer) to become effective media that can influence change towards a new paradigm of development.

IMPLICATIONS

The study shows that the publications of the four NGOs have differences and similarities in many areas. The first conclusion that can be drawn from a broader perspective is that their existence is meaningful because they dutifully expose the reality of the intrusion of globalisation and modernisation, and also cover many alternatives to creating a better society. Their existence balances the dominant mainstream media and reinforces the presence of a diversified alternative media.

The study found that the biggest challenge and burden of each NGO is its economic survival. At present most of them still rely on funding for their existence.

Generally, a medium's role is assessed according to its

potential and impact in relation to its circulation and popularity (in terms of type and size of audience); even the producers of alternative media assess themselves in a similar way. Suhay, though, seems to challenge this dominant thought in that it has a small, specific audience but plays a prominent role in the other related activities of its organisation.

The study also found that the specific role of each media group, which is usually seen as a weak point, is actually a strong point. NGO publications generally contain substantive content covering prominent and important issues. Articles with similarly strong, distinctive and critical styles are rarely found in mainstream mass media.

In view of this, we can say that media has evolved from electronic to digital, laying particular emphasis on speed, efficiency and broader utility over anything else. If we formerly referred to electronic media as 'fast media', now we can refer to digital media as 'faster media'. The distinguishing point between electronic and digital media vis-à-vis print media is that fast media allows the presentation of complicated stories, especially those concerning various ways of thinking and macro structural systems. In contrast, print media is best for dealing with issues that need to be explained and debated. One can say that the existence of print media helps hold back the rapid growth of electronic and digital media.

Given the NGOs' relative economic instability, the presence of fast media and the strong influence of globalisation, the NGOs' print publications are compelled to adjust along the following areas:

Principles and reality: Media's role

This study found that three of the publications excluding Suhay, need to target the general public as their audience. With this in mind, NGO publications need to review the content and variety of stories to serve the general public's needs and reap benefits. In a world where capitalism and consumerism tend to dictate media content, the term 'human interest' now usually focuses on what is considered entertainment. And this topic appears to be the main interest of people. The voices of the suffering are not heard. An alternative view is that 'entertainment' is an illusion, yet people are willing to buy and invest in such things.

It is in this matter where the NGOs' publications with their substantive content and style can educate the general public; but it is also in this area where CAP and its Utusan Konsumer are exceptions because Utusan Konsumer enjoys wide circulation, covers a broad audience and has a variety of content. Moreover, Utusan Konsumer carries stories on complex structural and policy matters, just as it does stories closely related to the common man. CAP, on its part, usually reports on general events and matters affected by government's policies, problematic structures and mistakes. Some issues are presented as cover stories or front-page items in the newspaper. These 'big issues' are not reprinted in booklet or mini-book form, which are highly popular with Utusan Konsumer's audience.

The types of audience must match the content specialty of NGO publications. Presenting the general public with specialty issues like indigenous peoples, classes of farmers, small-scale fisherfolk, disadvantaged groups, etc., is not unusual since these topics are also taken up by the general mass media. The difference lies in the fact that in general media, these topics do not assume as significant a role, relative to the amount of publicity given them by NGO media.

Still it would be advantageous to have the general public as the target audience as doing so would enable the NGOs to create a larger impact and to endure as a group.

U-turn warning

Normally, an NGO or any organisation expects its publication to be popular and recognised for its strong voice or impact on campaign issues, but this not an easy task to accomplish. There are constraints like budget, professionalism and the capacity of local personnel. Further, amidst these limitations, the NGOs' media work is usually given less priority. Sometimes, it does not even merit physical space in the workplace.

NGO publications also often market themselves as supplements covering issues that are either ignored or receive less attention in mainstream media. It is for this reason that NGO media are often called 'alternative media'.

After several years, NGOs have come to realise that their publications are not well-known among the general public, have limited readership and have virtually no

impact despite the high costs incurred in producing them. These results should force them to review their styles and improve their publications. They should also realise the need for a marketing plan, and more attractive presentation methods, including the use of lighter reading material, to create mass appeal.

Important as these challenges are, measures to address them could lead to misunderstanding. The problems of unpopularity, low circulation and dependence on external funding cannot be solved by simply changing a cover style, adding colourful photographs and pages, having an attractive layout, simplifying the contents and altering the writing style. Rather, publications also need to take a closer look at their objectives and target audience. Setting a clear target audience from the very start is important from the start. A publication with a very narrow target audience like Suhay cannot expect to be popular with the general public. NGO publications should consequently strive to create in the readers the feeling that they cannot afford to miss an issue of the publication.

NGOs must accept their limited roles in leading the public's thinking. They should not expect readers to devote more time on their publications, especially if their audiences belong to the disadvantaged sector. And even if their target audiences are the general public, the above-mentioned problems prevail.

Alternatives to the NGOs' alternative media

People who think about coming out with their own publications tend to believe in the power and potential of media to change society. In fact, the theory of media impact is divided into two different points of view. One view believes that media has an impact or influence on its audience; the other view posits that contrary to belief, media has no actual impact.

While an exact measurement of the potential of media is unavailable, it is an acknowledged fact that media production consumes huge amounts of money, time, manpower, skills, knowledge and wisdom. This is a very basic point that people often overlook and do not think about thoroughly. Consequently, there are forms of media, most especially print media that are easily and widely produced. Most organisations, including NGOs which run public campaigns, feel the need to come up with their own publications and end up producing one. Running public campaigns is less of a problem for those professional, business-oriented media that can launch campaigns using income from advertisements or sponsors or use their publications as a tool to seek other benefits. Therefore, given that alternative media seeks no profits or business benefits per se, how can they expect to last?

This realisation could lead to specific changes in the case of NGO publications that have worked under various constraints, are set to play the role of communicator or to send 'messages' directly to their target audiences. Future demands will necessarily translate to a perceived need for bigger investments and more professional skills. Alternative media need attractive and modern forms and styles similar to those of mainstream media. Or better still, they should go a step further than the existing forms and styles of mainstream media.

This study has some recommendations. Firstly, it is time for media to present alternative views in publications that fully operate like public media. A concrete example would be to issue a weekly or possibly daily newspaper that functions like general mass media, but focuses on many different stories and presents diverse alternatives. This idea can materialise with serious and effective organisation and management. It requires that NGOs come together to brainstorm the process, gather relevant resources, and push for support to promote the publication, specifically during its inception period. Planning ahead for the purpose of independent long-term survival will be essential.

Presently, the existence of a number of NGO publications seems indicative of the availability of sufficient resources, but in reality, NGOs have fewer resources than seems apparent. What needs to be done then is to modify the production practices of each for a better-integrated movement.

Possibly, effecting changes will address the problem of unpopularity or low circulation of NGO publications, a common predicament also characterised by the chronic need for subsidies, the lack of impact or visibility. In other words, these alternative media should be used as a tool, following which the proposed objectives can be achieved. Toward the achievement of the broader mission of NGOs, media could be an unimportant component or factor, or if used well, it could assume an important role.

When talking about target audiences, aims must be thoroughly discussed. Achievable and relevant aims – like education or the provision of a forum for building further networks and connections – must be stated. The fewer the goals, the better – after all, when multiple objectives are set, the work accomplished can prove ineffective and unfocused.

Set against an appropriate set of roles and objectives, alternative media that exist for specific target audiences can gain tremendous meaning and value in the eyes of the public.

THE POWER TERRAIN OF FEDERALIZING IN A DEVELOPING SOCIETY: CAN THE PHILIPPINES LEARN FROM MALAYSIA'S EXPERIENCES WITH FEDERALISM?

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INTRODUCTION

While the Mindanao Muslim-Christian conflict conflagrates, Filipino political leaders and organisations seek solutions to the war, in political-structure transformation through federalism[1]. As of 2002, federalism has gained outspoken support in the Philippines. This research aims to investigate the human terrain of federalizing the Philippines. I visited Malaysia, the only Southeast Asian nation that functions under a federal structure of government, to see Asian-style federalism in action, and find out what lessons the Philippines could learn from the Malaysian experience.

My research findings cover Malaysia's historical processes, how federalism operates now, and ten insights for those interested in federalizing the Philippines.

METHOD

I ran in-depth interviews of four key players in the process of Malaysian federalism, as exemplars of views at different historical points and positions relative to the Malaysian government's stand. Table 1 illustrates the interviewees' political positions.

Each interview took about two hours and questions were structured depending on the respondent's expertise. Each interview was taped, and transcribed verbatim. Examples of questions asked: (a) Who pushed for federalism in Malaysia? Why? (b) Was there resistance? Why? How was resistance managed? (c) What social factors came to play as federalism is maintained these days? (d) Any opinion/advice you would give Filipinos who are interested in setting up a federal system of government in the Philippines?

Table 1: Sample choices for in-depth interviews

		Historical Point When Interviewee was Politically Active	
		Early 1960's during the formation of the Federation of Malaysia	**Present Time, 2002**
Interviewee's Political Position Predominant Malaysian Government Positions	Pro-Government	*Respondent A: Ghazali Shafie* Project Officer for the formation of Malaysia; former Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Information, and a Senator.	*Respondent C: Abdul Aziz Rahman* Influential UMNO party leader; former political posts: two-term senator; Chair of Senators' Club, Pahang Deputy Chief Minister and State Executive Councillor; UMNO Deputy Divisional Leader in a Pahang District; UMNO Deputy Youth Leader in Pahang.
	Anti-Government	*Respondent B: Said Zahari* Former editor of a Malaysian daily newspaper Utusan Melayu; picked up in Singapore when Singapore was still part of the Malaysia federation; 17 years political detainee in Singapore, 1963-1979, charged with opposing the formation of Malaysia (Zahari 2001:173).	*Respondent D: Hu Pang Chaw* Town Councillor of Kota Bharu, the capital of Kelantan; appointed by the Kelantan state PAS government; inactive member of DAP. Holds a post at the State Information Secretariate of Kelantan as officer-in-charge of racial relationships, publicity and culture.

In addition, I talked with a number of academicians and non-academicians about everyday political life in Malaysia. English dailies and television news reports added insights to what I could learn about the texture of Malaysian politics. Invariably, Malaysian published works on federalism proved to be a valuable source of information.

1948: TRANSITION TO THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA

Malaysia experienced federal transitions twice, in 1948 and 1963. The 1948 federal formation gathered 11 states under various types of political aggrupation and levels of British colonial governance. The political units of the 1948 federation were the four Federated Malay States (FMS) of Selangor, Perak, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan; the five Unfederated Malay States (UFMS) of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Perlis and Johor; and the two Straits Settlements of Pulau Pinang and Melaka[2]. These 11 states are known today as Peninsular Malaysia states. In 1957, these states gained independence from the British and as a nation became the Federation of Malaya (Information Malaysia 2000).

A second and more controversial federation occurred in 1963, when Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore became part of the federation, under a newly constituted nation called the Federation of Malaysia. Singapore's membership lasted for two years, after which it became an independent nation.

Who wanted federalism? Why?

The Malay ethnic group pushed for the 1948 federation, largely to secure their position of influence under British rule, vis-à-vis the Chinese in the same geographical territories. In 1946, the British attempted but failed to set up a more centralised Malayan Union, which was opposed by the Malays. Malay resistance to the Malayan Union stemmed from their disenfranchisement of the Sultans'/Rulers' political authority in each state; and opposition to a citizenship clause making it easy for the Chinese to obtain Malayan citizenship. The 1948 federal structure emerged from the uniting of forces among the Malays, who wanted to preserve the local sultanate powers, and, more importantly, protect the Malays' political influence vis-à-vis the Chinese. By then, the Chinese had immigrated in droves to the various Malay states, especially in the commerce-heavy urban areas (Ongkili 1985).

Two social forces mobilised to create federalism: the sultanates and the Malay-based political party, the United Malays National Organisation or UMNO. In March 1946, the rulers[3] raised the idea of a federation as an alternative to the Malayan Union. By July 1946, the rulers, UMNO leaders and British authorities met intensely to craft the details of the Federation. Among the highlights of the agreement were a Federation that supported sultan sovereignty, local-state individuality, a strong unitary central government, and special privileges for the Malay ethnic group (*Andaya & Andaya* 1997).

In the midst of rejecting the centralised Malayan Union, and counterposing a federal structure along sultanate political configurations, UMNO was born. It started off as a coalition between the nationalist Malay wing that wanted to eradicate Britain's colonial hold, and the Malay leaders who did not want the Chinese to figure prominently. Note the regional context of the 1948 Malayan federation – a post World War II scenario that found Southeast Asian countries moving out of centuries of Anglo-European colonial rule. The Malay nationalists developed personal ties and shared similar anti-colonial goals with Indonesian leaders fighting the Dutch. They saw UMNO's push for federalism as a venue for winning Malaya's independence from British rule (Andaya & Andaya 2001), and perhaps swaying UMNO over to the regional anti-colonial cause (Shafie, interview).

UMNO was clearly for Malays, but the 'non-Malays' that the organisation wanted to leave out of their political scenario varied from the British to the Chinese. The fragile UMNO coalition against external colonial rule and intra-state Chinese forces did not hold together for long. Eventually, the nationalist wing left UMNO. Hence, the social force that created the 1948 federal structure carried with it a conservative slant favouring the Malay ethnic group (Andaya & Andaya 2001).

Who opposed federalism? Why?

The Malay nationalists, the Chinese and the Indians in Malaya, disagreed with the formation of the Federation of Malaya. The Malay nationalists resented that the Federation Agreement did not grant immediate independence to Malaya. The Chinese saw that the stringent citizenship requirements would grant only around ten percent of them citizenship, and the Indians wanted political rights that approximated those of the Malays. In December 1946, a coalition of various

Malay-nationalist, Chinese and Indian political groups consolidated into the AMCJA-PUTERA alliance, chaired by Chinese leader Tan Cheng Lock. Conflicting political group interests in AMCJA-PUTERA took its toll on the organisation, and so this opposition alliance soon broke down (Andaya & Andaya 2001).

When the Federation of Malaya began in 1948, there was no significantly strong political resistance to the restructuring. Several factors contributed to this: First, the collaboration of the traditional rulers and UMNO consolidated pro-federal sentiments among Malays. The sultanates provided the cultural terrain behind federalism, while UMNO's party apparatus supplied the political machinery for federalizing. Second, the British colonial authorities had just triumphed in World War II, and were ready to release their Malayan colonies. Third, potential opposition forces like the Malay nationalists and the Chinese and Indian ethnic groups were silenced with strong-arm tactics like massive detentions under British and UMNO political rule.

The Federation of Malaya was promulgated on 1 February 1948. By June 1948, a State of Emergency quashed any opposition and legalised detentions of individuals perceived as 'seditious'. The Emergency surprised the Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which was then growing logarithmically in its loud opposition to the Malay-dominated Federation. The Malaya government charged that MCP was communist-infiltrated, and by the close of 1948, 1779 alleged communist sympathizers were detained, and hundreds more were deported (Andaya & Andaya 2001).

HANDLING OF POWER STRUCTURES AND INTERESTS DURING TRANSITION

For purposes of analysis, I see four types of political blocks during the 1948 transition to federalism: (a) the British colonial authorities (b) the newly formed UMNO political party (c) the Sultanate Rulers and (d) all other opposition forces, including Malay nationalists, the Chinese ethnic group represented by the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Indian ethnic group represented by the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).

The colonizers did not push for the Malayan Union after strong local resistance, and eventually collaborated with the Rulers and UMNO to set up the Federation. The Rulers felt the new Federation, structured along sultanate lines, retained their traditional hold on their respective kingdoms. Sultans were eventually recognized constitutionally as part of a Conference of Rulers (Shafruddin 1988).

UMNO's ability to grab the political heat of federal transition and turn it into fuel for party building jettisoned them into the political grandiosity that they enjoy today[4]. At that juncture in history, UMNO, in alliance with the traditional Malay-sultanate power-bases built on anti-Chinese/Indian sentiments among the Malays[5], swayed the British over to their side, and used a combination of heavy-handed tactics and power-sharing schemes to neutralise Chinese and Indian ethnic groups.

The 1948 federalisation disenfranchised the Chinese and Indians. They became second class local residents through biases in federal stipulations. Citizenship requirements included length of residence in Malaya, a prescription unobtainable by numerous immigrant Chinese and Indians. And in the final federal document, the word 'Malayan' covered only individuals who habitually spoke Malay, accepted Islam and conformed to Malay custom (Andaya & Andaya 2001).

The political silence of the Chinese and Indians at this point can be explained in two ways. One perspective sees their protests being clamped down by the Emergency Regulation that detained those who opposed the federal proposition (Andaya & Andaya 2001; Ongkili 1985). The other view sees non-Malay ethnic groups being won over by power sharing with UMNO. In an interview, Ghazali Shafie described UMNO's decision to split power with the Chinese and Indians through UMNO's alliance with MCA and MIC. This provided the stability[6] to make the federation work. As Shafie said, "The principle of sharing of power is the principle that created federation. If the Chinese and the Indians objected to federation, we couldn't have a federation of Malaya."

Who wanted federalism? Why?

Picture the Southeast Asian regional scenario circa 1963. Cold War antagonists intensify efforts to recruit Asian countries to their 'super camps'. China emerges as a regional power, expanding its influence to Indochina, Indonesia and the Philippines. Indonesia's Sukarno, sympathetic to China's anti-imperialist

tone, carries the nationalist crusade to like-minded organisations in Chinese-populated Singapore. By 1963, communist forces in Singapore threaten Lee Kwan Yew's leadership. Malaya, with its own bourgeoning communist movements, grows more alarmed over having a communist state at its borders. Also, with the 1963 expiration of Singapore's transitional constitution, Singapore was expected to demand and obtain complete independence from British hold. This was the geopolitical context that set the stage for the 1963 Federation of Malaysia.

Both the British and Lee Kwan Yew were concerned that Singapore would bow to communism. Singapore's merging with a moderate (i.e. non-communist) Malaya would strengthen Lee Kwan Yew's power with Singaporean nationalists[7]. Malaya's leaders saw that a merger could eradicate the risk of a hostile communist state at its border.

But ethnic Malays and the nation's Malay-controlled government saw a large loophole in the Singapore-Malaya merger. With Singapore's largely Chinese population, a merger would create a Chinese majority in the new Federation. Not only would the Malays lose their foothold on political power, a majority Chinese population would increase the risk of the Federation swaying ideologically toward China's communist orientation. A merger would rid Malaya of external threat, but create internal threats.

To neutralise the rise of a Chinese majority in the Federation's population, British and Malaya leaders considered a plan to enlarge the new Federation to include Sabah and Sarawak. The British were ready to grant them independence, but were interested in the future alliance, in the larger scenario of Cold War configurations. A second condition favoured the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak in the merger, its heterogeneous non-Muslim indigenous groups. They were neither Chinese nor Malay. To configure demographic ethnicities in favour of Malays instead of the Chinese, the Federation created a new ethnic category called Bumiputra[8] that included Sabahans, Sarawakians and Malay Muslims.

Great Britain, Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew, and the Malays in Malaya under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, stood at the forefront of efforts to create a new Federation, expanding the Federation to include Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. In 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was born. Two years later, however, Singapore left the federation to become an independent state[9]. Today, the membership of the Federation of Malaysia is composed of the Peninsular Malaysia states, plus Sabah and Sarawak.

Who opposed federalism? Why?

Let us first get an overview of the social resistance to the 1963 Federation of Malaysia. For different political interests and fears, the following groups rallied against the formation of the new Federation: (a) Chinese, Malay, and Indian nationalists in Peninsular Malaya and Singapore (b) Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei leaders[10], and (c) the Indonesian and Philippine governments.

In Peninsular Malaya, the Socialist Front and other groups protested against the new Federation, along with Singapore's Workers Party and its allies. One of my research interviewees, Said Zahari, was detained for 17 years, after his 1963 arrest in Singapore. Zahari, a Muslim Malay of Javanese descent, worked as a journalist both in Malaya and Singapore. He was editor of Utusan Melayu in Singapore when he was picked up during Operation Cold Store, a manoeuvre by the joint Security Council of Singapore, Malaya and Britain to crush opposition to the new Federation. His leftist party, the Party Rakyat Singapura, protested British intervention, the exclusion of Indonesia, and the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak in the Malaysia Federation.

In his autobiography *Dark Clouds at Dawn*, Zahari (2001) criticised British intervention, and pushed for the inclusion of Indonesia. Furthermore, during an interview, he clarified the complexities of left-wing resistance against the Malaysian Federation, claiming that his group's resistance was neither for federalism as a structure, nor for the inclusion of Singapore, but for the addition of Sabah and Sarawak to the Federation. Zahari explained that:

> It was not the federal system in Malaya that we opposed, but we opposed the Malaysian project which was to us a colonial project, Sabah and Sarawak especially. In fact we, belonging to the left wing, we wanted Singapore, only Singapore, to get back to Malaya because it is geographically, economically, geopolitically part of Malaya. It was only separated by the British colonial power. We wanted Singapore to be part of the United Federation of Malaya. We wanted an independent United Malaya, independent

> in the sense that we do not get to the camp of the West or East. In present terms, they call it the Third World. Sabah and Sarawak are not part of the country, never have been. Sabah and Sarawak are part of the Borneo Island, the larger part of which was under Indonesian control, you know the West Kalimantan. Sabah and Sarawak were British colonies, so in the interest of the British at that time, political as well as strategic interest, that the British were afraid that if Sabah and Sarawak were not aligned to Malaya and Singapore…it might join with Indonesia.

Opposition to the merger was high among the people of Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak – non-Peninsular territories aimed for Federal annexation. The people in Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak wanted to coalesce first into one independent state, and then join the Malaysian Federation as a single unity called the North Kalimantan state (Onkili 1967; Zahari, interview, 2002). They feared Peninsular Malaya would make them *de facto* colonies, not states of the new Federation (Ongkili 1967). In protest against the planned Federation, Brunei's Party Rakyat Brunei linked up with Sabah's still-informal United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO) and Sarawak's United People's Party (SUPP) in a United Front formed in July 1961 (Ongkili 1967; Zahari 2001).

In August 1962, Brunei's influential Party Rakyat won 54 out of 55 seats in the first Brunei elections to the District Councils, and garnered all 16 elected posts in the Legislative Council (Al-Haj 1977). Unsure whether the Brunei Sultan would sway toward joining Federal Malaya, Party Rakyat staged an armed uprising in December 1962.[11] The Brunei Revolt was quashed by British and Malayan troops.[12] Interestingly, during the revolt, Party Rakyat's leader Azahari sought refuge in Manila as the guest of Nicasio Osmena (Andaya & Andaya 2001; Al-Haj 1977).

Brunei's failed uprising did not swing the Brunei Sultan to Malaya's expanded federal plans. He disagreed with some financial and constitutional proposals. One controversy pertained to the ownership of Brunei's vast oil wells. Malaya proposed that Brunei retain ownership in the first ten years after Federation, after which it would belong to the Federal government (Ongkili 1985). Another disagreement was the constitutional arrangements of the Sultan's position vis-à-vis sharing power with other Sultans or Rulers in Peninsular Malaya. Brunei's Sultan felt he was entitled to a more senior monarchic position than what was offered (Andaya & Andaya 2001). In an interview, Malaya's Project Officer for the formation of Malaysia, Ghazali Shafie, claims that Brunei, "…was not prepared to share power. The Sultan wanted power to himself. The sharing of power is not only between the people and the people, (but also) between the Rulers…" Brunei stayed out of the Federation, and continues to be an independent state.

Opposition also came from Indonesia and the Philippines. Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal diplomatically resisted the new Federation, having worked for the Maphilindo dream – a vision of a united Malaya, Philippines, and Indonesia, free of colonial control (Zahari 2001). Indonesia's intense resistance can be understood from an ideological lens and not only from the territorial-expansion issue over Sabah and Sarawak. Indonesia's communist-influenced Sukarno stood diametrically opposed to the US-friendly British camp. Malayan and Singaporean leftists not only supported the inclusion of Indonesia, but also raised Indonesia to leadership status in this expanded state.

Hence, Indonesia raised the loudest opposition to the 1963 Federation. It waged Konfrontasi, with armed incursions into the borders of Sabah and Sarawak, and guerilla-style explosions in Malaya and Singapore. Indonesia's armed aggression was eventually contained by Malaysian and Commonwealth forces (Andaya & Andaya 2001).

HANDLING OF POWER STRUCTURES AND INTERESTS DURING TRANSITION

British and Malayan governments used a variety of military, diplomatic and financial strategies to push the 1963 federation to completion. Singapore wanted to merge with Malaya. It bargained for, and received concessions related to its free port status, autonomy in education and labour, and retention of a large proportion of its revenues in these areas. The more contentious parties were leftists' oppositionists within Malaya and Singapore, the distant colonies of Sabah and Sarawak, Indonesia and the Philippines.

In February 1963, the joint Security Council of Singapore, Malaya and Britain imprisoned all leaders of the Federation opposition in a move called Operation Cold Store to quash internal opposition. Said Zahari was arrested in Singapore on 2 February 1963 and remained a political detainee for the next 17 years

(Zahari 2001).

Sabah and Sarawak were better treated; perhaps Malaya needed them to counterbalance Singapore's Chinese majority. Three strategies were used with Sabah and Sarawak: (a) private and personal diplomacy with its key leaders, (b) giving in to Sabah and Sarawak's negotiated demands for greater autonomy in the new Federation's constitution, and (c) additional sources of revenue and special development funds.

Face-to-face diplomacy with key leaders significantly shaped the federalisation process. Such private interactions took place during golf games, ship rides, informal meals, car trips, and at the sidelines during more formal meetings. In Shafie's (1998) book entitled *Ghazali Shafie's Memoir on the Federation of Malaysia*, he writes about his political navigations as Project Officer for the Formation of Malaysia.

Concessions granted to Sabah and Sarawak were significantly more liberal than compromises with Singapore. The non-Peninsular states demanded for and received greater politico-cultural autonomy, and the demographic status of Bumiputra[13] which granted them privileges given only to Malays, and not the Chinese nor Indians in Malaya (Hai 1977). Concession highlights covered the granting of the following to Sabah and Sarawak: (a) authority over immigration, including that of Malaysian citizens from other states[14], (b) Islam would be the official religion but other religions could be propagated, (c) Malay would be recognised as the national language, but English would continue as a medium of instruction, and (d) indigenous peoples would enjoy special privileges similar to those the Malays enjoyed in Peninsular Malaya (Andaya & Andaya 2001).

A significant condition to the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak was the infusion of federal funds. A pre-Federation Intergovernmental Report promised that Britain would grant 1.5 million British pounds per year for the first five years toward developing Sabah and Sarawak. In addition, the Commonwealth Development Corporation declared it was interested in expanding its activities in these two states (Ongkili 1967).

Indonesia's Konfrontasi was quelled by counter-military confrontations with Malaysian and Commonwealth forces. In 1965, when President Sukarno was deposed by forces aligned with pro-US General Suharto, Indonesia's relations with Malaysia upturned. Malaysia's conflict with the Philippines over Sabah was carried out on a diplomatic level, between Britain and the Philippines. Malaysia stayed out of the diplomatic fray. However, Sabahans themselves rejected the Philippine claim to annexation. The Sabah population wanted to merge into an autonomous state with Sarawak and Brunei. If this was not possible, Sabahans preferred a fusion with Malaysia over integration with the Philippines. Eventually, the Philippines' protest over the new Federation quieted down (Ongkili 1967). With Federation restructuring in place by 1963, Malaysia embarked on its independent politico-economic track.

MALAYSIA 2002: RAPID DEVELOPMENT AND EMERGENCE AS A GEOPOLITICAL LEADER

Malaysia's current development pace moves forward more briskly than its other Southeast Asian neighbours. My informal queries indicate that local lay people attribute their country's swift development to Prime Minister Mahathir's resolute drive to invest and develop the country, a strong think tank core of financial/development wizards surrounding Mahathir, relentless quashing of any 'destabilizing' opposition, and the highly disciplined, hard-working culture of the Chinese Malaysians.

On the geopolitical arena, Malaysia is a moderate Islamic force that can take on a significant role in the Western world's strained relations with Muslim/Arab societies. The Federation maintains open diplomatic ties, but has not played political footsie with Britain and the US. Malaysia's financial viability and development are not largely intertwined with the IMF or the World Bank. Hence, the Federation is relatively independent of politico-economic manoeuvring by Western powers.

Malaysia's position as a key player in contemporary geopolitics is clearly seen in the importance given by President George Bush to Prime Minister Mahathir during the latter's US state visit in May 2002. This was closely followed by Mahathir's Vatican meeting with the Pope. Also notable is the fact that Malaysia hosted the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in February 2003.

Political terrain of contemporary federalism in Malaysia

The political landscape of Federation of Malaysia

comprises the following. First, political power is highly centralised, through a Malay-dominated political-party system that controls electoral outcomes, federal development funds and investment schemes. Second, Malaysian Chinese and Indians do not enjoy the same politico-economic privileges as the Bumiputras, but in recent years, Chinese and Indians have not organised major protests against ethnic inequalities. Third, rulers or sultans hold their sway on religious practices. Fourth, the only significant power left to the states is control over land-related matters. Fifth, overt opposition to the ruling federal government exists through the Malay-based Islam-conservative PAS party, which holds sway in the states of Kelantan and Terengganu.

A highly centralised federal government through the UMNO political party

I asked one of my key respondents, "Based on your own political experience, what are the most important powers of the federal government?" His response: "Party organisation." In Malaysia today, the Malay party UMNO lords over the nation's federal political terrain, through the umbrella electoral coalition Barisan Nasional. In 1953, the Malays in UMNO and the Chinese in MCA formed the Alliance Party; the Indian party MIC later joined the Alliance in 1955. Political expansions marked the Alliance's increasing strength. In 1974, the aggrupation was officially renamed Barisan Nasional (BN). By 2000, BN claimed 14 political parties in its coalition (Berita 2000). Although each party in BN officially holds one vote each (Shafie, interview), the power to make crucial politico-economic decisions lies in UMNO (Crouch 1996), and its party president, the Prime Minister.

UMNO's political moves emanate from their dual-strategies of power-sharing and no opposition (Shafie, interview). Shafie recalls Tunku Abdul Rahman's advice that, "If you're prepared to share power, the power will never leave you." The federal government's accommodation of Chinese, Indian, Sabahan and Sarawakian parties into the BN umbrella group, suggests that indeed ethnic Malays have been willing to share power. Further, major constitutional concessions to Sabah and Sarawak show a willingness on the part of ethnic Malays to accommodate the interests of non-Malays.

Yet, this power-sharing strategy contains shadowy practices in everyday politics that may concentrate power in the hands of the ethnic Malays. Political concessions to non-UMNO parties are made before elections when other groups are most in need of UMNO support. Inter-party negotiations do not take place after elections, when other parties would have established their political bases and could negotiate from a position of strength. Shafie comments on this UMNO-led BN process "Look at our alliance, our BN (Barisan Nasional). Before elections. All the policies are made before elections. What can the opposition do? Do you notice that? All the policies were made before elections, not after elections. The other coalitions in the whole world (coalesce and negotiate) after elections. We are the only people who have the coalition before election…Don't you notice that up to now? Before elections!"

UMNO seems to uphold a twin-pronged strategy that combines power-sharing with no-opposition. This gives mixed signals of open democracy and tight-fisted authoritarianism. The no-opposition principle is rationalised in the name of development. The political assumption here is that opposition destabilises, and blocks development. In the interview, Shafie pointed out that, "In a developing country, we cannot afford to have too much opposition…There's no time, otherwise, for development. (Do) you have all the time to fight the opposition in order to stay in power?" The UMNO-dominated federal government juxtaposes opposition-and-development in a mutually exclusive manner, and then quashes opposition in the name of development.

The strength of the centre over the periphery exhibits itself not only within UMNO and Barisan Nasional, but in the Malaysian political party system. For example, the opposition PAS party, with political state-strongholds in Kelantan and Terrengganu, carries out its decision-making processes through the party headquarters in Selangor state. Sabah and Sarawak state politics exhibit a semi-independent stance from their political party's federal centre. The Sabah and Sarawak aggrupations within the ruling Barisan Nasional maintain their party headquarters in their respective states, and not in Kuala Lumpur or Selangor (Information Malaysia 2000).

In recent history, the politically persuasive powers of large-scale development funds have been utilised by the federal government, especially in states with looming opposition forces, like Kelantan, Terengganu, Sabah and Sarawak. Hence the federal government cannot

arbitrarily decide on the amount of state allocation, regardless of political (un)friendliness of the state political party with the federal ruling party. However, in everyday political practices, there are major loopholes, where the federal government's party-in-power manoeuvres its resources to increase power centrality.

First, the federal government controls the national development fund and other resource-based Councils. When state governments move away from UMNO control, the government ceases to channel funds through state authorities, and sets up a strong Federal Development Department presence as a counterforce to the opposition. The state office of the Federal Development Department grows into an UMNO-led presence in the opposition state, distributing funds for the federal government (Chaw, interview).

Other federal political infrastructures have wrested local powers away from legislatively-defined state prerogatives. States are supposed to decide on their resource-based policies like matters related to land, mining, water, and forestry. But the federal government has created resource-related Councils at national level that decide on policies for all states in the Federation. Examples of resource-based federal Councils are the Finance and Land Councils.

Another federal financial process used is the release of state funds. Taxes collected from the state go to the federal government, and the central government reallocates these funds based on population and state size[15]. Federal guidelines define the allocation to the state, and cannot be changed arbitrarily. However, the timing of the funds release is what plays into power-manoeuvring. Federal constitution mandates that fund release takes place twice a year. The Kelantan experience shows that the federal government can opt to release the second state allotment on 31 December, holding the state government in abeyance over financial resources (Chaw, interview).

What is the political picture at the periphery?

Three types of political peripheries exist in the Federation today: (a) the political-opposition periphery of the PAS party, which governs two out of the 14 states, (b) the ethnic peripheries in Peninsular Malaysia, namely the Chinese and Indians. They saturate Peninsular Malaysia, and are not territorially defined by state boundaries; and, (c) the ethnic periphery of Sabahans and Sarawakians in East Malaysia, whose state territories are defined by the Federal Constitution.

Except for the Indians, all the marginalised groups are represented in the electoral-opposition composition of Malaysia. PAS is a Malay-Muslim party pushing for an Islamic state; DAP is a Chinese-dominated opposition party; Sabah and Sarawak have local opposition groups. New to the opposition scenario is Keadilan, a political party inspired by the former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim (Information Malaysia 2000). Barisan Nasional lords over the other parties, except in Kelantan and Terrenganu, where PAS reigns. Both Barisan Nasional and PAS are Malay-dominated. This implies that the electoral arena in Malaysia leaves little space for minority ethnic groups to play out their identity interests through electoral contestation.

The September 11 incident increased international concern over the rise of PAS. Barisan Nasional projects PAS as an Islamic fundamentalist political party. Founded in 1952, PAS controlled Kelantan from 1959-1978 and Terengganu for a shorter period. From 1973-1977, PAS joined Barisan Nasional, but left the umbrella coalition after a few years. PAS has controlled Kelantan since the early 1990s, and has newly reascended to power in Terengganu. In an interview, Town Councillor Hu Pang Chaw from Kelantan said that religious freedom continues and objected to the federal government's claim that the PAS government in Kelantan is a close-minded Islamic government.

However, other conversations with Mr. Chaw indicated that the state government followed conservative Islamic traditions. For example, in federal-state conflicts, he related how the UMNO-sympathetic Kelantan Ruler hosted a celebration with a female Malay singer. The PAS state officials resented this because local state regulations ban female entertainers. However, state officials could not do anything because, as Chaw explained, "The Ruler/Sultan is above the law, so we cannot issue summons to the palace, we cannot go into the palace and stop them. So we just tell the people what they are doing, all against the Islamic Law, Islamic teaching. We tell the people, that's all that we can do. We are constrained on this matter." A second narrative hints at PAS's conservatism. When asked about my visiting Kelantan and meeting the PAS Chief Minister, I was told I could speak with the Minister, but I must be 'all covered up'.

I did not sense any inclination toward ethnically organised political protest actions against the federal government during my research visit in 2002. However, Malaysia's history shows intense Chinese protests during certain historical moments after the Second World War, for example, the uprisings in 1947-48, and the ethnic riots of May 1969. In both cases, the federal state used its Emergency powers to control publications, arrest without trial, and deport so-called political destabilisers (Andaya & Andaya 2001).

Chinese and Indians are left out of the bountiful privileges given to Bumiputras, a category encompassing Muslim Malays, Sabahans and Sarawakians. Such privileges include special loan rates, a 30% Bumiputra-presence in business endeavours, pro-Bumiputra employment and education quotas, and unspoken government preferences for handing out federal contracts to Bumis. In my informal conversations with Chinese and Indian Malaysians, I heard about their strong resentments toward pro-Bumiputra policies. In spite of their political marginalisation, the Chinese appear to be economically better off than the Bumiputras. However, actual economic statistics disaggregated according to ethnicity are not easy to obtain in Malaysia.

Can a balance of economic and political powers across, not within ethnic groups explain the absence of any ethnic uprisings in contemporary Malaysia? The configuration of today's Malaysian inter-ethnic society appears to be marked by a combination of the following factors: (a) political favours and influence granted to the economically marginalised Bumiputras, (b) economic prosperity of the politically marginalised Chinese plus a sharing of this economic well-being by the professional-class Indian group, and (c) the political co-optation of high profile Chinese and Indian leaders into the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional through MCA and MIC (Chinese and Indian political parties.)

In the initial years after federation, both Sabah and Sarawak showed signs of strong autonomy politics, in favour of independence from the Malaysian federal centre. However, the federal government has increased control over the states of Sabah and Sarawak through the UMNO (Hai 1997). For example, when Sarawak Chief Minister Ningkan sought fresh elections on a platform of state rights and autonomy, the federal government declared an emergency in Sarawak, managed to amend the Sarawak constitution and voted Ningkan out of office. Sabah leaders after federation likewise demonstrated strong inclinations toward autonomy.

The federal government eventually wrested control in Sabah through the following strategies: (a) political interventions – charges of corruption and detention without trial under the Internal Security Act and formation of an UMNO-dominated Sabah coalition; and (b) economic interventions – slowing down development projects and banning the export of timber logs that hurt the state's economy.

The picture today indicates that the federal government, through UMNO, has established virtual control over Sabah and Sarawak. The heavy use of centralised development funds to sustain federal political clout over Sabah and Sarawak thrives in contemporary political exercises. Aeria (1997) illustrates the politics of development in Sarawak, for example, by presenting a partial compilation of federal development projects and financial handouts during the 1996 Sarawak state election campaign.

The opposition PAS party, however, seems to be gaining strength instead of losing steam. PAS continues to challenge the UMNO-dominated federal government in everyday political issues in Malaysia. PAS also plans to consolidate forces with other opposition parties in a new merger called Barisan Rakyat (the People's Front), in preparation for the next electoral exercise. (The Star 18 May 2002:7). Interestingly, PAS plans to merge with Keadilan and Party Rakyat, which are Malay-dominated. Chinese-dominated DAP has been left out. Hence, the opposition to federal centralisation seems to be emerging from the same politically dominant ethnic group, the Malays, and not from the Chinese.

Hai (1997) points out lessons to be learned from the peripheral experiences with the centre, by Sabah/Sarawak and Kelantan. One is that cultural distinctiveness supports autonomy. Kelantan holds a unique culture, distinguishable from the Malay culture surrounding Kuala Lumpur. Kelantanese possess their own local dialect, a more established religious education system, and a tighter traditional society. Sabah/Sarawak likewise have cultures distinct from the dominant Malay culture, but the local political parties in these two states were unable to build on this political agenda with enough intensity to overcome the avalanche of

federal pressure.

Hai emphasises the lesson learned from Kelantan's success and Sabah/Sarawak's inability to maintain their peripheral identity as separate from the federal centre – the need for a state-based political party with a programme or ideology appealing to the majority, and persuasive enough to overcome the resources and pressures from the federal centre.

IMPLICATIONS: LESSONS THE PHILIPPINES CAN LEARN FROM THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE

Here are ten ideas that summarise lessons the Philippines can learn from the Malaysian experience on federalism. I recommend that these ideas be transformed to workshop questions by Filipinos who want to run nationwide workshops on federalism. Grassroots and elite seminars among Christians[16] and Muslims can prepare the human terrain for transition to a more decentralised political structure.

1. The creation of Federations. Federations cannot be created top-down. To prevent post-federation uprisings, there has to be widespread local political and cultural support for the political restructuring.

2. The 'script' of power distribution (federal legislation). In developing societies, formal legislative scripts rarely create the 'play' in everyday political life. As political 'plays' activate during the process of federalizing, configurations of power need to be considered. Questions to ask: How will the federalizing process interface with the presidential elections in 2004? What interests, coalitions, comprises will be made concerning issue of federalism? Conditions of national and local leadership, political culture, personal/group interests and fears, and informal compromises need attention.

3. The geopolitical configuration, both global and regional. Philippine federation may transgress the interests and fears of influential geopolitical powers that may in turn block or support the move for federation. Today, with increasing global conflict related with Western/Muslim social identities, global and Southeast Asian interests associated with this bourgeoning conflict will see activation in the Philippine federalizing process.

4. Federalisation involves power-sharing and constitutional compromises, with impetus coming from the dominant group.

5. Resistance from members of the dominant group. They may not want to let go of the economic-political power positions/benefits that they enjoyed in a centralised structure.

6. Resistance from the peripheral group. They fear absorption by the larger group and loss of their politico-cultural identity, resources, and management of their everyday lives.

7 Two forceful stages shape the human terrain of federation: transition to and maintenance of federalism. Transition politics includes the tasks of: (a) those who will prepare the human field for transition – paper work, private and public political diplomacies, concessions and negotiations among interest blocs, (b) mobilising international support and minimising resistance – especially in the context of the new global configuration of Western vs. Muslim/Arab conflict, (c) mobilising support and minimising resistance, (d) dealing with local interests and fears of the centre and periphery groups, (e) inserting the federation process within the political script that contemporary Philippine politics provides in the coming years – electoral exercises, regional issues, personal and group ambitions of local players, and (f) preparing development funds and the appropriate utilisation and delivery of such funds for confidence building during the federation process.

8. Institutionalised religion and religious power. Both Christianity and Islam can play a positive role in the transition stage. In the Philippines and many other developing societies, religion operates in the public arena. Religious leaders take on social roles of power and influence. Religious leaders may opt to take public positions on the side of federalizing, and explain how this political strategy addresses the Mindanao war.

9. Massive political disenfranchisement caused by poverty. Although fractionalised and heterogeneous, the majority may possess their own political scripts distinguishable from the articulate leaders among the Christians and Muslims. Such political scripts may be awakened and mobilised by either pro- or anti-federation movements.

10. A strong local political aggrupation. A political

group, perhaps, among each peripheral group, with its own programme/ideology and a cultural orientation that reflects the unique cultural practices of the local population. This native political aggrupation will take on the role of maintaining indigenous politico-cultural identities, and prevent absorption of the periphery by the centre, when the federation emerges.

Notes

1. For research on the Philippine Muslim-Christian conflict, I suggest the following references: Filipinas Foundation (1976), Lacar and Hunt (1972), Nuñez (1997), and Tiongson (1973). For further reading on politico-historical narratives of the Mindanao internal war: Cesar Abdul Majul's (1999) *Muslims in the Philippines*, Samuel Tan's (1977) *The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900-1972*, Macapado Abaton Muslim's *The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines* (1990), and *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao* by Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda Gloria (2000).
2. Non-Malaysian readers may know these Straits Settlements as Penang and Malacca.
3. Rulers (Sultans) head sultanates. They gain authority by inheritance, as in a monarchy.
4. Until today, UMNO controls Malaysian politics. It has been the political party of all Malaysian Prime Ministers, from the Tunku Abdul Rahman to Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.
5. Shafie said "The Chinese and Indians were regarded by the Malays as outsiders. They cannot share the same offer made by the British for citizenship. If they (British) understood it, they would have gotten the Chinese and Indians on their side and the Malays would have lost."
6. Stability, in this context, refers to the absence of effective opposition to federalism.
7. In Southeast Asia, communism and nationalism are both anti-colonial in orientation.
8. The literal translation of Bumiputra is 'children of the soil', implying that the Malays and indigenous groups of Sabah and Sarawak were the original inhabitants.
9. In 1965, Suharto took over Sukarno's rule reducing the communist threat in Southeast Asia.
10. Brunei remains an independent state. Sabah and Sarawak joined the Federation of Malaysia.
11. Zahari said, "It was the British who provoked the revolution (in Brunei). The British infiltrated into Party Rakyak leadership and provoked…when Malaysia was to be formed."
12. In his autobiography, Former Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman writes that Malayan police forces helped the police in Sarawak, Borneo (Sabah) and Brunei (Al-Haj, 1977). Historians point to the British armed might as the quelling force of the Brunei uprising.
13. An official category invented for federation purposes.
14. Until today, Peninsular Malaysians and foreigners need to obtain another visa from the Sabah and Sarawak immigration authorities to enter these territories.
15. State size is measured according to the number of kilometres of the federal route in each state.
16. Especially Christians, I think, who may resist Philippine federalism more than Muslims.

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Appendix 1
FRAMEWORK FOR API 2001 WORKSHOP

Three themes underlie all 26 projects undertaken by the initial batch of Asian Public Intellectuals. The first recognises the powerful presence of globalisation in Asia. The second addresses the contradictory effects of globalisation on Asian social life. The third stresses the need to articulate and enact Asian solutions to ease globalisation's dislocating consequences in the region.

These three themes suggest three major sessions of the first API workshop: **structure, outcomes,** and **possibilities**. They also call for a fourth session, **future issues**, to address critical issues and to propose possible lines of action by API Fellows. These three themes also help to outline a framework, or guide, for this year's workshop.

STRUCTURE, MECHANISM, AND EVENTS

Sociologists define **structure** as a set of internally-related objects or practices, or alternatively, a set of arrangements that define the relationships between and among peoples, their social institutions, and the resources they possess. In metaphorical terms, structure represents the 'grammar of social life' – the unseen, underlying set of principles that shape the words and sentences of our social life.

Globalisation is such a structure. It is the shorthand for an economic programme that reduces the economic role of government. Its grammar calls for the liberalisation of trade, the deregulation of markets and prices, and the privatisation of state enterprises. Globalisation also champions the fueling of economic growth, a condition that will occur most rapidly by 'leaving things to the market'. And done accordingly, so its proponents claim, globalisation will yield greater global productive efficiency and ultimately improve global welfare.

Markets, however, do not simply arise from thin air; they are socially and historically constructed. They are not simply sites where people buy goods and services from one another; they are also a set of arrangements, or structures, by which exchange takes place. The grammatical terms on which transactions take place are complex and diverse, but the social relations that play out in these markets are strongly shaped by ideologies and social positions – gender, class, nation-state, race and ethnicity, among other hierarchical criteria, significantly count in this exchange. Also influential are arrangements that include a gamut of laws, conventions, physical and social infrastructure, and the distribution of wealth and property – all of which are defined primarily by the state. The state is thus a key player in the globalisation game.

Beyond arrangements, structures like globalisation also possess a mechanism, what sociologists of the critical realist school call 'causal powers and liabilities', that can be activated to produce change, or if resisted, may not be activated at all. 'Causal powers' refer to the structure's ability to penetrate social life and reproduce itself; 'liabilities', in turn, refer to a structure's susceptibility to, among others, group pressure and gross departures of its operating procedures. As structure, globalisation has the causal power, or the mechanism, to establish itself as a hegemonic force in contemporary social life. This mechanism initiates the globalisation process, one fueled by, and resulting in, a massive cross-border flows of goods, services, money, information, and culture.

But this mechanism also contains within it a set of liabilities that can weaken the way globalisation operates. This weakened state will take place when the balance of power significantly shifts in favour of an alternative system – whatever that is. To date, however, despite the efforts of anti-globalists, globalisation continues to retain its robust presence in our everyday life.

One way the mechanism of globalisation operates is through the allocation and distribution functions of the market. As people seek to meet their needs, they buy goods and services in the market. What is bought and what is sold, however, is the outcome of decisions made by people, that is, buyers and sellers. Buyers and sellers continually reconstruct markets by allocating and reallocating resources. At the same time, markets determine the distribution of income: sellers will try to meet the demands of buyers, and will try to shape markets in ways that lead buyers to demand what they have to sell. How then does globalisation carry out the allocation and distribution functions of the market?

Central is the exercise of power. One factor that creates this power is wealth, which is used directly or indirectly to influence the economic and political process. But wealth, by itself, structures markets: it is purchasing power. Thus, an important circularity thrives within a market system: existing wealth affects both the structures and operations of markets at the same time that markets, by affecting the distribution of income, also affect the distribution of wealth. Because of this circular process, markets tend to increase inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth.

But markets also create tendencies in the opposite direction – by limiting inequality, for example. This happens when a monopoly is challenged through competition, which in turn, may then change the goods and services available; or when buyers and sellers are in conflict with respect to consumption patterns. The extent to which markets generate equality and inequality thus depends on the way they are structured; the way they are affected by the social, cultural and political environment; as well as the way social, cultural and political forces operate separately. Markets are not abstract, neutral entities but are real processes of exchange embedded in social institutions like the state, the economy, and family.

'Leaving things to the market', i.e. globalisation, has thus produced **outcomes**, or 'events', beyond the economic. Because globalisation favours the powerful and the strongest, it has placed vulnerable groups such as women and ethnic minorities at a disadvantage by marginalising basic human needs and confounding their sense of identity. Globalisation has also enfeebled the working classes by rendering their livelihood and entitlements insecure. It has even despoiled the environment – the forests and the seas, for example – by engaging in indulgent commercialism.

But the same global mechanism has also opened up borders, especially through the flow of information and improvements in technology, creating new social, political and economic opportunities as, for example, in the spread of democratic ideas. It has also made geographical boundaries porous as masses of people uproot themselves from their local areas and transplant themselves in the workplaces of other countries.

Yet, as globalisation erases the boundaries of culture, it also moves toward the creation of a monoculture. Powerful global forces, largely Western-led, tell us what to buy, when to buy it and how much to pay for it. Globalisation of media and markets has moved in to shape our needs and wants and so restructures cultural identities. It is in all these senses that globalisation is seen as having contradictory consequences.

Where do the **possibilities** of change lie? If the preceding argument is acceptable, that is, if markets can be seen as 'a set of arrangements by which exchange takes place', then it is logical to consider possibilities of change by looking at alternative arrangements that will limit, or eliminate, the oppressive impacts of markets on social life. Property rights, physical and social infrastructure, the distribution of income and wealth, the activities of civil society groups, the myriad regulations that govern economic affairs – all these things can be reconstructed to create situations that will push global markets to do business in ways that will enhance people's welfare.

The state will be a major force in making this push. In doing so, it will sometimes perform a precarious, tightrope act of balancing the needs of global forces and the needs of its people. The state's desire to redistribute income, for example, may be caught in the need, on one hand, to reduce taxes, and on the other hand, to satisfy requirements to provide incentives attractive for foreign investors – and thus improve the state's level of competitiveness in the global scene.

The workshop's starting frame is simple: globalisation as **structure** possesses within it a mechanism that, under certain conditions – a chief one being a set of market forces – produces certain **outcomes**, or events that are contradictory in character. But the flow from structure to mechanism to outcome (and back if necessary) is not mechanical: it is our analytic task to show what sparks the engines of globalisation to produce particular outcomes, and how these outcomes reinforce or weaken the globalization process. Several ways or **possibilities** have already been taken to ease the dislocating outcomes of globalization. This workshop examines these and other possibilities, relates them to other works, and identifies **future issues** that API intellectuals can tackle in the years to come.

These notions define the major sessions of the workshop and identify the pertinent papers under each session.

Session 1: Globalisation in the Asian Context
How globalisation recreates itself in Asia, and how it strengthens some groups and subjugates others, are among the central issues in this first session. The task is largely theoretical and macroscopic, but it is one anchored in the empirical realities of the region. It will frame the discussions in subsequent sessions, and will be of invaluable help when we explore Asian alternatives to global practice and identify issues for later action. The presentations of two Fellows are apt here. **Jomo Kwame Sundaram** will report on how some Asian countries recovered from the Asian financial crisis. **Phra Paisal Visalo** will suggest a way of fashioning a spirituality appropriate in a global setting.

Session 2: Outcomes of Globalisation
Because globalisation has had contradictory effects, across and within nations, the task of Asian Public Intellectuals is to describe and to understand the conditions that produced these outcomes. The bulk of the work done by the first batch of API Fellows falls in this session. Of the total 26 proposals, 18 dealt with topics concerning the outcomes of globalisation. These can be grouped into three clusters: contested resources, institutional dilemmas, and identity reconstruction. This order of outcomes proceeds from the macro-level to micro-level.

Outcome 1: Contested Human and Natural Resources
The unprecedented flow of information, ideas, and resources attendant to globalisation has spawned massive movements of people across borders. Similarly, the entry of transnational corporations into developing countries, the construction of power plants (and potential pollution from waste products), the transformation of local habitats into tourism sites, and the extraction of natural resources such as wood, minerals, and marine products have jeopardised the resource base of many Asian countries. Several papers by API Fellows illuminate globalisation's impact on Asia's human and natural resources.

Human Resources: Globalisation has precipitated the movement of people across national borders in search of better-paying jobs. **Pataya Ruenkaew** cites the labour migration of Thai women to Japan and Germany, with the aim of providing a support network, or safety net, for these workers. The movement of people also means increased health risks, one of them being the spread of the HIV virus and AIDS. **Pande K. Trimayuni** probes into this phenomenon in his study of migrant workers in Malaysia and the Philippines.

Natural Resources: Differing views on ways to control and manage natural resources have ignited many conflicts between the state and local communities. **Henry Chan** explores the roots of this conflict between the state and forest dwellers in the forests of Indonesia and Thailand, and hopes to propose ways to manage future collisions. **Somchai Preechasinlapakun** documents forest management practices in Malaysia and the Philippines and links these practices to the emergence of a modern state and responses of indigenous peoples. The exploitation of the sea is the concern of **Surmiati Ali**, who worked with fisherfolk in Malaysia and Thailand to investigate 'changes in the traditional system of marine resource management. Her concept of 'sea tenure' may be the key to protecting fisherfolk in the future.

Outcome 2: Institutional Dilemmas
Social institutions, to sociologists, are sets of beliefs and practices that organise and maintain what people define as important social needs. Economic institutions, for instance, serve to produce and distribute goods and services, while political institutions regulate the use of, and access to, power. The impact of globalisation on financial and political institutions is widespread and well-known – with calls for sound 'financial governance' and political 'good governance' as bases for proper global governance. Less is known, however, about its effects on other social institutions. The reports in this session deal with these other institutions – specifically art, popular culture, and the law.

Art and Popular Culture: The works of **Wong Soak Koon** and **Nick Deocampo** serve as appropriate introductions to the session on identity since they deal with the reconstruction of national images. Both Fellows confront this issue by delving into the realms of literature and film. Soak Koon explores the changing identities of Filipinos as refracted through the reception of literary works, while Deocampo looks at the changing identities of Asian countries as seen from the lens of their cinema. Museums and comic books also represent cultural sites penetrated by global forces. **Fusanosuke Natsume** touches on how Japanese comics and cartoons, *manga*, as an artifact of popular culture, has penetrated Thai and Indonesian life.

Law Enforcement: As economic liberalisation offers consumers a wide array of goods and allows traders an expanded market, legal and law enforcement institutions start to grapple with practices that existing laws do not yet cover. One example is the international trafficking in drugs, women, children, and even body parts. **Yasuhiro Mizutani** focuses attention on one institution of legal enforcement, the police, as it attempts to strengthen its grip on people's movements in Thailand

Outcome 3: Identity Reconstruction

Two broad concerns underlie these works: the first focuses on the shifting identities of ethnic **minority groups**; the second, on identity formation of **majority groups.** A greater number of papers, however, draw attention to minority groups.

Minority Groups: All papers on minority groups express concern at the ways ethnic communities have been made marginal by state policies or by global forces in terms of the decline of traditional practices and the resulting loss of a collective identity. Three API Fellows state this case in dramatic terms. **Nur A. Fadhil Lubis** explores the changing character of Muslim identity in the Philippines and Thailand. **Herry Yogaswara** describes the displacement of ethnic minority groups in the Cordilleras of the Philippines and the way a non-government organisation assists them in asserting their rights. **Colin G. Nicholas**, in turn, talks about the Orang Asli, the aboriginal peoples of Peninsular Malaysia, and tries to find out how local leaders contributed to the decline of indigenous socio-political systems.

Two other works extend these discussions, and examine how state policies attempt to integrate minority groups to mainstream life and are met with local resistance. **Sri Nuryanti** presents the case of the Thai-Moslems who reject, among others, 'Siamisation', the policy of acculturation, while **Tatsuki Kataoka** delves into the case of the Lahu and other hill tribes in Northern Thailand whose distinct local identities get blurred as a result of Christianisation and Sinofication.

Two other Fellows explore how minority groups preserve ethnic identity and ethnic practice in mainstream society. **Benny Subianto** assesses how the Chinese-Filipinos have managed to find a balance between marginality and inclusion. **Abdur-Razzaq Lubis** demonstrates how one minority group, the Mandailing of Sumatra and Malaysia, has been able to assert local identity through cultural promotion, the development of resources, and the empowerment of local communities.

Majority Groups: Globalisation's tendency to develop standards for local economic and political practice can boost national economies and create difficulties for minority groups. But it can also produce problems for members of majority groups who must reconcile their traditional sense of identity with the forces of globalisation and state power. **Prangtip Doarueng** addresses this issue as he examines the problem of national (or majority) identity by investigating shifts in Indonesian identity amidst the country's political and economic crisis. **Cecilia de la Paz** dwells on museums, one of the more venerable cultural spaces of a nation, as a negotiated and contested space in projecting images of ethnic minorities to majority populations and to the world.

Session 3: Possibilities

Globalisation as structure draws its power from its ability to lock national economies in situations which they cannot easily break, and to resist efforts that may weaken its grip on a nation's social, political and cultural life. The dissenting voices of the 'anti-globalists' all over the world to halt globalisation may have been loud, but their protests have yet to significantly slow down its onslaught.

Six works chart these possibilities and constitute a block of ideas to discuss prospects for change. Three involve cooperative projects among Asian experts; the remaining three advocate alternative or supporting structures to cushion globalisation's dislocating outcomes.

Cooperative Projects: The value of intellectual exchange in the region emerges in the work of **Phar Kim Beng**, who sees the gathering of experts as an 'epistemic community' that will facilitate a commitment to community goals. **Etsuko Miyata de Rodriguez** reports on her year of teaching in the Philippines where she assisted students in dating, classifying and interpreting ceramic ware **Rene B. Javellana, S.J.** assembles heritage conservation advocates in the region to develop mechanisms for transnational sharing of experiences and approaches.

Structural Alternatives: The remaining three Fellows make a pitch for alternatives in Asian politics. **Cristina Montiel** explores the possibility of adopting features

of Malaysian-style federalism and Indonesian-style decentralisation and local autonomy as an alternative political structure to manage conflicts in Mindanao, Philippines. **Sukran Rojanapaiwong** seeks ways to increase the political leverage of alternative media to protect and conserve the environment in Malaysia and the Philippines. **Pibhop Dhongchai**, aware of the hegemonic power of transnational capital, champions the idea of alternative social movements that will work for the interests of local citizens.

Session 4: Future Issues

Where do we go from here? After hearing the Fellows' reports and discussing these with each other, it will be useful to identify issues that API Fellows can address in their future work. These issues may deal with ways to further one's work, or with new topics to investigate. In furthering one's work, one may choose, for instance, to broaden the comparative base of one's present project, or pursue an alternative line of inquiry – or an alternative methodology – using the same geographic areas, local communities, or textual materials.

In proposing new topics, one might recommend research on matters that have been relatively unattended to in this workshop. Four of these issues, for example, are poverty, inequality, militancy, and religious fundamentalism. Poverty in Asia remains a serious problem, and a great part of it is exacerbated by globalisation. At the same time, the events of September 11 have drawn attention to religious fundamentalism and militant 'rear guard' action that seeks to challenge a global power.

A discussion on future issues fulfils other needs as well. It will also help consolidate the gains produced by the first round of grants and suggest what API Fellows can do to exert more influence in the public life of their country or in the region as a whole.

Let us look forward to an active and fruitful workshop.

Ricardo G. Abad
June 2002

Appendix 2

WORKSHOP SCHEDULE

Day 1, Tuesday, November 19 – Opening Ceremony

14:30 - 17:30	Registration – Secretariat
18:30 - 19:30	Opening Session – Fr. Jose M. Cruz, S.J., Master of Ceremonies
18:32	*Address of Nippon Foundation President, Yoshei Sasakawa*
18:43	*Address of IKMAS Director, Dr. Ragayah Haji Mat Zin*
18:55	*Address of Former President, Republic of the Philippines, H.E. Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino*
19:30 - 21:00	Dinner

Day 2, Wednesday, November 20 – Globalisation as Structure

08:30 - 08:45	Orders of the Day – Secretariat
08:45 - 09:15	Introductions – The Fellows
09:15 - 09:45	Framework for the Conference – Dr. Ricardo Abad
09:45 - 10:30	SESSION 1: GLOBALISATION IN ASIA
09:45	*Session Introduction – Dr. Takashi Shiraishi, Moderator*
09:50	*Jomo Kwame Sundaram*
09:10	*Phra Paisal Visalo*
10:30 - 11:00	Coffee Break
11:00 - 12:15	Plenary on Globalisation in Asia – Dr. Takashi Shiraishi, Moderator
12:15 - 12:30	Guidelines for Discussion Groups
12:30 - 14:00	Lunch Break
14:00 - 17:30	Discussion Groups (see page 236 for composition of groups)
18:00 - 19:00	Cocktails
19:00 - 20:00	Dinner
20:00 onwards	Free Time

Day 3, Thursday, November 21 – Outcomes of Globalisation

08:45 - 09:00	Orders of the Day – Secretariat
9:00 - 10:30	SESSION 2: HUMAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES
9:00	*Session Introduction – Dr. Ragayah Haji Mat Zin, Moderator*
9:05	*Panel Presentations – Group 1*
	Pataya Ruenkaew, Pande K. Trimayuni, Henry Chan,
	Somchai Preechasinlapakun, Surmiati Ali
10:00	*Open Forum*
10:30 - 11:00	Coffee Break
11:00 - 12:30	SESSION 3: INSTITUTIONS – ART, POPULAR CULTURE, LAW
11:00	*Session Introduction – Dr. Surichai Wun' Gaeo, Moderator*
11:05	*Panel Presentations – Group 2*
	Wong Soak Koon, Nick Deocampo, Etsuko Miyata de Rodriguez,
	Fusanosuke Natsume, Yasuhiro Mizutani
12:00	*Open Forum*
12:30 - 14:00	Lunch
14:00 - 15:30	SESSION 4: IDENTITY I
14:00	*Session Introduction – Dr. Taufik Abdullah, Moderator*
14:05	*Panel Presentations – Group 3*
	Nur Faisal Lubis, Herry Yogasawara, Colin Nicholas, Sri Nuryanti, Tatsuki Kataoke
15:00	*Open Forum*
15:30 - 16:00	Coffee Break
16:00 - 17:30	SESSION 5: IDENTITY II
16:00	*Session Introduction – Dr. Diana Wong, Moderator*
16:05	*Panel presentations – Group 4*
	Benny Subianto, Abdur Rizzaq-Lubis, Prangtip Doarueng, Cecilia de la Paz
17:00	*Open Forum*
17:30 - 18:30	Free Time
18:30 - 19:00	Cocktails
19:00 - 20:00	Dinner
20:00 onwards	Free Time

Day 4, Friday, November 21 – Possibilities for Change and Future Issues

08:30 - 09:00	Orders of the Day – Secretariat
09:00 - 10:30	SESSION 6: POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE
09:00	*Session Introduction – Jose M. Cruz, S.J., Moderator*
09:05	*Panel Presentations – Group 5*
	Phar Kim Beng, Rene P. Javellana, S.J., Cristina Montiel,
	Sukran Rojanapaiwong, Pibhop Dhongchai
10:00	*Open Forum*
10:30 - 11:00	Coffee Break
11:00 - 12:30	Plenary Discussion: Key Issues – Dr. Ricardo Abad, Moderator
12:30 - 14:00	Lunch Break
14:00 - 15:30	SESSION 7: FUTURE ISSUES/EVALUATION
14:00	*Session Introduction – Mr. Tatsuya Tanami, Moderator*
14:05	*Plenary Discussion*
15:30 - 16:00	SESSION 8: CONCLUDING SESSION
	Summation and Concluding Remarks – Dr. Ricardo Abad
16:00 - 18:00	Free Time
18:00 - 21:00	Cultural Night, Cocktails and Dinner

Day 5, Saturday, November 23 – Liberation and Release

09:00 - 17:00	Cebu Tour
18:00 - 20:00	Farewell Dinner and Acknowledgments

DISCUSSION GROUPS

Group 1 – Human and Natural Resources
Surmiati Ali, Henry Chan, Somchai Preechasinlapakun,
Pataya Ruenkaew, Pande K. Trimayuni

Group 2 – Social Institutions: Art, Popular Culture, Law
Nick Deocampo, Etsuko Miyata de Rodriguez, Yasuhiro Mizutani,
Fusanosuke Natsume, Wong Soak Koon

Group 3 – Identity I
Colin Nicholas, Tatsuki Kataoka, Nur Faisal Lubis,
Sri Nuryanti, Herry Yogasawara

Group 4 – Identity II
Benny Subianto, Abdur Razzaq-Lubis,
Prangtip Doarueng, Cecilia de la Paz

Group 5 – Possibilities for Change
Pibhop Dhongchai, Rene P. Javellana, S.J., Cristina Montiel,
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Appendix 3
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Etsuko Miyata de Rodriguez, Kim Phar Beng, Nur Faisal Lubis and Somchai Preechasinlapaku.

Appendix 4

ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS

(in alphabetical order according to Fellows' names as they are spelt)

Abdur-Razzaq Lubis

THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION: THE CASE OF THE MANDAILING PEOPLE

This paper presents the activities carried out by the author to establish, assert, restore and enhance Mandailing identity. Undertaken during the course of his Fellowship as an Asian Public Intellectual (API), these activities include, among many others, research and evaluation work on the Mandailing identity; the writing of proposals for the conservation and management of Mandailing cultural and natural resources; and networking with scholars to obtain information, expertise, and assistance. Based on these experiences, the author makes several recommendations to promote Mandailing studies and cultural identity.

Benny Subianto

FROM MARGINAL TRADERS TO CAPITALISTS: CHINESE FILIPINOS JOIN THE MAINSTREAM

Until the 1950s, the Chinese in the Philippines were mainly marginal traders. Their 'pariah' status stemmed from the policies of the colonial rulers and those of the Republic of the Philippines, which considered them 'aliens'. The Retail Trade Nationalisation Act of 1954 barred foreigners like the Chinese from retail trade. As a result, the Chinese entered into wholesale trading and manufacturing under the Import Substitution Industrialisation scheme. Much later, Philippine President Marcos, in the belief that the Chinese were less prone to politically conspire against his holding on to power, passed the Mass Naturalisation Decree of 1975 that enabled 'deserving foreigners', including the Chinese, to obtain Filipino citizenship. Consequently, the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed the flourishing of Chinese-Filipino businesses in retail, banking, finance, real estate, manufacturing and others. But over and beyond the rise of Chinese businesses, the 1980s also saw the birth of a new hybrid: the Chinese-Filipinos.

Cecilia S. De La Paz

IMAGINING NATIONS AND COMMUNITIES THROUGH MUSEUMS: THE POLITICS AND AESTHETICS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES

The nations of Japan and the Philippines, with their specific historical experiences, construct a public culture through museums as sites of imagining the idea of 'nations' and 'communities'. Folk craft objects as emblems of traditional everyday life are appropriated in urban museums, where symbols of national identity are created and the value of authenticity ascribed to ethnic communities. Yet in the politics of representation that are created by the displayed life, social inequities and cultural justice are set aside in the name of homogeneity. So what attitudes are encouraged by museums in their display? How can museums and their collections address the needs of a modern community grappling with rapid social and environmental changes? This paper explores some answers to these questions so that a dynamic Asian perspective can emerge on the issue of cultural contestation and identity construction.

Colin Nicholas

COMPROMISING INDIGENOUS LEADERSHIP: LOSING ROOTS IN TRIBAL COMMUNITIES

Indigenous leaders need to be rooted in their communities in order to provide intellectual and social direction for their communities. External interests know this and strive to compromise and co-opt indigenous leaders in order to extract profit and benefits from such communities. This paper looks at how indigenous leaders develop and what role they play in their communities today.

Cristina Jayme Montiel
THE POWER TERRAIN OF FEDERALISING IN A DEVELOPING SOCIETY: CAN THE PHILIPPINES LEARN FROM MALAYSIA'S EXPERIENCES WITH FEDERALISM?

This research investigated the human terrain of federalising in a developing country. I visited Malaysia, the only Southeast Asian nation that functions under a federal structure of government. I wanted to see Asian-style federalism in action, and find out what lessons the Philippines could learn from the Malaysian experience. The study looked at the power terrain of Malaysia's transitions to federalism in 1948 and 1963, in relation to three questions: (a) who wanted federalism and why? (b) Who opposed federalism and why? (c) How were power structures and interests handled during transition? The study likewise scanned the power terrain of contemporary federalism in Malaysia. This paper closes with 10 lessons the Philippines can learn from Malaysia's experience with federalism.

Fusanosuke Natsume
EAST ASIA AND MANGA CULTURE: EXAMINING MANGA-COMIC CULTURE IN EAST ASIA

Much has been made of the globalisation of popular culture, and nothing seems to signify this more strongly than the popularisation of *manga*-comics across Asia. The spread of *manga*-comics is apparent, as is its connection to globalisation, but what is less clear is the specific cultural, historical and economical context in which this phenomenon developed. Is *manga* really an indigenous Japanese phenomenon that the surrounding Asian countries borrowed, adopted and even 'stolen' in an attempt to 'catch up' with Japan the cultural giant? Alternatively, are there other explanations that go beyond the larger mould of globalisation? There are always two sides to the story, especially when it comes to the story of Globalisation. This paper examines the spread of *manga* culture in East Asia, from not only a global perspective, but also the contexts in which it developed in individual countries under the influence of local cultures. The globalisation of *manga* cannot be understood as an indigenous Japanese phenomenon, no more than the popularisation of the Beatles can be explained in terms of British culture. It is a cross-cultural phenomenon that requires a new framework for a fuller understanding, one that takes into account both its global nature and the characteristics indigenous to individual cultures.

Henry Chan
MORAL CONFLICT AND THE CONTEST OF FOREST RESOURCES IN THAILAND AND INDONESIA

The contest over forest resources has led to intractable conflicts between traditional users and external forces, specifically those aligned with the modern market economy. As the external forces dominate forest extraction, traditional users become marginalized. Conflict over forest rights and resources also erupts, with traditional users often at the losing end. While some of these traditional users are absorbed into the external system, others resist and strive for survival. This paper seeks to explain and develop mechanisms to address conflict by using new approaches based on moral conflict – an approach that sees conflict as a result of the convergence of different economic, political and social systems over the utilisation of the same set of resources.

Herry Yogaswara
IDENTITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE AMONG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE CORDILLERA OF NORTHERN LUZON, THE PHILIPPINES

This study focuses on the interplay between 'self identity' and 'identity by other' among the indigenous peoples of Cordillera in Northern Luzon, the Philippines. Seen historically, ascriptions from 'outsiders' came from the Spanish and American colonial governments that labelled these people as 'savage' and 'non-Christian'. The post-colonial Philippine government has continued the practice but prefers the use of the label 'indigenous people'. The people of the Cordillera, however, dislike the label and assert their self-identity as *Igorot*. An examination of everyday life in Cordillera reveals identity as a fluid and pragmatic notion. Colonial and postcolonial interventions do shape and transform the traditions and practices of indigenous peoples. The tradition does not disappear, but is used to serve pragmatic goals.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram
SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE CRISIS

This paper focuses on the prospects for sustained development in the three Southeast Asian economies most adversely affected by the crises of 1997–98, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. These three second-tier Southeast Asian economic growth experiences are quite distinct from and inferior to those of the first generation NIEs, especially the South Korean and Taiwanese. Globalisation, including international financial liberalisation, has reduced the scope for selective interventions that proved so crucial to the catching up achieved in the East Asian miracle. However, the process of accelerated economic growth is uneven and far from smooth, leaving considerable room for similar initiatives more appropriate to new circumstances to emerge. The hybrid systems that are emerging have not really advanced late development efforts. There is an urgent need to expand understanding of the full implications of globalisation in different circumstances in order to identify the remaining scope for national developmental initiatives.

Nick Deocampo
LESSONS FROM THE CELLULOID FOREST: CINEMA AND THE CHANGING IDENTITIES OF ASIA

Cinema was introduced to Asian countries during the twilight years of colonialism (early 1900s) and it was first bestowed with western colonial traits. However, with nations declaring themselves independent, cinema soon acquired a national identity through the process of indigenisation. Presently, the national cinemas we know are once again challenged by the forces of globalisation, which demand that national cinemas attain global identity for them to survive in a global market in a global world with a global future. This paper is a reflection on how the evolving identities of Asian cinemas have been conditioned both by historical and cultural forces, and how these forces bear on the future of Asia's most popular entertainment and cultural form.

Pande K. Trimayuni
THE HIV VULNERABILITY OF ASIAN WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS: EXAMPLES FROM THE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND AND MALAYSIA

Women migrant workers are highly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. There are internal and external factors that contribute to their vulnerability. The personal factors are: loneliness, boredom, tension, tiredness, stress, and home-sickness. There are also external factors, such as sexual violence, the traffic in sex, or contaminated blood transfusions. The undocumented status of migrant workers increased their vulnerability to sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS in particular. Based on case studies on returnee migrant workers of the Philippines, it was found that these women were infected in various ways: through rape, blood transfusions, or unsafe sexual relations. Conditions in countries like Thailand and Malaysia are contributing to the vulnerability of women migrant workers to HIV. To reduce this vulnerability of women migrant workers, a comprehensive evaluation from pre-employment, onsite and reintegration stages, is necessary for both documented and undocumented migrant workers from all job sectors. This is the responsibility of both the sending and receiving countries. Migrant workers, governments, NGOs, religious groups, the mass media, health workers and other groups should come together to solve the problem.

Pataya Ruenkaew
TOWARDS THE FORMATION OF A COMMUNITY: THAI MIGRANTS IN JAPAN

Based on narrative biographical interviews with 22 female Thai migrants and observation data as well as expert interviews, this paper discusses the migration from Thailand to Japan. It reveals that Thai transnational migration to Japan is not entirely dominated by women, as about 40 per cent of Thai migrants in Japan are men. Since the early 1980s, Thai migrants have entered Japan. Many of them faced difficulties such as exploitation and discrimination in the work places, no access to insurance, and language problems as well. Despite these dilemmas, many of them have opted to remain in the country and become illegal migrants. They interact as Thai in Japanese territory, share common objectives and subjective characteristics and have to depend on one another for survival in Japan. This has resulted in

the formation of a Thai community for self-protection and self-reliance. The community also serves as a mechanism to achieve their goal of migration.

Phra Paisal Visalo
THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION: LESSONS FROM INDONESIA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND JAPAN

The disruptions of traditional communities, the economic marginalisation and political repression of peoples, and the offensive thrust of secularism, all of which are modern phenomena, contribute to the revival of religion in the age of globalisation. This paper notes three new forms of religious revival around the world, and particularly in three Asian countries – Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan: the rise of fundamentalism, the explosion of new religions, and the growth of 'consumer religion'. These religious phenomena indicate that spirituality is a part of human nature that needs to be fulfilled. But to be relevant to the modern world, religious reforms are necessary to limit the devastating effects of consumerism and help strengthen civil society. Spiritually enriched religions and civil society must cooperate with each other so that globalisation can benefit humankind instead of serving corporate interests. Globalisation from the grassroots needs to be developed to check globalisation from the boardrooms.

Pibhop Dhongchai
MAIN TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO GLOBALISATION

In the paper, the author argues that globalisation is a modern form of colonialism whereby instead of gun-ships, financial and market liberalisation have been used to subjugate Third World countries. It is also passé to think of the impact of this new imperialism in terms of national boundaries. Even in developed countries, the top twenty per cent of the population exploits many of their own people. Anti-globalisation is therefore a worldwide movement that brings people from the North and the South together. This paper illustrates problems and solutions four areas, namely: (1) alternative education movements, (2) natural farming, organic farming and integrated farming movements, (3) alternative community movements, and (4) alternative movements for local banking. Alliances of alternative movements in these four areas of development have emerged and become stronger. They are setting a new political and social discourse to replace that offered by conventional representative democracy, which simply works for the interest of the powers that be and the capitalists.

Prangtip Daorueng
IDENTITY CRISIS AND INDONESIA'S PROSPECTS FOR NATIONAL UNITY: THE CASE OF ACEH

Much has been done in Indonesia to forge a concept of national unity among its over 200 million citizens whose individual identities are rooted in different grounds. But the ongoing secessionist sentiment, especially in Aceh, signals the failure of this concept. The state-built sense of national identity has failed to convince the Acehnese that they and the Republic are one. That identity differences have now emerged, and often manifest themselves in orgies of violence, are worth exploring. But identity differences are not the root of the problem. The real reasons lie in many sources, chief among them being the measures of repression enacted by a state obsessed in keeping its people unified.

René B. Javellana, S.J.
ADVOCACY AND EDUCATION IN HERITAGE CONSERVATION

Although the roots of heritage conservation go back at least a century, as a popular and international movement, heritage conservation is a post-war phenomenon. Heritage conservation is closely allied with the issue of the survival of diverse cultures amidst the pressures of an increasingly globalised and culturally homogenised world. While major social institutions like government, church, schools and museums play a crucial role in conservation, the work of heritage trust groups, conservation societies, and professional associations has often been instrumental in creating public interest in conservation. These groups almost always acknowledge the need for educating the public, raising its awareness and making it a participant and not a mere observer in the protection of culture. The situation of the heritage conservation movement in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Japan is the theme

of this fellowship project. Common problems faced by heritage advocates and the creative solutions they have evolved are highlighted in this report.

Sri Nuryanti
THE LANDSCAPE OF INTELLECTUALS' THOUGHTS: PATTANI IDENTITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Using the thoughts of intellectuals, this paper seeks to describe and analyse the construction of identity among the Muslims in the province of Pattani, Thailand. This examination will cover the following aspects: history, ethnics and ethnicity, language, system of education, symbols and memories, nation and nationalism, movements, and current developments. Viewing these factors in a social setting is critical as well since differences in perception and level of acceptance by the majority has made Southern Thailand (of which Pattani is a part) operate on a different set of dynamics from the rest of Thailand. The Muslim people in Southern Thailand are mostly Malay descendents. They have their own customs, traditions, language and culture that differ from the mainstream Thai practices. But similarities are also present, and these should be uncovered to gain a better perspective on issues concerning identity construction.

Sukran Rojanapaiwong
THE ROLES OF NGO PRINTED MEDIA ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

This study is an analysis and critique of four printed publications on the environment issued by NGOs in the Philippines and Malaysia. It finds similarities and differences in these publications, which besides having different formats and styles, also focus on different issues related to alternative agriculture, indigenous people and the environment. But all are similar in their conviction that their organisations will not derive business benefits or profit from their respective publications and related activities. They can also be similarly classified as examples of 'hard core media' whose substance and content tend to be critical of government policies and social structures, while promoting justice and more equitable development goals. Unfortunately, this 'hard core' style is the main reason for the unpopularity and low circulation of three of the four publications – all except Utusan Konsumer. All share funding constraints, work overloads, and limited human resources. This study therefore recommends that media groups within NGOs assess their organisational structure and target audiences. To achieve wider circulation and attract a broader target audience, for example, it is essential for NGOs to reconstitute themselves as more professional media organisations.

Surmiata Ali
THE CHANGING OF THE TRADITIONAL MARINE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OF MALAY AND PATTANI SOCIETY

This paper describes the changing patterns of marine resource management in two Muslim fishing communities located in two countries, Malaysia and South Thailand (Pattani). In large part, the changes in resource management stem from the development of technology, specifically the introduction of new fishing gear into these two communities. In Malaysia, this technological development began in the 1960s and was so successful that it brought about overfishing. This extraction, however, did not badly affect precious marine resources because local fishermen respected regulations concerning property rights. In fact, the technological development led to better marine resource management, and improved the lives of small-scale fishermen. In contrast, in South Thailand, the entrance of modern technology into the waters of Pattani Bay in the 1970s did not lead to the sustainability of marine resources. The Pattani fishermen's limited understanding of common property rights and the conflict between groups of fishermen, especially in Rusembilae Village, only led to the loss of resources and negative prospects for development. The role of technology cannot be understood apart from the social context.

Tatsuki Kataoka
THE FORMATION OF ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE LAHU IN THAILAND

This paper aims to investigate ethnic identity and the folk concept of 'knowledge' among the hill tribes of Thailand in the process of religious change. Two communities of the Lahu, the Tibeto-Burman speaking hill tribe, were chosen as research sites

where a comparative survey of the Lahu Christians and those who adhere to a Chinese religious tradition was conducted. The findings demonstrate that recent anthropological discussions on the flexibility of ethnic identity in mainland Southeast Asia can explain only limited aspects of a complex system of ethnic relations. Moreover, the 'essentialist' nature of an identity system cannot be eliminated. As regards the folk concept of 'knowledge', the paper finds that the Lahu concept of 'alternative knowledge' is different from what urban intellectuals advocate as a counter to world capitalism. A comparison of the current situation of the hill tribes' knowledge in Thailand to the place of 'hill culture' in Japan further shows that such an advocacy contains possibilities in constructing a 'bottom-up' national identity with a multi-ethnic origin.

Wong Soak Koon
LITERATURE AND CRITICAL LITERACY: ENGLISH LANGUAGE WRITING FROM MALAYSIA AND THE PHILIPPINES

This paper analyses the ways by which writers from the Philippines and Malaysia explore the contradictions inherent in identity formation as the protagonists in literary texts negotiate their multiple positions: as the cultural-political subjects of the nation-state, as the ethnic-religious subjects of an ethnic community, and as the economic subjects of global capitalism. Using a critical literacy pedagogy which draws from Freire and the New London Group, the author discusses how teaching-learning encounters enrich the implications of the following themes as explored in literary texts: 'revisioning' history, identities-in-flux (the national and global subjects are inflected by ethnicity, class and gender), and the appropriation of English by writers who dethrone its hegemony in an era characterised by the globalisation of culture.

Yasuhiro Mizutani
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN POLICE INSTITUTION IN THAILAND FROM THE 1930s TO THE 1950s

This paper investigates the historical role of the Thai police in keeping public order between the 1930s and the 1950s, the period during which it played a particularly crucial role in the political and administrative life of the nation state. Mainly through the use of the funeral books of police officers, the study sketches the characteristics of the Thai police during the period. The findings suggest that the strategy of social control employed by the Thai police relied more on the personal qualities of its men and the great flexibility of police operations. These characteristics persist to the present and can facilitate corruption among the police or the abuse of their power for political gain or purposes.

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